Natural theology

m^mm^m-

m^mm^i

i

$

ST ATJG •

k?-1- * w T

MANUALS OF CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY.

(STONYHURST SERIES.)

MANUALS OF CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

,

BERNARD BOEDDER, S.J.

A /*

a

NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, AND CHICAGO :
BENZIGER BROTHERS,

Printers to the Holy Apostolic See.

1891.

PREFACE.

THE manual of Natural Theology which now makes
its appearance before the English-speaking public,
existed in manuscript substantially ready for print in
the year 1889. Through a combination of untoward
circumstances its publication has been delayed till
now. The delay in its appearance has not been
without advantage for the book itself. Its subject
makes it most suitable to be the last in order of
publication among those volumes of the Stonyhurst
Series which are concerned about Speculative
Philosophy ; for though the utmost care has been
taken to make it intelligible even to those who
have studied no other branch of Philosophy, yet
minds prepared for the reading of this manual by
a careful perusal of its companions in the depart
ment of Speculative Philosophy, will arrive at a far
deeper and fuller understanding of its contents.
The better readers are versed in the laws of right
reasoning by the study of Logic, the more
thoroughly convinced they are of the absolute

viii PREFACE.

necessity for the human mind to admit the exist
ence, sources, and criteria of Certitude, as laid
down in the First Principles of our Series, the
greater diligence they have bestowed upon acquir
ing a firm grasp of the fundamental notions and
principles treated of in General Metaphysics,
and the more solid the knowledge is they have
gained of the moral freedom, spirituality, and
immortality of the human soul expounded in
Psychology, the greater will be their ability to
appreciate and to turn to practical account the
doctrine about God which is explained and defended
in the present volume.

This manual embraces not only those questions
which in our Latin compendia usually are treated
of under the heading Theologia Naturalis, but also
those which commonly are discussed as a part of
Cosmologia. This was done in order to give the
necessary completeness to the treatment of my
subject. Our English volumes are in the first
place intended to help those who do not intend
to study in detail Catholic Theology to a sound
understanding of the most important questions of
Philosophy, and particularly to show them the way
to judge intelligently and to solve clearly modern
difficulties against those natural truths which form
the basis of Christianity.

PREFACE. ix

In the celebrated Catholic controversy about the
manner of Divine foreknowledge of and concurrence
in human actions, it has been my endeavour to
give a good account of the opposite opinions and
of my own position. I frave purposely avoided
quotations, as often as I could conveniently
without doing harm to the cause of truth, in
order to eliminate any element of prejudice or
party strife.

B. BOEDDER.

St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst,
April 4, 1891.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTORY

PAGE

I

BOOK I.-OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
CHAP. I.— VIEWS OF MONOTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS ON THE
NATURAL FOUNDATION OF A REASONABLE BELIEF
IN GOD. REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM AND OF

THE SO-CALLED ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
II.— PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT

FIRST CAUSE OR PERSONAL GOD . . 30

III.— ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE PER
SONAL GOD "5
IV.— TlIE FUNDAMENTAL RELATION OF GOD TO THE

WORLD. REFUTATION OF PANTHEISM. DOCTRINE
OF CREATION . .109

V. SOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES AGAINST THE FUNDA
MENTAL TRUTHS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 149

BOOK II.— THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

PROLEGOMENA

CHAP. I. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD. . . . 238

II. THE ETERNITY OF GOD .... 243

III.— THE IMMENSITY OF GOD .... 249

IV.— THE DIVINE INTELLECT . . 256

V.— THE DIVINE WILL . . . 290

VI. THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD . . • 3J9

t VII.— THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF Con . . 325

xii

CONTENTS

BOOK III.— THE ACTION OF GOD UPON
THIS WORLD.

PACK

PROLEGOMENA. — CONNECTION OF THIS BOOK WITH THE TWO

PRECEDING ...... 344

CHAP. I.— DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. . 348

II. — DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND ITS RELATION TO EXISTING

EVIL . . . ; . . .381

,, III. — POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE . 412

APPENDIX I. — ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION . . . 439

II.— EXAMINATION OF PROPOSITIONS I.— VI. IN

SPINOZA'S ETHICS ..... 449

III. — IMMEDIATE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD IN THE

PATRISTIC WRITINGS .... 461

IV.— ST. THOMAS AND THE IDEA OF INDETERMINATE

BEING ...... 463

V. — THE LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UNITY

AND INFINITY OF GOD .... 465

„ VI.— ON THE OPTIMISM OF ST. THOMAS . . 467

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTORY.

i. NATURAL THEOLOGY is the science of God, so far
as God can be known by the light of our reason
alone. In order to make the meaning of this
definition clear, we have first to explain what we
understand by Theology ; then what signification we
attach to the compound term Natural Theology; and
finally, what right we have to call Natural Theology
a science.

First, then, as regards the word Theology. It is
derived from two Greek nouns, #eo<? and \6yo$, and
means literally speaking or reasoning about God.
In this sense the word occurs in both Plato and
Aristotle.1 By Natural Theology is meant that kind

1 Plato (Republ. 379 A) speaks of ol rvirot ircpl 6co\oyias,
meaning the forms in which tales about gods should be shaped.
Aristotle (Meteorolog. Lib. II. c. i.) gives us the opinion of ol
diarpifiovTes irepl ras Oeo\oyias on the sources of the ocean. He
refers to the old poets, Orpheus, Hesiod, Homer, and their fables
about the gods. St. Thomas, in his commentaries on Aristotle, calls
them the poete theologi ; by Aristotle himself they are styled ol
6eo\6yoi. (Metaph. Lib. XI. al. XII. c. vi.) According to Max Miiller,
&f6s, Deus, is connected with the Sanscrit Deva, signifying " the
Brilliant," a very suggestive denomination of the Supreme Being
who, according to St. Paul, dwells in light inaccessible (i Tim.
vi. 16), and according to St. John, is "Light" (St. John i. 5). (Cf.
M. Miiller, Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 405, 449, and
Science of Religion, p. 269.)

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

of reasoning about God, which starts from princi
ples, the truth of which can be known to us by the
light of our natural reason left to itself, that is, to its
innate capacity of perceiving and judging the facts
as well of common as of scientific experience, and of
drawing conclusions from these facts according to
principles that either are self-evident or have pre
viously been proved. If this reasoning is carried on
systematically, it results, as we shall discover, in a
system of truths about God, the First Cause of all things,
and may therefore be rightly called the Science of
Natural Theology.

It is the object of this science to vindicate the
existence and honour of the one true God against
the denial of Atheists, the doubts of Agnostics, the
misrepresentations of Pantheists, and the absurdities
of Polytheists.

2. There is another system of truths regarding
Almighty God which is called Supernatural, or more
commonly, Dogmatic Theology. Between this and
Natural Theology there is a wide difference.

(1) In the first place they differ in their founda
tion. For whereas Natural Theology is based upon
principles known by reason with human certainty,
Supernatural Theology has for its foundation prin
ciples accepted by faith which rests on the autho
rity of God Himself, who has declared them to us
by Divine revelation.

(2) From this difference there results another
regarding the method of demonstration used in the
two sciences. Natural Theology draws its arguments
from the intuitions of reason and from facts of ex-

INTRODUCTORY.

perience ; Supernatural Theology finds the premisses
of its conclusions in the sources of Christian Revela
tion, which are the Canonical Scriptures and the
documents of Divine Tradition.

(3) Finally there is a vast difference between the
achievements of the one and the other. Natural
Theology inquires into the existence, the attributes,
and works of the one infinite God, without being
able to treat of the inscrutable mysteries of the
Blessed Trinity and of the Word Incarnate; whereas
Supernatural Theology, although it does not pre
tend to make these mysteries comprehensible to
reason, yet, guided by Divine revelation, which has
established their reality, analyzes their meaning,
shows their consequences, illustrates their harmony
with known truths, and thus throws light upon the
Divine beauty of Christian Revelation.

Hence we see that the chief subject-matter of
which Natural and Supernatural Theology treat, is
the same ; but the aspect, under which they view it,
is altogether different, or to express this in the
language of the schoolmen, Natural and Super
natural Theology agree to a large extent in their
material object, but they differ in their formal
object.

3. The very nature of Supernatural or Dogmatic
Theology implies and demands that Natural Theology
should precede it and prepare its way. For it is the
duty of reason to prepare the minds of men for the
acceptance of Divine revelation, upon which Dog
matic Theology is built. Before an infidel can
reasonably feel obliged to acknowledge a creed as

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

Divine, he must be convinced that there is a God,
who can communicate truths to men, and that men
can accept these truths without danger of deception.
It is Natural Theology that opens the way to this
conviction by strict logical reasoning. Christian
Doctors therefore rightly call the truths developed
in Natural Theology the praambula fidei; and the
office assigned to Philosophy in general, when it is
called the handmaid of (Dogmatic) Theology, belongs
especially to the particular branch of Philosophy
now under consideration.

We may add that Dogmatic Theology taught
under the supervision of the Infallible Church, is for
the Catholic philosopher a guiding-star even to his
philosophical reasonings about God. This is a
most sound and intelligible proposition, but it is one
peculiarly liable to misrepresentation. We are far
from claiming the right to draw the course of
philosophical reasoning away from its natural paths
in order to bring the results into fictitious conformity
with those of revelation. Such a procedure would
be as foolish as it would be dishonest. Our claim
is to imitate the mariner to whom the star is a
guiding-star, not because it dispenses him from the
due use of the compass, but because it enables him
to check the errors into which he may have fallen in
his estimate of the records of the needle. The
Catholic philosopher is conscious that human reason,
particularly when it embarks on the difficult sea of
philosophical speculations, is liable to go astray
through defective observance of its own laws. On
the other hand he has sure grounds for his con-

INTRODUCTORY.

viction that the Church's teaching is absolutely
reliable. What more reasonable than that on
rinding a discrepancy between the results of his
philosophical reasoning and his Dogmatic Creed, he
should conclude the former to be in some point
defective and should retrace his steps to discover
where the defect may lie ?

4. In what we have said about the stand-point
of a Catholic writer on Natural Theology, we cannot
reasonably expect to be fully understood by those
outside the Church. All that we ask for from non-
Catholic readers is to judge our conclusions in
Natural Theology by the light of principles which
must be admitted by every reasonable man. Let
them consider whether we ever make an undue use
of authority to establish a truth which should be
proved by reason alone ; let them judge for them
selves whether we meet our adversaries with solid
arguments or with empty phrases, and whether we
enunciate any opinion which is out of harmony with
well-established scientific facts.

5. Approaching our subject in this spirit, we
have a reasonable claim to the sympathy and interest
of our readers. For what subject of inquiry can be
compared with the first source of all things, the
Infinite Majesty of God ? Moreover, if as reason
able beings we are irresistibly drawn to inquire into
the causes of things, must not all our researches
suffer from want of solidity and completeness, if we
lack a true knowledge of God, the First Cause
of all things, and of His relation to this world ?
Such knowledge throws light upon the origin of

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

the universe, upon the nature and destiny of man,
upon the true meaning of life, upon our duties here
on earth, upon our prospects for the future, upon
the wonders as well as the woes of human history.
Nay, there is no department of knowledge which
is not ennobled when viewed in the light of these
truths : because from God, and through Him, and in
Him, are all subjects that can possibly have a claim
on man's attention.

What makes this study still more important is
that without it we cannot hope truly to estimate and
solidly to refute the charges brought forward against
the reasonableness of Christian faith by atheists,
agnostics, and pantheists, who know well how to
support their statements with an array of specious
arguments. If we wish to diminish the harm inevit
ably caused by the spreading of such false opinions,
we must be able to produce a good store of
arguments by which the existence of God, His
attributes, and His relation to this world are proved,
in such a way, that their force may come home
to the mind of every one who does not obsti
nately prefer darkness to light.

For some of our readers it may be useful to
call attention to the danger of resting content with
a partial knowledge of our subject, or thinking that
a thorough grasp of it can be obtained without
patient study. Beginners who have not persever
ance enough to reason step by step, but who
pick out one question or another at random, must
not wonder if they very soon find themselves
hopelessly confused, and utterly unable either duly

INTRODUCTORY.

to appreciate or clearly to solve the difficulties of
adversaries.

6. The order of our discussion is suggested by
the three following questions :

I. Can we know for certain that there exists
One first intelligent and infinitely perfect Cause of
all things, that is to say, One personal God of infi
nite perfection, Creator of the world ?

II. Granted that there exists One personal God
of infinite perfection, what are the special attributes
of this One infinite Being?

III. If there be such a personal God, what can
we know about His action upon this world ?

Following the line of thought suggested by these
three questions, we shall divide our treatise into
three books : the first treating of the existence of
God, the second of the attributes of God, the third
of the influence which God exercises upon this
world.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

BOOK I.
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

VIEWS OF MONOTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS ON THE
NATURAL FOUNDATION OF A REASONABLE BELIEF
IN GOD. REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM AND OF
THE SO-CALLED ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

SECTION I. — Explanation of the different opinions about God's

existence and the proofs for it.

7. THE chief object which we aim at in the first
part of Natural Theology, is to discover the true
reasons why the existence of an intelligent First
Cause of the universe must be admitted as certain.
To clear the ground, we first give a short review
and estimate of the different opinions held by philo
sophers who believe in a personal God, concerning
the natural relation of the human mind to that
belief.

8. The more noteworthy opinions on the subject
in question may be reduced to these four headings :

VIEWS OF MONOTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS. g

(1) The opinion that we have naturally an
immediate consciousness of God's existence. This
opinion is known under the name of Ontologistn.

(2) The opinion that we can prove the existence
of God a priori from the^ mere concept which we
form to ourselves of God. This kind of proof for
the existence of God is commonly called the Onto-
logical Argument. The name is unfortunate, as it
suggests a connection of the argument so styled
with the system of Ontologism. In reality there is
none.

(3) The opinion, that the existence of God,
although it cannot be perceived by us immediately,
nor be proved a priori, can yet be proved evidently
a posteriori by reasoning from the contingent and
finite things of this world to God, the necessary,
self-existing, infinite Being.

(4) The opinion, that it is reasonable and man's
duty to believe in the existence of God, but that it
is impossible to prove by evident arguments that
the denial of that existence is an untruth.

9. Of these four opinions, the first has its most
eminent representatives in Nicholas Malebranche
(I7I5),1 Vincenzo Gioberti (1852), Antonio Ser-
bati Rosmini (1855), and Casimir Ubaghs (works
published 1854 — J856). The second can boast of
such great names as St. Anselm of Canterbury
(1109), and in later times, Rene Descartes (1650),
and Leibnitz (1716). The third was generally held
by metaphysicians of all ages, from the bright

1 The figures added to the names of philosophers in this section
refer to the year of their death, with the exception of Ubaghs.

io OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

dawn of metaphysical inquiry in Plato's Dialogues
up to the bold revolution attempted in the realms
of philosophical thought by Kant in his Critique of
Pure Reason. That the human mind is able to rise
from the knowledge of the finite things which sur
round us to a certain, though inadequate, know
ledge of God, the first and the intelligent Cause of
the universe, was unanimously asserted by Plato
(348 B.C.) and Aristotle (322 B.C.), by St. Augustine
(430 A.D.), by St. Thomas Aquinas (1274), and the
long series of the schoolmen, by Bacon (1626), and
Locke (1704).

Moreover, although St. Anselm, Descartes, and
Leibnitz thought the ontological argument to be
a very easy proof of God's existence, they were
by no means of opinion that it is the only one
possible. On the contrary, in the writings of all
three we find also arguments for God's existence
drawn from the contemplation of finite things.2 In
recommendation of this third line of argument, we
may further say that it is supported by scientific
men of the first rank, such as Kepler, Newton, Faye,
Sir John Herschell, Sir William Thomson, &c.3

But, notwithstanding the great authority of the
third opinion, its hold over the best minds of
educated Europe was shaken considerably by Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason. In this work, the first
edition of which was published in the year 1781,
the fourth opinion mentioned above was advo-

* St. Anselm's Monolog. cc. i. — iv. inclusive ; Descartes' Principia
Phil. Part I. pp. 17, 18; Leibnitz, Opera (Edit. Erdm.), p. 506.
3 See below, § 40.

VIEWS OF MONOTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS. II

cated as the only reasonable defence of the belief
in God. According to the author of the Critique,
convincing proofs for the existence of a Supreme
Being are not attainable by the Speculative
Reason. In order to confute atheism, he therefore
appeals to what he calls the Practical Reason.
Man, he says, feels himself under the sway of
an internal voice which categorically commands
him to do good and to avoid evil. He cannot
despise this voice without violating his human
dignity, nor can he follow it consistently, unless he
acknowledges a supreme Lawgiver and Judge, to
whom he is responsible for his moral conduct.
Consequently it is man's duty to believe in God's
existence, although he is not able to show con
vincingly that the denial of that existence contains
an objective untruth.

10. The opinion of Kant has been adopted under
various forms by many philosophers of our century,
who nevertheless have been far from committing
themselves to the whole of his theory of human
knowledge. Thus Jacobi (1819) maintained that
God's existence can be known neither by reasoning
nor by immediate intuition, but is manifested to us
by a kind of irresistible spiritual feeling. On the
Continent, De la Bonald (1840) found what he
thought a sufficient proof for God's existence in
the necessity of a primitive Divine revelation, with
out which, according to his views, the origin of
intellectual human knowledge cannot be explained.
Lamennais (1854), m order to show how unreasonable
the denial of God's existence is, fled for refuge to

12 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

the universal consent of mankind, which he took
to be the general criterion of truth and certainty.
In England, Hamilton and Mansel, urging that we
necessarily entangle ourselves in glaring contradic
tions as soon as we compare the attributes of the
Infinite with one another, deduced the obligation of
faith in God, as He is put before mankind by Christ
and His Apostles, chiefly from the perfect harmony
between that faith and our moral instincts.

This last way of defending God's existence
against atheism proved injurious to the good cause
on behalf of which it was undertaken. For the
most striking of the arguments, by which Mr.
Herbert Spencer in his First Principles, tries to
prove that nothing definite can be known about
the underlying cause of the universe, are borrowed
from Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought.

11. We shall now proceed to give our reasons
for adhering to the third of the opinions we have
just mentioned, which maintains that man can come
to a certain knowledge of God by means of his
natural understanding, not however by way of
immediate intuition, nor by reasoning a priori, but
by arguments a posteriori based on the essence and
properties of the things comprised under the term
"world."

SECTION 2. — Refutation of Ontologism.

12. As we said above (§ 8), Ontologists are those
philosophers who believe that the mind of man, by
its very nature, has a certain direct consciousness
of God's existence. They do not affirm that man

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 13

by his natural faculties is able to see God face to
face, to perceive Him as He is in Himself, or to
have a direct intuition of His Essence. Indeed,
they could not say so without exposing themselves
to ridicule, and to the charge of contradicting the
Christian Creed which they profess. What they
mean is that man's knowledge begins by some dim
perception of God, considered not in His Essence,
but in His relation to creatures.

13. A germ of Ontologism thus explained is
found in Descartes' Principia Philosophic?* He says
that the idea which we possess of an infinitely
perfect Being, could not be produced in us but by
this Being Himself. Malebranche developed this
germ into a philosophical system. In his celebrated
work, Recherche de la Verite, he tells us that the
human mind knows all things save its own existence,
through the ideas it forms of them. These ideas
are occasioned by sense-impressions ; but they are
not the mere result of sensations, nor are they the
product of our mental activity. They are perceived
in God, who is immediately present to us. He is,
so to say, the Sun in the midst of the world of
thinking created spirits, and only inasmuch as He
pours out the light of His eternal ideas upon our
minds do we see truth in Him, who is the First
Truth, the Prototype of all things and of all
thoughts that are true.

Since Malebranche, no one has defended Onto
logism more vigorously than Gioberti in his Intro-
duzione allo studio della Filosofia. He represents the

4 Part I. pp. 17, 18.

I4 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

immediate intuition of God, which he believes to
be natural to man's mind, as a direct perception of
God's influence upon this world. Consequently the
starting-point of all human learning is this judg
ment : " Being creates existences." (L'Ente crea le
esistenze.) By Being he understands the self-existing
Divinity ; by existences, creatures, which he does not
call beings, because they have no independent being
of their own, but are dependent upon the creative
act of their first cause. His opinion consequently
is, that our first intellectual act is a direct intuition
of God creating the world.

Another and milder form of Ontologism is to
be found in Rosmini's Thtosophia, and in Ubaghs'
Theodicea. Rosmini holds that the idea of being,
which according to his theory respecting the origin
of ideas is innate in us, must be nothing else but
the idea of God, the Creative Cause of finite beings.
Ubaghs thinks that we are born with the idea of the
Infinite God, and that this idea is in the beginning
unformed, but becomes formed by reflection, to
which we are led by our education in human
society.

Similar views on our natural knowledge of God
are defended by Maret in his Essai sur le Pantheisme,
by Gratry in his work De la Connaissance de Dieu,
by Fabre in his Defense de I'Ontologisme, and by
others in France, Belgium, and Italy.

Notwithstanding the wonderful ingenuity which
these authors exhibit in support of their hypothesis,
we must, in the interest of truth, lay down the
following thesis.

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 15

Thesis I. — Immediate intuition of God, as held by
ontologists, is beyond the reach of man's natural under
standing.

14. In stating this proposition we admit with
the ontologists as a fact of Christian revelation,
that all men who die in the grace of God, shall
in Heaven see Him as He is. And they on their
part admit that this Beatific Vision, reserved for
the servants of God, is not the natural endowment
of our human understanding, but the supernatural
reward of living faith. Consequently, to explain
the possibility and truth of this Vision does not
belong to the domain of Philosophy. So far
we are at one with our adversaries. What we
have to prove against them is, that God in His
relation to creatures cannot be the object of our direct
intuition here on earth. The first reason for which
we assert this, is drawn from our internal ex
perience.

15. If the direct intuition of God in His relation
to creatures is a natural endowment of the human
soul, we certainly must be able to become with the
greatest facility perfectly convinced by mere reflection
of the fact that we are in God's presence, and no
thought should be easier to us than the thought of
God. However, this is not so. Effort is required
to raise our mind from things visible to their in
visible First Cause. Even those who are perfectly
convinced of God's existence, may live hours and
days without thinking of Him. Nay, at times
doubts may arise in their minds against their faith

16 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

in God, and how can they put off these doubts?
Not by mere reflection, but either by dwelling upon
the strong reasons from which God's existence is
mediately evident, or by calling to their minds certain
practical maxims, the reasonableness of which has
been once understood, and with which the doubt
about God's existence is incompatible. Every well-
instructed Christian knows that the existence of an
all-wise, all-powerful, and infinitely good God is a
fundamental dogma of Christianity. Moreover, he
has satisfied himself about the reasonableness of
adhering to the truths of Christianity. After this
it is a practical maxim with him, that a wilful doubt
about God and His attributes is a serious sin.
Appealing to this maxim, he rejects the doubts
against God's existence as unreasonable sophistries.
This is a reasonable process, and corresponds to
a palpable need of the believing mind. But on
the ontologistic hypothesis, such a need would not
arise.

16. If we examine a little more deeply into our
subject, we find that the conflict between experience
and Ontologism has its root in the very nature of the
human soul. This soul is neither an outgrowth of
matter, as materialists would have us believe, nor
is it a pure spirit, that is to say, a thinking and free
being altogether independent of matter in the exer
cise of its natural functions. Man's soul is a spirit,
organizing and quickening matter. The fact that
our soul cannot exercise its vegetative and sensitive
energies except in a material body and by the help
of material organs, necessarily reacts upon its

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 17

spiritual faculties of understanding and free-will,
albeit the acts of these faculties considered in them
selves are not organic acts. The conclusion drawn
from this state of things, the fuller discussion of
which belongs to Psychology, is this. Man's mind
has for its immediate and direct object only such
things as can be perceived by the senses. It can
arrive at the knowledge of immaterial beings only by
reasoning, and by faith in reliable authority. Con
vinced of this, Aristotle uses language which implies
that it is as impossible for man's mind, left to
its natural resources, to have a direct perception
of spiritual things, as it is for an owl's eye to find
delight in the rays of the mid-day sun.5 Experience
fully verifies this conclusion, for in order to explain
things not accessible to sense perception, we con
stantly have resort to illustrations drawn from the
objects of sense. If, then, no spiritual thing is
directly accessible to our mind, how can we have
an immediate vision of God the Infinite Spirit ?
If there were any truth in the Ontologist hypo
thesis, such a direct intuition of God would be
natural to us. For the ontologists say that we

5 Aristotle, Metaph. Lib. I. brev. c. i. Aristotle's words are:
wffTrep yap /cat TO T&V vvKTtpi$<av op.fj.ara. irpbs rb (peyyos e^et rb p.tQ'
f)/j.fpav, ovT(i> Kal TTJS rjfjitTfpas tyvxys & vovs irpbs ra TT; (pvcrei tpavepw-
rara iravrcav. According to this passage, our understanding is like
the eyes of nightbirds for daylight, as regards the beings most intel
ligible in themselves. Now spiritual beings are more intelligible in
themselves than material beings, inasmuch as the pre-eminence of
internal intelligibility follows the pre-eminence of natural being. Cf.
the beautiful remarks of St. Thomas on this passage of Aristotle.
Comment, in Metaph. Aristot. Lib. II. Lect. i. § " Ostendit causam
praemissae difficultatis," etc.
C

i8 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

directly perceive God's relation to creatures. Now
it is evident that a relation between two terms
cannot be directly perceived unless each is the
object of direct perception.

17. No wonder that a theory so inconsistent
with experience and with human nature is also
inconsistent with itself. Ontologists say that we
perceive immediately something of God, yet do not
immediately perceive His essence. In this there is
a contradiction. For in God, as the ontologists
willingly grant, there are no accidents. His essence
is absolutely simple. It is therefore impossible to
see anything of Him immediately without seeing
His essence. From this conclusion ontologists
recoil, and rightly, for it is opposed to Revealed
Truth ; but it logically follows from their hypo
thesis, and therefore that hypothesis must be
rejected as false.

18. Nor can the reasons which ontologists bring
forward to support their theory move us to give a
more favourable verdict on it. The more important
of their arguments are the following, to each of
which we shall add its respective answer.

A. We have an idea of the Infinite. This idea
cannot be got by abstraction from finite beings nor
by reasoning about them. Therefore it must -be
admitted that it was given to us together with our
existence ; in other words, that the direct intuition
of the Infinite is natural to the human mind. (Thus
Malebranche, Gioberti, Ubaghs.)

Answer. It is true that every Christian, nay,
every monotheist who understands his position, has

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 19

a genuine idea of the Infinite. His idea of the
Infinite is not a merely negative one, as Sir William
Hamilton would have it. He does not only know
that the Infinite is altogether different from the
Finite ; he knows something positive about the
attributes by which it is characterized. But from
this it in no way follows that the representation
of the Infinite by the human mind has its origin
in direct intuition. On the contrary, from the fact
that our idea of the Infinite expresses its object not
in a purely positive way, but by the help of negation,
it is evident that not the thought of the Infinite but
the thought of the Finite is most natural to our
mind. Why is it that when we speak of God, who is
pure reality, or, so to say, pure affirmation without
negation of perfection, we speak of Him in such a way
as to predicate of Him perfection, and at the same
time remove the limits of these perfections, calling
Him infinitely wise, infinitely powerful, and so
forth ? No other sufficient reason can be given
save this, that the power, the wisdom, and the other
positive perfections of creatures which we predicate
of God, are directly known to us only within certain
limits. We first think of finite things according to
their own being, not paying attention to their limi
tation ; then comparing less perfect finite beings
with more perfect, we become aware of their limi
tations; finally, thinking of all possible finite
perfections united in one Being, and denying all
limitations which are necessarily proper to them
in finite beings, we form a negative -positive concept,
as it is called, of the Infinite. In this manner we

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

do really think of the infinitely perfect Being,
although we think of it in a very inadequate way.

Now it is true that such an idea of the Infinite
cannot be got from finite things by mere abstraction,
nor can it be arrived at by one step of reasoning,
but it can be reached by a chain of lawful reasonings
from absolutely certain premisses. And this is what
we have to make clear in the course of our treatise.
For the present it may suffice to indicate the prin
cipal links in this chain. Things produced suppose
a first unproduced cause ; an unproduced cause
exists by virtue of its own essence, or is self-existing;
there can be but one self-existing being; the one
self-existing being must be the source of every
possible being — in other words, it must be infinitely
perfect; otherwise the total first cause of all con
tingent being would be less perfect than the effects
which it can produce.

B. There must be harmony between the order
in which things follow one another in their real
existence, and the order in which they are ideally
expressed in our minds; otherwise our mental
representations would not be true. Now of all
existing beings God is the first. Consequently the
first judgment of the human mind must refer to
God. (Thus Gioberti.)

Answer. For human cognition to be true, it
is not requisite for antecedent to be known before
consequent, cause before effect. I may first come
to know a book, and thence proceed to learn by
inference the existence and character of the author.
Or I may first come to know the author, and thence

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 21

infer the nature of his book. In either case my
knowledge of the book and the author can be true.
It would only be false if it were to represent to me
the book as the cause of the author, instead of the
author as the cause of the^book. The requisite of
truth, alleged by Gioberti, is not the requisite of
truth in general, but that of perfect truth, which
comprehends all possible truths. And this exists
nowhere but in the Divine intellect. To have truth
in general, it is enough that everything mentally
affirmed to be real, really is what it is affirmed to
be ; it is not necessary that the order of mental
affirmation follow the order of real existence.

C. The human mind is naturally directed to
God as to its last end. Consequently, as God is
the first object of the human will, so must He be
the first object of the human understanding. (Thus
Malebranche.)

Answer. From the fact that God is man's
last end, it follows that the human soul at some
time or other (at least after death, in the case of
one who dies before attaining the use of reason),
must come to some knowledge of God carrying with
it a natural tendency of the will towards God. But
it does not at all follow that man from the beginning
of his existence must have the actual use of his
intellect ; much less that the first acts of his intel
lect must have God for their object.

D. As God alone exists by Himself, so He
alone can be intelligible by Himself. Therefore
created things cannot be known except so far as
God is known. (Thus Gioberti.)

22 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Answer. In a certain sense it is true, that
God alone is intelligible by Himself. His is the
only existence which is essential, 'which cannot not
be ; or, in other words, He alone has the reason of
His existence in His own essence. In all creatures
actual existence is not essential, but only possible
existence ; or, in other words, the essences of
creatures considered in themselves are merely
possible things, only existing on the condition of
God's creative act, which is not necessary, but free.
However, this truth is of no force to prove that
really existing creatures cannot be known but
in God. A creature which really exists is really
distinct from a merely possible creature. It is
not a pure essence, but a created essence, and
therefore has an existence of its own distinct from
God's existence, although it owes its existence to
God's free creation. Now as intelligibility results
necessarily from existence, so from an existence
distinct from God's existence there must result
an intelligibility distinct from God's intelligibility,
although God is the efficient cause of the creature's
existence, and consequently of the creature's intelli
gibility.

E. The universal attributes which we give to
creatures, when we predicate, for instance, that
"John is a man," or that " Bucephalus is a horse,"
express something necessary, eternal, unchangeable.
But created things are contingent, temporal, change
able. Therefore we cannot have drawn our universal
ideas by abstraction from created things ; but they
must be due to a direct intuition of their uncreated

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 23

cause. (Thus Vercellone, Milone, Fabre, Sans-Fiel,
and other modern ontologists.)

Answer. Properly speaking there is, as St.Thomas
rightly affirms, only one being which is necessary,
eternal, unchangeable, namely, God.6 If we say
that the universal attributes of created things are
necessary, eternal, unchangeable, we mean simply
that God is the necessary, eternal, unchangeable
source of all kinds of possible things which we
express by universal ideas, and that consequently
these things are understood by God necessarily,
eternally, unchangeably, as imperfect imitations of
His own essence, and producible out of nothing by
His infinite power. Hence we may say that uni
versal attributes, or, in other words, the objects of
universal ideas, are negatively eternal; but we may
not say that they are positively eternal. A thing is
positively eternal, if it exists by its own essence, un
changeable, without beginning and without end. It
is negatively eternal, if, as a thinkable, conditionally-
existing object, it is not limited to a certain time.
Thus the object of the universal idea "man" is
negatively eternal, because no possible time can be
given at which by the power of God that idea might
not be verified in one or many individual men. The
human mind is obviously capable of forming such
a negatively eternal idea. Perceiving with our
senses an individual thing, wre at once grasp with
our intellect that which is, or at least may be,

6 Cf. Sum. Thcol. i. q. 9. a. 2. and q. 10. a. 3. especially ad 3m.
A more full explanation of the eternity of all truth is given by
St. Thomas, Qq. Disp. de Veritate, q. i. a. 5.

24 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

common to many suck individual things. This we
do without penetrating into their individual con
stitution. It is therefore a baseless assertion that
the formation of universal ideas is conditioned by
a direct intuition of God.7

SECTION 3. — Criticism of the Ontological Argument.

19. Having proved that the Ontologistic hypo
thesis, according to which all our knowledge is based
on a direct intuition of the Infinite, cannot be ad
mitted, we have now to explain our objection to the
opinion of those who think they can prove the existence
of the Infinite from the idea of the Infinite. Their
argument is known among scholastic philosophers
by the name of the " Ontological Argument," a
term which we must distinguish from the " Onto
logistic Hypothesis." It has three celebrated forms,
of which the first was proposed by St. Anselm, the
second by Descartes, and the third, virtually at
least, by Leibnitz.8 We give the substance of all
three.

20. St. Anselm reasons thus : By God is under
stood the greatest Being which can be thought of.
But a Being which not only exists in the mind as

7 For further discussion of Ontologism, we may recommend
Stockl, Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, Vol. I. pp. 123, seq., Vol. II.
pp. 570, seq., 579, seq., 621, seq.; Lepidi, O.P., De Ontologismo ;
Zigliara, O.P., Delia luce intellettuak e del? Ontologismo; Kleutgen,
Phil. Scholastique, nn. 377—490; Liberatore, Psychol. Edit. I.
novae formae nn. 200—206; Theol. Nat. n. 3 and n. 6; On Universal
(Translated by E. H. Bering), pp. 64—95, and pp. 180—196.

8 Cf. Opp. S.Anselmi, Proslogium. c. 2; Descartes, Principia
Philosophic, Pars I. 14 ; Leibnitz' Opp. (Edit. Erdm.), pp. 374, seq.

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 25

an object of thought, but has also actual existence
outside the mind, is greater than a Being which
exists in the mind only. Therefore God exists
actually outside the mind.

In Descartes the argument takes this form :
Whatever is contained in a clear and distinct idea
of any object must be affirmed of that object. But
a clear and distinct idea of an absolutely perfect
Being contains the notion of existence. Conse
quently, we must say that there really exists an
absolutely perfect Being.

Leibnitz remarks on the two forms of the Onto-
logical argument just proposed that the scholastics
were wrong in rejecting them. He says they are
not fallacious, but need to be completed. They
do not offer any reason for their assumption that
the idea of the greatest and absolutely perfect
being is possible and not self-contradictory. He
thinks, however, we may safely assure this possi
bility as long as no one proves the contrary. Thus
in his mind the Ontological argument should be
cast into this shape : God is at least possible, for
in the concept of Him no repugnance is discovered.
But if He is possible, He must exist, because the
concept of Him implies existence.

21. It has been said in answer to St. Anselm and
those who took up his argument, that it only proves
the existence of the infinite being in the world of
ideas, not in the world of realities ; that it proves
the ideal possibility of such a being, but not its real
existence. Even in St. Anselm's time this objection
was raised by a certain ingenious thinker named

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Gaunilo. After having first objected to the validity
of the premisses, this man argued thus against the
conclusion :

" There are people who say that somewhere in
the ocean there exists an island, which certain men,
because of the difficulty or rather impossibility of
finding what really does not exist, have surnamed
the lost island. This island is by fiction represented
as possessing in incredible abundance all sorts of
precious and delightful things, far more than the
celebrated Isles of the Blessed ; nay, as surpassing
in riches all the countries inhabited by men, although
no proprietor or settler is living on it. If somebody
were describing all this to me, I should of course
easily understand his explanation : there could be
no difficulty in that. But if he went on thus to
argue : You cannot any longer doubt but that the
island I spoke of, the idea of which you admit
without hesitation to be in your mind, exists also
in reality somewhere. Indeed, you cannot deny it,
if you only attend to what I now say : It is more
excellent to exist not in the mind only, but in
reality, than to exist in the mind only. Therefore
the aforesaid island must really exist ; for if it did
not, any other real country would surpass it in
excellence, and consequently the island which you
have thought to be superior to all, really would not
be superior to all. If the speaker attempted thus to
make me admit the real and undoubted existence
of that island, I should either believe him to be only
joking, or I should not know which of us to think
the more stupid, myself, if I granted such a con-

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 27

elusion, or him, if he really thought that he had
proved the actual existence of that island with
anything like certainty. Assuredly, I should not
yield to him, unless he convinced me that its
excellence was thought of by me as something really
and undoubtedly existing, and not only in the same
way in which we can think of what is false or un
certain."9 Nevertheless, this mode of putting the
objection is not so strong as it may seem at first
sight. St. Anselm answered it thus: " If any one
can find anything whatsoever, either really existing
or only represented by the mind, with the one
exception of the greatest being conceivable, such that
he can reasonably apply to it the form of this my
argument, I promise to find him the ' lost island '
with such success that it shall never be lost again."10
So far the Saint is perfectly right. Whoever
grants as certain that we have a true idea of an
infinite being, cannot deny that existence is implied
in that idea without contradicting himself: for an
infinite being cannot be otherwise than self-existing.
A being which is not self-existing is necessarily
limited : for it cannot possess anything but what it
has received from its cause ; and its cause cannot
give it the perfections of self-existence. Therefore,
when there is question of finite being, it may be
granted that I can think of a finite being better
than any that really exists ; and yet quite con
sistently with this concession it may be denied that
such a being as I think of does really exist. For

9 Opusculum pro Insipiente, inter Opp. S. Anselmi, c. 6.

10 Liber Apologeticus, inter Opp. S. Anselmi, c. 3.

28 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

a finite being is contingent, and without internal
contradiction can be conceived as not existing. But
if it be admitted as certain, that I really think of
an infinite being, the actual existence of such a being
must be allowed ; for an infinite being cannot with
out internal contradiction be conceived unless it be
conceived as self-existing.

Thus far, then, we do not find any serious fault
with the advocates of the Ontological proof. Our
reason for not admitting the demonstration as a
valid refutation of agnosticism is its failure to
provide us with a warrant for the absolute certainty
of the assertion, that we have an idea of an infinite
being. We therefore state our objection thus :

Thesis II. — In the so-called Ontological Argument
the supposition underlying the premisses that the idea
of an infinite being is not self -contradictory, is assumed
without sufficient warrant. Consequently, that argument
is not a perfect demonstration of God's existence.

22. Of course we readily allow that the idea of
an infinite being is in fact not self-contradictory. We
only deny that this can be ascertained with certainty
otherwise than by the a posteriori argument. It
must be established by consideration of contingent
things, and by inference from their existence of the
necessary existence of One First Cause. As long as
this has not been shown, the agnostic may justly
reply to the Ontological proof: " Possibly there
may be many self-existent beings. In that case the
idea of an infinite being is self-contradictory. For
none of the many self-evistent beings would be the

REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGISM. 29

source of the perfections of all other beings ; and
consequently none of them could be really infinite ;
because a being which does not unite in itself all
thinkable perfections, must be finite. Of the many
self-existent beings, then, which I suppose there
may be, none can be infinite. And as you yourself
allow, no contingent being can be infinite. But all
being is either self-existent or contingent. The
conclusion is that an infinite being is absolutely
impossible, and consequently we can have no real
idea of such a being."

To this objection the advocate of the Ontological
argument has no satisfactory answer. He can say
nothing but what Leibnitz said : " We may safely
suppose the possibility of an infinite being, till it
be disproved." Perhaps we may. But a supposi
tion made on these terms is no basis of certainty.
In short, the Ontological argument is a very strong
argument ad hominem against one who does not
challenge the supposition of the premisses ; but in
no way an objectively evident proof.11

11 St. Thomas Aquinas criticizes and rejects the argument of
St. Anselm in I. dist. 3. q. i. a. 2. ad 4m. ; Sum. Theol. i. 2. i. ad
adum, and Contra Gent. i. c xi. § "Nee oportet ut statim cognita."
An estimate of it is also given by Kleutgen, Phil. Schol. nn.
937 — 942. The history of this argument, which may be seen in
the Life of St. Anselm, by Martin Rule, M.A., Vol. i. pp. 195, seq. is
very interesting.

CHAPTER II.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT
FIRST CAUSE OR PERSONAL GOD.

SECTION i. — Method of Proof.

23. THE object of the three following chapters is
to prove not only that there is a First Cause of all
things else that exist, but also that this First Cause
has the attributes which are associated with the
conception of a First Cause in the minds of mono-
theists, especially of Christians. This is most
necessary if we are to make our ground sure. In
a certain sense materialists and pantheists maintain
the existence of a First Cause. What else are the
eternal atoms out of whose combinations and move
ments the materialist believes the cosmos to be
composed ? What else is the Absolute of the
pantheists, alleged to be eternally evolving itself
under manifold aspects and conditions, and thereby
creating the world out of its own substance ? In
truth, what is denied, particularly in these days,
is not so much self-existence, as personal self-
existence. We have to prove the existence of a
Personal First Cause, that is to say, of an intelligent
self-existing Being who is distinct from the cosmos
of which He is the ultimate cause.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 31

24. The proof of this position is three-fold. We
have the argument of the First Cause, the argument
from Design, and the so-called Moral argument.
The argument of the First Cause draws from the
simple fact that some things exist the conclusion
that there must be a First dfause, and then from the
fact that intelligent beings, namely, men, exist, the
further conclusion that this First Cause must be
intelligent. It can thence proceed to the ultimate
conclusion that such a First Cause must be One
and Infinite in all respects.

The argument from Design starts with the order
observable in the world, and infers the existence
of a supra-mundane intelligent Designer. It then
continues, in accordance with the method of argu
ment already pursued by the argument of the First
Cause, to argue for the self-existence, unity, and
infinity of this Designer.

The Moral argument is that drawn from the
general recognition of the existence of an invisible
Lawgiver, a superhuman Lord and Ruler. It
contends that a recognition of this character must be
taken as the genuine voice of nature, and not as the
outcome of any of the deceptive influences to which
nature is subject. However, this argument, like
that from Design, only proves the existence of an
intelligent, superhuman ruler of the world. It does
not tell us whether this ruler is self-existent or
himself dependent on some previous Maker or
Ruler. For this we must again go back to the
argument of the First Cause.

Thus it is seen that the argument of the First

32 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Cause is the only one which is sufficient in itself.
Absolutely, therefore, the others might be dispensed
with. Nevertheless, they have their useful purpose.
The argument of Design brings out more impres
sively the need of recognizing Intelligence in the
First Cause, and the Moral argument fortifies our
minds in their grasp of the previous arguments,
for it shows them to be no mere outcome of an
individual speculation, the conclusion to which
the minds of men are impelled in such numbers
and under such conditions that we are constrained
to recognize in the impelling force the voice of our
intellectual nature.

SECTION 2. — The Argument of the First Cause.

Thesis III. — Not all things are effects of causes, but
there exists an unproduced First Cause, endowed with
intelligence and free-will, in other words a personal God.

25. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason,1 acknow
ledges that the human mind cannot divest itself
of the idea that everything that has a beginning
has a cause. However, he demurs to the objective
certainty of this principle when applied to parti
cular cases without limitation. According to him it
is one of those judgments which he was pleased to
call synthetic a priori judgments, judgments, that is to
say, which we are constrained by a natural necessity
to accept as universally true, although they are
neither self-evident nor verifiable by experience.

1 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by M. Miiller), p. 8.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 33

26. Yet if we would not fall into the abyss of
universal scepticism,2 we must admit the objective
validity and universal range of the principle of
causality rightly understood. Our reason demands
absolutely that we should say that whatever does not
exist of absolute necessity, cannot exist without a propor
tionate cause. That this principle must be admitted
as universally valid, will become clear by showing
its connection with the principle of contradiction.
We lose all hold on truth the moment we cease to
acknowledge the principle of contradiction, that is
to say, as soon as we allow that the same thing
under the same aspect may be and not be at the
same instant. But the principle of contradiction
stands or falls with that of causality. That which
does not exist of absolute necessity is of itself only
contingent, depending for its existence on a con
dition outside itself: otherwise, existing uncon
ditionally, it would be an absolutely necessary being.
If we suppose that there was in any particular case
a beginning of existence without cause, in other
words, that a violation of the principle of causality
took place : this could not happen without there
being an instant in which a mere possible thing — a
thing, that is to say, which depends for existence
on a condition external to itself — really depended
upon itself as the condition of its existence ; and
this would be a manifest violation of the principle
of contradiction.

2 To understand fully the intrinsic absurdity of universal scep
ticism, the reader may consult The First Principles of Knowledge, by
the Rev. John Rickaby, especially c. viii. pp. 134 — 147.
D

34 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Moreover, this principle is not only violated if we
admit a beginning of existence without cause, but
also if we admit such a beginning without a pro
portionate cause ; namely, without a cause which con
sidered in its totality contains a perfection at least
equal to that of the effect. For if it did not, the
excess of the effect over its cause would really be
without any cause, in violation of the principle of
contradiction.

27. By means of the same principle of causality
we now go on to prove that there must be some
thing self-existing. For the present we do not
inquire whether the thing self-existing be matter or
mind, whether it belong to this world as a part of
it, or whether it be above this world. The only
truth to be established is this. Not all beings can be
effects ; there must be something which is a cause
without being the effect of another cause, and this
something must be self-existent.

Our argument is as follows : Everything in so far
as it is an effect is indebted for its actual existence
to some other thing. But supposing there be no
. self-existent being, then the totality of being must
be an effect, no matter whether it be a finite or an
infinite series of various kinds of being. Conse
quently in that supposition whatever falls under
the concept of existing being past or present, must
be indebted to another being for its existence. But
this is evidently absurd ; for it cannot be true
without the existence of something beyond the bounds
of what falls under the notion of existing being.
Therefore the supposition that there is no self-

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 35

existent being is unreasonable, and the assertion of
a self-existent being is demanded by reason.

28. A strong confirmation of this truth is to be
found in the fact already mentioned, that neither
materialists, nor evolutionisms, nor pantheists are
bold enough to give an explanation of the origin of
the present world, without supposing an eternal
something, either " Matter," or the " Unknown," or
the so-called "Absolute," or the pure "Ego,"
or the "Idea" of Being, or the "Will," or the
" Unconscious." What they all refuse to admit is
the existence of an intelligent and free self-existent
being, a personal God, distinct from and superior
to this material world and to mankind. The task
now remains to show that the same principle of
causality, which led us to acknowledge a self-
existent being, leads us further to the conclusion
that this self-existent Being is personal.

29. The human soul is an immaterial (spiritual)
and free being. But the First Cause of an imma
terial and free being cannot be a material being, and
one constrained by an irresistible natural impulse to
the production of its effects. Consequently the First
Cause of the human soul must be an immaterial
free being, which implies that we must consider a
self-existent spiritual and free being to be the first
cause of man. But such a being is manifestly
distinct from, and superior to the material world
and to man. Therefore the existence of a self-
existent being, immaterial and free, superior to the
material world and to man, cannot reasonably be

36 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

denied ; or what amounts to the same, the existence
of a personal God is evident.

30. Is there any flaw in this reasoning? Surely
no one who admits the first premiss upon which
the argument is based, can reasonably object to
the rest. What it means is this. The human soul,
that is to say, the inmost principle of thought
and will in man, differs altogether from everything
material. We call it therefore a spiritual being,
by which we understand a being not composed
of parts, as matter is, but complete in its simple
essence, and able to act and to exist by itself
without being united to matter. Freedom also
we attribute to the soul, by which we mean a
power of self-determination existing in the will.
The human soul is free inasmuch as its will is able
to choose or not to choose any object presented
to it by the understanding, as long as that object
does not appear desirable under every possible
aspect.

But are we sufficiently warranted in making
these assertions ? Are they more than an attempted
answer to some of the deepest psychological pro
blems, supported, it is true, by the authority of
mediaeval schoolmen, but directly opposed to the
tendency of modern thought ? Can it then be
reasonable to take for the basis of the solution of
the most important philosophical questions such a
debatable fact as that of the existence of a spiritual
human soul endowed with free-will ?

These are questions which no doubt suggest
themselves to some of our readers, and we are

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 37

bound not to pass them by unanswered, although
the complete answer belongs to Psychology.3

31. The answer to the question, whether our
soul be an outgrowth of matter or an immaterial
being, must not be given a fcriori, but must be based
on facts. As the tree is known by its leaves, its
flowers, and its fruit, so does the human soul
manifest its nature by its ideas, its judgments, and
its desires. It is to these that we must give our
attention in order to become convinced of the
spirituality of the soul.

There are two sorts of ideas in us, sense ideas
(or phantasms, imaginations) and intellectual ideas.
A sense idea is an internal representation of a pheno
menon, or of a combination of phenomena, that
have impressed themselves upon one or more of the
organs of sensation with which the human body is
endowed. An intellectual idea is the expression of
being under a more or less general aspect. The
difference between the two will be best seen in
concrete instances. I have a sense idea of a
circle, if I represent to myself a perfectly round
plane figure ; I have an intellectual idea of a circle,
if I know what constitutes the being, the essence
of a circle, its "whatness," or what is commonly

3 These questions, all-important as they are, do not belong to a
treatise on Natural Theology. For anything like a satisfactory
discussion of them we must refer back to the Manual of Psychology
(Stonyhurst Series), by the Rev. M. Maher, pp. 361 — 393, also
pp. 443 — 467 ; and to the Manual of Logic (ibid.}, by the Rev.
R. F. Clarke, pp. 105 — 120, also pp. 140 — 157. We shall, however,
be consulting the convenience of our readers by indicating at least
the outline of the argument of which the fuller development is to
be found in the books referred to.

38 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

called its definition. My sense idea of a circle is
as variable as the magnitudes of circles are, but in
each representation it corresponds only to one magni
tude ; my intellectual idea of a circle on the contrary
is as invariable as the definition of a circle con
sidered not in its verbal expression, but in its meaning-
and at the same time it is applicable not to a limited
number of circles, but to all possible circles. In the
same way the sensile idea or phantasm of a man
corresponds either to one particular man or to
several men perfectly resembling one another in
external appearance, but the intellectual idea of
man or the mental expression of what is meant
by the word " man " is applicable to all possible
men.

32. This premised, we admit readily that our
sense ideas or imaginations are caused directly by
organic impressions, and require the immediate co
operation of a material organ, the sensitive nerves
and the grey matter of the brain. Moreover,
because of the substantial union between soul and
body, the formation of intellectual ideas and the
rise of indeliberate desires connected with them, is
also largely dependent upon the imagination, and
consequently upon the state of the brain and the
whole nervous system as acted upon by the ex
ternal corporeal world. We allow therefore that
the human brain may be called the organ of under
standing inasmuch as it is the organ of imagination,
the operation of which in this our mortal state is a
prerequisite to the working of the understanding.
To this must be added that we cannot by direct

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 39

intuition get intellectual ideas except of things
represented by our imagination. The consequence
is that to a certain extent a change in the operation
of the imagination naturally carries with it a change
in the operation of the understanding. There is
thus some foundation for the expression borrowed
from mathematics, that the understanding is a
" function of the brain ; " since by " function "
mathematicians mean a quantity so connected with
another quantity that any change in the one is
accompanied by a corresponding change in the
other. But the expressions referred to must not
be taken to mean that our intellectual knowledge
consists of sense impressions. Mr. Herbert Spencer
is therefore wrong in saying : " Feelings are in all
cases the materials out of which in the superior
tracts of consciousness, Intellect is evolved by struc
tural combination."* And again, he is wrong in
speaking of our senses thus, "The impressions
received by these senses form the materials of
intelligence which arises by combination of them,
and must therefore conform to their development."5

33. Against theories such as these we maintain
that our intellectual ideas, our rational judgments,
and our deliberate resolutions cannot possibly be
the effects of organic impressions either hereditary
or acquired.

A man who knows what mathematicians mean
by the word " circle," and what philosophers under
stand by the term "rational being," has an intel
lectual idea of the words " circle," and " rational

4 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. p. 192. 5 Ibid. p. 388.

40 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

being." No doubt he has also in his brain the
phantasms of circular figures seen before, and the
phantasms of many rational beings with whom
he has conversed. Again, there are in his brain
the organic impressions of the words in which the
explanation of " circle " and " rational being " are
given to him. But there is a vast difference between
these phantasms in whatever combination they may
be taken, and the meaning of the words, " circle "
and "rational being." Organic impressions can
only lead to the representation of what has really
affected our organs. But the meaning of a word
cannot really affect an organ ; for it is not an existing
particular thing which can move and change, it is the
term of an act of our mind, it is that which our
thinking mind manifests to us as something really
belonging to those particular things which, on
account of their similar natural properties, are
denoted by the words in question. Consequently,
the meaning of a word as known by our minds is
something which has no proportion to organic move
ments, and therefore cannot in anyway be considered
as the result of organic action. This holds good
about the meaning of any word, but especially of
such terms as, " Being in the abstract," " Impossi
bility," "Causality," "Spirit," "Infinite perfection,"
"Consciousness," "Intellectual idea," "Infinitesi
mal," "Differential calculus," finally, "the Un
known," as explained by Mr. Spencer himself.

34. Moreover, as intellectual ideas expressing
things in general, by their very applicability to an
unlimited number of things, infinitely surpass the

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 41

effects which can reasonably be attributed to organic
impressions, so neither can the concomitant con
sciousness which we have of the existence of these
ideas in us be explained on the hypothesis of mere
organic causation. I thinjc for instance of the
signification of the word "spirit," and whilst I
entertain this thought I also know that I am
entertaining it. Thus the thinking principle de
noted by the pronoun " I," is at once the thinking
subject and the object of its own thought. Assur
edly this could not be, unless this principle is an
immaterial being; for in matter no particle acts
upon itself, but one particle acts upon another.
Therefore the thinking principle in man which is
called the soul, must be an immaterial spiritual
being.

35. If intellectual ideas and the reflection of
the mind upon them are due to quite another
principle than matter, much more must this be
said of intellectual judgments and the concomitant
reflection on them. Let us take the principle of
contradiction : " Nothing can be and not be at the
same instant and under the same respect." As
often as we enunciate this principle, we affirm that
there is absolute opposition between any perfection
and the negation of the same. We feel certain about
this opposition, not only with regard to the past and
present, but also with regard to all future time, and
with regard to all possible perfections to which the
concept of being may be applied. How could the
knowledge of the unlimited value of that principle
be attributed to an organic impression, without

42 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

admitting an effect infinitely superior to its total
cause ?

36. The spirituality of the human soul, following
as it does from the preceding considerations, is the
foundation of that freedom of will by which man is
enabled to become master to a large extent, not only
of the rest of the visible creation, but of his own
actions, so far as they are dependent upon his deli
berate resolutions. It is because we have a spiritual
soul, that we are able to consider one object under
many aspects, and to weigh the motives which
recommend its choice or dissuade it. As our
reasonable will is a property of the same spiritual
soul, which is the spring of our intellectual ideas
and judgments, we cannot be necessitated to the
choice of any object, so long as reasons against that
choice present themselves to our mind. We often
have to decide whether we will follow the reason
able counsel of a friend, or stubbornly and selfishly
take our own way ; whether for the sake of charity
we will undergo an inconvenience, or for the love of
pleasure procure ourselves a superfluous comfort ;
whether we will act upon an approved moral maxim,
or yield to the mere impulse of anger, pride, or other
passion. In all these cases we are responsible for
our choice, unless the use of reason be so disturbed
in us as to make reflection impossible. Our own
consciousness bears witness to the fact that what
ever we choose deliberately, we choose without
being necessitated to the choice. It is for this
reason we experience remorse and self-reproach,
when we have chosen ill. And as we naturally

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 43

hold ourselves responsible for our deliberate
volitions, so our very nature inclines us easily to
forgive indeliberate offences committed by others,
however grave they may be ; whereas nothing
provokes us more than deliberate malice. All these
internal facts can be explained only on the admission
of the truth, firmly recognized by mankind taken as
a whole, that our deliberate resolutions depend upon
the free choice of our reasonable will. Whoever,
with the pantheist Spinoza6 and other monists or
determinists, denies this freedom of will, not only
puts himself in glaring opposition to the common
good sense of mankind, but also implicitly denies
the essential distinction between praiseworthy
virtue and blameable vice;7 nay, he teaches a
doctrine which leads to absolute scepticism ; for he
cannot hold his opinion without confessing a natural
and indelible tendency of the human understanding
to accept what in his view is a mere delusion, the
notion that man in some of his actions is a deli
berate, free, and responsible agent.

37. If man's soul were nothing more than a
principle of growth, of individual and specific bodily
development, of sense-perception, and of animal
appetite, then, of course, he could strive after
nothing but what is in harmony with animal
craving, or tends to individual organic comfort, or
to the good of kith and kin ; and he would do even

6 Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II. prop. 48, and Part I. Appendix.

7 Spinoza denies this distinction explicitly: "No action con
sidered in itself is either good or bad." (Ethics, Part IV. prop. 59,
towards the end of the demonstration.)

44 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

these actions with a certain specific uniformity, as
dumb animals do them, always in the same way.
But man by his free-will rises infinitely higher. He
alone in the whole animal creation, sits down deli
berately to meditate how he may do things better
than his ancestors have done for centuries before
him ; he alone has invented and continually makes
progress in the arts ; he alone cares for the study of
nature ; he alone utilizes it for intellectual purposes.
He alone is free either to yield to the immoderate
cravings of animal appetites, or to subject them to
the demands of reason and conscience ; nay, he
is able deliberately to struggle against sensible
pleasure, deliberately to mortify his passions, deli
berately to aim at the " higher things." The evidence
of these facts has induced Mr. A. R. Wallace, who
is called by Mr. Mivart " the surviving chief of
the encompassed and besieged citadel of Darwin
ism," to throw in his lot with those who maintain
the spirituality of the soul. In his Exposition of the
Theory of Natural Selection* after having shown that
man's mathematical, musical, and artistic faculties
cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of evolu
tion,9 Mr. Wallace thus continues : " The special
faculties we have been discussing clearly point to
the existence in man of something which he has not
derived from his animal progenitors —something
which we may best refer to as being of a spiritual
essence or nature, capable of progressive develop
ment under favourable conditions. On the hypo
thesis of this spiritual nature, superadded to the

8 London: Macmillan and Co., 1889. 9 Pp. 466, seq.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 45

animal nature of man, we are able to understand
much that is otherwise mysterious or unintelligible
in regard to him, especially the enormous influence
of ideas, principles, and beliefs over his whole
life and actions. Thus alqne we can understand
the constancy of the martyr, the unselfishness of
the philanthropist, the devotion of the patriot, the
enthusiasm of the artist, and the resolute and perse
vering search of the scientific worker after nature's
secrets. Thus we may perceive that the love of
truth, the delight in beauty, the passion for justice,
and the thrill of exultation with which we hear of
any act of courageous self-sacrifice, are the workings
within us of a higher nature which has not been
developed by means of the struggle for material
existence."10

38. We have therefore a right to say that the
fact affirmed in the major premiss of our argument
for the existence of a personal God, viz., the spiri
tuality of the soul (§ 29), cannot be reasonably
doubted. But if we must admit this fact, we
cannot but allow its legitimate consequences. It is
evident that there must be a cause of the human
race. Astronomers and geologists, palaeontologists
and historians agree, that man did not always exist.
How then did the first man come into existence ? We
pass over the question as to the origin of his body ;
but whence came his spiritual freely-electing soul ?
A spiritual and free being cannot be the outcome of
a mere organic development. Therefore the cause of

10 Ibid. p. 474 ; cf. ib. as far as p. 476 ; cf. Dublin Review, Jan.
1890, " Darwinianism," by M. Mivart.

46 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

the human soul must be an agent itself spiritual and
free. And if you suppose this agent to be not a
self-existing but a created spirit — which hypothesis
we shall discuss later on — that created spirit must
have a self-existing spirit for its First Cause. This
follows evidently from the impossibility of any series
of produced causes which is not dependent upon
an unproduced First Cause; an impossibility we have
proved in § 27. The conclusion is that the First
Cause of the human race is a spirit, self-existent
and freely-choosing, in other words, a personal God.

SECTION 3. — The Argument from Design.

Thesis IV. — The manifold and beautiful order of
nature is the work of a designing mind of vast
intelligence; and must be ultimately explained by the
existence of a personal God.

39. The argument from Design is built upon the
fact that material things do constantly and in a
most complex way group themselves together into
well-ordered wholes and systems. This fact cannot
be explained sufficiently otherwise than by admitting
an Intelligence presiding over nature's works, design
ing and adapting means to ends with foreknowledge
of eventual results. That the Intelligence we speak
of is self-existent, we cannot directly prove by this
argument. We shall have to supplement the de
ficiency in this regard by the argument of a First
Cause. Yet considered apart from it, the argument
from Design is in itself a striking refutation of
materialism, whether in the shape of a fortuitous

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 47

mechanical concurrence of atoms, or in the monist's
mystic vision of the undifferentiated developing into
the differentiated and individualized.

40. The order which prevails throughout the
visible world has excited the attention of thinkers
from the very dawn of Philosophy. According to
Cicero,11 Thales, the leader of the Ionian school,
held God to be that Intelligence which out of water
forms all beings. Anaxagoras12 believed likewise in
a Superior Reason pervading the whole of nature.
Plato13 attributed the harmonious order of celestial
and terrestrial bodies to a designing mind ; and
Aristotle, at the end of the twelfth book of his
Metaphysics, concludes from the unity of the order
in the physical world to the unity of its Ruler.
The same argument was treated more fully by the
Stoics, a fine specimen of whose reasoning is pre
served by Cicero in the second book of the De
natura Dcorum.1*

To say nothing of scholastic philosophers,15
Bacon16 held it for absolutely certain, that the attri
butes of God, and particularly His wisdom and His
ruling providence, are traceable in creation. Leib
nitz17 expressed it as his persuasion, that the material

11 De Natura Deorum, i. 10. Cf. Aristot. De Anima, i. 5.

12 Cf. Stockl, Geschichte der Philosophic, p. 51 ; Ueberweg, History
of Philosophy, i. p. 63.

13 Philebus, pp. 30 b, seq.

14 Cf. especially the beautiful illustrations in c. xxxiv. and
c. xxxvii.

15 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. q. 2. a. 3. c. " Quinta via."

16 Bacon de Verulam, De dignitate et augmcntis Scientiarum, Lib. III.
c. ii. pp. 207, seq. Cf. Stockl, Geschichte dcy neuern Phil. I. p. 21.

17 Leibnitz, Opera (Edit. Erdra.) p. 506.

48 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

elements of the world, considered in themselves, are
capable of quite another order than that by which
they actually are connected ; whence he concludes
that the realization of this one order out of many
possible orders must be attributed to the deter
mining mind of God. Kepler's reverence for the
Author of Nature is well known. Newton concludes
his Scholia with a scholion generate in praise of the
Creator, whose infinite wisdom in arranging the
solar system had struck him with admiration.
" This most elegant contrivance, consisting of the
sun, planets, and comets," he says, "could not
originate but by the design and power of an intel
ligent Being/' What this great astronomer saw so
clearly, the great biologist of modern time, Charles
Darwin,18 felt instinctively and " with overpowering
force," although he did not care to draw the con
clusion suggested to common-sense by his own
observations. Let us add here that although John
Stuart Mill doubted whether the Darwinian principle
of the "survival of the fittest" be not able "to
account for such truly admirable combinations as
some of those in nature," he was nevertheless of
opinion, " that it must be allowed that in the
present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in
nature afford a large balance of probability in
favour of creation by intelligence."19

Of far more weight, however, than Mill's timid
admission of a large balance of probability, is the

18 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by F. Darwin, Vol. I. p. 316,
note.

19 Three Essays on Religion, pp. 172, 174.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 49

firm conviction of many of the best scientific men
of our own century, that it is absolutely impossible
to explain the adaptations we meet with in all
departments of nature, otherwise but by intelligence
and design. St. George Miyart tells us that the
cause of the phenomenal universe " must be orderly
and intelligent, as the first and absolute cause of
an orderly series of phenomena which reveals to
us an objective intelligence in the bee and the
ant, which is not that of the animals themselves,
and which harmonizes with and is recognized
by our own intellects."20 Dr. W. B. Carpenter,
after having given us in his Vegetable Physiology
a highly interesting chapter on the Secretions of
Plants,21 pauses to contemplate with his readers
" the important inferences which may be drawn
from the foregoing details, in regard to the
Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of the Almighty
Designer." 22

With the two great biologists just mentioned,
A. R. Wallace, in the work already quoted above,
agrees at least to a certain extent. According to
him, the " three distinct stages of progress from
the inorganic world of matter and motion up to
man, point clearly to an unseen universe — to a
world of spirit, to which the world of matter is
altogether subordinate."23

No less pronounced statements in favour of the
existence of an intelligent arranger of the universe,

20 Lessons from Nature, p. 358. -1 Vegetable Physiology, c. x.

22 Op. cit. n. 404, pp. 258, 259 in First Edition.

23 Cf. Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection, pp. 475, 476.

E

50 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

came from other quarters of modern science.
" Overpowering proofs of intelligence and benevo
lent design," said Sir William Thomson some years
ago,24 " lie around us, showing to us through nature
the influence of a free-will, and teaching us that all
living beings depend upon one ever-acting Creator
and Ruler." Two years later, Sir William Siemens
repeated the same judgment in these words : " We
find that all knowledge must lead up to one great
result, that of an intelligent recognition of the
Creator through His works."25

At the same conclusion which English scientists
drew from the order of nature, the French astro
nomer, Faye, in his work Sur V origin* du monde
(Paris, 1884), arrived from the consideration of the
human mind. After having stated that human
intelligence must owe its origin to an intelligence
higher than human, he thus continues: "Plus Videe
qu'on se fera de cette intelligence supreme sera grande,
plus elle approchera dc la verite."26

But what seems to us the best extrinsic evidence
of the great strength of the argument from design,
is the fact that such a judge of the value of argu
ments as Kant thinks it a blameable imprudence not
to conclude from the order of nature to an intelli
gent designer. " This proof," he says,27 " will

24 Presidential Address, 1882.

25 See also statements made by Professor Stokes, Professors
Stuart and Tait, and Sir John Herschell, in The Month of January,
1889, pp. 39, seq.( in " The New Genesis," a criticism of E. Clodd's
Story cf Creation, by Rev. John Gerard.

26 Op. cit. p. 114.

a Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by M. Miiller), ii. p. 535.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 51

always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the
oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with
human reason. It gives life to the study of nature,
deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly
acquiring new vigour. It reveajs aims and intentions,
where our own observation would not by itself have
discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of
nature by leading us towards that peculiar unity, the
principle of which exists outside nature. This
knowledge reacts again on its cause, namely, the
transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief in
a Supreme Author to an irresistible conviction. It
would therefore be not only extremely sad, but
utterly vain, to attempt to diminish the authority of
this proof. Reason, constantly strengthened by the
powerful arguments that come to hand of them
selves, though they are no doubt empirical only,
cannot be discouraged by any doubts of subtle and
abstract speculation. Roused from all curious specu
lation and mental suspense, as from a dream, by
one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty
of the cosmos, reason soars from height to height
till it reaches the highest, from the conditioned to
conditions, till it reaches the supreme and uncon
ditioned Author of all." Later on,28 Kant refers to
the objection that we must not argue from the need
of foresight in human workmanship to a similar
need in nature. His answer is : " We cannot do
better than follow the analogy of these products of
human design, which are the only ones of which we
know completely both cause and effect. There

•-'« I'. .

52 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

would be no excuse, if reason were to surrender a
causality which it knows, and have recourse to
obscure and indemonstrable principles of expla
nation, which it does not know." :

It is true that Kant, while granting thus much,
has nevertheless some speculative difficulties against
the argument from Design. We' shall treat of these
later. For the present we are satisfied with knowing
that one of the most acute leaders of modern
thought, forced by the voice of reason, bears testi
mony to the great truth that "the heavens show
forth the glory of the Lord,"30 that " by the great
ness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator
of them may be seen so as to be known thereby," *
and that " the unknown God "82 "left not Himself
without testimony, doing good from Heaven, giving
rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with
food and gladness."33

We now proceed from authority to argument.

41. Order is the adaptation of diverse things to
one definite result. Order of simple coexistences is
called statical; order of motions and activities is
called dynamical. Thus for instance, in a well-
arranged library we have statical order, in machinery
not only statical, but also dynamical. These defini
tions supposed, it cannot be doubted that the visible
universe in all its parts bears marks of a most
varied and beautiful order. Darwin was so struck
by this complex final order, that he did not hesitate
to pronounce " nature's productions far truer in

v" P 538 M Psalm xviii. i. si Wisdom xiii. 5.

av Acts xvii. 23. a3 Acts xiv. 16.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 53

character than man's productions;" and to maintain
that they are " infinitely better adapted to the most
complex conditions of life, and plainly bear the
stamp of far higher workmanship."34

Any good popular treatise on astronomy and
physiology will serve as a rich source of illustrations
bearing on the truth of these statements, nor is
there any one who will be foolish enough to dispute
them. It must, however, be carefully noted, that
we do not as yet affirm that everything in this world
is well-ordered, nor do we say that there is a
universal combination of things for the fulfilment of one
common purpose. Were we to claim all this, we
should indeed be claiming only what, if rightly
understood, is most true. But so far-reaching a
proposition is not necessary for the argument from
Design, nor would it be sufficiently warranted until
we have carried our inquiry further.

42. Confining, therefore, our attention to those
manifestations of order which are obvious to every
one who cares for the study of the workings of
nature, we ask : How did these orderly arrange
ments, their harmony, beauty, and usefulness, come
to be ? May we suppose, with Epicurus, that they
are the effect of chance ? in other words, that they
are owing to an accidental concurrence of atoms,
moving in infinite space, and meeting one another in
such a way as to form, after many failures, various
kinds of inanimate and animate bodies ? Such an
hypothesis would be not only inadequate to account
for the laws and results of chemical combinations,

34 Origin of Species, c. iv. p. 65.

54 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

and for the origin of life ; it would be intrinsically
absurd, conflicting with the universality of the Prin
ciple of Causation, inasmuch as this fortuitous con
currence would be an uncaused concurrence.35 There
must then have been a cause of the formation of
the heavenly orbs and their arrangement in systems:
a cause again which, on our earth, grouped together
the elements into organized structures, moving,
growing, repairing themselves, and reproducing
their kind according to definite laws. Where shall
we find this cause ? It must either be inherent in
the elements of matter, or it must be something out
side these. If it is outside matter, it can only be a
mind, understanding and designing the order of
matter. But will not the inherent forces of matter
suffice to explain this complex order ? Let us see.

35 On this point not only all sound metaphysicians, but also all
true scientists, are at one. " The one act of faith in the convert to
science," says Professor Huxley, "is the universality of order, and
of the absolute validity, in all times and under all circumstances, of
the law of causation. This confession is an act of faith, because,
by the nature of the case, the truth of such propositions is not
susceptible of proof. But such faith is not blind, but reasonable,
because it is invariably confirmed by experience, and constitutes the
sole trustworthy foundation for all action." Then picturing, for
illustration's sake, the raging sea, he thus continues : "The man of
science knows that here, as everywhere, perfect order is manifested ;
that there is not a curve of the waves, not a note in the howling
chorus, not a rainbow glint on a bubble, which is other than a
necessary consequence of the ascertained laws of nature, and that
with a sufficient knowledge of the conditions, competent physico-
mathematical skill could account for and indeed predict every one
of these 'chance' events." (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by
F. Darwin, Vol. II. c. 5, written by Professor Huxley, p. 200.) We
agree fully with all of this, inasmuch as it implies that nothing happens
without a proportionate cause, and that consequently an accidental
concurrence of causes is nonsense.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 55

43. In the first place, the inherent forces of matter
cannot be appealed to as the cause of the order
prevailing in the inorganic world. We know that
material elements produce different effects according
to their different collocations in regard to one
another.36 Consequently, each effect is the natural
outcome of a previous disposition of the parts of
matter. This being so, every orderly effect is due to
a pre-arrangement of particles suitable to the pro
duction of such an effect. That is, the order which
is worked out by the elements of matter, presupposes
order in the combination of the working elements.
Thus the question of order in the world of inani
mate matter is thrown back to the origin of that
combination of elements which generated order.

Nor do we escape the necessity of seeking a
cause external to the combinations themselves, by
pleading the possibility of an eternal series of
combinations. In the first place, eternal succession
is a self-contradictory conception. Succession im
plies links of a series, it is constituted by the con
tinuous addition of link to link. Now links added to
one another are always numerable. Links of a series
must always be in some number, however immense
the number may be. But to be in some number, is
to be finite : for every number is made up of finite
unities. Thus eternal succession would be essentially
finite, because it was succession, and yet infinite
because eternal.

36 " The last great generalization of science, the Conservation of
Force, teaches us that the variety in the effects depends partly
upon the amount of force, and partly upon the diversity of the
collocations." (Mill, Three Essays on Religion, p. 145. Third Edit.)

56 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

In the second place, even if eternal succes
sion were possible, it would furnish no explanation
of the phenomenon of orderly combination which
the world exhibits : any more than infinite exten
sion of a chain hung in air would supply the
want of supports for it. Consequently, although
we have nothing to say against the assumption
made by astronomers, that our cosmic system
resulted from the condensation and division of a
primitive rotating nebula; yet we cannot admit
this nebula, without observing that there must have
been a first arrangement of the material elements
which constituted it, one which already contained
in germ the present system, or else the said system
could never have resulted from it. Now this first
arrangement was neither the effect of the forces of
matter, nor was it essential to matter. Had it been
the effect of material • forces, it could not possibly
have been the first disposition of matter, but was
rather the effect of a preceding disposition of the
elements. Again, had it belonged essentially to
matter, it could not have yielded to another dispo
sition so long as matter existed, and thus the present
cosmic system could never have been formed. There
fore, if we would explain the origin of that system
without violation of reason, we are forced to say
that its first beginning, nebular or otherwise, is due
to an intelligent cause.37

37 Professor Huxley supports our conclusion, when in defence of
Darwin's Origin of Species he writes: "The teleological and the
mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive.
On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the
more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 57

44. If the forces of matter are inadequate to
explain the order of the inorganic world, much less
can they account for the existence of life and the
orderly relations which exist between animate and
inanimate beings. »

Whence comes the adaptation of inanimate
nature to the support of life ? The natural tendency
of brute matter cannot explain it. The relation
of brute matter to life is accidental to its nature.
Whence then did the relation originate ? No
satisfactory answer to this question can be given
except this : that an Intelligent Ruler of this
world arranged the material elements of which
the universe is built up in such a way that they
gradually became adapted to the service of living
beings whose existence he intended and foresaw.
This answer must be insisted upon all the more
from the fact that man, the most noble being on
earth, finds it rich with an innumerable multitude
of things accommodated to his bodily and mental
wants. As we have proved before (§ 32, seq.), the
soul of man is not the outgrowth of matter, but
the work of an intelligent Creator only. No evolu
tion of matter, of plants, and of animals, could
culminate in the existence of man, composed of a
human soul and a human body ; and yet matter and

which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences, and
the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist,
who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular
arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the
universe." (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by F. Darwin, Vol. II.
pp. 201, 202, in Professor Huxley's chapter on "Reception of
The Origin of Species.'1)

58 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

life inferior to man, conspire to furnish him what he
needs for the maintenance of his body, and to help
him in the cultivation of his intellect. Certainly no
reasonable explanation of this great fact can be
given but by recurring to an intelligent mind,
superior to man and the irrational world, which
arranged the latter, ere man was created, with a
view to prepare him a fit dwelling-place.38

45. We have then seen hitherto that the adapta
tions to one another which connect the various
groups of beings in the macrocosm of the universe
must be attributed to a Designing Mind. The same
conclusion we arrive at by pondering the order pre
vailing in the microcosm of each living organism,
from the tiniest unicellular plant up to the most
highly organized animal. Just as in scientific
inquiry, the further that it proceeds, the more
it becomes evident that brute matter by its own
forces alone never developes into organized living
structures ; so, when we look at the subject from
a metaphysical point of view, we are forced to
maintain that the vast differences which separate
the natural tendencies of living bodies from
those of lifeless matter, are a sufficient evidence
of the impossibility of a natural evolution of the
latter into any species of the former. And with
this conclusion coincides the verdict of scientific
experience.

38 " A successively increasing purpose," says St. George Mivart,
" runs through the irrational creation up to man. All the lower
creatures have ministered to him, and have, as a fact, prepared the
way for his existence. Therefore, whatever ends they also serve,
they exist especially for him." (On Truth, p. 495.)

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 59

Mr. St. George Mivart speaks on this point with
authority. He says :

" That there is an absolute break between the
living world and the world devoid of life, is what
scientific men are now agreed about — thanks to the
persevering labours of M. Pasteur. Those who
affirm that though life does not arise from inorganic
matter now, nevertheless it did so ' a long time ago,'
affirm what is at the least contrary to all the evi
dence we possess, and they bring forward nothing
more in favour of it than the undoubted fact that it
is a supposition which is necessary for the validity
of their own speculative views. There is, then, one
plain evidence that there has been an interruption
of continuity, if not within the range of organic life,
yet at its commencement and origin. But we go
further than this, and affirm, without a moment's
hesitation, that there has, and must necessarily have
been, discontinuity within the range of organic life
also. We refer to the discontinuity between organ
isms which are capable of sensation and those which
do not possess the power of feeling. That all the
higher animals ' feel ' will not be disputed. They
give all the external signs of sensitivity, and they
possess that special organic structure — a nervous
system — which we know supplies all our organs of
sensation. In the absence of any bodily mutila
tion, then, we have no reason to suspect that their
nervous system and organs of sense do not act in a
manner analogous to our o\vn. On the other hand,
to affirm that the familiar vegetables of our kitchen-
gardens are all endowed with sensitivity, is not only

60 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

to make a gratuitous affirmation^but one opposed to
evidence, since no vegetable organisms possess a
nervous system, and it is a universally admitted
biological law, that structure and functions go
together. If, then, there are any organisms what
ever, which do not feel, while certain other organisms
do feel (as a door must be shut or open), there is,
and must be, a break and distinction between one
set and the other."39

What then was it which gave birth to organic
life ? To say, it had no beginning, but that from
eternity there existed one or several series of living
organisms, would involve the postulate of succession
without beginning, which we have proved to be self-
contradictory. (§ 43.) But, if organic life can neither
be considered as an effect of the forces of dead
matter, nor have the source of its own existence
within itself, we cannot reasonably explain its origin
except by admitting that an intelligent Being, ruling
over the matter of our earth, first put into it the
germ of life, although we are not able to point out
when, and in what way, this influence was exercised.
Hence, the countless living organisms that people
our globe are the realizations of ideas conceived by
an immaterial superhuman Intelligence. This Intel
ligence drew the plans on which they are built, fore
saw the stages of evolution, through which they run
with so astonishing a regularity, furnished them
with a multitude of skilfully-contrived organs, and
adapted their whole structure to the environment in
which they are placed.

w Origin of Human Reason, pp. 10, n.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 61

46. That the Ruler in whose mind the order of
the world originated is a self-existing intelligence,
and consequently a personal God, does not follow
immediately from the fact that the order of the
world must be the work of a, superhuman Intelli
gence. What does, however, follow immediately is,
that the Intelligence which rules the physical world
is so vast, that no human understanding and wisdom
can be compared with it. For many ages the
cleverest of men have been occupied in studying
the relations that exist between the different parts
of living beings, and between these parts and their
functions, and yet there is no man who understands
completely the mysteries hidden even in one living
cell. Far indeed then above human comprehension
must be the excellence of that Mind whose ideas
were the models after which the universe was
fashioned, with its wealth of marvels and com
plexity of order.

If, however, we would show that the order of
the world is due, not only to an Intelligence far
exceeding all intelligence of man, but ultimately to
a self-existent Intelligence — in other words, to a
personal God, we must go back to the argument of
the First Cause. Either the intelligent mind who
designed the order of our world is dependent upon
a series of other minds without beginning, or it
depends upon a first mind, or it is itself the first
mind. The first alternative is absurd, because it
implies a series of causes produced without a self-
existent cause to produce them (§ 38); therefore either
the second or the third must be admitted. But this

62 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

is equivalent to an admission that the order of the
world depends upon an intelligent, self-existent
cause ; for the cause of the cause of order must
also, at least mediately, be the cause of order itself.40

SECTION 4. — The Moral Proof.

Thesis V. — Mankind has at all times believed in
the existence of an intelligent nature superior to the
material world and to man. This universal belief can
only be explained as the result of the real existence of
such a nature. But to grant this much is to grant
implicitly the existence of a personal God.

47. When we have convinced ourselves by a train
of reasoning that some proposition is true, we
are always anxious to know if our conclusion is
identical with that of other minds. Our own
minds may have been the victims of some lurking
fallacy, but it is less likely that other minds should
have been simultaneously deceived in the same
manner. Thus we gain confidence when we find
them to be in agreement with us, and our confidence
becomes very great indeed when these other minds
are in immense number and belong to various
classes of persons acting independently of one
another. It is natural therefore that now that we
have completed our proofs of the existence of God
drawn from intrinsic evidence, we should go on to
inquire how far the Divine existence is universally

40 On the argument from Design, cf. Janet, Final Causes. Trans
lated into English by William Affleck, 13. D. Second Edition.
Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark, 1883.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 63

recognized, and that we should claim the result of
the inquiry as a signal corroboration of our position.

We claim more, however, than this in the
present argument. We claim to find in this uni
versal recognition which we assert, not only a corro
boration of what has preceded, but an argument of
absolute value in itself. We claim that a fact like
this of the consent of nations in the recognition of
God must be deemed the voice of universal reason
yielding to the compelling evidence of truth. The
cause must be adequate to the effect. A universal
effect must imply an equally universal cause. But
truth alone is such a cause. Error is always partial,
local, temporary ; truth alone is everywhere the
same.

48. This is the outline of the argument we now
advance. Its force will become more manifest
when we have examined into its details.

First, about the fact. From the ancient writers,
pagan as well as Christian, many well known
passages have been collected in which this universal
recognition of a Divine government of the world is
attested. Thus Plutarch says : " If you go round
the world, you may find cities without walls, or
literature, or kings, or houses, or wealth, or money,
without gymnasia, or theatres. But no one ever
saw a city without temples and gods, one which does
not have recourse to prayers, or oaths, or oracles,
which does not offer sacrifice to obtain blessings or
celebrate rites to avert evil." 41 And Cicero has
declared that " there is no nation so wild and
41 Adv. Coloten Epicureum.

64 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

fierce, as not to know that it must have a God,
although it may not know what sort of a God it
should be." 42 From among Christian witnesses we
may take Clement of Alexandria, who tells us that
" all nations, whether they dwell in the East or on
the remotest shores of the West, in the North or
the South, have one and the same rudimentary
apprehension of Him by whom this government
(of the world) has been established." 43

One is prone nowadays to suspect passages
like these of resting too little on solid information,
too much on the inferences and generalizations of
oratory. Still they have their value, and attest to
us the results of such actual experience as came
within the reach of former generations. They have
a right also to be taken together with the results of
modern inquiry which, if they are found to agree
with them, they can complete. And they do agree
with the discoveries of the most recent times.
There are few tribes of the earth which have not
been scrutinized by the active-minded explorers of
the present century, and scrutinized on the whole
with scientific care and skill. Out of the entire
number thus examined it is just possible that a few
are altogether without religious ideas. Sir John
Lubbock has maintained that there are such. But it
is a task of no small difficulty to elicit from savages
a true account of their religious beliefs. They are
shy in the presence of the white man, and they have
also often a superstitious fear of mentioning the
names of their gods. Thus it becomes likely that

42 De Leg. I. c. 8. 43 Strom. Lib V. n. 260.

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 65

even this small residuum is not really as atheistic
as it has been alleged to be. This is the judgment of
one who is in the front rank of anthropologists, and
is. clear from any suspicions of undue partiality in
favour of the religion of theists. Mr. Tylor writes :

"The assertion that rude non-religious tribes
have been known in actual existence, though in
theory possible, and perhaps in fact true, does not
at present rest on that sufficient proof which for an
exceptional state of things we are entitled to
demand. ... So far as I can judge from the
immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to
admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears
among all low races with whom we have attained
to thoroughly intimate acquaintance." 44

That the facts brought forward by Sir John
Lubbock to prove the contrary, are not really to the
point, has been clearly shown by Gustav Roskoff.45
The conclusion at which he arrives is, that " hitherto
no tribe has been found to be without any traces of
religious sentiments." In this he is fully borne out
both by the distinguished German ethnologist, Oskar
Peschel,46 who denies categorically that any tribe
has been met with without religious ideas, and

44 Primitive Culture, Vol. I. pp. 378 and 384.

43 Gustav Roskoff 's words are as follows: " Es ist bisher noch
kein Volksstamm ohne jede Spur von Religiositat betroffen worden."
(Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvolker, p. 178, Leipzig, 1880.)

46 " Stellen wir uns die Frage, ob irgendwo auf Erden ein
Volksstamm ohne religiose Anregungen und Vorstellungen jemals
angetroffen worden sei, so darf sie entschieden verneint werden."
(Oskar Peschel, Volkerkunde, p. 260. Fifth Edit. Leipzig, 1881.)
F

66 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

also by F. v. Hellwald, in his Natural History of
Man.47

49. Even if there were a few races altogether
without religion it would not touch our argument.
Our object is to ascertain the voice of nature, and
of rational nature. It is only to be expected that we
shall find its tones affected by an admixture of
the tones of error in degraded races, and that the
extent of the confusion should follow the degrees of
degradation.

Here, however, the very natural objection will
occur to the reader's mind : Do we not find an
opposing voice at the other end of the scale of
civilization ? Do not those who deem themselves
and are perhaps deemed by the mass of men to repre
sent the acme of intellectual culture, proclaim them
selves to be conscientiously agnostic in reference to
this important doctrine ? That there are these
apparent exceptions to the general law must of
course be admitted. But we must not allow our
adversaries to assume too much. Undoubtedly
there is an increasingly large number of persons
who profess themselves to be agnostics. Still only
a small portion of these can be regarded as persons
of special culture : and if there are some such, it
must not be forgotten that there are many more
of equal culture who are earnest theists. The fact
thus alleged against us when reduced to its proper

47 " Mil Fug und Recht darf man von einer Religion der Wilden
sprechen ; denn bisjetzt sind noch keine vollstandig religionslosen
Volkerstamme gefunden worden." (F. v. Hellwald, Naturgeschichte
dfs Menschen, p. 95. Stuttgart, 1883.)

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 67

proportions becomes this. In the present age there
are many agnostics who declare that they do not
see grounds for admitting the Divine existence, and
some among them are in the front rank among the
thinkers of the day. After all, this is a fact not
peculiar to the present age. It can be paralleled
by similar instances in the last century, and it can
be paralleled also by similar instances among the
philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome. Even
the reasonings on which modern agnostics rely are
substantially the same with those which we find in
the writings of these ancient atheists.

If any one, certainly Professor Huxley must
know, whether the scientific progress of our age has
really created new and formidable difficulties against
Natural Theology. Yet he says : " There is a great
deal of talk and not a little lamentation about the
so-called religious difficulties which physical science
has created. In theological science, as a matter of
fact, it has created none. Not a solitary problem
presents itself to the philosophical Theist at the
present day which has not existed from the time
that philosophers began to think out the logical
grounds and the logical consequences of Theism."48

50. Thus we are able to state as generally true
the fact with which we have to deal. The acknow
ledgment of a superior and invisible intelligence
governing the visible universe is common to all ages
and all regions, to civilized and uncivilized tribes
alike. We find a disposition on the part of

48 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by F. Darwin, Vol. II. c. v.
p. 203.

63 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

some few philosophers to dispute the validity of
the belief, but nevertheless the belief has proved
to be persistent and indestructible in the mass of
mankind. It is this persistency among the mass
of men, retained even in the teeth of sceptical
opposition, on which our argument is based.

Now for the interpretation of this important
fact. How comes it that minds are so accordant in
their inference that the nature and movements of
the visible world imply the existence of an invisible
over-ruling spirit ? There must be motives acting
on the mind to induce it to draw this conclusion :
and the motives must have been the same every
where, since the effect, the inference, is the same
everywhere. If the inference is of the character
which we have investigated in the previous theses,
and if this inference is true ; if it is true that the
universe bears upon its face the characteristic marks
of an effect, and an effect presupposes a propor
tionate cause, if the universe bears upon its face the
marks of design and purpose, and the only pro
portionate cause of design and purpose is a cause
endowed with intelligence, then the world-wide
recognition of such an intelligent ruler of the
world is fully justified and explained. And that
this is the true explanation we may establish by
way of elimination. What other explanation is
there in the field ? Bayle in the seventeenth century
undertook to suggest other possible causes. He
named the following :

(i) Ignorance of natural causes. Men observed
the marvellous course of nature in the midst of

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 69

which they lived, and, unable as yet to detect the
physical causes from which they actually spring,
attributed them to the action of invisible beings
which they anthropomorphically invested with form
and qualities resembling their own.

(2) Fear excited by the stupendous forces of
nature, by the flash of the lightning, the roll of
the thunder, the fury of the waves, and the shock
of the earthquake.

Primus in orbe deos fecit timor ardua cceli
Fulmina durn caderent.

(3) The fraud of the ruling classes, of priests and
kings, who played upon these natural predisposi
tions of the people by stamping them with the
seal of their own superior authority : so doing
because they perceived that the tendency of the
beliefs was to exalt their own character as priests
and kings by causing them to be regarded as the
Divine representatives and as the mediators through
whose instrumentality alone the Divine anger could
be appeased.

Of these three reasons only the first is radical
and need be considered. Given a belief in the
existence of a Divine ruler, fear would naturally
ensue, and where the idea of God was mingled
with error, as it undoubtedly has been among
barbarous nations, this fear would take an unreason
able form. But fear alone could not create a belief in
God. In like manner, given belief in the existence
of God formed on other grounds, the natural
consequence would be a conviction that earthly

7o OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

rulers are His representatives holding authority
under Him, and this conviction might lend itself
to the interested motives of unworthy rulers where
the people were sufficiently untutored to credit such
fraudulent representatives.

What then is to be said of the first alleged
cause of the belief in question ? And be it noticed,
that this self-same cause which is said to have
originated the belief in God in past ages, is
alleged to be sustaining it now among the ignorant
theists, who, according to our modern men of
progress, shut their eyes to the enlightenment of
modern thought. You discover final causes, is the
charge against us, and you then infer from them
the existence of an architect of the universe,
because you fail to see that the existing physical
causes are quite able of themselves to evolve the
complicated system which we call the world.

This charge, however, is a little out of date
now. Those who used confidently to make it
are beginning to realize what was seen by their
adversaries all along, namely, that the appeal to
physical causes and even to a long course of
evolution under their action only results in push
ing back the need of a designer to an earlier stage,
and indeed makes the need itself the more impera
tive. However, this is a point that has already been
sufficiently considered. All that we are at present
concerned to notice is, that if failure to regard
physical causes as containing within themselves an
adequate explanation of the cosmos has been the
motive which has engendered this universal recog-

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 71

nition of the Divine existence, the failure is not one
which can be confidently appealed to as discrediting
the recognition. We are merely reduced to this,
that whereas a certain argument seems to modern
agnostics unsound and to modern theists sound, the
general consent of mankind is on the side of the
theists, not of the agnostics. And this is just what
the theist appeals to as constituting an independent
argument in his favour. How explain, he says, this
persistent general belief without seeing in it the
voice of rational nature ratifying the truth of the
conclusion and the validity of the inference ?

51. Of course it must not be supposed that we
deny that here and there some among the thinkers
of former ages have erred, just as barbarous tribes
even may err now, in attributing to the immediate
action of the Divinity results of which the imme
diate cause was the action of some physical agent.
Errors in assigning wrong causes to physical facts
have no doubt been committed repeatedly, and have
been corrected by our superior information. Herein,
in fact, we see, from the opposite side, an illustration
of the value of our principle that persistent universal
belief is an evidence of truth. The errors in question
proved themselves to be errors by dropping out with
the march of discovery. They have proved not
to be universal and persistent. But these crude
notions of immediate Divine action in the move
ment of the storm or the flash of the lightning, are
not what we are appealing to. The question is not
why some men multiplied their gods, or attributed
to them this action or that ; but why mankind in

72 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

general have agreed in thinking that the world as
a whole presupposes the existence of an intelligent
governor, and why this belief has shown itself,
and continues to show itself to be as persistent in
the face of all attacks made upon it by the agnostic
thought of the various ages, as the other beliefs
have shown themselves to be yielding and transitory.
Error, we know, cannot live for ever. It is always
in danger of destruction, because its foundations
are insecure. Truth, on the other hand, though it
may lie for a time obscured, must persist, because
its foundation is on the rock of evidence.

52. It will help to render the force of our argu
ment more distinct, if we bear in mind the difference
between what were once happily called by Cardinal
Newman "Implicit and Explicit Reason." To reason,
that is to say, to be intellectually moved by certain
premisses to the adoption of the conclusion towards
which they point, is one thing. To give an accurate
account of the nature of the premisses grasped by
the mind, is quite another. To quote the Cardinal's
words :

" Let a person only call to mind the clear im
pression he has about matters of every-day occur
rence, that this man is bent on a certain object, or
that man was displeased, or another suspicious : or
that one is happy and another unhappy; and how
much depends in such impressions on manner, voice,
accent, words uttered, silence instead of words, and
all the many subtle symptoms which are felt by the
mind, but cannot be contemplated ; and let him
consider how very poor an account he is able to give

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 73

of his impression, if he avows it and is called upon
to justify it."49

The illustration is taken from one class of in
ference, but is applicable to others. To give an
accurate account of one's reasoning is a faculty
confined mainly to those who possess the art of
reflection and analysis, born of the discipline of
philosophical training. To reason correctly is a
faculty much more widely found. It is noticeable
that most men reason correctly concerning practical
matters which come within their special sphere of
interest and experience. All men who are in their
right senses reason correctly concerning those
matters which are of fundamental importance for
the conduct of life. And thus it comes to pass that
in a certain sense untrained minds are given to
reason more correctly than philosophers. The latter,
although enjoying the power to analyze their reason
ings into its elements, do not always enjoy this
power to perfection. Accordingly they set down the
premisses inaccurately, and then, finding them in
sufficient to bear the weight of the inference, dis
card as unsound conclusions which are really valid.
Meanwhile the untrained mind, undistracted by any
such false notions, pursues its natural course, and
arrives with certainty at the true conclusion. Here,
then, we have the justification of the stress we have
been laying on the appeal to the persistent universal
consent of mankind in recognizing the existence of
a superior intelligence. The appeal is from the
mind caught in philosophical mazes through its

49 Sermons before the Universitv of Oxford, p. 274. Third Edit.

74 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

inability to grasp with sufficient accuracy the true
premisses on which the arguments for God's exist
ence rest ; and it is to minds free from this dis
tracting influence which by their concord in such
number, variety, and persistency, prove themselves
to be dominated by the evidence of truth.

53. In the last clause of the thesis we are proving,
we assert that to admit this universal recognition
of a superior intelligence governing the universe is
implicitly to admit the existence of a personal God.
The word " implicitly " must be carefully noticed.
The argument from universal recognition is often
misapprehended, because it is understood to aspire
to more than it really does. Cicero, long ago, said,
in words already cited : " No nation is so wild and
fierce as not to perceive that there must be a God,
although ignorant what kind of God it must be."
The two questions, whether God exists, and what
is the true nature of God, are to be distinguished.
As to the latter, the grossest and most absurd of
notions have prevailed, and it might be urged
against us that if we desire to take the beliefs of
the mass of mankind as in itself an evidence of
truth, we ought in consistency to take their gross
and absurd notions as an integral part of the belief.
What right have we to pick and choose ? What
right have we to cite as valuable witnesses the
polytheists and even the fetish worshippers, and
at the same time disregard as valueless their belief
in polytheism and fetichism ? However, the answer
is reasonable enough. The element of persistent
universality on which we lay stress is to be found

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 75

in the belief in the existence of a supreme intelli
gence. But as soon as men went beyond this, and
sought to conceive to themselves the form and
manner of this overruling intelligence, they fell into
error, and their error is revealed as such by its
want of universality and its* want of persistency.
The forms which mythology has assumed among
the various tribes may resemble one another in
certain general characteristics, because even erro
neous thought is an attempt to understand realities,
and must be governed to a certain extent by what
it sees ; still, on the whole, the mythologies are
characterized by their dissimilitude : they are racy
of the soil where they spring up.

We are content, then, to appeal to the consent
of mankind for the rudimentary conception of a
governing intelligence (or intelligences) overruling
the world. But we contend that in this rudimentary
conception is contained implicitly the doctrine of
a personal God. To show that this is the true
inference from the premisses is not the task of the
present thesis. It has been partly demonstrated
already, and remains to be more completely
demonstrated in the theses yet to come.

Such is the Moral proof, grounded upon the
belief of the human race in the existence of God.
It is not absolutely conclusive, except when
taken in conjunction with the argument of the
First Cause. That argument shows perfectly the
existence of a personal God ; yet it gains much in
practical value, when accompanied by the other two

76 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

(the argument from general consent and the argu
ment from Design), which appeal more directly to
ordinary understandings. To confirm our conclusion
now indirectly, by evincing the untenableness of the
opposite, we will point out some of the practical
consequences that flow from agnosticism.

SECTION 5. — Logical consequences of Agnosticism.

Thesis VI. — The logical consequences of Sceptical
Atheism or Agnosticism in the practical order show
clearly that the position of the agnostic is opposed to
reason.

54. The word atheist suggests the idea of a man
living without regard for God. If he does so,
because he thinks that there is no sufficient reason
for believing in God's existence, he may be called
a theoretical atheist ; if on the other hand, he admits
that existence, but disregards the law of God in
regulating his free actions, he will then be called a
practical atheist. In this place we have not to treat
of the consequences of practical atheism except
in so far as they are included in those connected
with atheism maintained as a theory. Confining
ourselves to the theoretical atheists, we have again
to distinguish dogmatic and sceptical atheism. A
dogmatic atheist is one who asserts without doubt,
" There is no God ; " whereas a sceptical atheist,
commonly called an agnostic, maintains only that
we can know nothing definite about the First Cause
of things.

If the logical consequences of Sceptical Atheism
are disastrous, those of Dogmatic Atheism will

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 77

not be less disastrous, though they can hardly be
more. We may, however, limit our attention to
the consequences of the former only. Dogmatic
Atheism is not very common now-a-days, at least
among men of culture. Agnostics, we know, are
wont to protest very strongly against the desig
nation of atheists being applied to them, and
the protest, whether reasonable or not, proves at
least this much, that in their estimation the intel
lectual position of one who should claim to have
demonstrated the non-existence of God is altogether
irrational. Under these circumstances it is not
necessary to consider the practical consequences of
Dogmatic Atheism, but only those of Agnosticism.
This we call Sceptical Atheism, since the name
is one that is founded on truth and required
by symmetry. The objection that may be raised
to it by agnostics may become less if they will
observe that the name atheist taken by itself has
been denned to mean one who acts as if there
were no God. Agnostics can hardly deny that they
do this. "Worship of the silent sort" has indeed
been pronounced fitting before the "altar of the
Unknowable." But is such an evanescent homage,
whether it be fitting or not, really sufficient ?

We assert then, in the present thesis, that the
logical consequences of sceptical atheism in the
practical order are so opposed to reason as to
involve a condemnation of its tenets. There are
pessimists in the world, and their number is said to
be increasing with the spread of " modern thought."
But although these may be cited as valuable wit-

78 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

nesses to the force of the argument about to be
advanced, the thesis is not addressed to them. It
is rather addressed to those who cannot think that
Nature is a fraud or a pest, but believe its course to
be stamped with the promise of a true hope.

In proof of our thesis, we will first invite, atten
tion to the moral paradox in which the agnostic
finds himself entangled, or rather would find himself
entangled if only he would reflect sufficiently. Few
agnostics would deny that, if the Christian assump
tion were correct and the existence of such a God
as Christians believe in were an ascertained truth,
it would follow at once that He must desire the
worship of loving reverence. Just as it is incon
ceivable that, if two persons hold towards each
other the physical relationship of father and son,
the father should not desire to enter into the moral
relationship of intercourse with his son and have it
reciprocated by loving and reverent affection and
obedience, so also, if there is a personal God from
whom man, has received his being, faculties, and all
else that he can call his, it is inconceivable that God
should not desire to enter into moral relationship
with him and receive a loving and obedient service
and worship. The conception of a God who, at
some past moment, made the world, set it spinning
like a top, and then ceased to care about it, has
always been rejected by the larger part of civilized
nations, and at the present day has fallen into
discredit. If, therefore, God desires this worship,
man ought to render it, and in the case of his
not rendering it, the requirements of natural

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 79

equity are violated and an indignity is offered to
God."

So much as this will be generally conceded to us
by agnostics. They do not challenge the inference
as to conduct and worship which Christians draw
from Christian premisses. They only challenge the
premisses, that is, the certainty of the existence of
God. They do not go so far as positively to deny the
existence of God. They merely contend that it is
uncertain. But in declaring it to be uncertain most
of them go farther, and admit with Darwin that it is
more probable than the opposite opinion. That is to
say, it is probable that there exists a God desirous
of receiving love and worship from His creatures,
and therefore reciprocally probable that it is man's
sacred duty to render it to Him. This the agnostic,
by the very fact that he protests against being called
an atheist, is bound to admit, and yet because he
professes himself unable to go farther and convert
the probability into a certainty, he cannot render
the worship. Such is the moral paradox to which
the agnostic is reduced.

And the paradox will be felt the greater if the
agnostic will observe that, on his own principles,
the hypothesis of the existence of an intelligent ruler
of the world is not only probable, but even the most
probable theory to account for the facts. When he
forgets his philosophy, and as a man of science, that
is, of physical science, adopts the attitude of the
pure realist, he professes himself agnostic on the
ground that Evolution in its extremest form may
account for that order reigning through Nature

8o OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

which is the theist's foundation-stone. Now, Evo
lution thus conceived, however it may be dressed
up in modern fashions, is in essence nothing but
the old theory of the fortuitous concourse of atoms :
the theory that, given eternal atoms and eternal
motion, eventually order will result from their inter
action, since order is self-sustaining and chaos is
not. Although in answer to this we have given
clear reasons to show that neither the theory of
chance nor that of evolution can account for the
orderly arrangements of the universe (§§ 42 — 46);
nevertheless let us grant again, for the sake of
argument, that either of the two is a conceivable
explanation of the genesis of the cosmos. Can it pos
sibly be claimed as relatively probable, or anything
but relatively most improbable when set in competi
tion with the rival theory of a personal Designer ?

If the agnostic puts on his philosophic cloak and
becomes a transfigured realist with Mr. Spencer,
the existence of an " Infinite " is admitted, and all
denied is the lawfulness, in face of the relativity of
knowledge, of attributing to the Unknown Cause
of the universe any attributes derived from the
consideration of the things of this world, man not
excluded. The protest made against the practice
of assigning them to Him is made on the ground
that they are likely to be altogether beneath Him :
that is to say — if logically explained — on the
likelihood that He may possess attributes which
may go so far beyond even the most noble qualities
of the human mind, that the latter are nothing but
a dim and comparatively insignificant image of a

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE 81

First Mind, and that human personality is but a dim
and comparatively insignificant image of the Person
ality of the First Cause. In other words, that the
great " Unknowable " is supereminently a person.

If the agnostic declines to be in any sense a
realist, and shuts himself up in some form of pure
idealism, we will not attempt to press him with
the statement of the present thesis. The idealist
is guilty of inconsistency in his every act of inter
course with the outer world. With such a burden
of inconsistencies upon him, and all so easily borne,
we cannot expect him to shrink from one more. But
we may say this, that for realists the hypothesis of
the existence of a personal God ought to count as the
most probable of the theories in the field, and thus
the moral paradox which has been described as arising
out of the agnostic position becomes the more acute.

55. Such is the logical consequence of agnos
ticism as regards the duties more properly called
religious. Its logical effects on the observance of
the moral law in general are also fatal. We main
tain that in the great mass of mankind, were agnosti
cism ever universally accepted, its effects, moral and
social, would be most pernicious. Individuals
of the average human type cannot lose the belief
in an , all-seeing and infinitely holy and just God
without being exposed to commit many crimes,
which they would not have committed if they had
persevered in that belief. If God does not exist,
no one is able to point out any sufficient prin
ciple of morality, which he can prove that man
is absolutely bound to abide by. Of course certain
G

82 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

actions will be more becoming than others, because
more suited to rational nature. If a man is a man
of good taste he will so far forth abide by these
actions and abstain from their opposites. But
suppose he does not care to be a man of taste,
what is to oblige him to it ? On that supposition,
no one has a right to blame his fellow-man for
enjoying life as he thinks fit. What is man, if you
take God away? What else but a machine made
of matter, held together by material forces ? What
shall oblige me to have more respect for that
machine called man, than for another called ox or
sheep or monkey, which anatomy proves to be con
structed on quite a similar plan and to be made
of the same organic elements ? Why is it a greater
crime to destroy a man-machine than to destroy a
monkey-machine ? Unless there is an immaterial
Divine Spirit, there cannot possibly be an imma
terial human soul, and if there is not an imma
terial human soul, our so-called freedom of will
is an illusion. But if our freedom is an illusion,
moral responsibility is an empty name, and if
that is an empty name, nobody is to be blamed,
however erroneous may be the misdeeds by which,
in the opinion of men, he sins against the dignity,
as it is called, of man. These and the like are the
practical lessons which logically follow from agnos
ticism. How can they be put into practice without
giving free rein to the most revolting vices in the
mass of men?

Again, if agnosticism with these moral conse
quences, which objectively are implied in it, were

OF AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. 83

universally prevalent, all social relations would sooner
or later be in hopeless confusion. The good order
of a commonwealth rests above all upon a healthy
family life. Where domestic relations, domestic
authority, domestic virtues are not respected, civil
relations will constitute a very frail machinery :
civil authority will only rest upon changeable party-
passions ; civil virtues will degenerate into hypo
critical egotism. But if in the family God is not
acknowledged, if His fear does not check the impe
tuosity of vicious cravings, the most sacred bonds
of family life will soon be broken. A nation
of agnostics soon would suffer from so many evils
that, to quote the saying of the Roman historian,
Sallust, " neither the evils nor their remedies would
be bearable." If such a nation did continue to exist
for awhile, if agnostic philosophers succeeded in
stemming the deluge of universal disorder by the
moral principles of utilitarians and altruists, the
reason could only be this, that human nature is too
good to suffer a universal application of the moral
principles which strict logic would recommend as
the consistent outcome of the agnostic theory. To
sum up, Agnosticism is a hypothesis which in its
logical consequences leads to the destruction of the
most fundamental principles of reason, and to the
moral and social ruin of mankind. Therefore it
must be out of harmony with human reason, it
must be altogether untrue and unreasonable.

No doubt it will be objected to this reasoning,
that agnostics are numerous now-a-days, and are
found to be as respectable as Christians in their

34 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

moral conduct. If by agnostics are meant select indi
viduals of that body, mainly persons in comfortable
circumstances, no imputation on their moral conduct
is intended. Their probity is quite recognized, and
is consistent with our argument : although it must
be admitted that agnosticism has yet to show that
it can scale the moral heights on which Christian
heroism is so much at home. The question is as to
logical consequences: and these must be sought, not
in individuals, but in masses. Moreover, a suffi
ciency of time must be allowed for the tendencies to
work out their natural results. If agnosticism and
Christianity are compared in their effects on the
masses of men, already the baneful tendency of the
former is disclosing itself in a growing corruption
of morals wherever it prevails.

This, we may infer, is only the beginning.
Centuries of recognition of the Christian sanctions
of the moral law have bequeathed a strong here
ditary bias in favour of morality which will hold out
for awhile against the adverse forces. But this bias
must abate, if the world continues to drift away from
the only sound form of theism, which is Christianity.
Mr. Spencer, we know, anticipates a blissful age
when the feeling of moral constraint, of the "ought,"
will die of atrophy, because the path of right and the
path of pleasure will, under the influence of more
suitable education, have been made to coincide.
We can only say that the present outlook, if we go
by observation, not by questionable a priori infer
ences, offers no anticipations of any such eventual
coincidence.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE PER
SONAL GOD AND HIS FUNDAMENTAL RELATION TO
THINGS DISTINCT FROM HIM.

Introductory Remarks.

56. THERE exists a personal God, that is to say,
a self-existing, intelligent Being, upon whom the
material world and mankind depend. This state
ment is the outcome of the proofs given in the
preceding chapter. Against it and the evidences for
it several difficulties have been advanced, which it is
our duty to weigh and to solve. However, to do
this with greater clearness, it will be useful first to
treat of the most fundamental attributes of the
personal God, His unity, simplicity, and infinity;
and then to state the fundamental relation, in which
all things distinct from God stand to Him ; in other
words, to show that there is no being besides God,
which does not owe its origin to creation out of
nothing by God's power.

SECTION i. — The Unity of God
Thesis VII. — There can be but One personal God.

57. When we say that God is One, we mean
that the Divine Nature exists undivided, and cou-

86 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

sequently is not something belonging to several
Beings. From what Christian Revelation teaches
about the incomprehensible mystery of the Blessed
Trinity, the Christian student is acquainted with
the dogma that God is One and Three ; that there
are three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost, each of whom is the same One God.
Therefore if we say the Father is God, the Son is
God, the Holy Ghost is God, we do not wish to be
understood as predicating the Divine Nature of the
Divine Persons in exactly the same sense in which
we predicate the human nature, when we attribute
it to three human persons, Peter and Paul and
Andrew. By the affirmation that one human nature
is common to three human persons, we do not
mean that really one and the same existing human
nature belongs equally to the three, for, as St.
Thomas expresses it, in three individuals of the
human nature there are three humanities;1 that is
to say, three human persons are not rightly spoken
of as having one human nature, but as being per
fectly similar to one another, in regard of those
attributes, which, being contained in our general
idea of human nature, are predicable of each of
them. But quite another meaning is to be given to
the statement that One Divine Nature is common
to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It means
that the three Divine Persons are One real Divine
Existence, One undivided Divine Essence. In the
language of St. Thomas we may thus express the

1 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 39. 3. " In tribus suppositis hurrianae
aturre sunt tres humanitates."

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 87

difference between the meanings of the terms "one"
and " common " in the two phrases mentioned :
"The unity and community of the human nature is
not an objective reality but a subjective conception
of objective reality, . . . but the actuality signified
by the name ' God/ that is to say, the Divine
Essence, is in its objective reality both one and
common."2

58. The mystery of the Blessed Trinity and its
relation to the Unity of God is in our thesis neither
affirmed nor denied. Its truth transcends human
reason, and is to be believed on the authority of
that personal God whose unity and infinity we can
prove, and whose infinite perfection guarantees His
veracity. The Divine character of the doctrine of
the Blessed Trinity is to be vindicated by Dogmatic
Theology, whose task it is also to show that there is
no manifest contradiction between the two state-

2 St. Thomas, i. 39. 4. ad 3m. " Unitas autem sive communitas
humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum con-
siderationem. . . . Sed forma significata per hoc nomen, Deus,
scilicet essentia divina est una et communis secundum rem."
Neither St. Thomas nor we ourselves must be understood to mean
that there is no objective foundation for the oneness of our conception
of human nature. There is indeed an objective foundation for it ;
but it does not consist in the real identity, but in the real similarity of
human nature as considered in many human subjects. It is this
which St. Thomas teaches (Sum. Theol. i. 13. 9), saying: " Natura
humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem." He
implies thereby that the meaning of the abstract term " human
nature " is really verified in each of many human individuals. Yet
as each individual verification of that term differs from any other
individual verification considered as individual, there is no objective
identity, but only objective similarity. For further information on
this subject, cf. Clarke's Logic, pp. 140 — 162.

88 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

ments, God is One in Essence, God is Three in Persons.
We have to prove only the former of these state
ments.

59. We may commence by appealing to the unity
of the universe as testifying to the unity of its
author. It is true that a two-fold objection may be
taken to the validity of such an appeal. It may be
urged that in addition to the universe in which we
are placed, there may possibly be other universes, one
or more, in the remotest regions of space, so far off
as to enter into no relations whatever with any even
the most distant of the constellations which belong
to our cosmos. Whatever unity we discern in our
own cosmical environment, however it may point
to a single Creator of itself, is quite consistent, it
may be urged, with the co-existence of other self-
existing creators for other universes of the kind
suggested. This is the first objection. Another is
that unity of result need not imply more than unity
of action in the cause. Thus the unity even of our
own universe might be satisfied by the hypothesis of
several self-existing Gods acting in friendly com
bination.

It must be conceded that in view of these
objections an appeal to the unity of our universe as
evidence of the oneness of God falls short of absolute
validity. In other words, it can only establish a
presumption, predisposing our minds to the accept
ance of the metaphysical arguments presently to be
propounded. The presumption, however, is entitled
to be regarded as exceedingly strong. The two
possibilities mentioned as depriving it of full cer-

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 89

tainty are not of a very solid character. Only
captiousness could accept them as in themselves
probable solutions of the problem of cosmical unity.
On this point we may hear Mr. John Stuart Mill,
a man not too given to assent to the conclusions
of Natural Theology. He says:3

" The specific effect of science is to show by
accumulating evidence, that every event in nature
is connected by laws with some fact or facts
which preceded it, or in other words, depends for
its existence on some antecedent ; but yet not so
strictly on one as not to be liable to frustration or
modification from others : for these distinct chains
of causation are so entangled with one another, the
action of each cause is so interfered with by other
causes, though each acts according to its own fixed
law, that every effect is truly the result rather of the
aggregate of all causes in existence than of any one
only, and nothing takes place in the world of our
experience without spreading a perceptible influence
of some sort through a greater or less portion of
Nature, and making perhaps every portion of it
slightly different from what it would have been, if
that event had not taken place. Now, when once
the double conviction has found entry into the mind
— that every event depends on antecedents ; and at
the same time that to bring it about many ante
cedents must concur, perhaps all the antecedents
in Nature, insomuch that a slight difference in any

3 Mill, Three Essays on Religion, pp. 132, seq. We give Mill's
words in full, without committing ourselves to every statement he
makes on the subject.

90 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

one of them might have prevented the phenomenon,
or materially altered its character — the conviction
follows that no one event, certainly no one kind of
events, can be absolutely pre-ordained or governed
by any Being but one who holds in his hand the
reins of all Nature and not of some department
only. At least if a plurality be supposed, it is
necessary to assume so complete a concert of action
and unity of will among them that the difference is
for most purposes immaterial between such a theory
and that of the absolute unity of the Godhead. . . .
The reason, then, why monotheism may be accepted
as the representative of theism in the abstract, is
not so much because it is the theism of all the
more improved portions of the human race, as
because it is the only theism which can claim for
itself any footing on scientific ground." We agree
fully with Mill's last statement, and would refer
the reader to Ch. Pesch,4 who argues that the
result of the best modern archaeological researches
is to show that monotheism and not polytheism
was the primitive form of religious belief.

60. Let us now pass on to the metaphysical
argument, for which we must claim certainty,
although it has to be acknowledged that it is some
what subtle and requires careful reflection for the
perception of its full force. But this, after all, is
only what must be expected when we have to deal
with so sublime a subject.

With St. Thomas we may introduce the argument

4 Cf. Ch. Pesch, Der Gottesbcgriff, i. and ii. Freiburg : Herder,
1885 and 1888.

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. gi

thus : If the reality expressed by the concept of
Socrates did not comprise more notes than the reality
expressed by the concept of man, the extension of
both concepts would be the same : in other words,
there would be only one man, as there is only one
Socrates. Now the reality corresponding to the
concept of this God does not contain more notes
than the reality corresponding to the concept of
God or of Divine Nature : because God has not
a nature produced by another being, but is His
nature, being a cause without cause.5

In other words, when there are diverse beings
sharing the same common nature, as there are
distinct men sharing the common nature of man,
there must be a principle of diversity as well as a
principle of unity. The diversity cannot be without
its raison d 'etre any more than the unity. In the
case of God there is not this double principle.

It will help to the understanding of this
argument, which we acknowledge to be very
abstract, if we put it also in another way. If there
are several self-existing beings, the reason of the
distinction between them must either be self-
existence as such, or something necessarily con
nected with self-existence as such, or something
accidentally connected with it. Manifestly, however,
self-existence as such cannot be the ground of the
distinction in question. Nor can the distinction

5 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. n. 3. " Si ergo Socrates per id
esset homo per quod est hie homo, sicut non possunt esse plures
Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem convenit
Deo : nam ipse Deus est sua natura. . . . Secundum igitur idem est
Deus et hie Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures Deos."

92 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

proceed from anything necessarily connected with
self-existence as such; for that must be wherever
self-existence is. Nor can anything accidentally
connected with self-existence be said to constitute a
reason for the said distinction ; because a self-
existent being is necessarily unchangeable, change
implying possibility of successive states of existence,
and such possibility is incompatible with self-
existence, which must be as constant as the essence
with which it is identical.

SECTION 2. — The Simplicity of God.

Thesis VIII. — God's Being is physically and
metaphysically simple.

61. What is one is undivided in so far as it is
one ; what is simple, is not only undivided but
indivisible. Oneness does not exclude composition,
although it excludes division ; with simplicity all
composition is incompatible. Every man is one
natural being, but he is not one simple being,
because he consists of two substantial principles,
body and soul, united with one another. Man
therefore is composed of substantial parts ; in him
there is substantial composition. If we consider
the immaterial soul of man alone, we have a being
not composed of substantial parts, and therefore
rightly called a simple substance. Nevertheless,
even the soul is not exempt from all composition.
It is liable to accidental composition. For it is
changeable in regard to its thoughts and volitions,
so that we can distinguish these and it as com-

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 93

ponent parts of a whole. Both these kinds of com
position are found in existing things, and we call
them real or physical composition. In God neither
of them exists, consequently He is physically simple
in the strictest sense.

The proof of the physical simplicity of God
rests upon His self-existence. Whatever is sub
stantially compounded, depends in its essential
constitution upon the union of parts, each of which
differs from the compound substance. But since
the self-existent owes nothing to what is different
from itself, its essential constitution cannot depend
upon the union of parts different from itself. There
fore God, being self-existent, cannot be substantially
compounded. Nor is accidental composition con
ceivable in the Divine Being. How could it be ?
An accident is a perfection or modification added
to the nature of a substance. But to the nature
of the Divine Substance no perfection or modifica
tion can be added. Any addition made could not
be the addition of anything self-existent, because
what falls under the conception of self-existence
belongs to the Divine Nature itself. Nor, again,
could it be the addition of anything not self-existent :
because what is not self-existent cannot be found in
the Divine Nature.

The same follows from the infinity of God which,
as we shall see, is a corollary of God's self-existence
and unity. This infinity supposed, we argue thus :
What is infinitely perfect can receive no addition.
But every accident is an addition to the substance
in which it inheres. Therefore a being infinitely

94 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

perfect, as God's Being really is, can receive no
accident.

62. Moreover God is not only physically simple, but
also metaphysically. As physical simplicity excludes
physical composition, so metaphysical simplicity
excludes metaphysical composition. The difference
between physical (real) and metaphysical (virtual)
composition may be thus expressed : Physical com
position means union of diverse realities completing
one another to constitute one really existing being,
as for instance, man is a physical compound of
body and soul ; metaphysical composition means
union of diverse concepts referring to the same real
being in such a way that none of them by itself
signifies either explicitly or even implicitly the whole
reality signified by their combination ; man, for
instance, is a metaphysical compound of animal
and rational. This metaphysical composition belongs
to all creatures, even to such as are physically
simple. The reason for this assertion is obvious
enough. That which is signified by the defi
nition of a created thing, its essence as we call it,
depends for its existence, not upon itself, but upon
its creating cause. Without the influx of the
creating power of God the creature is nothing but
an objective idea of the Divine Mind, something
known only as capable of existing under the con
dition that God wills its existence. In other words,
the essence of every creature is in itself a mere
possibility ; not a real, but a conditional existence.
In conceiving its essence, or the contents of its
definition, we thereby neither express nor imply its

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 95

existence. Consequently the objective concept of
the real existence of a creature is metaphysically
compounded of the two concepts of its essence
and existence.6 That this first kind of metaphysical
composition cannot be predicated of God is evident;
for its only foundation is the contingency of created
being; therefore it must be alien to the Divine
Nature, which exists with absolute necessity.

63. Another sort of metaphysical composition in
creatures is that contained in the objective concept
of their specific nature. The species man or rational
animal includes what is meant by the two concepts
animal and rational. As the former is equally
applicable to irrational beasts and to men, it
evidently neither expresses nor implies the meaning
of the concept rational. Therefore we say that
human nature is metaphysically composed of the
genus animal and the specific difference rational.
Now this sort of metaphysical composition is in
compatible with the Divine Nature ; because God
cannot be included in any genus of beings. Beings
can be classed as one genus, only so far as under
some one aspect their essences are perfectly similar,
occupying in this respect a perfectly equal position
in the scale of beings. But God cannot be perfectly
similar to any order of beings diverse from Himself
under any aspect whatsoever ; because all other
beings are dependent upon Him; they are, as it

6 St. Thomas and the scholastics expressed this briefly by
saying that in no created thing are essence and existence the
same ; and that every created thing is composed of essence and
existence, or of potentiality and actuality (potentia and actus).

g6 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

were, an outflow of His unchangeable simple self-
existence. His justice cannot be perfectly similar
to any sort of created justice, nor His mercy to any
mercy belonging to any of His creatures. Borrowing
a beautiful, although necessarily inadequate illustra
tion from the Angelic Doctor,7 we may say : As the
sun by his light and heat is the unapproachable prin
ciple of millions of forms of life and growth, so God
by His wisdom and power is the unapproachable
principle of all kinds of beings, surpassing in His
simplicity the manifold perfections of all and each
of them by an infinite distance. It is this which
Mr. Herbert Spencer has in view when he rightly
maintains that those who admit a first self-
existing unconditional Being must admit that
this Being cannot be classified. " Between the
creating and the created," he says,8 " there must be
a distinction transcending any of the distinctions
existing between different divisions of the created.
. . . The infinite cannot be grouped along with
something that is finite ; since, in being so grouped,
it must be regarded as not-infinite. It is impossible
to put the absolute in the same category with any
thing relative, so long as the absolute is defined as
that of which no necessary relation can be pre
dicated. . . . There cannot be more than one First
Cause. . . . The unconditioned therefore as classable
neither with any form of the conditioned nor with
any other unconditioned cannot be classed at all."
So far so good. But when the same author goes on
to say of the unconditioned First Cause : " To
7 Sum. Theol. i. q. 4. a. 2. ad im. 8 First Principles, p. Si.

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 97

admit that it cannot be known as of such or such
kind, is to admit that it is unknowable," he certainly
is wrong. It is true, from the impossibility of
classifying God with any creatures, it follows that
no creature can know Him adequately as He is
knowable and known by Himself; that no creature
can comprehend Him. But our inability to com
prehend God does not imply that we cannot
predicate of God whatever real perfection there is
in creatures. Later on we shall give reasons to
show that we have a real and true knowledge of
God, however utterly inadequate it may be.

64. For the present we may add that not
only the metaphysical composition mentioned above,
but any conceivable sort of metaphysical composi
tions are all inapplicable to God. The general reason
for this may be stated thus : Concepts which in
their application to objective reality are absolutely
inseparable, so that none of them can have a real
foundation different from the real foundation of the
rest, cannot be metaphysically compounded. For
though none expresses what is expressed by the others,
yet each of them implies all the rest. But the
concepts which we form of the Divine attributes are
in their application to objective reality absolutely
inseparable. Each of the Divine attributes in its
objective reality coincides with the one self-existing
Divine substance, which we have proved to be a
simple unchangeable essence. Consequently none
of the Divine attributes has any objective foundation
except in so far as it is one with the rest ; which
is evidently the same as to say that the Divine
H

98 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

attributes are absolutely inseparable in their appli
cation to objective reality. Divine justice, for
instance, without Divine mercy is impossible ; and
so is Divine power without Divine wisdom. There
fore these attributes are not metaphysically com
pounded, although they must be said to be meta
physically or virtually distinct; the concept of justice
does not express what is expressed by the concept of
mercy, although it implies the same.9

SECTION 3. — The Infinity of God.
Thesis IX. — God is infinitely perfect.

65. Infinite, according to the etymological mean
ing of the word, is that which has no limits. Now
a thing may be said to have no limits, either because
we are not able to assign its limits, or because it
is really unlimited. We speak, for instance, of an

0 Real distinction does not necessarily mean real composition, nor
does virtual distinction necessarily mean virtual composition. For
things to be compounded they must first be distinct ; but, given the
existence of distinct things, it is not necessary that they should be
compounded together into a unity. Catholic Theology recognizes
a real distinction between the three Divine Persons, because They
are, as "substantial" relations within the One Godhead, opposed
to one another ; but it is not constrained in consequence to admit
that the Godhead is really compounded of Them, because it teaches
that each Person is not really distinct from, but really identical
with, the Essence of the Divinity. Again, Catholic Theology
recognizes a virtual distinction between the Divine Essence and
each Divine Person, but it does not teach us that the Divine
Essence is virtually compounded of the three Persons, because the
concept of each Divine Person does not prescind from, but involves
the concept of the Divine Essence. These observations show us
that the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is opposed neither to the
physical nor to the metaphysical simplicity of God.

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 99

infinite number, of infinite space. These expressions
do not imply that number and space do or can exist
without limit. That is repugnant to reason. For
what is number in reality but a collection of units,
all of which are equally conceivable by one general
concept ? But no collection of such units can be so
great that the addition of another unit would be
inconceivable ; on the contrary, however much it
may be increased, it must remain a limited number.
If it ever became really unlimited or infinite, the
taking away of one unit would make it finite ; and
its infinitude would be made up of a finite number
and a finite unit, which is evidently absurd.10

66. Nor can space be actually unlimited, because
its real foundation consists in the dimensions between
the extreme surfaces of one body, or of many bodies
taken together, or of all bodies forming the one
universe, as we call it. Now such dimensions cannot
become so large as not to allow of a larger one. If
space ever were actually infinite, a certain part of it,
say a cubic inch, would be contained in the whole a
really infinite number of times, the impossibility of
which is clear from what we have said about infinite
number.11

67. A so-called infinite number, therefore, can
only be a number so great that every number assign
able by us is next to nothing in comparison with it.
In the same way, infinite space can exist only so far
as there can exist a space so great that any corporeal
magnitude assigned by us is next to nothing when
compared with its dimensions.

10 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 7. 4. u IHd. 7. 3.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

These remarks about infinite number and space
will serve to illustrate the meaning of the word
"infinite** when applied to God. We do not intend
thereby to suggest the idea of a being containing
infinite extended parts, or compounded of any sort
of infinite entities. Such notions not only suppose
the possibility of infinite extension and number, but
are also opposed to the simplicity of God, as already
proved.

68. Infinity, then, when predicated of God,
means that He is unlimited in His perfection, that
is to say, that every perfection conceivable belongs
to Him. The proof of this statement is based on
the truth that God alone is self-existent, and every
thing else contingent. This truth supposed, we may
argue thus : All perfections conceivable fall either
under the heading self-existent or under the heading
contingent, in other words, they are either uncaused
or capable of being caused. The former class God
possesses formally, that is, He possesses them as
they are in themselves according to their own
proper nature. The other class, since He, as the
only First Cause, is able to produce them, He
must have equivalently and eminently : that is, in
some manner superior to the manner in which
they exist outside Him, and at the same time
enabling Him to realize them in their own proper
nature.

Thus God is infinite in all perfections. For it is

no limitation to His perfection that He does not

contain contingent perfections formally. To contain

hem eminently is more than to contain them merely

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 101

formally. It is, in fact, to contain them in an
infinite instead of a finite manner.

69. This truth of the infinite perfection of God
must be our guide in deciding whether any given
attribute can be predicated of God or not. There is
a truth underlying the error of the agnostic, namely,
the fact that our knowledge of God, although evi
dently true as far as it goes, must necessarily be
inadequate. From this, however, it by no means
follows that no name expressing a created perfection
can be given to the Most High. On the contrary,
we say that all nouns and verbs applied to creatures, so
far as their objective meaning expresses pure perfection
without connoting imperfection, must be true of God
before they can be true of creatures. Indeed perfection,
as such, signifies something actual ; and everything
actual, so far as it can be conceived without the
limitations and privations which accompany its
existence in created beings, must be eminently in
the Infinite Being.

70. The preceding observations enable us to lay
down the following three canons for the predicates
to be given to God in common with creatures in
general and with man in particular.

I. Although no predicate given to creatures, and
expressing a perfection, attributes this perfection to them
without limit; yet the meanings of some predicates, taken
by themselves, do not connote imperfection, whereas the
meanings of others always connote it. The former must
be applied to God in the proper sense of the words, the
latter not. Thus we may say of God that He is
infinitely mighty, infinitely wise, has infinite know-

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

ledge, is infinitely^/, infinitely benevolent, and so on.
But we cannot say that He is infinitely extended like
a body, that He reasons with infinite perfection, that
He possesses infinite courage, &c. To illustrate the
difference by an example, let us take the two
adjectives wise and courageous. I may say and must
say of God that He is wise in the proper sense of
the word. And why so ? Because the word wise
denotes the perfection of knowing the causes of
things, and this perfection can be conceived without
the addition of any imperfection. But it is quite
otherwise with the word courageous. This connotes
the condition of having to face danger, whereas
a being which can be threatened with danger
necessarily must be limited in its perfection ;
only things weak and not wholly self-sufficient
can be brought into danger. And thus the infi
nitely perfect God cannot be properly said to be
courageous.

71. II. Although certain predicates are in the most
proper sense applicable to God and to creatures; yet they
are true of God in an infinitely higher sense than of
creatures. In God they are found without limit and
independently, in creatures they are found under
limitation, and with entire dependence upon the
power of God. Consequently, the relation of these
predicates to God and to creatures is not equal,
but most unequal, although their meaning is
realized in both : and, in consequence, when we
ascribe them to God, our intention is to ascribe
them to Him with the understanding, implied or
expressed, that there is this inequality of relation

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 103

between the mode in which the reality signified
exists in Him and in creatures. This may be
illustrated by our parallel procedure when in
propositions worded in exactly the same terms, we
ascribe beauty of countenance to a portrait and to
its living original. In each case we say, " What a
beautiful face," and by employing in each case
exactly the same language, we signify that the same
reality finds a truthful concrete expression alike in
the original and in the portrait ; but we are quite
aware of the great difference between the mode in
which beauty of countenance is realized and predi-
cable in the two cases. If we do not call attention
to the difference by the wording of our proposition,
this is partly because when a reality is predicated of
a subject in a simple proposition, the predication
asserts only the fact of the subject possessing the
reality, not the mode in which it is possessed, partly
because the difference of mode is sufficiently clear
to the persons addressed without formal statement,
or at all events can be left to stand over till another
time, as one cannot be always explaining. As it is
always an advantage to have technical terms to fix
distinctions like this, predication is said to be
univocal when the reality predicated is not only
found in all the subjects of predication, but found
in each of them in the same manner, and analogical
when it is found in them, and thereby founds an
analogy between them, but is not in them all in the
same manner.

To apply this doctrine to the case of God,
we say that attributes like "being," "goodness,"

io4 OF THE EXISTENCE OP GOD.

"power," "wisdom," &c., are predicable of God
as well as of creatures, meaning thereby that the
meaning of these terms has a true realization in
Him, although we are quite aware, and on fitting
occasions explicitly declare, that the manner in which
they are realized in Him differs widely from the way
in which they are realized in His creatures : that
His Being, Goodness, Power, Wisdom, &c., are
necessary, uncaused and self-existent, and without
limit ; whereas the being, goodness, power, wisdom,
&c., of creatures is contingent, caused, and finite.
We say, therefore, that these terms are predicable
of God and creatures, not univocally, but analogi
cally. 12

From this second canon there follows the very
important corollary :

The application of the same predicates to God and to
creatures does not imply co-ordination or classification of
God with creatures.

Wherever two things are co-ordinated or classi
fied together there must be not only likeness, but,
under one aspect at least, perfect likeness. Now
creatures, though imitations of the Divine Essence
in all their perfections, are under no aspect perfectly
like that Essence. What we mean, when we speak
of created perfections, is in God really ; but the way
in which it is in Him, differs under all aspects from

"Quantum igitur ad id quod significant hujusmodi nomina,
proprie competunt Deo et magis proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et
per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi
non dicuntur proprie de Deo." (Sum. Theol. i. 13. 3. c. Cf. ibid.
ad 2dum. : •• Id quod significatur per nomen non convenit eo modo
ei (Deo quo nomen significat sed excellentiori modo. '

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 105

the way in which it is in creatures, not only in
degree but in kind.

Thus, for instance, wisdom, or the knowledge of
the nature of things and their causes, is truly in
God, and can to a certain extent be truly in man.
But in God it is identical with the simple and
infinite Divine substance ; consequently God is His
wisdom, and His wisdom is an eternal all-compre
hensive act of knowledge, including (as identical
with it) an infinitely perfect Will, which never can
act against the practical corollaries of theoretical
wisdom. In man, on the contrary, wisdom exists as
an acquired accidental quality, now as actual know
ledge, now as an habitual disposition to actual
knowledge ; and so far as it is actual knowledge in
the mind, it is composed of many successive mental
acts, all of which are more or less inadequate
expressions of their objects. In a word, a wise
man is not his wisdom, but has wisdom, and has it
only in a very small degree.

72. III. Predicates, the meaning of which expresses
perfection with connotation of imperfection, though they
cannot be true of God in their proper sense, may be true
of Him when used metaphorically.

As man belongs to the order of sensible things,
he is fond of clothing his thoughts in impressive
imagery drawn from the objects of sense. A hero is
a lion ; a discoverer a luminary of science ; and so
forth. This use of metaphors, provided it be in
taste and moderation, is a great aid to human
language, even in speaking of God Himself. Instead
of naming a perfection of His directly, we may

106 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

suggest it indirectly by expressing something which
bears a resemblance to it at least under one or other
aspect. Thus we may attribute eyes to God to signify
His knowledge, ears to express His acceptance of
our prayers. We may speak of Him as angry with
sinners, when we would point to effects of His
justice.

73. This subject of the application of terms of
human thought to the Deity is treated by St.
Thomas,13 whose doctrine is the doctrine of all
Catholic philosophers. It could therefore only
be want of familiarity with their teaching which
led Mr. Herbert Spencer not to except them
from the charge of anthropomorphism which he
launches against even the most civilized believers
in a knowable Deity. These are his words : u
" From the time when the rudest savages imagined
the causes of all things to be creatures of
flesh and blood like themselves, down to our own
time, the degree of assumed likeness has been
diminishing. But though a bodily form and sub
stance similar to that of man, has long since ceased
among cultivated races to be a literally-conceived
attribute of the Ultimate Cause ; though the grosser
human desires have been also rejected as unfit
elements of the conception ; though there is some
hesitation in ascribing even the higher human
feelings, save in greatly idealized shapes ; yet it is
still thought not only proper, but imperative, to

18 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. q. 13. Especially, art. 3. art. 5. and
art. 6. are to be noted.

14 First Principles, pp. 109, no.

FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 107

ascribe the most abstract qualities of our nature.
To think of the Creative Power as in all respects
anthropomorphous, is now considered impious by
men who yet hold themselves bound to think of the
Creative Power as in some .respects anthropomor
phous, and who do not see that the one proceeding
is but an evanescent form of the other."

Certainly it would be great irreverence to enter
tain an anthropomorphous conception of God, so as
to attribute to Him human perfections, as such, in
the limited and imperfect way that those perfections
exist in ourselves. But no instructed theist will do
so. It is true that we attribute to God what Mr.
Spencer seems to call the most abstract qualities of
our nature, understanding, free-will, wisdom, bene
volence, love of justice, &c. Yet at the same time we
explain that only the abstract meaning of these
perfections is objectively real in God, not the
dependence and limitation which attend the realiza
tion of that meaning in man. Instead of co
ordinating God with man in any of these attri
butes, we prove that all of them in Him are
identical with His self-existing nature in a way
infinitely perfect, and therefore infinitely exceeding
our experience and our comprehension. But the
fact that we are unable to comprehend God's infinity
is no proof that we can know nothing definite about
Him. On the contrary, as we have shown, His
very infinitude compels us to predicate of Him
whatever created perfection is, by way of abstraction
and exclusion of limits, conceivable without in
cluding objective defect or imperfection. Moreover,

io8 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

after having predicated all this, as far as we can, we
must confess that all the predicates by which we
have tried to describe the infinite Majesty of the
Most High, though they express what is truly proper to
His Being, nevertheless fall infinitely short of an
adequate representation of that Being.

The final practical conclusion, therefore, to which
we are led by reasoning from creatures to their First
Cause, is not that of the agnostic who says, " We
ought to be silent about the attributes of God," but
that of 'the Psalmist: ''Great is the Lord and
exceedingly to be praised;"15 "Magnify the Lord
with me, and let us extol His name together."16

18 Psalm xlvii. i. i« Psalm xxxiii. 4.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATION OF GOD TO THE
WORLD. REFUTATION OF PANTHEISM. DOCTRINE
OF CREATION.

Introductory Remarks.

74. OUR inquiries about the First Cause of things
have led us to the conclusion that there exists one
self-existent, simple, infinitely perfect Being, the
personal God of monotheism. We now have to
show that this personal God is the First Cause
of all that is not God, by creation of it all out of
nothing. We will first explain what is meant by
creation out of nothing, and then show that the
world owes its origin to a Divine act of creation.

SECTION i. — Definition of Creation.

75. Creation, in the wider sense of the word, signi
fies a change produced in things already existing,
or in the relations between them. Thus we say, that
men of genius create works of art ; that the Pope
creates Cardinals, that a speech creates a sensation.
It is evident that in the production of every such
change something is originated which did not exist
before ; for if nothing at all resulted but what there

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

was already, there would be no change. On this
ground we might be tempted to say that every
production is creation out of nothing. However,
this is true only in a limited sense, inasmuch as
the result of the change was previously nothing and
has now become something. It is not true that
there was no substratum or subject pre-existing
which underwent the change. More strictly speak
ing, the change of a thing is not produced out of
nothing, but out of something changeable.

76. Creation in the strict sense may be defined as
follows with St. Thomas : " Creation is a production
of a thing according to its whole substance, nothing
being presupposed, whether created or increate." 1

In explanation of this definition we may remark :

(a) Creation is production. Consequently, what
is created is not without cause, but is the effect of
an existing cause.

(b) Creation is the production of a thing according
to its whole substance. In other words, by creation is
originated the whole of a thing existing in itself.
The phrase, "according to its whole substance,"
distinguishes creation from accidental and sub
stantial changes. An accidental change takes place
when a thing is modified and yet remains speci
fically the same thing. Thus a child is accidentally
changed by growing bigger, by receiving sense-
impressions, by moving about, by developing his
intellectual faculties, &c. A substantial change

1 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 65. 3. c. : " Creatio autem est pro-
ductio alicujus rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praj-
supposito, quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum."

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. in

supposes a substance to be specifically changed.
As simple immaterial substances cannot change
their kinds, only corporeal substances are capable
of substantial changes. We have a substantial
change in an individual body, when it manifests
forces differing not only in degree but in kind from
those which it had before. Thus it is probable that
every chemical composition involves a substantial
change of the elements combined, and it is certain
that the change of inanimate matter into a living
plant or animal is a substantial one.

(c) The terms of our definition explained under
(a) and (6), constitute its essence ; the rest is added
by St. Thomas in order to illustrate the meaning of
creation out of nothing more fully by opposing it to
certain false theories.

a. By adding that to the production called
creation nothing uncreated is presupposed, St.Thomas
opposes the pantheistic error, according to which
the world is an emanation from the Divine Sub
stance.2 By the same addition, creation out of
nothing is contrasted with the Platonic notion of
an uncreated matter, an error which pervaded also
the philosophy of the lonians.3

/?. By adding that creation is a production where
nothing created is presupposed, it is explicitly marked
as something altogether different from the change of
existing things.4

a Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. q. 90. art. i.

3 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. q. 44. art. 2 ; De Potcntia, q. 3.
art. 5.

4 Cf. Contra Gent. ii. 17 ; De Potentia, q. 3. art. 2.

H2 OF THE EXISTENCE OU GOD.

77. Another scholastic definition of creation taken
in the strict sense of the word is the following, not
easily expressed in English : Crealio est productio rci
ex nihilo sui el subjecti. We may perhaps paraphrase
it thus : " Creation is the production of a thing
from a previous non-existence as regards itself, and
also as regards any being on which the creative
act was exercised." After the explanation we have
given of St. Thomas' definition, this other will be
sufficiently understood, if attention be paid to these
two points:

(a) That is said to be produced ex nihilo sui,
which is really produced. Every effect therefore is
a. productio ex nihilo sui, even if it consists only in the
accidental or substantial change of a pre-existing
thing.

(b) That is said to be produced ex nihilo sui et
subjecti which is not merely the result of a change,
but a whole new being, a whole substance, which
exists by the power of an efficient cause, and of
which nothing existed before. We have now to
prove that the world originated through creation
in the sense explained, and we commence by
excluding the alternative suppositions.

SECTION 2. — Pantheism.

78. Thesis X. — The world and its component
elements are not affections of the Divine Substance and
inherent in it, but are altogether distinct from it. Pan
theism, therefore, is repugnant to reason.

This assertion is directed against the pantheists
or monists, who maintain that the assemblage of

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 113

things which we call the world is really the one
Divine Absolute Being under various aspects ; these
aspects they are pleased to call sometimes moments,
sometimes determinations, sometimes modes. We
are not here concerned with the semi-pantheistic
theories of emanation, according to which creatures
are particles separated from the Divine Substance.5
Our proposition is directed against Pantheism in
its perfect form. We shall consider it only in its
most general outlines, as it manifests itself in some
fundamental theorems common to the well-known
pantheistic systems of Spinoza,6 Fichte,7 Schelling,8
and Hegel.9

These authors, though starting from very different
principles, agree with one another in these two
assertions :

I. Properly speaking, there exists only one Being.
This one Being is called Substance by Spinoza, the
Pure Ego by Fichte, the Absolute by Schelling,10 the
Logical Concept by Hegel.

II. The one Being evolves itself by a necessity
of fate into forms of being, diverse from and opposed
to one another, inasmuch as they are so many
several determinations under which the First Being
manifests itself; and yet at the same time all one
and the same, inasmuch as it is the same First

5 Concerning these theories, see § 84 below.

6 Ethica, Pars I. Prop. vi.

7 Grundlinien, der gesammten Wissemchaftslehre (Leipzig, 1794)*
pp. 10, seq.

8 Philosophic der Natur (1803), p. 67.

9 Encyclopadie, Band. i. §§ 9, 21.

10 Schelling considerably modified his system in his later works.

I

ii4 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Being that manifests itself under all these diverse
determinations.

79. Against these assertions we say :

(a) The attributes of the First Being, demon
strated by us in the preceding theses, compared
with our external and internal experience, forbid us
to admit that the same being is really common to
God and to the things of this world.

We have seen that the First Being, called God,
is one undivided essence, in no way composed of
parts, and that He unites all perfections in the
identity of His unchangeable existence. On the
other hand, external and internal experience bear
witness to the fact that the world round about us,
and human beings themselves, form not really one
undivided substance, but many separate individuals,
each complete in its own being, differing from and
not seldom opposed one to another in natural or
voluntary tendencies. Is it not ridiculous to say
that a cat is the same real being with the mouse
which she devours, and with the dog that worries
her, and that cat and dog alike are the same being
with the master who with his whip restores peace
between them ? Is it not absurd to maintain that
the criminal to be hanged is really the same being
with the Judge who pronounces sentence of death
against him, and with the executioner who carries
out this sentence ? And who can accept the state
ment that the atheist is substantially the same
Being with God, whose existence he denies and
whose name he blasphemes ?

Moreover, experience tells us that there is

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 115

nothing in the material world known to man which
is not either composed of parts, or a part itself;
and that, consequently, nothing is complete and
perfect in its simplicity. How then can this world
be really one Being with God, of whom we have
proved that He is in the highest degree simple ?

Finally, reason based on experience teaches us
that the purely corporeal world lacks altogether the
faculties of understanding and free-will, and that
these faculties, even in the most gifted of the human
race, are in a state of imperfection and perfectibility.
It is therefore absolutely impossible that either the
corporeal or the spiritual world known to men
should be one with God, who, as we have proved,
is infinitely perfect, and therefore under all aspects
without defect, and incapable of evolving new per
fections or new modes of perfection in His own
Being.

80. (b) The evolution of the Deity, as stated by
pantheists, is not only opposed to God's attributes,
it also involves a contradiction. There is nothing
by which it could be caused but the internal activity
of the First Cause. Now an activity, by which the
First Cause should produce in itself what it does
not already possess, is inconceivable. Such pro
duction would result in effects contained in their
total cause neither formally nor eminently : that is to
say, neither in the same way in which they exist
when produced, nor in a higher way more than
equivalent to the existence of them all. The total
cause of the determinations of being into which
the pantheistic Deity evolves itself, is supposed to

n6 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

be this Deity itself, without the determinations to
be evolved. For these cannot be in that Deity
formally, before their evolution takes place, other
wise there would be no evolution. Nor can they
be said to exist in it eminently, before they are
formally actuated ; because on this supposition the
First Being, so far from tending by its evolution
to unfold its own essence, as pantheists would have
it, would tend rather to corrupt that essence and
to make a monster of it.11

Consequently, on the pantheistic hypothesis, the
First Cause is less perfect before it determines
itself than it becomes by such determination : and
yet this lower perfection suffices to effect the
determination and raise it to a more perfect state.
In other words, it is in itself the total cause
of successive advancements in perfection, without
previously possessing those superadded perfec
tions either formally or eminently. Thus the
pantheistic God continually violates the inviolable
principle of causality. Either the principle of causa
lity must go or pantheism.

81. (c) Finally, what becomes of morality in the
pantheistic hypothesis ? Is there still room for a
distinction between actions really good and really
bad ? If pantheism be true, all actions are good.
The coward and the hero, the miser and the philan
thropist, the tyrant and the martyr, all are deserving

11 Indeed, Hegel says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is
that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evi
included ? " (Geschichte der Philosophic, Werke XV. p. 275; cf. Mansel
Limits of Religious Thought, p. 46.)

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 117

of praise ; for they all do what the supreme law,
which rules the evolution of the Absolute, inexorably
demands : their actions are nothing but a manifes
tation of the pantheistic God as He necessarily must
be according to a law of fate inherent in Pits nature.12

SECTION 3. — The Contingency of the World.

Thesis XL — Neither the 'matter of the universe,
nor the human soul, nor anything else except the one
simple infinitely perfect God, can be self -existent. There
fore all things except God are contingent.

82. The first two parts of this proposition are
contained in the proposition just established. If
nothing in the world known to us is inherent in the
Divine substance, then neither matter nor human
souls can be inherent in that substance. But outside
the Divine substance there can be no self-existent
substance, because self-existence is, as we have
seen (Th. VII. — IX.), restricted necessarily to one
simple infinitely perfect substance. Therefore the
matter of the universe and human souls can have
only conditioned existence, and are contingent sub
stances.

The same argument proves that nothing outside
of God can be self-existent. For if you assume

12 Spinoza does not seem to shrink from a barefaced acceptance
of this necessary inference from his pantheistic system. Thus, for
instance, he expresses himself in his Ethics, Part IV. Prop. 59, at the
end of the proof: " No action considered in itself is either good or
bad." And Part IV. Prop. 45, Schol. 2, he bases upon the moral
principle just mentioned this practical maxim : " To enjoy ourselves
in so far as this may be done short of satiety or disgust — for here
excess were no enjoyment — is true wisdom."

ir8 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

anything else but God to be self-existent, for
instance, if you assume with the Manichaeans a
supreme principle of evil, you thereby destroy
the unity, simplicity, and infinite goodness of self-
existence clearly demanded by reason.

We need only remark that by "things" we
mean realities in some way complete in themselves,
endowed with an internal principle of action ; such
realities, for instance, as men and every living being
that leads its own distinct life. All other realities
diverse from the Divine substance are either parts
of contingent things or accidental determinations
of the same. In this way the human body is a
part of the human substance, and the hands and
feet of a man are parts of his body, whereas his
sensations, thoughts, and volitions are accidental
determinations. Since matter is contingent, and
since only material substances can consist of parts,
it is evident that all parts of substances are con
tingent. That accidental determinations of whatever
contingent substances must be contingent, is implied
by the very term " accidental," and follows, more
over, from their natural dependence upon contingent
substances.

SECTION 4. — The Dependence of all things on God.

Thesis XII. — All things in this world owe their
origin either immediately or mediately to an act of Divine
power.

83. According to the preceding proposition, all
things in this world are contingent. Consequently

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 119

there is none among them which exists by its own
nature. They all demand a cause for their existence.
For the present we will not inquire whether this
cause could not itself be a contingent substance,
say a spirit other than God and distinct from all
things comprehended under the term "this world."
Whatever power of production may be communi
cable to a contingent being, that power must be
derived from the same source whence is derived
the contingent being itself, namely, from the self-
existent First Cause. Consequently, before any
further inquiry, we are right in ascribing the origin
of all things in this world to the power of that
Cause.

SECTION 5. — Pvoof of an Immediate, Influence of God.

Thesis XIII. — At least our substance distinct from
God, has been immediately produced by God Himself.

84. From Thesis XI. it is evident that every
thing else save God is contingent. In other words,
nothing exists with absolute necessity but God
alone ; everything which is not God exists only so
far as He by His power originates its existence.
But God cannot have originated the existence of
things purely possible in themselves, unless at least
one of all possible substances that ever came into
existence has been immediately produced by Him.

SECTION 6. — Proof of Creation.

Thesis XIV. — God's immediate action in the pro
duction of contingent being was not a production out
of His own substance ; nor can it be, strictly speaking,

120 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

called change of possible being into actual being, but it
is creation of actual being out of nothing.

85. The first part of this thesis is directed against
the semi-pantheistic emanation theories now obso
lete. According to these, creatures are as it were
particles emitted from the Divine substance. The
absurdity of this opinion is evident ; for God, being
simple, as we have proved (Th. VIII.), is absolutely
unchangeable. Therefore it is impossible that He
should produce new substances out of His own by
causing particles to emanate from it.

The second part of the proposition is necessary
in order to warn the reader against a miscon
ception easily arising from the way in which
we imagine possible things. Of course we cannot
imagine them except by forming pictures of exist
ing things in our imagination. We fall into no
error by forming to ourselves such pictures, as
long as we recognize them to be mere pictures of
things which by their own nature are nowhere
until God causes them to exist. We must not,
however, forget this, and attribute to purely possible
things some sort of real existence distinct from
God. If we look at pure possibility in the light
of the truth already demonstrated, that all being
except God alone owes its reality to the Divine
action, we see that the interval traversed between
possibility and actuality is a purely imaginary in
terval, and that consequently no real change takes
place when a possible thing becomes actual. In
every real change the thing which changes passes

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 121

from one state of existence to another. The purely
possible thing does not exist at all : it has no state
of existence. Therefore it cannot really pass from
one state of existence to another ; its actuation
cannot be called change in the proper sense of the
word.

We shall have other occasions later on for
showing that the existence of other substances
distinct from the one Divine Substance and created
by it implies no limitation of the Infinity of the
Divine Substance. It is enough for the present to
observe that the infinity of an infinite being is not
limited by the existence of other finite beings
derived from it and dependent upon it, provided
these do not contain, as they cannot contain,
any perfection which is not in the Infinite Sub
stance equivalently and " eminently," with absolute
unity and simplicity.

SECTION 7. — Possibility and limitation of the world
accounted for by the Divine Infinity.

Thesis XV. — From the infinite perfection of God it
can be safely inferred that (i) creation is possible, (2) that
the successive or simultaneous creation of all possible sub
stances is not possible, (3) that the creation of an infinite
substance is impossible. Consequently the actually existing
world is not absolutely the best possible world, although it
is certainly the relatively best possible world.

86. (i) We have already explained the meaning of
creation out of nothing, and have, moreover, proved
the fact of creation. But the way in which creation

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

has taken place we never can fully understand ;
we have nothing analogous in nature by which to
illustrate it ; for all actions within our experience
are changes of existing things. However, though
we cannot comprehend creation, we are able to give
some explanations which will serve to make belief
in creation easier. We have then to bear in mind
that God is infinitely perfect (Th. IX.) ; and that
His Essence possesses the perfections of all possible
creatures in a higher and better way ; and is there
fore, as theologians say, " eminently " equivalent to
an indefinite number of possible substances. It
follows that seeing His Essence as it is, by His
infinite Intellect, He knows by this act of cogni
tion at the same instant all possible things.
Since also His Will is infinitely powerful, He can
by a mere act of will give existence to whatever
possible substance He knows.

The same truth may be expressed also in the
following way. An infinitely powerful Will can by
its sole act originate whatever is not intrinsically
repugnant. But no possible substance is intrinsi
cally repugnant ; otherwise the concept of it would
mean nothing. Therefore, every possible substance
can be originated by the sole act of an infinitely
powerful Will. Now, as God is infinite, His Will is
infinitely powerful. Consequently, by an act of His
Will alone, He can call into existence any possible
substance, that is, He can create it out of nothing.

13

13 It is highly gratifying to find that two of the foremost
champions of modern thought have nothing to object against the
possibility of creation. Mill says : " There is nothing to disprove

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 123

(2) Although God by His infinite power can
create any substance conceivable, yet He cannot

the creation and government of nature by a sovereign will." (Three
Essays on Religion, p. 137.)

Professor Huxley is more explicit, and as his statement on this
subject agrees marvellously with the* doctrine of St. Thomas and
Catholic philosophers in general, we will give it in full: "Some
say that the Hebrew word bara which is translated 'created,1
means ' made out of nothing.1 I venture to object to that rendering,
not on the ground of scholarship, but of common sense. Omni
potence itself can surely no more make something out of nothing
than it can make a triangular circle. What is intended by ' made
out of nothing,' appears to be ' caused to come into existence," with
the implication that nothing of the same kind previously existed.
It is further usually assumed that ' the heaven and the earth '
means the material substance of the universe. Hence the ' Mosaic
writer ' is taken to imply that where nothing of a material nature
previously existed, this substance appeared. That is perfectly
conceivable, and therefore no one can deny that it may have
happened. ... It appears to me that the scientific investigator is
wholly incompetent to say anything at all about the first origin of
the material universe. The whole power of his organon vanishes
when he has to step beyond the chain of natural causes and effects.
No form of nebular hypothesis that I know of is necessarily con
nected with any view of the origination of the nebular substance."
(Nineteenth Century, Feb. 1886, pp. 201, 202.)

To sum up the Professor's view on creation. He asserts : i. To
conceive creation as the change of nothing into something is
tantamount to conceiving an absurdity. 2. There is no objection
to creation, if you conceive it as the starting into existence of
the whole of the material universe by competent power. 3. Natural
science has even in our nineteenth century nothing to say against
the possibility of creation. The first two of these assertions agree
perfectly with the doctrine St. Thomas expounds, Sum. Theol. i.
44. 2. and 45. i. The third assertion has the approval of all sound
metaphysicians. However, the objection to the translation of bara
is not very strong, because the term " to make out of nothing" is
according to common parlance equivalent to " to make something in
such a way that it exists without having been made out of anything."
The reader may compare the phrase in question with phrases like
these: " I see nothing," " He knows nothing," &c.

I24 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

create all intrinsically possible finite substances so
that they all should exist at the same time ; nor can
He exhaust the category of possibilities by succes
sive creations.

The successive creation of all conceivable finite
substances would mean that God's power of creating
had at length become, or was destined at length
to become, exhausted. This is clearly incompatible
with His infinity. A like inference proves also
the impossibility of simultaneous creation of the
entire category of possible substances. When that
creative act was complete, God would be in the
position of being unable to go on creating. There
is also a further impossibility involved in simul
taneous creation of all the possible substances ; for it
would involve the existence of an infinite number.
(Cf. § 66.)

(3) The creation of an infinite substance is no less
inconceivable. To be infinite and to be created are
contradictory notions. The first involves the most
supreme and entire independence, the other is the
most intimate and absolute mode of dependence.

87. It follows that this world cannot be absolutely
the best, if by " absolutely the best " we mean " so
perfect that nothing could be more perfect." What
ever God may create is finite, and therefore infinitely
distant from God Himself, the one absolutely perfect
Being. But it may be asked : Why cannot this
world be absolutely the best possible world in this
sense, that no creatures can be more perfect than
those which exist in it ? To understand the impos
sibility of such optimism we must go back once

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 115

more to God's infinite wisdom and power. Having
infinite knowledge, He cannot devise a creature,
so perfect an imitation of His immense perfection,
but that possible imitations innumerable and in
definitely more perfect should remain within the
scope and view of His Essence. Having infinite
power, He never can create a being so perfect
that the production of a better one would transcend
His power. Among all created beings, therefore,
there is to be found none which is absolutely the
best possible.

88. Nevertheless, creation as a whole is relatively
the best. For that is relatively best, which is best
for the end for which it is meant, so far as it is
meant for it. Now as God's wisdom is infinite, He
cannot be unaware of whatever means are best
suited to the end, which He wills His creatures
to aim at in so far as He wills it. Moreover, being
infinitely good, He cannot act but in perfect harmony
with infinite wisdom. Therefore His creatures must
reach their end in the most perfect way so far as He
intends it. We add so far as He intends it in view of
the necessary distinction between what God wills
absolutely and what He wills only conditionally. A
creature endowed with freedom of will may not
reach its end in that way in which God intends
it conditionally, namely, on the hypothesis of its
co-operation with the benevolent intention of its
Creator. But it is evident that every creature must
reach that end which has been put before it abso
lutely, and to that extent must perfectly conform to
the standard fixed by God's infinite wisdom.

126 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

89. This doctrine, according to which the world
is not absolutely but only relatively the best, may
be called Moderate Optimism. It is upheld by St.
Thomas14 and his followers. It is opposed to the
Exaggerated Optimism of Leibnitz,15 of Malebranche,16
and of Rosmini.17 According to Leibnitz this world
is the absolutely best possible ; because if it were
not, there would have been no sufficient reason for
God to prefer it to the rest. Malebranche believed
it to be the very best conceivable ; because God
would not have acted in the most perfect way, as it
behoves His infinite perfection to act, if He had
produced a world less perfect than it might have
been. Rosmini thought that no world except the
existing one would have been worthy of God ;
because in this alone there is with the least means
the greatest good effected, and thus it alone is
worthy of God's goodness. We shall answer the
reasons of these authors later.

Having now explained how far creation is
possible to God Himself, we shall pass on to the
question whether God alone can create, or whether
a creature may possibly be endowed by Him with
the power of creating. The solution of this question
will enable us to state whether God is the immediate
Creator of all things existing.

14 Cf. Sum. Theol. i. 25. 6.

10 Cf. Opp. Leibnitz (Edit. Erdmann), p. 506.

16 Cf. Malebranche, Traite dc la Nature et de la Grace, 2, 51.

17 Cf. Rosmini, Teodicca, n. 651.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 127

SECTION 8. — Proof that God alone can create.

Thesis XVI. — Creation out of nothing involves the
exercise of infinite power. Consequently God alone can
create out of nothing.

go. It is evident that there must be a certain
harmony between the natural perfection of efficient
causes and the perfection of their activity. In pro
portion as the natural perfection of their substantial
being is greater, must their competence as efficient
causes increase ; for action is a manifestation of
being, and consequent upon it. Therefore, a being
whose nature infinitely transcends the nature of
other beings must be able to produce effects in a
way infinitely transcending that in which other
things produce their effects. Now between the
infinite perfection of God and the perfection of any
creature whatever, there is an infinite distance. God
therefore must be able to produce effects in an
infinitely more perfect way than creatures.

Hereupon we argue thus : If we find in the series
of effects one which is out of proportion with all the
rest, so that in it an efficiency is manifested with
which the efficiency manifested in others cannot be
compared — that effect is the work of the infinitely
powerful God alone. But a substance created out
of nothing is such an effect. All other effects are
mere changes of substances already created. All
other effects are conditioned not only by the influence
of their efficient cause, but also by the nature
of the subject in which they are produced. This

128 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

subject was originally a work of creation, wholly
dependent upon its creating cause alone. In
other words, every effect which is not creation
is dependent upon creation for its support, where
as creation is not dependent upon any other
effect. Under this aspect creation appears as
the primary action — to use the words of the great
Aquinas — and we must therefore conclude that it is
feasible to the primary agent alone.18 Creation is
the primary efficient action, inasmuch as some creation
precedes every other efficiency ; as also because no
other efficiency can be compared with it in excel
lence. Therefore that Being alone, with whose
infinite excellence no other being can be compared,
is able to create substances out of nothing.

91. St. Thomas suggests to us another argu
ment.19 The greater the disproportion between the
state before the exercise of efficient causality and the
state after it, the greater must be the perfection of
the causality exercised. More skill is required to make
a statue out of a piece of marble than a tomb
stone, to make a cathedral out of building materials
than a factory. To make the letters of the alphabet
subservient to the prosaic expression of daily occur
rences is an achievement incomparably easier than

18 Contra Gent. ii. 21. " Cum enim secundum ordinera agentium
sit ordo activorum, eo quod nobilioris agentis nobilior est actio,
oportet quod prima actio sit primi agentis propria. Creatio autem
est prima actio, eo quod nullam aliam praesupponit et omnes alia;
praesupponunt earn. Est igitur creatio propria Dei solius actio, qui
est agens primum."

19 St. Thomas, Sum. Thcol. ia. q. 45. art. 5. ad 2. et 3.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 129

to weave them into the tissue of a tragedy like
Hamlet.

This being so, if between the state before the
exercise of causality and the state after it there is
ever an infinite disproportion, then the causality
exercised must be infinitely perfect, and therefore
can belong to God alone. Now this is precisely the
case in creation. The individual substance created
out of nothing is void of all actual existence before
the Creator calls it into being. It is nothing by its
own nature ; whatever it is, has been produced by
the power of the Creator. Now between nothing
and any kind of existence there is an infinite dispro
portion. The power, therefore, which creates things
out of nothing must be infinite ; it must be the
power of God alone.

92. But here it may be objected : True, the
preceding arguments seem to prove that no creature
can have a power adequately proportionate to the
creation of another creature. This, however, does
not show that a creature cannot co-operate with
God as His instrument in creation. How will you
show that God cannot create one creature by the
instrumentality of another ?

To solve this objection, we must distinguish
between instrument in the proper sense, and instru
ment in the wider sense. An instrument, strictly
speaking, is only that which produces the very effect
in reference to which it is said to be instrumental,
under the guidance of a higher cause. In this sense,
the brush of the painter is his instrument in the pro
duction of a picture, and the sewing-machine is the
J

130 OF THL. EXISTENCE OF GOD.

instrument of the tailor in the making of a coat.
They make the picture and the coat respectively,
although under guidance from the human hand.
Moreover, it is the part of an instrument to concur
in the action of the principal agent by some action
proper to itself which disposes something already
existing to the effect of the principal agent. Thus
the saw cuts, which is an action proper to itself
and exerted on some already existing material,
and therefore concurs to the production of, say,
a circular plate, which is the effect after which
the principal agent is striving. Hence only those
effects can be wrought with the help of instruments
which consist in the gradual change of some subject-
matter, disposing it to a purpose. But creation, as
we have seen, does not consist in the change of a
subject already existing ; it is rather the effecting of a
subject by the power of will. Therefore instrumen
tality, properly speaking, cannot come into play,
when creation out of nothing is to take place.20
However, if we use the word instrument in a wider
sense, to signify a cause which produces an effect,
intended by God to be the condition under which
He Himself will create a new substance that stands
in a certain relation to the effect produced : we may
then say that a creature can be the instrumental
cause of a new creature. Thus parents may be said
to be the instrumental causes of the souls of their
children, although these souls are created by God
alone, as we shall see in the following section.21

w Cf. Sum. Theol. i. 45. 5. c. § " Sed hoc esse non potest."
21 Cf. Sum. Theol. i. 118, 2. ad 3m.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 131

SECTION 9. — Proof that God is the immediate Author of
Mind and Matter.

Thesis XVII. — Every individual human soul, and
every element of matter considered in its original state,
is an immediate effect of Divine creation.

93. As we have proved above (§§ 30 — 39), the
human soul is an immaterial substance, a spirit,
although a spirit united to matter. Upon this we
argue as follows : If the human soul cannot be
evolved out of matter, nor be taken from the sub
stance of a spirit, it owes its existence immediately
to creation. But it is evident that a material being
cannot be changed into an immaterial being; and
it is absolutely impossible that a spirit should be
divided. (§ 34.) We must then conclude that every
human soul comes into existence by creation out
of nothing, and as God alone can create things of
nothing (Th. XVI.), every human soul is imme
diately created by God Himself.22

94. As regards the origin of matter, in whatever
state it may have been originally, it is certain that
its existence is due to an exercise of Divine Power,
for it is not self-existent, but contingent. (§§ 81, 82.)
The question still to be answered in regard to its
origin is this : Was matter produced by Almighty
God immediately or mediately ? Now it must have
been immediately created, because mediate pro
duction of matter is impossible. For on two
suppositions only could it be possible ; first, that
God could change a spirit into matter, or secondly,

22 Cf. Sum. Theol. i. 90. 2. et i. 181. i — 3.

1 32 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

that He could communicate to a spirit the power
of creating matter. But on the face of them, neither
of these suppositions can be held : it is incom
patible with the simplicity and characteristic being
of a spiritual substance that a spirit should be
transformed into matter, and it has been proved
already, that the power of. creation belongs ex
clusively to God. (Th. XVI. §§ go, seq.) We see,
then, that the origin of matter is due to immediate
Divine creation. In what state it was created,
whether in the state of elementary matter, or of
substances compounded of elementary matter, our
reason cannot tell. We must be satisfied with know
ing that at least every part of matter considered in
the most simple form in which it can exist — in other
words, every element — has been created by God
immediately.23

Scholion. The doctrine of creation in its relation
to the theory of evolution.

95. From the proof given above it follows that all
creatures of the universe are under a certain aspect
the immediate handiwork of God. They are all
made up of material elements immediately created
by Him. It is true, these elements are not now in
that state in which they were when they came forth
from the abyss of their nothingness. Under the
influence of destructive and generative forces put
into matter by the Creator, its elementary parts

53 Sum. Theol. i. 44. 2. et i. 65. 3. et Compendium Theologies, c. 95.
"Elementa secunclum se tota non sunt ex aliqua materia prsejacenti,
quia illud quod praeexisteret haberet aliquam formam . . . oportet
igitur otiam ip.sa elemeiHa immediate esse producta a Deo.'

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 133

circulate through immeasurable space, and form the
substratum now of this, now of that, species of in
animate or animate matter. But however great may
be the changes which matter thus undergoes, its
amount is neither diminished nor increased, its
original potentiality for the reception of various
principles of force (or forms, as scholastics call
them), remains always the same. A part of matter
determined to a certain mode of being and action by
an internal principle of force constitutes a body, or
an individual corporeal substance. Under the influ
ence of created forces, the state of matter in an
individual body can be so disturbed that the prin
ciple of force by which it is determined can no
longer continue to maintain its existence. Thus the
body loses its existence as this or that individual
substance, but it never drops out of existence alto
gether. The extinction of one principle of force is
accompanied by the production of another, the
natural result of a new combination of matter.
Each body, then, considered in its basis, is God's
work ; whereas the principles of force, or the forms,
through which bodies now existing receive their
specific character, are due to the destructive and
generative activity of created agents, with the single
exception of that principle from which the human
body receives its specific determination, namely, the
rational soul, the source not only of the intellectual,
but also of the sensitive and vegetative, life of man.
96. How far observation has justified, or will
justify the theory of evolution, we leave it to biolo
gists to decide. From a mere philosophical point

i34 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

of view we are unable to discover anything in
it which would be out of harmony with reason,
if only the following principles are kept strictly in
view :

(1) There is no evolution but of matter created
by God, through principles of force set to work by
Him originally, and working throughout all ages of
their operation according to laws determined by His
infinite wisdom.

(2) A lower principle of force is never by itself
alone the total cause of the production of a higher
one. Consequently the more perfect offspring of an
imperfect species of living beings is not due only to
the generative force of that species, but other causes
must help to produce it.

(3) A human person is never the effect of evo
lution.

The generative power of a created agent can pre
dispose matter for the reception of a human soul:24
but the soul being spiritual, God alone can create it,
and join it to matter, from which union there results
a man.

These three principles, which are simple corol
laries of the theses proved above, contain the most
fundamental truths about Divine creation as the
cause of this world.

We shall now proceed to answer some questions
connected with creation, the solution of which will

24 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 118. art. 2. ad 4. " Homogenerat
sibi simile, in quantum per virtutem seminisejus disponitur materia
ad susceptionem talis formae," i.e. of the " rational soul." (Cf. ibid.
art. 3. et q. 76, art. i.)

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 135

throw still more light upon the total dependence of
all things upon God. These questions are :

1. Is creation the result of a necessary, or of a
free volition of God ?

2. Could God have created without creating
from eternity ?

3. If eternal creation be not necessary, is it at
least possible ?

4. Can a world like ours exist from eternity ?
What we have to say upon these questions will

form the subject-matter of the five following pro
positions :

SECTION 10. — Creation a free act of God's will.

Thesis XVIII. — God lias freely chosen to produce

creatures.

97. Victor Cousin 25 says : Dieu s'il est cause pent
creer ; et s*il est cause absolue, il ne peut pas ne pas
creer — " If God is a cause, He can create, and if
He is an absolute cause, He must create."

According to this philosopher, the act of creation
is under different aspects both free and necessary.
It is free, not because God could determine
whether He would exercise His creative power or
not, but only because there is not any external
force constraining Him to the exercise of that
power. The necessity of creation, on the other
hand, is to be sought in the nature of God Himself;
it is this nature which irresistibly impels Him both
to desire and to produce creatures. '' The creative
act is a necessary act, because it results from the

25 Introd. d VHistoin de la Phil. Le9on 5.

136 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

nature of a cause, which must needs act ; and it is
free, for it proceeds from the proper, independent,
primitive spontaneity of a cause which acts by
itself, which determines itself, so that its deter
mination, though necessary, is nevertheless entirely
its own, and is not under any influence from with
out."20

Against these assertions we maintain that God
has created only because He freely willed the
existence of creatures, being equally free not to
will it had He pleased ; as again to will the existence
of creatures other than those actually created had
that been His choice. This is the only legitimate
inference from the infinitude of the Divine per
fection. Had God been compelled by necessity to
create, He must have been so compelled, because
His infinitely perfect intellect represented to His
infinitely perfect will that creation was a necessity
required to supply some deficiency otherwise dis
cernible in His Being. But creation could not have
this effect. To infinite perfection nothing further in
the way of perfection can be added, and again, to
view the same truth in a different light, created per
fection is derived perfection. It is derived from that
of God in which it is precontained eminently.27

28 " L'acte cre"ateur est un acte ndcessaire, puisqu'il resulte de
la nature d'une cause, qui ne peut pas ne pas agir ; et il est libre,
parcequ'il emane de la spontaneite propre, independante, primitive,
d'une cause, qui agit d'elle meme, qui se determine elle meme,
sans que sa determination necessaire, mais toute sienne, subisse
aucune influence du dehors." (T. E. Allaux, La Philosophic de
M. Cousin, pp. 19, 20.)

27 This technical term has been explained already. See pp. 100,
101.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 137

What is here meant will be more easily realized
by the reader if he considers the relation of
the supreme to the subordinate authorities in the
body social. Under the absolute monarch many
lower officials are constituted, each endowed with
a measure of power and authority derived from
his. Now their authority cannot be added to
his so as to form a total authority of larger
dimensions than his is by itself. Whatever they
have they hold under him, and he possesses it in
a higher and more independent manner. Substitute
God for the absolute monarch, creatures for the
subordinate powers, perfection for authority, and
then we have set before us exactly the relation of
the Divine perfection to that imparted by creation
to creatures. And we see clearly that creation adds
nothing to the Divine excellence which it did not
already possess. There can, then, be no motive
presentable to the perfect will of God necessitating
creation. On the other hand, although creation is
seen to be an act which does not increase the
Divine perfection, it is also seen to be an act
good in itself, and therefore, though not necessary,
still worthy of election should God so please. For
creatures, as being imitations of the Divine per
fection, are worthy of existence and consequently of
love.28 Their existence need not be, but it may
be if it please God to choose it.

28 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 20. 2. c. et ad 2dm et 4tm.

I3S OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

SECTION n. — Creation not necessarily Eternal.

Thesis XIX. — The decree to create is necessarily
eternal, but its effect, or the resulting existence of creatures,
is not necessarily eternal.

98. The way in which an eternal and yet free
decree can exist in God is incomprehensible to our
limited intellects ; nevertheless we can understand
the reason why the free decree to create must
be eternal. A free choice cannot be reasonably
delayed without a sufficient motive. But in God
there was no sufficient motive to delay the decree
to create. The reason for which free beings
reasonably suspend their choice is either the fact
that for the present they are not in need of an
action, which later may be useful to them, or the
consciousness that choosing at once may cause them
unforeseen inconveniences. But God could not
suspend His decree for either of these reasons.

He is by His very essence independent of
creatures; they never can be useful to Him, nor
augment His infinite perfection. Moreover, what
ever motives there may be to create or not to
create, these motives are always and fully perceived
by His infinite intellect. In the same instant in
which He sees them, He sees also the result of
whatever line of action He may choose. It is,
therefore, inconceivable that He ever should have
existed without the decree to create.

99. As to the second part of our thesis, we do
not state therein that God cannot create anything

RELATION OF GOD TO THE V70RLD. 139

from eternity ; we say only that it cannot be proved
that anything has been created from eternity. Our
proof of this statement is as follows : The reason
for which God is said to have necessarily created
from eternity must lie either in the nature of His
essence, or of His free decree, or in the nature of
creatures, or in some combination of these motives
one with another.

In God's own essence there cannot possibly be
a reason why He must create from eternity if He
chooses to create at all, since His essence is quite
sufficient for His infinite love of good without the
addition of any creatures — a fortiori, without the
addition of them from eternity. Nor can it be
admitted that the existence of creatures must have
the same eternity as the Divine decrees by which it
is determined. As the power of Divine volition is
the only efficient cause of their existence, they must
exist with all the determinations and assignments
with which God from eternity wills them to exist.
Suppose a sovereign to make a decree ordaining
that certain authorities shall come into being at
certain fixed times, one a week hence, another a
year hence, &c., then they would come into being
according to their assignments, and not at the date
of the decree. Consequently it cannot be inferred
from the eternal decree of creation that the existence
of creatures is from eternity, unless it be proved that
God in His eternal decree has resolved to grant to
creatures an existence coeternal with His decree.
But this cannot be proved.

Is there, then, anything in the nature of creatures

i4o OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

to require that their existence, if realized at all,
should be eternal ? None can be given. All creatures
are of themselves nothing ; their existence or non-
existence makes not the least alteration in God's
infinitely perfect Being. It depends, therefore, upon
the free choice of God to fix the limits of their
duration as He pleases.

Nor does the necessity of eternal creation arise
out of the relation of the Divine essence to the
creative fiat or to the nature of creatures or to
both.

In the relation of this decree to the Divine
essence we find a reason for the eternal existence
of the decree itself, but not of the creatures decreed ;
in the relation of the nature of creatures to the
Divine essence we have a reason for affirming that
God must love creatures if they exist, but no reason
for the necessity of their eternal existence. If, how
ever, we turn to the relation existing between the
creative fiat and the nature of creatures, we may be
tempted to think that here there is really a reason
for the necessity of eternal creation. We might
seem justified in arguing thus: The total cause of
every creature is the free decree of God, which free
decree has existed from eternity. But the total
cause of an effect cannot exist without the simul
taneous existence of the effect. Every creature,
therefore, which really is a creature in the strict
sense of the word — that is to say, every being
immediately produced out of nothing, must have
existed from eternity. However, it is not at all
evident that in every case without distinction the

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 141

total cause of an effect cannot exist without the
simultaneous existence of the effect. It is true that
a cause as such bears a necessary relation to an
effect. It is also true that a cause from which an
effect proceeds, according to a natural law to which
the cause is subjected, cannot be in the state
sufficient for the production of the effect without
producing it at once. But, given an infinite will
able by the mere expression of its purpose to call
things out of nothing into existence, it is not at all
evident that it cannot remain unchangeable, and
yet freely determine when the effects shall begin,
of which its own infinite power is the only efficient
cause. Certainly no one can discover an intrinsic
contradiction in this proposition : Although the free
decree to create, which is the only efficient cause
of the existence of creatures, has existed from all
eternity, nevertheless the creatures decreed from
eternity have had a beginning, because a beginning
has been fixed from eternity by this free decree.

SECTION 12. — On the possibility of Eternal Creation.

Thesis XX. — It is not evident that no creature
whatsoever can exist from eternity.

100. The great doctors of the middle ages agreed
that eternal creation was not a necessity ; they dif
fered from one another on the less important point
whether eternal creation is or is not intrinsically
impossible.

St. Thomas Aquinas considered the controversy
hopeless, at least in its most general form, not

I42 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

descending to the particular inquiry whether this
or that given creature — man, for instance — could
possibly have existed from eternity.29 We say only
that the impossibility of a creature which had no
beginning cannot be demonstrated. In order to
prove this statement, it will be enough to show
that the arguments against the possibility of eternal
creation are by no means decisive. The most
forcible are the following four, to each of which
we will reply —

101. First Argument. Every efficient cause
must exist before its effect. But if eternal creation
is admitted, God, the efficient cause of the being
created from eternity, does not exist before His
effect. It is, therefore, against reason to admit
eternal creation.

Answer. It is not to be denied that an efficient
cause which produces its effect gradually must exist
before its effect exists ; whence it follows that the
existence of all effects produced by corporeal sub
stances is posterior to that of their causes. It is
also to be granted that an efficient cause, which is
not by its very existence always ready for the
production of an effect, must exist before its effect.
But it is in no way evident that cause and effect
cannot be simultaneous, when the cause by its mere
existence is ever ready to act. Now creation is an
instantaneous effect, and God by His unchangeable
and infinitely powerful Will is always able to

29 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 46. art. 2. To understand
St. Thomas properly, the reader must fonder what he here says
in answer to the eighth objection.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 143

produce every effect conceivable. The conclusion,
then, of this first argument cannot be granted as
evident.

102. Second Argument. Creation is production
out of nothing. But a creature which exists from
eternity has been always something. Consequently
such a creature cannot be said to have been
produced out of nothing ; in other words, it cannot
really be a creature.

Answer. The meaning of the phrase, " Creation
is production out of nothing," is this : the created
being is nothing in itself, but owes its whole
existence to the will of its Creator, who has not
produced it by the change of any substratum, but
has called it into existence by a free act of His
omnipotent Will. From this it does not follow
that the created being cannot have been called
into existence from eternity. If a creature has
existed always, it has always been something
through the exercise of creative power, but it
has never been something in virtue of its own
essence.

103. Third Argument. Every finite being must
be under all aspects infinitely distant from the per
fection of God, the one infinite Being. But on the
hypothesis of an eternal creation this is not true,
because a creature produced from eternity is equal
at least in duration to God.

Answer. We grant the major, but deny the
minor of this argument. By the very fact that the
duration of a creature is contingent and continually
dependent upon God's free-will, it is infinitely less

i44 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

perfect than the duration of God, who continues
in existence with absolute necessity by virtue of His
own essence.

104. Fourth Argument. Succession from eternity
is impossible. But succession belongs to the nature
of every creature. Every creature which exists in
the moment A can cease to exist in the following
moment B. This could not hold if the duration of
the creature in the moment B were not really
different from its duration in the moment A. But
really different durations following one another
constitute a succession of durations.

Answer. We grant that succession from eternity
is impossible. We do not deny that succession
belongs to the nature of every actually existing
creature ; but we say that it is not evident that it
must belong to the nature of every possible creature.
Though great scholastic philosophers, St. Bona-
venture,30 the Conimbricenses,31 and others, held
that even in the duration of a created spiritual
substance there is succession, by reason of the
contingency of all created being ; still that position
is open to doubt. The full reason why a spirit
existing now can presently cease to be is not
any tendency to nothingness inherent in the spirit
itself, but it is the absolute dependence of the
creature upon the power of God, who preserves
it in being, and who by withdrawing His preserving
influence could, if He pleased, let it fall back into
nothingness. We have, therefore, no clear evidence

30 In 1. 2. dist. d. 2. a. i. q. 3.

31 In 1. 4. Phys. c. 14. p. 2. Cf. Pesch, Phil. Nat. n. 502.

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 145

that in the substance of a spiritual creature there is
succession.

But it may be asked, Is there not necessarily
succession in its operations ? Or is any created
spirit possible which can operate without change
in itself? If that is an impossibility, every created
spirit must necessarily have a beginning, for a spirit
cannot be wholly without operation. This reason
goes a long way to show that the creation of a spirit
from eternity, and a fortiori the creation of matter
from eternity, is absolutely impossible, because an
existence from eternity can hardly be% other than a
changeless existence ; and we cannot conceive either
matter or spirit to have existed from eternity with
out change. We are not inclined to think that such
a created existence is possible ; but neither have we
a certain reason for saying that it is intrinsically
repugnant. We must, then, conclude by saying
that the impossibility of eternal creation is not
certainly proved.

SECTION 13. — The beginning of this World.

Thesis XXI. — The universe, considered in its chief
processes, had a beginning.

105. Having stated our opinion about the possi
bility of eternal creation in the abstract, another
question remains to be answered. Can the par
ticular world in which we live have existed from
eternity ?

The meaning of this question is not whether the
innumerable species of creatures which constitute
K

146 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

the world known to man can have been created
without a beginning. Even the conclusions of
natural science indicate that all living beings which
people the earth, if considered not in the germ of
their species, but in their specific nature itself, had
their origin long after the creation of matter. We
intend only to ask : Was it intrinsically possible,
and consequently in the power of the Almighty,
to decree that the chief processes of nature should
go on without ever having had any beginning ?
This question may be resolved into the following
three :

1. Can there have been motion of matter without
a beginning of motion ?

2. Is evolution of vegetable and animal life
possible without a beginning of evolution ?

3. Can the generations of mankind have suc
ceeded one another for all ages without there being
any first parents or first children ?

To each of these questions we answer in the
negative.

106. And first as regards motion of matter.
Motion is not an instantaneous act, but involves
really different successive phases. There is no
motion of matter without continuous changes of
position of material particles. The concept of
motion and the concept of succession are in
separable from one another. But succession cannot
have existed from eternity. In it a " sooner " and
a " later " are necessarily involved. Every " later "
had evidently a beginning, and consequently every
" sooner," which is essentially related to a " later "

RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 147

— in other words, every "sooner" which con
stitutes a part of succession must have had a
beginning. Bearing now in mind that succession
is involved in motion so as to be necessarily con
nected with the movements. of material particles,
we must pronounce it metaphysically impossible
that motion of matter should have been without
a first start or beginning of motion.

This conclusion opens the way to the other,
that evolution of life, the processes of assimilation
and decomposition, of generation and corruption
in animate matter, are inconceivable unless they
have had a beginning. They all imply succession,
and consequently can have had but a limited
duration.

107. Coming now to the human race, it must
have had a beginning not only for the reasons just
given, but also because the number of human souls
that possibly can exist can never be actually infinite.
Such a number is intrinsically impossible, as we
have shown in our chapter on infinity. (§ 66.) But
if mankind had existed from eternity, the number oi
human souls that existed at any given moment, if
we suppose that none of these naturally incorruptible
beings is annihilated by the absolute power of God,
would really be actually infinite. Whatever there
fore may be our opinion on the absolute possibility
of an eternal creature, there can be no doubt that
a universe like ours, in which there is motion
and organic life, and in which one generation of
men follows another, cannot have existed from

148 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

eternity, considered even in its most fundamental
features.32

We have treated here the question of the
duration of our world only from a metaphysical
point of view. So far as the existence in the past
of the present state of our solar system, of organic
life and of man is concerned, the theories of modern
astronomers, of geologists and paleontologists sup
port our conclusions.

On the other hand, Aristotle opposes them in
asmuch as they rest upon the impossibility of
motion without a beginning. The arguments by
which he endeavoured to prove that motion must
be without a beginning, together with modern
arguments in favour of eternal creation, will find
their solution in the following chapter.

38 Our thesis is supported by Cardinal Zigliara, who arrives at
the same conclusions in a way somewhat different. His words are :
"Existimo autem mundum uti nunc est, non potuisse ab seterno
creari. . . . Etenim si creatio ista foret possibilis, consequi videtur
quod in successione ab aeterno usque ad praesens forent, in facta
hypothesi, actu infinitae successiones vel in tempore, vel in motu,
vel in generatione, vel saltern in cogitationibus alicujus mentis
creatae." (Summa Philosophica, Vol. II. pp. 38, 39.)

CHAPTER V.

SOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES AGAINST THE FUNDA
MENTAL TRUTHS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

SOME of the difficulties urged against the conclu
sions at which we have arrived have already been
partially considered. It was indispensable to the
course of our argument not to pass them by un
noticed. But it is necessary to examine them more
fully in the present chapter.

SECTION I. — Arguments urged by Traditionalists m favour of
the opinion, that only by faith can we be certain of God's
existence.

108. (i) First Traditionalistic Argument. — The
existence of God is an article of Christian faith.
But articles of Christian faith must be believed
on the authority of God — they cannot be proved
by natural reason alone. Consequently the existence
of God is indemonstrable.1

Answer. The term "article of faith" may be
taken both in a wider and in a more restricted
sense. In a wider sense, every truth revealed by
God is an article of faith, even if it is demonstrable
by reason. In a more restricted sense, only those

1 St Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 2. art. 2. obj. i.

1 50 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

dogmas, which, even after their revelation, cannot
be proved by reason alone, are articles of faith.
Such dogmas are the Mysteries of the Incarnation,
of the Blessed Trinity, and others. Many truths of
Natural Theology are articles of faith in the wider
sense ; they form part of the revelation made by
God to His Church; but they are not articles of
faith, if this term be taken in its more restricted
sense. To this class belongs the great fundamental
truth of the existence of a Personal God.

If it be urged that from the solution just given
it would follow that God had revealed to us His
existence and attributes without any need, we
answer with St. Thomas,2 that the revelation even
of those truths concerning God and His perfections
which can be discovered by reason alone, is a great
benefit to mankind. To say nothing in this place
of the supernatural graces attached to it, there are
three great wants clearly discernible from which,
had not these truths been revealed, the human race
as a whole would have suffered.

First, without this revelation few men would
have a proper knowledge of their Creator. Some
would not arrive at it on account of their natural
incapacity to inquire into recondite truths, and
others could not undertake a satisfactory search
on account of the multitude of their occupations.
Moreover, a large number would shirk the patient
consideration and reasoning without which a more
accurate knowledge of the First Cause of all things
cannot be attained.

* Contra. Gent. i. c. 4.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 151

Secondly, if that revelation were not given, the
comparatively few, who could and would speculate
about Divine things, would take a long time to
reach any large or valuable results on account of
the difficulty of the speculation. And thus a con
siderable part of human life would be spent in
arduous study of Him, whom we are not created to
study so much as to know and love and obey from
the dawn of reason.

Finally, on the same hypothesis there would be
far more room for erroneous views about God, than
there is now, as we may infer from comparing the
theories of philosophers with the truths possessed
by any child that knows its catechism.

109. (2) Second Traditionalistic Argument. — It is
impossible that the contemplation of finite things
should lead to any certain knowledge of the Infinite
God.

Answer. It is true that we cannot leap from
finite to infinite by one argument. But we can by
a chain of arguments. We have to commence by
proving that there is a First Cause, and that this
First Cause can be but One. After that, it is to be
shown that no perfection conceivable is wanting in
that Cause which we call God. Thus it appears
that one Infinite God really exists, although the
notion we have of Him can only be partially positive.3
That is to say, we cannot express the fulness of
God's perfection by mere affirmation ; but having
affirmed it under a certain aspect, we must signify
the rest by excluding all limits from what we have

3 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 2. art. 2. ad 3m.

i52 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

affirmed, saying for instance, God is wise without
limit, He is infinitely wise, and the rest.

SECTION 2. — Kanfs difficulties against the proofs of God's
existence.

no. Kant, in his celebrated work, Kritik der
reinen Vermmft (Critique of Pure Reason), discusses
at length the Ontological Argument, the Argument
of the First Cause, and the Argument from Design.
He finds fault with each of them, and arrives at the
conclusion that speculative reason is unable to come
to a satisfactory result in the matter.

Answer, i. What Kant alleges against the onto-
ogical proof, we may pass over, as we ourselves do
not admit that proof; although we do not approve
of all that Kant says in refuting it.4

2. Against the Argument of the First Cause,
Kant has two principal difficulties. First, he con
siders that we are not certain of the universal
value of the " Principle of Causality," upon which
the proof of the existence of a First, Self existing
Cause entirely turns.5 The answer to this objec
tion is fully given in our proof. (§§ 25, 26.) It was
there shown that Kant's opinion must lead to the
denial of the principle of contradiction itself, and
to universal scepticism. But he is armed with
another weapon. He says that those who use
the Argument of the First Cause really fall into
the fallacy of the ontological proof, while appearing

4 See discussion of Ontological Argument in c. i.
6 Kritik dtr reinen Vernunft, p. 637 (Dritte Auflage). In the
t anslation by M. Miiller, p. 523.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 153

to avoid it. They first demonstrate a posteriori a
first cause, a self-existing being ; and then from the
concept of self-existence they infer the existence of
an Infinite Being. This conclusion he deems to be
invalid. Were it valid, he £ays, it would be equally
lawful to infer by a converse process the existence
of an Infinite Being from its concept — and this
is the line of the ontological proof.6 This objection
at first sight seems formidable : but in reality its
whole force is due to a want of distinction between
unlawful and lawful reasoning a priori. It is un
lawful to reason a priori from a concept, the internal
truth of which may reasonably be doubted by those
whom you would convince. So long as they
may reasonably say, we do not know whether an
intrinsic contradiction may not be hidden in that
concept, your conclusion must remain suspected of
error. But should you argue from the concept of a
thing, the existence of which you have already
proved, no one can reasonably demur to your
conclusions. Now those who defend the Ontological
Argument follow the former unlawful line of reason
ing; while the latter, the lawful line, has been
observed by us in the development of our Argument
of the First Cause. Those who use the ontological
proof, begin with the assumption that the concept
of an infinitely perfect being is not self- contra
dictory. This they have no right to do, as we
showed when discussing their argument. Very
different is our mode of reasoning. We first prove
a posteriori that an intelligent, self-existing Being

8 Ibid. p. 639. Apud M. Miiller, ibid. p. 525.

154 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

certainly exists. This established, we have a right
to maintain that the concept of self-existence is not
self-contradictory; for what must exist, can exist.
We are, therefore, entitled to argue from that
concept, and to assert as absolutely true everything
that is evidently connected with the truth of self-
existence, to wit, that a self-existing being is
evidently One, Simple, and infinitely Perfect.

3. The Argument from Design is held in higher
respect by Kant.7 He objects, however, to its
conclusiveness for two reasons.

(a) By itself alone it does not lead us to the
knowledge of a Self-existing, Infinite God and
Creator, but only to the persuasion that there exists
an intelligent Architect of this world. To know
something definite about the nature of this Architect,
we must fall back upon the unsound ontological
proof; for, in trying by means of the Argument of
a First Cause to bring the Argument from Design
to a full issue, we commit ourselves to the onto
logical proof, inasmuch as we reason a priori from
self-existence to Infinity.

To this we answer : it is true that the Argument
from Design does not carry us the whole way. We
completed it on the lines of the Argument of the
First Cause.8 But we deny that this mode of com
pleting it can be justly condemned as a falling back
upon the ontological proof; and the reasons for
this denial we have just given.

(b) Kant again doubts whether the supposition

7 Ibid. p. 651. Apud M. Miiller, ibid. p. 535.
• C. ii. § 46, and throughout the whole of cc. iii. iv.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 155

underlying the Argument from Design is valid,
"that well-ordered effects of nature no less than
well-ordered effects of human art, can only have
been produced by the pre-arrangement of an
intelligent mind.9

Regarding this difficulty we remark that the
analogy between order in works of nature and order
in works of art by itself alone is not an absolutely
solid foundation, although, as Kant himself admits,
it is very persuasive. Consequently, to anticipate
Kant's objection, we went deeper down, and laid
another foundation, which is solid enough. (Cf.
§§ 42—45.)

SECTION 3. — Difficulties of Spencer and Mill against the
proof of a First Cause.

in. (i) Mr. Herbert Spencer10 grants that regard
ing the origin of the Universe three verbally intel
ligible propositions may be made : the atheistic,
the pantheistic, and the theistic, but he maintains
that further consideration shows them all three to
be inconceivable. The atheist postulates a self-
existing actual universe, the pantheist a self-existing
potential universe, the theist a self-existing Creator
of the universe ; consequently all the three theories
rest upon the assumption of self-existence. Self-
existence, however, is inconceivable, and accord
ingly none of the three theories can be admitted as
a conceivable explanation of the world's origin.

9 Ibid. p. 654. Apud M. Miiller, Ibid. p. 537.

10 First Principles, pp. 30 — 35.

156 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

To prove that self-existence is inconceivable, he
argues thus : n " It is clear that by self-existence
we especially mean, an existence independent of
any other — not produced by any other ; the assertion
of self-existence is simply an indirect denial of
Creation. In thus excluding the idea of any ante
cedent cause we necessarily exclude the idea of a
beginning — to admit that there was a time when
the existence had not commenced, is to admit that
its existence was determined by something, or was
caused : which is a contradiction. Self-existence,
therefore, necessarily means existence without a
beginning ; and to form a conception of self-
existence is to form a conception of existence
without a beginning. Now by no mental effort
can we do this. . To conceive existence through
infinite past time, implies the conception of infinite
past time, which is an impossibility."

Answer. It is at least consoling to have in this
passage a recognition of the old truth that the
human mind is forced to admit something self-
existing. Mr. Spencer also in another passage
says:12 " We cannot think at all about the impres
sions which the external world produces on us
without thinking of them as caused ; and we
cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causa
tion without inevitably committing ourselves to the
hypothesis of a First Cause." In these words
he himself gives us a clue wherewith to extricate
ourselves from the labyrinth of his arguments about
self-existence. He confesses in this latter passage

11 First Principles, p. 31. 12 Ibid. p. 37.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 157

that we cannot do without self-existence ; and in
the very passage which we have quoted above, and
in which he has declared self-existence to be impos
sible, he has given a tolerably clear explanation of
self-existence; how then can, he uphold his assertion
that self-existence is inconceivable ? We cannot
explain anything without really conceiving it, unless
indeed we try to explain what involves an intrinsic
contradiction. Can any intrinsic contradiction be
suspected in the notions from which we form the
concept of self-existence ? Far from giving any
reason for such a suspicion, Mr. Spencer adduces
the strongest motives possible for not entertaining
it. He states that the human mind cannot explain
the most obvious daily experiences without falling
back upon a First Cause. This granted, we must
either admit the existence of a First Cause, or
assert that our minds have an essential tendency
to obtrude upon us a notion that is wholly visionary.
Mr. Spencer's inability to take in the idea of
self-existence seems to arise from the views which
he holds — erroneous views, we should call them —
on the human intellect, and on time, and also from
his failing to make any distinction between com
prehending a thing thoroughly and conceiving it at
all. Were the acts of the human understanding
the effects of organic impressions, and were all
thinking consequently reduced to the association
of pictures in the imagination, the concept of self-
existence in that case would be, as Mr. Spencer
says, "literally unthinkable," as would also be all
other universal and immaterial concepts. We have

158 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

argued already for the existence of such concepts in
expounding the argument of the First Cause.13

Mr. Spencer says that the idea of self-existence
involves the concept of infinite time. But why ?
The concept formed by men of a Being uncaused
and wholly independent is in reality a concept of
self-existence. This concept does not explicitly
express the infinite duration of that Being, and is
so far forth inadequate ; it is not a comprehensive
concept ; God alone comprehends His self-existence
and infinite duration. This duration is, however,
not infinite time, as Mr. Spencer thinks it should
be. In God there is no kind of succession ; and
where there is no succession, there is no time.

Moreover, actually infinite time is self-con
tradictory ; there can be finite actual time, and
indefinite possible time, but not actually infinite time.
God's duration is eternity, the unchangeable con
tinuance of His self-existing Essence without
possible beginning or end. Being eternal in Him
self, He is the source of all existences capable of
change, and consequently the real ultimate foun
dation of all possible time, which He comprehends
by knowing fully His own eternity. We can have a
true concept of indefinite possible time, but not an
adequate concept. We conceive indefinite possible
time, past or future, when we conceive the pos
sibility of an indefinitely long series of successive
changes before or after the present moment.

13 See also the articles, "An Examination of Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Psychology," by Professor Mivart, Dublin Review, October
1874 till January 1880.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 159

112. (2) Mill, in his Essays on Religion,1* objects
against the Argument of a First Cause thus : " The
Argument for a First Cause admits of being, and
is presented as a conclusion from the whole of
human experience. Everything that we know (it
is argued) had a cause, and owed its existence to
that cause. How then can it be but that the world,
which is but a name for the aggregate of all that
we know, has a cause to which it is indebted for
its existence?

" The fact of experience, however, when correctly
expressed, turns out to be, not that everything
which we know derives its existence from a cause,
but only every event or change. . . . That which
in an object begins to exist is that in it which
belongs to the changeable element in nature ; the
outward form and the properties depending on
mechanical or chemical combinations of its com
ponent parts. There is in every object another
and a permanent element, viz., the specific ele
mentary substance or substances of which it consists
and their inherent properties. These are not known
to us as beginning to exist : within the range of
human knowledge they had no beginning, and con
sequently no cause ; though they themselves are
causes or con-causes of everything that takes place.
Experience therefore affords no evidences, not even
analogies to justify our extending to the apparently
immutable a generalization grounded only on our
observation of the changeable."

Answer. The proof which Mill here puts before
14 Pp. 142, 143.

iGo OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

his readers as the common proof for a First Cause,
is certainly not the proof given either by us or by
St. Thomas, or any Catholic author of weight and
reputation.

The observations which Mill makes on the proof,
as he has stated it, deserve attention. It is true
that by mere reasoning from the facts of experience
we cannot convince ourselves that the elements of
matter are created out of nothing. But we arrive
at that conviction, if we begin with facts of
experience, and from them reason out the con
clusion, admitted even by Mr. Spencer, that there
must be a First Cause of changes, and thence
inquire into the nature of this First Cause and its
relation to the elements of matter. Such was our
mode of reasoning in chapters ii. sect. 2, iii., and iv.

II3- (3) Mill brings a second objection against
the necessity of searching for a First Cause. He
says : 15 " It is thus a necessary part of the fact
of causation within the sphere of our experience,
that the causes as well as the effects had a beginning
in time and were themselves caused. It would
seem, therefore, that our experience, instead of
furnishing an argument for a First Cause, is re
pugnant to it ; and that the very essence of causa
tion as it exists within the limits of our knowledge,
is incompatible with a First Cause."

Answer. Mill in this passage fails to see a
distinction between the circumstances of causation
to which our experience witnesses and its essence.
The natural causes of which we have experience

18 Essays on Religion, p. 144.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 161

have each its own cause ; but the dependence of
each cause upon another preceding it is neither
of the essence of causation nor a necessary adjunct
of it. The essence of causation consists in the
fact that one being is in sonae way the reason why
something else exists.

Whether the cause which acts is itself caused has
nothing to do with the essence of causation ; it is
a circumstance accompanying the causation of the
beings that come under our experience. But from
this it does not follow that every cause must be
caused. On the contrary, it can be shown that
this hypothesis is against evident first principles.16

114. (4) Mill objects to the argument by which
from the existence of the human mind we prove
the existence of a self-existing intelligent Being.
He says:17 "We are then entitled to ask, Where
is the proof that nothing can have caused a mind
except another mind ? From what, except from
experience, can we know what can produce what
— what causes are adequate to what effects ? That
nothing can consciously produce mind but mind is
self-evident, being involved in the meaning of the
words ; but that there cannot be unconscious pro
duction must not be assumed, for it is the very
point to be proved. Apart from experience, and
arguing on what is called reason, that is, on
supposed self-evidence, the notion seems to be
that no causes can give rise to products of a more
precious or elevated kind than themselves. But this

16 Cf. Argument of First Cause, c. ii. sect. 2.

17 Essays on Religion, p. 152.
L

162 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

is at variance with the known analogies of nature.
How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance,
are the higher animals and vegetables than the soil
and manure out of which and by the properties of
which they are raised up! The tendency of all
recent speculation is towards the opinion that the
development of inferior orders of existence into
superior, the substitution of greater elaboration and
higher organization for lower, is the general rule
of nature. Whether it is so or not, there are at
least in nature a multitude of facts bearing that
character, and this is sufficient for the argument."

Answer. This objection of Mill rests evidently
on two suppositions : I. Only from experience can
we know what sort of causes we must assume in
order to explain given effects. 2. Experience bears
positive evidence that effects are sometimes more
perfect than their causes.

To the first of these suppositions we must reply
by distinguishing between the determination of the
sort or quality of cause required to produce the
effect under consideration, and the identification,
from among the number of those possessing the
required qualities, of the particular individual, by
which the effect has in fact been produced. The
latter point can, as a rule, only be determined by
experience ; but the former can be determined by
inference from the nature of the effect, and, in fact,
can be determined" in no other way. It is only in
virtue of a previous inference which gathers from
the nature of the effect wrought the necessary
qualities and conditions of the agent which pro-

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 163

duced it, that experience is enabled to detect the
actual agent out of the number of others which
may happen to fall under observation. Moreover,
if study of the effect leads to the conclusion that
the adequate cause is one which from the nature
of its essential attributes must be the only one
of its kind in existence, in that case no further
recourse to experience is necessary, and we are
entitled at once, on the sole basis of the inference,
to identify the actual individual agent.

To the second of Mr. Mill's fallacious supposi
tions we must give an answer on similar lines.
Experience may seem to a superficial observer to
bear positive evidence, that effects are sometimes
more perfect than their causes : as, for instance,
that a mature tree with its foliage and fruit is more
perfect than the seed whence it sprang. Never
theless, more solid investigation is aware that it
must be guided to its results not by bare observa
tion, but by observation based on the principles
of reason. The principle of causality demands
that the cause shall always precontain what it
communicates to the effect. The seed, so far forth
as it is less perfect than the tree that grows out of
it, must be the partial not the total cause of the tree,
and accordingly observation proceeds to discern
what are the other contributing factors out of whose
union and co-operation the total cause is composed.
In the seed itself is a latent virtue which only reveals
itself by a gradual process. In order to the evolution
of this latent power, nutritive elements must be sup
plied in due time and manner from without. When

164 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

all these contributory agents are considered, we
discover that the principle of causality has in no
sense been violated. Each contributor precontains
what it communicates, in equal or higher measure
than its correlative portion of the effect ; and the
assemblage of them all precontains adequately the
entirety of the effect.

Thus our reasoning to the existence of God is
quite justified. Throughout we keep in view the
principle of causality, and find it leads us safely to
the conclusion drawn. Applying it to the assem
blage of visible things which surround us and are
stamped with the characteristics of effects, we con
clude that there must be a self-existing Being which
is their Cause. This determines the kind of cause
postulated. Further study of the idea of self-
existence shows that there can only be one self-
existent Being; and we are thus, without recourse
to experience, enabled to identify our First Cause.
The next stage has led us to discern the necessity
of creation ; since, on any other hypothesis, we
should be having two first causes. And lastly, we
were able to argue from the nature of the human
mind on the one hand, and analysis of the notion
of infinite being on the other, to the conclusion
that the human soul must have been created by
a free act of divine volition.

II5- (5) Mill objects further:18 "If mind, as mind,
presents intuitive evidence of having been created,

18 Essays on Religion, p. 153.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 165

the creative mind must do the same ; and we are
no nearer to the First Cause than before."

Answer. It is not mind as mind, but the human
mind as human mind, that presents evidence of
having been created. This* human mind manifests
itself to us as contingent and finite. From the
conclusion, then, that the human mind must have
been created, it in no way follows that the creative
mind similarly owes its origin to creation. On the
contrary, the irrationality of seeking an explanation
of the existence of created things in a processes ad
infinitnm, showing that there must be a First Cause,
shows likewise that the First Cause could not have
been created, but must be self-existent.

SECTION 4. — Difficulties of Mill and Lange against the
A rgument from Design.

116. (i) Having applied the Argument from Design
to the case of the human eye, Mill thus objects to
its force:19 " Creative forethought is not absolutely
the only link by which the origin of the wonderful
mechanism of the eye may be connected with the
fact of sight. There is another connecting link on
which attention has been greatly fixed by recent
speculations, and the reality of which cannot be
called in question, though its adequacy to account
for such truly admirable combinations as some of
those in nature, is still and will probably long
remain problematical. This is the principle of the
' survival of the fittest.' "

Answer. Only if accepted in its most extreme

18 Essays on Religion, p. 172.

166 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

form can the Darwinian theory be urged as an
objection against the Argument from Design ;
whereas, on the other hand, the extreme form of this
theory is losing in public favour just because it
attributes so much to chance and is absolutely
exclusive of finality. If evolution be the true ex
planation of the existing order of the cosmos, and
this evolution is due to the gradual working out to
their final issues of laws inherent in matter from
the commencement, then the question whether this
existing order be due to intelligence or not, is not
solved, but merely pushed back. In the achieve
ments of human industry, a self-constructing machine
would be taken to imply not comparative absence
of skill and contrivance in its maker, but a higher
exercise of these qualities ; and the same will have
to be said of the machine of the cosmos. The
more its order is due to an evolution which is the
outcome of the action of fixed laws inherent from
the first and tending definitely towards the final
result, the more striking is the manifestation of
intelligence which it bears upon its face. However,
the essence of extreme Darwinism lies in this,
that it seeks to attribute the course of evolution
ultimately to chance. Accidental varieties spring
up among individuals, and out of the vast number
of these, those which are advantageous in some
line to their possessors, are said to perpetuate
themselves in the struggle for existence. They go
to form the fittest, and the struggle for existence
being severe and consequently destructive, the fittest
of those born are naturally the survivors, and sur-

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTPIS. 167

viving, transmit their acquired advantages to their
offspring, and thereby fix them.

Such a system, no doubt, is directly opposed
to the Argument from Design. If the order of the
world can be explained by ghance, there is no need
to refer its origin to intelligence. But then this
hypothesis of origin by chance is just that which
has to be rejected as inadmissible, because it offends
against the undeniable truth that order presupposes
finality in the immediate cause and intelligence at
all events in the ultimate cause. It is not necessary,
again, to justify this statement, as we have done so
already (Cf. §§ 42, seq.), when we dealt with the
hypothesis of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. There
is, in fact, no essential difference, from a meta
physical point of view, between that ancient theory
and the modern theory of Natural Selection when
taken in its extreme form. However, it is precisely
on the ground that it attributes the magnificent
order of nature to sheer chance that this extreme
form of Darwinism is going out of favour.

We may here notice, without associating it
with Mr. Mill's name, another prevalent mode of
meeting the Argument from Design, which in some
respects is the opposite of that just considered. The
Argument from Design, it is said, proceeds from the
supposition that the cosmos is like Paley's watch, a
machine in which the component parts have no
natural tendency towards one another, but have
their motion and unity impressed upon them from
without. In other words, the ordering impulse is
here without the machine, and it is just on this

1 68 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

account that the inference to the existence of a
designing mind is just. But by what right is it
assumed that the ordering impulse in nature
generally is of this sort ?

" The thought or design which is at work in the
growth and development of organized structures is
not a mere mechanical power or cunning acting
from without — shaping, adjusting, putting together
materials prepared to its hand, constructing them
according to an ingenious plan after the manner of
a maker of machines. Here, on the contrary, the
idea or formative power goes with the matter, and
constitutes the very indwelling essence of the thing.
Instead of coming in as an after-thought, to give
to existing materials a new use and purpose not
included or presupposed in their own original
nature, the idea or design is present from the very
beginning, inspiring the first minute atom or cell
with the power of the perfect whole that is to be.
Nor for the building up and completing of the
structure, is there any call for the interposition of
external agency. From first to last it is self-
formative, self-developing : the life within resists
all merely outward interference and subordinates
all outward conditions to its own development. In
this case, therefore, we do not need to go beyond or
outside of the thing itself in seeking for the explana
tion of it. The thought or reason that explains it is
within the thing itself, nay, is its very self: so that
to perceive or know the thing at all is to perceive or
know the reason and ground of its existence."20

-° Caird's Introductions to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 146, 147.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 169

If we find this to be so in the organisms around
us, may we not extend the same idea to the whole
finite world and regard its order and the finality of
its movements as throughout proceeding from a
directing force which is immanent within it rather
than from one outside it like the God of Paley ?

This objection is easily answered. It is of no
consequence, in the first instance, whether the
directing principle which imparts finality to the
movements of the cosmos be external or internal to
it, except, indeed, in so far as the internal principle
of vital movement and growth in organisms supplies
us with evidence of a much more elaborate and far-
reaching finality than we find in the mechanical
achievements of human industry. But as long as
there is finality, there must be intelligence. For
finality involves an operation of the future on the
present, determining the course and direction which
the present movements are to take in order that
they may reach the future goal, and operation of the
future on the present is inconceivable except in so
far as the future is apprehended by an intelligence
which can set the physical forces in corresponding
motion and prescribe to them their lines of move
ment.21

Thus it matters not, in the first instance, where
we place the thought whence the design and finality
of the cosmos proceeds, whether within it as an
immanent principle, or without it as a God distinct
from it and transcending it. Ultimately, however,
the hypothesis of thought immanent in the cosmos,

21 Cf. §§ 43 — 45, where the full proof of this statement is given.

I7o OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

of an anima mundi in fact, is excluded. For the
argument of the First Cause leads us to a First
Intelligence which is self -existent, and the analysis of
the idea of self-existence causes us to perceive that
the First Intelligence must be a Pure and Infinite
Spirit, whereas the cosmos is finite and material.
Only on the hypothesis that cosmical monism or
pantheism was irrefutable, would an objection like
that just remarked upon, be really strong. We
have, however, given ample proof to show the
futility of pantheism and any other form of
monism. (Cf. c. iv. sect. 2). And if the reader bears
still in mind what we have said there, he cannot
fail to see that every appeal to immanent teleology
against an intelligent Designer is as futile as Mill's
appeal to the " survival of the fittest." Indeed it is
still more obviously opposed to reason than that
appeal, inasmuch as its foundation is more directly
repugnant to the attributes of a self-existing Being.

117. (2) Mill thinks that design and omnipotence
are incompatible. " It is not too much to say," he
maintains,22 " that every indication of design in the
cosmos is so much evidence against the omnipotence
of the Designer. For what is meant by design ?
Contrivance : the adaptation of means to an end.
But the necessity for contrivance — the need of
employing means — is a consequence of the limita
tion of power. Who would have recourse to means,
if to attain his end his mere word was sufficient ?
The very idea of means implies that the means have
an efficacy, which the direct action of the Being

33 L.c. pp. 176, 177.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 171

who employs them has not. Otherwise they are
not means, but an incumbrance. A man does not
use machinery to move his arms. If he did, it
could only be when paralysis had deprived him of
the power of moving them »by volition. But if the
employment of contrivance is in itself a sign of
limited power, how much more so is the careful and
skilful choice of contrivances ? Can any wisdom be
shown in the selection of means, when the means
have no efficacy but what is given them by the will
of Him who employs them and when His will could
have bestowed the same efficacy on other means?
. . . No one purpose imposes necessary limitations
on another in the case of a Being not restricted by
conditions of possibility."

Answer. By this way of arguing Mill proves
nothing more clearly than that he has a wrong
notion of omnipotence. Omnipotence is not an
ability to effect things which are intrinsically im
possible, but it is the power to effect whatever is
intrinsically possible. A power to produce what is
intrinsically impossible, for instance a philosopher
without a reasonable soul, would be a power for
non-sense in the strictest meaning of the word ; it
would be no power at all. Mill thinks that an
omnipotent Being is not " restricted by conditions
of possibility." This is true enough if it merely
means that God can do or make everything which
is not intrinsically impossible ; but it is not true, as
Mill suggests, that an omnipotent Being can by His
free-will make the intrinsically impossible become
intrinsically possible. Now it is intrinsically impos-

1 72 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

sible for all means to suffice for all ends indiscrimi
nately. If God will, for instance, that the sun's
action on the earth should be precisely what it is
now, and in accordance with the same physical
laws as now obtain, He could not possibly accom
plish this end by putting the earth where Jupiter is
and Jupiter where the earth is. If He willed that
the innumerable species of living beings that people
the earth should live on nourishment naturally suited
to their organisms, He could not reach this end by
providing food for only a few of them. Finally, if
He willed that men should merit their final happi
ness by faith, obedience, and patience, He could not
remove all difficulties and sufferings from their path
through life.

If these considerations are borne in mind, it
becomes clear that in selecting certain means
rather than others as being necessary or appro
priate to the accomplishment of certain ends, God
displays no want of power. The necessity or appro
priateness of the means for the ends is determined
by the laws of intrinsic possibility.

However, Mr. Mill's objection is not yet fully
answered. Why, he may still urge, require any
means at all ? Why, if God is omnipotent, can He
not create, for instance, full-grown living beings
at once, by a mere exercise of will ? The question
seems specious enough, but it proceeds from failure
to see that the freedom of God is not less infinite
than His omnipotence. Of course, an omnipotent
God could create straight off all the trees in the
world in a state of maturity, and could maintain

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 173

them in the perfection of their nature without the
agency of nutritive elements and processes. But
He may also prefer a system such as that in actual
existence, in which results are worked out gradually
by an evolutionary process, various agents com
bining and co-operating according to their natures
and properties. Surely the present age, which is
so much in love with evolution, ought not to deny-
that this latter is in itself an attractive system :
one, therefore, which may reasonably be selected
by a God desirous to manifest the excellences of
His creative power in a high degree. As an
absolutely best world is intrinsically impossible
(Th. XV.), the manifestation of God's omnipotence
in the world can in no system be exhaustive.
Precisely because Omnipotence is infinite power,
its effects cannot reflect it adequately. How far
it shall be manifested, depends entirely upon God's
free choice. God can choose no system in which
the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness would
be violated. But among the indefinite number of
systems that may be in harmony with the require
ments of absolute wisdom and goodness, there is
none of which the preference was not entirely open
to the freedom of the Creator. The answer, then,
to the question, Why require any means at all ? is
briefly this : Because God in His infinite freedom
has chosen a universe consisting of beings which
cannot manifest His power, wisdom, and goodness
in that degree which He freely intends without the
adaptation of means to ends in such excellency and
such profusion as our experience witnesses.

174 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

118. (3) Lange23 argues against design from the
great waste of living germs recurring constantly in
nature. " It cannot possibly be doubted that nature
proceeds in a way which has no resemblance with
human adaptation of means to ends ; nay, that its
most essential modus operandi, judged by the standard
of human understanding, is such as can only be
compared with the blindest chance. . . . From
the pollen of the plant to the fertilized seed-corn,
from the seed-corn to the germinating plant, from
the latter to the mature plant which again bears
seed, we see a constant repetition of a mechanism
which preserves life so far as it is preserved in the
present order of things, only by the generation of
thousands of beings to destroy them immediately,
and by availing itself of fortuitous coincidences of
favourable conditions. The destruction of living
germs, the failure of what has begun, is the rule ;
the * connatural ' (naturgemasse) development is a
special case among thousands ; it is the exception,
and this exception is made by that nature which the
purblind teleologist admires for its self-preservation
brought about by adapting means to ends. . . .
What we call chance in the preservation of species,
is of course no chance in regard of the universal
laws of nature, the grand machinery of which calls
forth all those effects ; but it is chance in the strictest
sense of the word, if we take this term as an expres
sion of what is opposed to the results obtained by
an Intelligence calculating in a similar way to men.'"
Similar lamentations about nature's " clumsiness "

23 Geschichte des Materialismus (ate Auflage), Vol. II. pp. 246, 247.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 175

and "cruelty" occur repeatedly in Mill's Essays on
Religion?*

Answer. We have to acknowledge that the elo
quent writer of the History of Materialism does not
advocate blind chance quite so openly as the
Epicureans of old. According to him, the preser
vation of the actually existing world of animals and
plants is due to the grand machinery of the laws of
nature. Be it so. Where, then, shall we search for
the origin of these laws ? Proximately, of course, they
are founded on definite combinations of the forces
of diverse natural beings. But those combinations
themselves — whence did they proceed ? To this we
have given a full answer. (Cf. §§ 43, seq.) After all,
therefore, even if we allow for argument's sake that
apparent failures result from the collision of various
natural laws — as Lange evidently supposes — it must
nevertheless be admitted that these laws are designed
by an intelligent Mind.

But, it may be asked next : Is it reasonable to
believe that this Mind is infinitely perfect ? If so,
whence so many failures in nature's working?
Should not a Creator of infinite perfection have
taken care that every one of His creatures reached
the end for which it was intended ? This evidently
is not the case in the present order of things ; for
what can be the end intended by the production of
living germs but that they shall grow and bear seed.
Instead of that, the greater part of them is wasted.
Does not this one fact alone suffice to justify fully
Lange's inference that nature is not subject to the
24 Pp. 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, &c.

176 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

government of a directing Mind in any way similar
to human minds? The answer to this question is not
too difficult. Before we can reasonably pronounce
that there are failures in nature, we must first be
certain that nature's ends go no farther than we
suppose them to go. The weak point in Lange's
argument lies precisely in his taking for granted
that living germs are good for nothing unless
they become full-grown living beings. This, how
ever, is evidently not the case, and Lange himself
practically denies it as often as he eats a piece
of bread or an egg. Who will say that all the
germs of life that are destroyed to furnish a savant's
breakfast-table, are wasted ? As we have demonstrated
in chapter iii., God is infinitely perfect, consequently,
infinitely good and wise. The object of His creation
must be worthy of His goodness and wisdom. From
this it follows, as we shall see in the treatise on
Divine Providence, that the absolutely last end of all
creation is the manifestation of God's goodness to
His rational creatures, and the relatively last end the
happiness of the rational creatures themselves. The
rest of the creation must serve as means to attain
the last end, which cannot be immediately reached
but by the knowledge and love of God, whereof only
rational creatures are capable. Experience proves
that the inferior creation is useful for man in various
ways, and that many of these ways, formerly un
known, are revealed in the course of time. It is,
therefore, unreasonable to say that creatures are
useless because we cannot find out how far they are
useful. After it has been demonstrated clearly that

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 177

an infinite Mind is the Author of the universe, we
cannot without rashness scrutinize the ways by
which that one infinite Mind of God leads His
creatures to their respective destinies. It is enough
for us that we can prove that there is an infinitely
good God, who guides His creatures to those par
ticular ends which He conditionally intends, as often
as the conditions are put, and that in any case He
guides them to those ends which He absolutely
intends, making all things contribute to the last
general end of creation.

Lange's objection appeared quite lately in a new
form. " I am not saying," says Mr. Mallock,25 "that
the theory of evolution has disproved the existence
of a designer, but that it has destroyed the traditional
evidence that the designer is good, or indeed that he
is even wise and skilful. How it has done this can
be explained briefly as follows. Suppose we were
told of a certain marksman that every one of his
rifle-shots, no matter at what distance, invariably
hit the target in the very centre of the bull's-eye,
we should say that this was evidence of unrivalled
skill. Supposing, however, we were to discover
subsequently that for every shot that hit the bull's-
eye he had fired a thousand that hit the rim of the
target, and fifty thousand that hit the neighbouring
haystacks, instead of thinking him skilful for having
hit the bull's-eye occasionally, we should be inclined
to think him skilful if he contrived always to miss
it. Now the old idea of creation was that every
thing was created suitable to the conditions of its

25 Fortnightly Review, November) 1890, p. 766.
M

178 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

existence ; in other words, the bull's-eye was hit
each time. The scientific theory is the precise
opposite— that most things were created unsuited
to the conditions of their existence ; and those only
have survived which happened accidentally to suit
them. In other words, for each time the bull's-eye
is hit, it is missed thousands of times ; and as the
God we are assuming is, ex hypothesi, firing eternally,
the fact of his hitting the target is no proof of his
having aimed at it. If the discoveries of science
amount to anything, they amount to this — that the
successes of nature are the siftings of innumerable
failures ; and if there is any force in the argument,
that the successes show skill, there is equal force in
the argument that the failures show want of it. ...
I am granting that the existence of a designer is
not only not disproved by science, but proved by it.
The one thing on which I am here insisting is that
science does not indeed disprove that the designer
is good and wise, but assuredly does destroy every
proof that he is."

Answer. We beg our reader not to mistake the
proper meaning of this difficulty. Mr. Mallock is
far from upholding the cause of agnosticism. All
he contends for is that, in the face of modern
scientific discoveries, God's goodness and wisdom
cannot be proved by reason, although they can be
certified by faith.

For the present we are only concerned about the
wisdom of the Designer of Nature. By what argu
ments does our objector think that science has
destroyed the evidence for it ? He refers us to the

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 179

theory of eternal evolution. Science, he considers,
has made it certain that evolution has been an
eternal process in nature, and upon this assumption
his argument is manifestly based. Is, then, this
basis solid? If " eternal" evolution is to mean
evolution without beginning, it is certain that no
cautious thinker would venture to maintain that it
has been established with any degree of probability
on the grounds of scientific facts. Moreover, we
have had occasion to prove that eternal evolution in
this sense is intrinsically repugnant (pp. 146, 147).
Perhaps by eternal evolution Mr. Mallock only
means evolution throughout countless ages. Even
if thus explained, can evolution be taken for more
than what Mr. Huxley takes it for — viz., " a
workable hypothesis " ? Whether the true answer
be negative or affirmative, we will at all events start
from the assumption that evolution existed and
went on through unmeasurable geological periods,
after the manner in which Darwinians conceive it.
On this assumption, if with a view to consider the
tenability of the hypothesis, we suppose the laws of
evolution to have been instituted by a Personal
God, the comparison he makes between a marksman
and the arranger of the universe is intelligible
enough. As the marksman aims at the target in
such a way as to hit, if possible, the bull's-eye, so
God, in laying down the laws of evolution for inani
mate and animate things, has a certain aim ; and if
He is to be taken as wise in any considerable degree,
He must reach His aim not only in some cases, but
at least in most cases ; He must reach it in each

i So OF THE EXISTENCE OF COD.

case not only approximately, but with precision.
Otherwise He would be like a marksman who
misses the target a far greater number of times
than he hits it, and who when hitting it strikes only
the rim, not the bull's-eye.

But now if we are to judge from the appearance
of nature whether God does hit the bull's-eye to
this extent, we must first be certain what is the
bull's-eye at which He is aiming when He lays
down and maintains laws of evolution for matter
and life. Mr. Mallock seems to think that according
to our doctrine God has intended that every living
being should be in complete harmony with its sur
roundings, and should always be placed in such
conditions as would foster and not hinder its con
natural development. It is quite true that if this
had been the object of the Creator, scientific facts
might be said to have destroyed all our evidence
for His wisdom, and laid us open to the attacks of
agnosticism. But the advocates of the design
argument have never imagined that the Divine
intention in framing this world was to disregard
the inherent tendencies to corruption, and to secure
to each form of organic life the completion of its
natural development and the fulness of comfort
and enjoyment. This has not even been supposed
of man, the highest among living organisms. If
indeed man's life as a whole to the inclusion of
the life to come were meant, we should have to
speak differently. But as far as that portion of
his life is concerned which is led here below, it
was acknowledged many thousand years ago by one

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 181

whose theism is beyond suspicion that, " Man born
of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with
many miseries." 26 And the very Founder of Chris
tianity deemed the conditions of life so inadequate
to assure absolute happiness and development that
among the reasons for which He wished His dis
ciples not to be over-anxious for the future, we find
this, " Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." 27

Under the heading " Divine Providence " we
shall show that God has created the world for the
manifestation of His goodness to rational creatures,
and for the happiness of the latter, who alone are
capable of true happiness. Consequently, in so far
as evolution with the restrictions laid down above
(pp. 133, 134) may be admissible, this is the final
goal towards which its whole course must be
directed. And the final goal must be reached only
and precisely in that degree of perfection which the
Creator intends.

We conclude, then, by saying that the target at
which the Designer of Nature is aiming is not the
prosperity of corporeal life, and the bull's-eye in
the target is not the perfect adaptation of each
individual life to its surroundings. The true target
is God's glory and the final happiness of those
rational creatures who obey the voice of their con
science, and the bull's-eye in the target is precisely
that degree of God's glory and man's final happiness
which the Creator in the light of His infinite know
ledge has fixed absolutely. It will be hard for the
champions of natural science to show either that

26 Job xiv. i. 27 St. Matt. vi. 34.

1 82 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

the end of creation thus explained is asserted with
out sufficient evidence or to prove that it will not
be reached finally.

SECTION 5. — Darwin's reasons for doubting the existence
of God.

ng. As appears from the Life and Letters of
Charles Darwin, edited by his son Francis,28 that
great observer of Nature never denied the existence
of God. The arguments brought forward to prove
that there is a God, seemed to him sometimes quite
overwhelming ; and in such moments he was forced
to be a complete theist. Yet, after he had lost
his faith in the Gospels, he lost also the habitual
conviction, formerly so strong in him, that the
universe is ruled by a wise God. His attitude
towards monotheism became that of a non-aggres
sive agnostic. Most of the reasons by which he
tried to justify his position, are closely connected
with his biological theory of evolution. On account
of the great influence which this theory exercises
over many minds, we think it well to give these
reasons in full with Darwin's own words and to
test their force carefully.

The value of the Argument from Design is called
in question by Darwin chiefly for three reasons,
each of which we will state in Darwin's own
words.

(a) In his autobiography, written in 1876, he
says : 29 " The old argument from design in nature,

28 Vol. I. viii. "Religion." 29 Ibid. p. 309.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS 183

as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so
conclusive, fails, now that the law of Natural Selec
tion has been discovered. We can no longer argue
that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve
shell must have been ma^e by an intelligent being,
like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to
be no more design in the variability of organic
beings, and in the action of Natural Selection, than
in the course which the wind blows. I have discussed
this subject at the end of my book on the Variation
of Domesticated Animals and Plants; and the argu
ment there given has never, as far as I can see, been
answered."

The argument to which we are referred in this
passage is as follows : 30 " Are we to believe that the
forms are preordained of the broken fragments of
rock which tumble from a precipice and are fitted
together by man to build his houses ? If not, why
should we believe that the variations of domestic
animals or plants are preordained for the sake of
the breeder ? But if we give up the principle in one
case, ... no shadow of reason can be assigned
for the belief that variations . . . which have been
the groundwork through Natural Selection of the
formation of the most perfectly adapted animals
in the world, man included, were intentionally and
specially guided."

The doubt expressed in the preceding lines is
dwelt upon also in a letter to Miss Julia Wedgwood
(written July n, i88i).31 He owns in this letter

30 The Variation of Animals and Plants, Vol. II. p. 431.

31 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol. 1. p. 314.

1 84 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

that "the mind refuses to look at this universe
being what it is, without having been designed."
Yet he finds it too difficult to believe that all vari
ations of organic structures should have been
designed, for instance, " each variation in the rock
pigeon." It seemed to him that to care about such
trifles was scarcely worthy of a Being who is the
Maker of a universe. " Do you consider that the
successive variations in the size of the crop of the
pouter pigeon which man has accumulated to please
his caprice have been due to "the creative and
sustaining powers of Brahma? " In the sense that
an omnipotent and omniscient Deity must order and
know everything, this must be admitted ; yet in
honest truth, I can hardly admit it. It seems
preposterous that a maker of a universe should
care about the crop of a pigeon solely to please
man's silly fancies. But if you agree with me in
thinking such an interposition of the Deity uncalled
for, I can see no reason whatever for believing in
such interpositions in the case of natural beings,"
&c.

In the same sense Darwin expresses himself in
a letter to Dr. Gray : 32 " An innocent and good man
stands under a tree and is killed by a flash of light
ning. Do you believe (and I really should like to
hear) that God designedly killed this man ? Many
or most persons do believe this ; I can't and don't.
If you believe so, do you believe when a swallow
snaps up a gnat that God designed that that par
ticular swallow should snap up that particular gnat

82 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol. I. pp. 314, 315.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 185

at that particular instant ? I believe that a man
and a gnat are in the same predicament. If the
death of neither man nor gnat are designed, I see
no good reason to believe that their first birth or
production should be necessarily designed."

We may put Darwin's argument in concise form
as follows : If some adaptations of certain antece
dents to certain consequents are explained by design
of the Creator, all must be explained so, however
trifling they may appear. But not all can reason
ably be explained so ; for instance, it cannot be
reasonably referred to creative design that pieces of
rock tumbling from a precipice are found fit for
building houses, or that man turns rock pigeons
artificially into fantail pigeons, or that a flash of
lightning kills an innocent man, or that a swallow
snaps up a gnat. There is consequently no sufficient
reason for admitting design at all.

What shall we answer to this ? At first sight it
might seem reasonable to doubt whether it is neces
sary to admit design everywhere in nature, if you
admit it anywhere. There is indeed no immediate
appearance of intrinsic contradiction in the idea
of a universe in which only the more important
operations should be guided by design.33 Consider-

33 In a letter to Asa Gray, dated November 26, 1860, the great
biologist himself inclines to take this view. He writes: "I am
inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with
the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we
may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel
most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human
intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.
Let each man hope and believe what he can." (Life and Letters,
Vol. II. p. 312.)

186 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

ing, however, that the first Designer of the world
is self-existent and infinitely perfect, He must
know from eternity not only in general, but in
detail, all conditionally future results of any plan
possible. Moreover, His infinite wisdom neces
sarily prevents any event from happening, the
occurrence of which would in no way serve His
plan. From this it follows that every effect in
the universe has been designed by God, inasmuch
as He has foreseen it, and has from eternity
decreed not to prevent its happening, but to
make its occurrence serve the end of all creation.34
Granting then Darwin's assertion that we cannot
be consistent with ourselves, unless we admit
that all effects in nature have been foreseen and
preordained, we deny altogether that there is
anything repugnant to reason in this admission.
Reason forbids us indeed to admit that each par
ticular event has been designed by a particular act
of the Divine mind distinct from the act by which
the whole of the universe was planned. Such an
assumption would clash with God's simplicity and
infinite perfection. But there is nothing intrinsically
repugnant in the statement that God by one act of
His infinite intellect foresaw all events, and by one
act of His infinite will subordinated each of them
to a particular good purpose. On the contrary, this
cannot be denied without denying what is logically
connected with God's infinite perfection, as will
appear in our treatises on Divine knowledge and
providence.

34 Cf. the solution of Lange's difficulty, § 118.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 187

120. (6) Another doubt against the conclusive-
ness of the design argument arose in Darwin's
mind from the consideration of the so-called
"rudimentary organs" in man. He thus expresses
it in a letter to Asa Gray '(December n, I86I):35
" With regard to Design I feel more inclined to
show a white flag than to fire my usual long-range
shot. I like to try and ask you a puzzling question,
but when you return the compliment I have great
doubts whether it is a fair way of arguing. If any
thing is designed, certainly man must be : one's
' inner consciousness ' (though a false guide) tells
one so ; yet I cannot admit that man's rudimentary
mammae . . . were designed."

The difficulty in conceiving "rudimentary"
organs as designed, expressed in the above passage,
has often been repeated by Darwinists. It rests
upon their not seeing the particular purpose those
organs should serve. But from the fact, that
the immediate object of an effect in nature cannot
be discovered by us, it certainly does not follow that
such an effect was not designed for some imme
diate object. As we have remarked already, when
solving Lange's difficulty, there are many things apt
to further the attainment not only of one but of
several particular ends. Granting then for argu
ment's sake, that a "rudimentary" organ may be
useless to the organism in which it is found, this
in no way justifies the inference that it is altogether
useless ; or that it is out of harmony with the final
end an infinite Creator must intend by decreeing the

a5 Life and Letters, Vol. II. p. 382.

188 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

existence of the universe. We have touched upon
this final end above (§ 118). We have explained
there that God creates in order to manifest His
perfection to His intellectual creatures. But does
it follow from this that each fact in nature must be
understood by man ? No one can reasonably deny
the possibility of the existence of intellectual creatures
whose minds are far more penetrating than the
mind of man. Supposing then that there exists
a world of created spirits, is it not very probable
that they see perfectly the rationale of the rudi
mentary organs, and recognize in them a vestige
of supreme wisdom ? And even apart from this,
the puzzle caused by the discovery of " rudimen
tary" organs seems to resemble much the amaze
ment naturally arising from the sight of any com
plicated arrangements of which we only know
the final outcome. For instance, a man of common
sense who knows no more about the mechanism of
a watch than that by turning the key properly, it
can be made to measure time, enters the shop of a
watchmaker well furnished with all sorts of instru
ments and materials. What the particular purpose
maybe which each of them answers in the construc
tion of watches, his ignorance prevents his knowing;
but it does not hinder him from the exercise of a
reasonable belief that there is none among them all
that is useless for the work of the watchmaker. Thus
he knows the common remote end of all the things he
sees, without understanding anything about the
particular proximate end through which each must
pass in order to reach the common remote end.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 189

What such a man knows about the instruments
he is looking at and what he does not know, seems
to illustrate well both the knowledge we are able to
attain about natural events and the ignorance in
which we must remain. By logical reasoning based
upon undeniable premisses, the certain conclusion
can be arrived at that the whole universe is under
the sway of one supreme infinitely wise Lord, that
He penetrates with one act of His infinite Mind
the essences and actions and mutual relations of all
things, that He intends them all for a final end
worthy of His Infinite Wisdom, and that He cannot
fail to direct them rightly to this end. On the
other hand, comparatively little can be known by
man about the proximate object of particular things
and events, although he may be sure that in some
way or other they must lead up to the attainment
of the final end. Even when he does catch a
glimpse of the usefulness of things in particular, he
never can grasp it fully, because he never comprehends
the nature of any natural being, nor does he com
prehend its relations to other beings, although he
may know a great deal about both. Consequently,
no solid doubt as to the wise guidance of nature
can be based upon our not seeing the "why and
wherefore " of things in particular. It is abun
dantly sufficient that the " why and wherefore "
in general can be proved evidently.

Moreover, in the particular case of rudimentary
structures, is it so certain that we can form to
ourselves no conception at all of some possibilities
of their utility ? Mr. Mivart suggests that they may

igo OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

perhaps be useful in aiding the physiological balance
of the organism. His whole passage may be
appropriately quoted.

" As to rudimentary structures we may content
ourselves with asking, in the words of Buffon, ' Why
is it to be considered so necessary that every part
in an individual should be useful to the other parts
and to the whole animal ? Should it not be enough
that they do not injure each other, nor stand in the
way of each other's fair development ? Moreover,
such rudimentary structures may have a certain
utility, may aid the physiological balance of the
organism after all ! It cannot yet be shown to be
so, but neither can it be shown that it is not so.
They are parts of a great whole, which to be
adequately understood must be surveyed in its
entirety. But any one of us can as little judge the
scope of the whole universe, as a fly perched on a
pinnacle of York Minster, can perceive the plan,
pressures, and bearings of the stones of that glorious
pile." 36

Buffon's suggestion that it is sufficient if a
rudimentary structure is not harmful to the indi
vidual, might perhaps seem open to the reply that
if the world were designed by God, we ought to
find not mere harmlessness but positive utility in
each one, even the minutest of its parts. We are
of the same opinion. But from that alone it does
not follow that Mr. Mivart was wrong in supporting
to a certain extent Buffon's view. To say that a
part of an animal is not positively useful to that

86 On Truth, pp. 478, 479.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS, igi

individual animal, to its vegetative and sensitive
operations, is assuredly not the same as to say that
it is of no use. The whole animal with all its parts
is to be considered not only as an individual being,
but also in relation to the'whole species ; and the
usefulness of each part is not only to be estimated
from its appropriateness to physiological functions,
but also from its value as contributing to the ex
ternal expression of that idea of the Creator of
which each organic type is a realization. It is
from this standpoint that the celebrated physio
logist Carpenter quotes with approval the following
words of Mr. Paget : " These rudimental organs
certainly do not serve, in a lower degree, the same
purposes as are served by the homologous parts
which are completely developed in other species or
in the other sex. To say they are useless is con
trary to all we know of the absolute perfection and
all-pervading purposes of creation ; to say they
exist merely for the sake of conformity to a general
type of structure is surely unphilosophical, for the
law of Unity of organic types is, in larger instances,
not observed, except when its observance contributes
to the advantage of the individual. No : all these
rudimental organs must, as they grow, be as ex
cretions, serving a definite purpose in the economy
by removing their appropriate materials from the
blood, thus leaving it fitter for the nutrition of other
parts, or adjusting the balance which might other
wise be disturbed by the formation of some other
part. Thus they minister to the self-interest of the
individual ; while, as if for the sake of wonder,

192 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

beauty, and perfect order, they are conformed with
the great law of Unity of organic types, and concur
with the universal plan observed in the construction
of organic beings." 37

121. (c) A third difficulty of Darwin against the
Argument from Design arose from the consideration
of the vast amount of suffering in sentient beings.
It seemed to him that a benevolent Creator could
hardly have predestined His creatures to so much
misery, whereas Natural Selection might sufficiently
account for it. He says : 38 " That there is much
suffering in the world no one disputes. Some have
attempted to explain this with reference to man by
imagining that it serves for his moral improvement.
But the number of men in this world is as nothing
compared with that of all other sentient beings, and
they often suffer greatly without any moral improve
ment. This very old argument from the existence
of suffering against the existence of an intelligent
First Cause seems to me a strong one, whereas . . .
the presence of much suffering agrees well with the
view that all organic beings have been developed
through variation and Natural Selection." The way
in which he thinks to explain the sufferings of men
and animals by Natural Selection he thus sums
up: "Such suffering is quite compatible with
Natural Selection, which is not perfect in its
action, but tends only to render each species as
successful as possible in the battle for life with

37 Paget, Lectures on Surgical Pathology, p. 31 ; quoted by Carpenter,
Human Physiology, p. 281.

™ Life and Letters, Vol. II. p. 311.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 193

other species in wonderfully complex and changing
circumstances."

A particular sort of suffering which caused
Darwin to have misgivings in regard of design is
mentioned by him in a letter to Asa Gray.39 *' I
cannot persuade myself," he says, "that a beneficent
and omnipotent God would have designedly created
the ichneumonidse with the express intention of
their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars,
or that a cat should play with mice. Not believing
this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye
was expressly designed." In the same letter, how
ever, he admits that such suffering proves nothing
conclusively against an omniscient Creator.

We answer to all this : An omnipotent and
benevolent Creator cannot design sufferings merely
for suffering's sake; He cannot find His delight in
the sufferings of His creatures. But there is no
argument to prove that He cannot will physical
sufferings as a means for the bringing about of a
real good connected with the final end of creation.
It is not necessary that each suffering of a sentient
being should have been proximately designed with
a view to man's moral improvement. It may imme
diately have regard to something else, and may
mediately serve the bringing about of a state of
things of which man finally can make use for his
moral improvement. In any case it will serve to
reveal either to man or to other intellectual creatures
higher than man the wonderful ways of God's
wisdom. That there is no Divine attribute with

39 Life and Letters, Vol. I. p. 311.

194 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

which the sufferings and moral disorders of this
world can rightly be said to clash, we shall prove
conclusively in the treatise on Divine Providence.
" But," a Darwinian may object here, " after all it
has not been shown that Darwin was wrong, when
he thought that the sufferings which make life so
bitter, are far more satisfactorily explained by the
hypothesis of Natural Selection than by that of
design." A sufficient answer to this objection is
obvious enough. Whatever truth there may be in
the theory of Natural Selection, certainly such
process of selection could not begin before the
existence of living organisms capable of struggling
for the maintenance of their lives. But it has already
(§§ 45, 46) been demonstrated that Natural Selec
tion, even if it be a true cause of the habits and
interests of living beings, cannot be their ultimate
cause. Intelligence must even then be inferred to
lie behind and to have established the evolutionary
system in which Natural Selection plays so
prominent a part. Granting then, for argument's
sake, that Natural Selection can account for the
prevalence of happiness with the addition of an un
avoidable measure of suffering, as Darwin believed,40
it certainly is not the chief cause either of happiness
or of suffering, but is only instrumental in working
out the plan conceived by the First Intelligent
Cause, as Darwin himself once rightly conjectured,
when he wrote to Dr. Asa Gray as follows : " I can
see no reason why a man or other animal, may not
have been aboriginally produced by other laws, and

40 Life and Letters, Vol. I. p. 310.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 195

that all these laws may have been expressly designed
by an omniscient Creator, who foresaw every future
event and consequence."41

122. Against the proof of theism drawn from
the common belief of mankind, Darwin makes this
remark : " This argument would be a valid one if
all men of all races had the same inward conviction
of the existence of God ; but we know that this is
very far from being the case." 42

There is no point in this objection unless the
argument, which it attacks, takes this form : " All
men have always believed in one God. But this
belief would never have spread so universally if
there were not really one God. Consequently we
must be certain about the existence of God."

Of course such an argument is open to the
objection made by Darwin. But this is not the
argument we have given above. (Cf. c. ii. § 49.)
We argue thus : There has always existed in the
majority of men a persistent belief in a Nature of
some kind or other, superior to the material world
and to man ; a belief against the reasonableness of
which, considered in its universal character, nothing
can be said ; a belief, moreover, the origin whereof
can only be satisfactorily explained by taking the
belief to be well-grounded and true. Consequently,
it must be admitted that there exists a Nature,
superior to the material world and to man.

Any doubts that might arise against the sound-

41 Darwin to Asa Gray, May 22, 1862. Life and Letters, Vol. II.
P- 312.

4'' Life and Letters, Vol. I. p. 312.

rg6 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

ness of this argument have already been solved in
the passage quoted above. (C. ii. § 49.) In that
place attention was also called to the inability of
the moral proof to stand by itself alone as an
unassailable foundation of monotheism. Neverthe
less, its value must not be under-rated. Although,
without support from the argument of a First
Cause it cannot convince us of the existence of
One, Infinite God ; yet it is strong enough to satisfy
every reasonable thinker that atheism and agnos
ticism are not congenial to human reason, and
must, therefore, be abandoned by every one who
would not come into the predicament in which
Darwin confessed himself to be43 in "a hopeless
muddle."

123. We come next to Darwin's difficulty against
the argument of a First Cause. He thus expresses
it in his autobiography : 44 " Another source of
conviction in the existence of God, connected with
the reason and not with the feelings, impresses me
as having much more weight. This follows from
the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of
conceiving this immense and wonderful universe,
including man, with his capacity of looking far
forwards and far into futurity, as the result of
blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting
I feel impelled to look to a First Cause having an

43 Darwin wrote to Asa Gray, Nov. 26, 1860: "I grieve to say
that I cannot honestly go as far as you do about design. I am
conscious that I am in an utterly hopeless muddle. . . . Again I
say I am and shall ever remain in a hopeless muddle." (Life and
Letters, Vol. II. p. 353.)

44 Life and Letters, Vol. I. pp. 311, 312.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 197

intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that
of man, and I deserve to be called a theist. This
conclusion was strong in my mind about the time,
as far as I can remember, when I wrote the Origin
of Species, and it is since that time that it has very
gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker.
But then arises the doubt, Can the mind of man,
which has, as I fully believe, been developed from
a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest
animals, be trusted when it draws such grand
conclusions ? I cannot pretend to throw the least
light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of
the beginning of all things is insoluble by us, and
I for one must be content to remain an agnostic."
In this passage Darwin confesses that the premisses
which lead to the conclusion of a first Intelligent
Cause are undeniable, and that the connection of
that conclusion with its premisses is so close that
the human mind cannot help seeing it. Such a
conclusion is, according to all sound logicians, the
enunciation of an objective truth. And yet Darwin
stops short of being satisfied. And why ? Have
his careful biological observations led to the dis
covery of any fact incompatible with the existence
of God ? Assuredly not.45 The only reason alleged
by Darwin for the abandonment of his previous con-

45 Even Professor Huxley acknowledges this: "The doctrine
of Evolution is neither anti-theistic nor theistic. It simply has no
more to do with theism than the first book of Euclid has. . . .
There is a great deal of talk and not a little lamentation about the
so-called religious difficulties which physical science has created.
In theological science, as a matter of fact, it has created none. Not
a solitary problem presents itself to the philosophical theist at the

ig8 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

victions is that a mind developed from that of the
mind of the lowest animals is not competent to form
an opinion on so grand a problem. This kind of
false humility which refuses to accept the con
clusions of logic and the evidence of reason because,
forsooth, we are developed as Darwin imagines
from the amoeba, does not need refuting. Even if
our minds had the origin which he ascribes to them,
it would be worth nothing as an argument. A mind
derived through generation from brutes would be
utterly unable to draw any conclusion at all. The
soul of a brute is a substantial principle " entirely
immersed in matter," altogether without power of
reasoning.46 Between an imaginary soul developed
from the soul of an amoeba and the real soul of
man there is an infinite difference. Man's soul, as
we have seen, is a spiritual being, the origin of
which is due to immediate Divine creation. (Th.
XVII.) Considering this truth, Darwin's objection
simply disappears.

As we have already shown, no natural law can
be reasonably explained without reference to a first
Intelligent Cause. If, therefore, progressive de
velopment and Natural Selection are laws of nature,
they must, like other laws, imply belief in an " all
originating, all fore-ordaining, all regulative intelli
gence to determine the rise and the course and the

present day which has not existed from the time that philosophers
began to think out the logical grounds and the logical consequences
of theism." (Life and Letters, yol. II. pp. 202, 203, in c. v. written
by Huxley.)

46 Mivart, Nature and Thought, p. 226; Maher, Psychology, pp.
550—554-

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH 5. IJ>9

goal of life as of all finite things." 47 It is, therefore,
quite natural that men who are both acquainted
with the results of scientific inquiry and grounded
in solid philosophical principles prove to be among
the first champions of monotheism. And why is
Darwin not among them ? Because he believes
fully in the development of the human mind from
what he calls the " mind of the lowest animals."
Is, then, this belief grounded on fact ? Not at all.
A consideration of the facts to which our own con
sciousness continually bears witness has led us to
the evident conclusion that the mind of man is a
spiritual substance. (§§ 31 — 37, incl.) In this con
clusion we are supported not only by the most
subtle philosophers of all ages, but also by one of
the most prominent and thoughtful biologists of our
own time. " The soul," writes Professor St. George
Mivart, " though existing amongst a constant suc
cession of changing conditions, can think of an
eternal unchanging absolute. The soul knows itself
as looking before and after, and as that which both
thinks and endures — persisting thus for years, or, in
other words, as a spiritual substance. Above all,
the soul can appreciate right and wrong, and now
and then freely choose its motive, and so dominate
and control the chain of physical causation by its
free-will. All these considerations show that its
nature is far more widely removed from that of the
active principle of the ape than is the latter from
a magnet. And as the soul or active principle of
an ape differs from the activity of a magnet by a

47 Flint, Theism, p. 209.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

difference of kind, so the soul of a man differs yet
more in kind from that of an ape." 4S Dr. Carpenter,
also another distinguished biologist, tells us that
the enunciations, " I am," " I ought," " I can," " I
will," are " firm foundation-stones on which we can
base our attempt to climb into a higher sphere of
existence." 49 He considers the human will as
"something essentially different from the general
resultant of an automatic activity of the mind "
as " a self-determining power ; " 50 and consequently
that " the death of the body is but the commence
ment of a new life of the soul." 51

Darwin's doubts prove nothing more clearly
than that the entertainer of them had a right
appreciation of his capacity for philosophy when
he wrote, " I have had no practice in abstract
reasoning, and I may be all astray."52 Our attention
will now be occupied with the arguments of men
who pushed their power of abstract reasoning to
such lengths as to construct the whole universe
a priori. These are our modern pantheists, leader
and chief of whom is Spinoza.

SECTION 6. — Spinoza's proof that God is the only substance,
and that everything else is a mode of God.

124. According to the pantheistic theory, ex
pounded in Spinoza's Ethics, there is only one

48 Nature and Thought, p. 266.

49 Mental Physiology, p. 376. 60 Ibid. p. 392.

61 Human Physiology, p. 1120, § 888.

62 Letter to Asa Gray in Life and Letters, Vol. I. p. 315.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTPIS. 201

substance, unproduced and infinite — God.53 Besides
God, no substance can exist or be conceived to
exist : consequently, whatever is, is in God ; it is a
mode or affection of the Divine Nature.54 God is
not the transient or external cause of all things, but
their immanent cause;55 they are all determined by
the necessity of the Divine Nature to exist and to act
in a certain definite manner.56 Hence it follows
that so-called freedom of will is a chimera,57 and that
things could have been produced by God in no other
way or order than as they have been produced.58

These are the leading tenets of the thirty-six
propositions, in which Spinoza, in the first part of
his Ethics, explains his views about the primary
cause of all things. From the general refutation
of pantheism given above (Th. X. § 78), it is evident
that these propositions contradict external and
internal experience, and contain a virtual denial of
the first principles both of speculative and of
practical reason. Yet they are worked out with a
show of exactness which has captivated while it has
imposed upon many minds. It becomes, therefore,
worth while to deal with them in some measure. We
shall, however, confine ourselves to the one under
lying fallacy on which the entire system is based.
This is his misuse of his ambiguous definition of
substance, which we shall examine briefly, and then
pass on to the principles by which the German
pantheists Fichte and Hegel, in spite of the un-

53 Ethics, Part I. Prop. vi. vii. viii. xi. 54 Ibid. Prop. xiv. xv.
55 Prop, xviii. 66 Prop. xxix.

57 Prop, xxxii. 68 Prop, xxxiii.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

popularity of their systems, have led the way to
more modern forms of monism.

Spinoza rests his proof that God is the only
possible substance on the proposition that one sub
stance cannot be produced by another substance,59
which is a virtual assertion of pantheism. This
proposition is proved by a series of previous pro
positions,60 all of which are based on the definition
of substance with which he starts. Substance is
defined by Spinoza as "that which is in itself and
is conceived by itself alone, that is to say, that of
which the concept can be formed without involving
any other concept." 61

This definition is patently ambiguous, and in
order to make sure whether Spinoza's sixth pro
position is really implicitly contained in it, we must
inquire into the different ways in which the defi
nition may be understood. Its meaning depends
upon the interpretation of the phrase, "that which
is in itself and is conceived by itself." This may
signify (i) a complete individual, physical being,
as distinguished from its natural properties and
accidental modifications ; it may also signify (2) a
self-existing being, a being under all aspects inde
pendent of any other being, whether as an under
lying subject in which it inheres, or as a cause
from which it proceeds. On the first interpre
tation, Spinoza's definition of substance is almost
identical with the scholastic definition ; on the

69 Prop. vi. 60 Prop. i. — v. incl.

61 " Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur,
h.e. id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo
formari debeat."

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 203

second, his definition is not applicable to any but
the first Being, the Divine Essence, and as this
Essence cannot be multiplied, Spinoza's Prop, vi.,
"One substance cannot produce another substance,"
follows from it, and this involves Pantheism. Yet
the absurdity of pantheistic monism (Th. X.) proves
fully that nobody can interpret substance in the
second meaning of Spinoza's definition without
committing himself to sheer nonsense. Now as to
the steps of reasoning by which Spinoza reaches his
famous Prop, vi., it will be enough to remark on the
first. His Prop. i. runs thus : " Substance is prior
in nature to its affections."62 In proof of it he says
nothing but that it follows from his definitions of
substance and of mode. We have said enough about
the former. The latter is as follows : " By mode I
understand an affection of substance or that which
is in something else by which also it is appre
hended."63 This may signify a substantial principle
imparting to the whole its specific character, or a
natural property really distinct from the being of
which it is predicated, or an accidental modification
of a being. Thus the soul of a dog is in the matter
of its body as a specifying principle (forma substan-
tialis) : the faculty of understanding, considered in its
operations, is in the human soul as a natural property
really distinct from the soul ; and the derangement
of mind is in the lunatic as an accidental modification.
If, then, we take Spinoza's definition of substance

62 " Substantia prior est natura suis affectibus."
es a per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones sive id quod in
alio est, per quod etiam concipitur."

2o4 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

in the first of the two senses given above, and his
definition of mode in the first of the three senses
just explained, his first proposition is false. It is not
true, for instance, that a dog is prior in nature to
the specifying principle called his soul. Taking the
same interpretation of the definition of substance
along with the second and third interpretations of
the definition of mode, we find the first proposition
to be evidently true ; for it is undeniable that
natural properties and accidental modifications of
a particular being cannot be conceived, except as
following the existence of that being. In so far as
they do not follow its existence in the order of time,
they at least follow it in the order of nature, that is
to say, their existence cannot be conceived but on
the supposition that the being exists of which they
are predicated. Finally, if we take Spinoza's' defini
tion of substance in the second sense given above,
and his definition of mode in any of the three senses
explained by us, it appears at once that his first
proposition is altogether false. We have proved
that God is physically and metaphysically simple.
He is therefore not a substance like matter, which
can be raised to diverse substantial degrees by the
reception of diverse specifying principles. Nor are
there in Him natural properties to be conceived as
something under certain aspects really distinct from
His essence, and following that essence, in the
way that an act of our understanding is really
distinct from and follows the essence of the soul.
Much less can God be the subject of merely
accidental modifications.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 205

But in what sense does Spinoza take his two
definitions ? Explicitly he does not tell us. Yet
in the arguments by which he supports his following
propositions64 there is not any force, unless substance
be taken in the second se^ise ; and, as he declares
creatures to be affections or modes of the One
infinite substance,65 mode is taken in the third sense
explained by us. Hence it is evident that in
Spinoza's very «first proposition there are hidden
two false suppositions, the one that substance is
synonymous with self -existence , the other that self-
existence is changeable. The first of these two
assumptions we have refuted in Th. X., the other
will explicitly be refuted in Th. XXII.

SECTION 7. — Remarks on the theories of Fichte and Hegel
and others.

125. According to Fichte the Ego is the embodi
ment of all reality. All individual things, to the
existence of which consciousness and experience
testify, are nothing but different aspects of the
infinite reality of the Ego, bound by fatal necessity
to oppose itself to itself. Whatever therefore man
perceives is properly speaking in himself, inasmuch
as his own being is one reality with the many-sided
infinite Ego.

The foundation upon which this pantheistic
idealism rests is the belief that knowledge of
existences separate from that of the person knowing
transcends the bounds of possibility.

64 Prop. ii. — vi. 65 Prop. xiv. xv.

206 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

" Whatever you are looking at as outside your
self," says Fichte, "is always your own self;
whatever you are conscious of in it, you are really
contemplating yourself." 66 This opinion grew upon
him by reading the first edition of Kant's Criticism
of Pure Reason. Following out logically what Kant
had said about the impossibility of giving a satis
factory account of the objectivity of our knowledge
by speculative reason, Fichte did* away with the
object, and thus converted the world into a necessary
illusion of the One Infinite Subject. The general
refutation of pantheism given by us above (§§ 78 —
81, inclus.) suffices abundantly to show how utterly
Fichte's system is opposed to sound reason. And
we may add that those who like Fichte consider
the entire world to be but a series of interesting
games played by consciousness with its subjective
phenomena, are quite unreasonable in challenging
their opponents to point out a bridge by which they
may pass from real subject to real object. Either
they believe that they have opponents or they do
not. If they do not, why ask the question ? If
they do, therein is the acknowledgment that in
their own cognitive faculties they possess a bridge
which is sufficiently safe.67

126. In a quarrel between the followers of Fichte
and those of Hegel, the latter may claim for their
master the distinction of greater dialectical skill,
but it will be impossible to show that the Hegelian

66 Fichte, Die Bcstimmung des Menschen, p. 228.

67 The idealism contained in Fichte's system has found a fuller
*-eiutation in the treatise of this series entitled First Principles.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 207

system considered in its essence is more in harmony
with reason than that of Fichte.

Hegel calls the Divine Essence the Idea, and
explains it so as in reality to signify by the term the
abstract concept of being. ^Thought and Being are
one in his system. If he had said this of the
Divine Nature distinct from and above the world,
he would have been perfectly right. God is at
once Infinite Being and Infinite Thought. What
is thus true of God, Hegel affirms of the Idea
of Being, under which our mind conceives what
ever is and can be. This Idea of Being, as Hegel
regards it, is something infinite, something gene
rating within itself by natural evolution all finite
things, opposed as they are to one another, and
persevering in its own reality as the unity of these
opposites.68

The basis of this theory is the fiction, that not
the singular, but the universal is properly real.
Hence it follows that as there is one concept which
expresses the most universal object, i.e., Being as
such, that concept must be the foundation of all
reality, so much so, that all existing things are but
determinations of abstract Being, evolving itself
into finite beings opposed to one another. This
fiction has its origin in the confusion of the real
order of things with the ideal order ; in other words,
in the confusion of the beings conceived by us with
our way of conceiving them. Though our external
and internal experience bears witness that there are
many finite beings altogether distinct from one

88 Cf. Encyclopddie, Band. i. §§ 79 — 82.

2o8 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

another, and though by reasoning we arrive at the
knowledge of one Infinite Being, really existing
apart from all finite beings, yet with our intellect
we can abstract from all the differences between
Finite and Infinite, and from all the differences
between various finite beings, and come to consider
whatever is, simply in so far as it is not nothing.

Thus we form one indeterminate concept of
Being, applicable to all beings, however vast the
difference between them. But from this abstraction
producing the concept of universal Being, it does not
follow that there is in reality one universal Being,
of which all particular beings are modes or deter
minations. On the grounds which moved Hegel
to maintain that all being is properly one being, we
should have just as much right to say that all
Englishmen are properly one Englishman, and that
the English race dies out as often as an Englishman
breathes his last, and nevertheless lives on as
precisely the same Englishman in another shape.

127. The system of Schopenhauer, who takes the
world to be the evolution of an underlying "will,"
and that of Hartmann, who makes the "unconscious "
answerable for the multitude of creatures, exhibit
the self-evolution of the First Cause in a form more
offensive not only to Christian but also to human
sentiment.

Another form of monistic error is the materialistic
evolutionism according to which " material and
mental groupings have gradually advanced from
the simple to the complex, until the extraordinary
complexity of the human brain and human thought

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 209

processes have been reached."69 Such hypotheses
spring from erroneous opinions on the nature of
intellect and causality, and they suppose the possi
bility of eternal succession. These subjects have
been sufficiently dealt with, partly in the present
volume and partly in other of the series.

The adherents of these various systems like
to be called " monists," and they are wont to
apply the name of God to their One Reality, into
which they profess to resolve all existence. But
the true name for them is " atheists," and we must
protest against the practice of giving to the name
of God a meaning distinct from that which it has
hitherto borne, and even opposite to it in all that
gives to the idea of God its special value as the
basis of moral conduct and obligation.

SECTION 8. — Aristotle's reasons for the necessity of eternal
motion. Similar modern arguments from the writings of
Kant and Cousin.

128. Aristotle was a monotheist, but he did not
understand the dependence of the universe upon the
free-will of its Creator, and therefore fell into the
error of advocating the necessity of eternal motion.
By motion he means not only local change, but
every change in bodies, and it is his opinion that God,
the self-existent immoveable mover of all things, if
He caused the existence of a universe in motion,
must have caused it from eternity. In support of

69 Nature, October 28, 1886. In a review of Sidgwick's Outlines
of Ethics, by C. LL. M.

O

2io OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

this position, Aristotle brings forward three argu
ments, of which the second and third are repeated
in another form by Kant and Cousin.

129. His first argument is this : 70 Before a body
can be changed, it must exist. But it cannot come
into existence except in virtue of a change, and
this change supposes another change, and so on to
infinity in the past. Consequently matter has been
changing from eternity.

Answer. Granting the major of the argument,
we deny the minor. A changeable body can
originate by creation out of nothing, a mode of
origin which does not contain a process of change,
as proved above. (Cf. Th. XIV. § 84.)

130. Second Argument of Aristotle. — Where time
is, motion is. But time had no beginning ; for
every moment of time is the end of past and the
beginning of future time. Consequently there was
no first moment.

Answer. Again we have no objection to the
major, but we must deny the minor. The truth
underlying the statement made in the minor is this,
that there must always have been duration. But
there is a great difference between duration in
general, and that special form of duration called
time. Duration is a general term simply denoting
persistency of existence. Time is a particular kind
of duration of which the characteristic is succession ;

TO \ve give here Aristotle's reasons in a compendious form. See
the text in Aristotle's Physics, Lib. VIII. cc. i. vi. and St. Thomas
in his commentary in Lib. VIII. Physicorum, Lect. 2, especially from
n. 16 to the end, and Lect. 13, n. 8 towards the end.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 211

a new phase of being ever succeeding in the place
of another which ceases to be. Time, therefore,
supposes things liable to change. So far as it
signifies the common measure of the durations of
transitory existences and actions in our globe, it
is in reality nothing else but the continual rotation
of the earth round its axis, which by the observing
mind of mankind has been divided into its natural
parts, each consisting of one day and one night,
of which all our artificial divisions of time are
either parts or multiples. From this it is evident
that time must have had a beginning no less
than succession, as we have shown above, (p. 146.)
The only duration which must have been without
beginning is the unceasing existence of the one
infinite Godhead.

Bearing this in mind, we can meet the turn by
which Aristotle tries to strengthen his second argu
ment. He says : If there was a beginning of time,
then there was no time before the first moment of
time. But this cannot be allowed ; for he who
says ''before" indicates time past. It is therefore
impossible that time had a beginning.

The answer is this : You can only say " before
the first moment of time," if you mean to use the
phrase in reference to an imaginary backward pro
longation of it, devised by the mind as an aid to
language : or else it denotes only the eternal dura
tion, the unchangeable persistency in existence of
the Divine Being. Ordinarily speaking, the first of
these alternatives is that which is actually present
to the mind of the speaker who uses the expression

212 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

" before the first moment of time," or " before the
first moment of the existence of created things
liable to changes."

Similar to that of Aristotle is the following
reasoning of Kant : " Let us assume that it (the
world) had a beginning. Then as beginning is an
existence which is preceded by a time in which
the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently
there was a time in which the world was not, that
is, an empty time. In an empty time, however,
it is impossible that anything should have its
beginning, because of such a time no part possesses
any condition of existence or non-existence to dis
tinguish it from another."71 We answer, that empty
time is no time. There was no real time before
the beginning of the world. God alone existed,
and made the beginning of time by creating the
world. But God's duration is unchangeable eternity.
Therefore the beginning of the world was preceded
by eternity, not by time.

131. Third Argument of Aristotle. — The origin of
all motion is ultimately due to God, the first abso
lutely unchangeable cause. But the first absolutely
unchangeable cause cannot produce motion except
from eternity to eternity : for otherwise He would
undergo change Himself. It is therefore impossible
that motion if existent should ever have had a
commencement.

Answer. The proposition that a cause which
continues unchanged cannot have an effect now,
unless it has had the same effect before and will

71 Cf. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by M. Miiller, Vol. II. p. 369.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 213

have it afterwards, holds good only on the suppo
sition that the cause produces its effect by natural
necessity. It is in no way applicable to God, who
calls His creatures into existence by an eternal
free decree of His will, and by the same decree
determines the limits of their existence and motion,
both in time and manner. We have already
suggested as a help to realize this compatibility
of the creative exercise of Divine free-will with the
non-eternity of the effects, the analogy of the
relation of the exercise of the human free-will to
its effects in the moral order. The decrees of
the sovereign, though all made together, come into
effect at various times, some sooner, others later.
There is no need of any contemporaneousness
between the commencement of the effects and the
determinations of sovereign will by which they are
caused. We do not propose this illustration as an
argument, but rather as an analogy which enables
the mind to conceive to itself under some concrete
form the mode of action which we are led by due
course of reasoning to attribute to the Divine
exercise of free-will. From this illustration we are
entitled to gather at least this much, that, if the
Divine will is able to produce physical realities of
itself, by its sheer exercise, and if the decree of
that will persists unchangeable, as it was conceived
from eternity, then no further difficulty arises from
the non-contemporaneousness of the commence
ment of the effect with a corresponding com
mencement of the Divine decree which is its cause.7'2

72 Cf. pp. 138, seq.

214 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

That the Divine will is thus effective, we prove from
the infinity of the Divine Nature.

With the argument of Aristotle may be compared
the assertion of Victor Cousin, that God is the
one absolute and infinite substance, and as such
is essentially a cause. Consequently, argues this
author, He cannot abstain from producing effects.73

To this our reply is, that God is essentially a
cause only inasmuch as by virtue of His essence
He can cause, but not as though His essence
determined Him irresistibly to create finite things.
As we have proved in the fourth chapter, God
chose freely from eternity the act of creation, being
able not to choose it. And as He has chosen the
act itself, so He has freely fixed the moment of the
beginning of His creatures.

SECTION 9. — Mansel's arguments for the doctrine that all
our attempts to form to ourselves the idea of God involve
us in contradiction.

132. Among the defenders of the groundwork
of Christian faith against atheism in England
some twenty or thirty years ago, not the least
conspicuous was Dean Mansel. His Limits of
Religious Thought went though several editions.
There is a great deal of valuable matter in the
work, entitling the author to be regarded as one
who has in some respects done good service. Yet
it is to be regretted that some passages betray a
want of sound principles, and contain statements

73 Cf. Cousin, Cours de 1828, Le9on v. p. 26.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 215

which in the hands of an acute adversary can serve
as weapons for attacking the very cause they are
meant to uphold. They have been taken advantage
of by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his advocacy of
agnosticism.

. Hansel's work consists of eight lectures. In
the second of these he tries to prove that when we
compare the attributes of God one with another,
though each of them seems to be brought home to
us by lawful reasoning, yet our intellect cannot help
seeing contradictions between them. At the same
time he is of opinion that man has sufficient grounds
for ignoring these contradictions, and for supposing
that they are not objective but only subjective, owing
to the weakness and ineptitude of our minds for
dealing with a Being so immense as God. This is
the escape by which he saves his religious con
victions, as he declares in the third lecture.

His final conclusion he states as follows: "It
is our duty, then, to think of God as personal ; and
it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It
is true that we cannot reconcile these two repre
sentations with each other ; as our conception of
personality involves attributes apparently contra
dictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not
follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but
in our own minds ; it does not follow that it implies
any impossibility in the absolute nature of God.
The apparent contradiction, in this case, as in those
previously noticed, is the necessary consequence of
an attempt on the part of the human thinker to
transcend the boundaries of his own conscious-

2i6 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

ness." "4 Mr. Herbert Spencer, after giving in his
second and fourth chapters on the Unknowable long
extracts from Hansel's argument, refers in his fifth
chapter to Hansel's conclusion in the following
terms : " That this is not the conclusion here
adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any
meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires
us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our
duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to
the established limits of our intelligence, and not
perversely to rebel against them. Let those, who
can, believe that there is eternal war set between
our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations.
I, for one, admit no such radical vice in the consti
tution of things."75

The " eternal war" and the "radical vice," of
which Hr. Spencer speaks here, are certainly to be
deprecated by any reasonable man. But is either
the one or the other a necessary consequence of
true monotheism ? Let us judge for ourselves by
examination of the extracts from Hansel to which
Hr. Spencer appeals.

133. Hansel thus reasons about the metaphysical
idea of the Infinite : " The metaphysical representa
tions of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must
necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have
acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum
of all reality. ' What kind of an absolute Being
is that,' says Hegel, 'which does not contain in
itself all that is actual, even evil included ? ' We

74 Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), p. 89.
76 First Principles, p. 108.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 217

may repudiate the conclusion with indignation ; but
the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and
Infinite is an object of human conception at all,
this, and none other, is the conception required.
That which is conceived as absolute and infinite
must be conceived as containing within itself the
sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes
of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of
it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it ; and
if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable
of becoming more than it now is, and such a capa
bility is a limitation."76 Mr. Spencer seems to
suppose that against this explanation of the notion
of the Infinite nothing can be said ; yet there is
everything to be said against it. It is not true
that the Absolute and Infinite Being must contain
whatever is actual, and whatever mode of being is
possible. In so far as that which is actual contains
an imperfection, and a fortiori in so far as it contains
a privation, it cannot possibly be conceived as
belonging to the Infinite : for the Infinite is an
embodiment of all perfections without admixture
of imperfection. Created perfections exist in God,
as we have explained, not formally with their limi
tations, but eminently as in one undivided unchange
able Essence. If the perfections of creatures are
in God without limit, they are in Him certainly
without the presence of any evil whatsoever, for
evil is more opposed to perfection than mere limita
tion ; it is a privation of the perfection that is due
to a being. To say with Mansel that the exclusion

76 Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), p. 46.

218 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

of any possible mode of existence from the Infinite
would be to put a limit to its nature, is against
reason. There is no possible mode of created
existence without limit, because, as we have proved,
only one Being unlimited in perfection is possible.
Consequently, not merely one or another possible
modes of created existence, but all possible modes
of created existence, must, as such, be alien to the
Divine Being. Nevertheless, as we have shown in
treating of the Infinity of God, whilst the modes
with which created perfections exist cannot be in
God, the reality expressed by the abstract concept
of each perfection is in the most proper sense of
the word included in His simple and infinite Essence.
Creatures are distinct from this Essence, but put
no limit to it, because their nature is infinitely
below the Divine Nature. Created beauty does not
suffer in any way from its being represented by
artists, now in stone, now in metal, now on canvas ;
because all these representations are only imperfect
imitations of the original. How, then, should God
cease to be infinite by being distinguished from a
multitude of creatures, each of which is only a very
imperfect copy of His simple Being, though it may
excel among its fellow-creatures ?

134. Another argument of Mansel against the in
telligibility of the First Cause is based upon a com
parison of the idea of Cause with that of the Absolute.
Both must be predicated of God, and yet they seem
to exclude one another. "A Cause," says he, "cannot,
as such, be absolute : the Absolute cannot, as such,
be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 219

relation to its effect : the cause is a cause of the
effect ; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the
other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies
a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt
to escape from this apparent contradiction, by intro
ducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute
exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a
Cause. But here we are checked by the third
conception, that of the Infinite. How can the
Infinite become that which it was not from the
first ? If causation is a possible mode of existence,
that which exists without causing is not infinite ;
that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its
former limits."77

To the first part of this argument, we concede
that a cause cannot be absolute, if it causes under
the pressure of necessity ; for in this case the
existence of the cause is dependent on the existence
of its effect, inasmuch as it requires it as its essential
complement. Nor can it be absolute and infinite,
if it does not produce an effect without undergoing
internal change. But there is no reason for saying
that the nature of a Being cannot be an absolute
and infinite1 cause, if its causation is both free and
conducted without any internal change. The possi
bility of such a way of causation is, as we have
already urged, not only not opposed to the Divine
attributes of Absoluteness and Infinity, but is a
necessary consequence of them. God being absolute
and infinite, must be infinitely powerful, infinitely
free in His volition regarding the existence of

77 Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), p. 47.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

creatures, and at the same time immutable. His
causation is consequently a free act of His will,
which, on account of its infinity, is capable of such
an act without being changed. Such causation
is incomprehensible, but it is not inconceivable. We
know perfectly what we mean by asserting it, and
we see clear reasons for asserting it, though on
account of our finite nature we cannot fathom the
manner in which it exists.

135. The proposition, that our mind sees con
tradiction between God as a Cause and God as
Absolute, is argued by Mansel also in another way.
Supposing rightly that creation must be thought of
as an effect of God's free volition, he says : " Volition
is only possible in a conscious being. But con
sciousness again is only conceivable as a relation.
There must be a conscious subject and an object
of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject
to the object ; the object is an object to the subject ;
and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This
difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded,
by distinguishing between the Absolute as related
to another and the Absolute as related to itself.
The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be
conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself.
But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less
self-destructive than the other. For the object of
consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's
existence or not, is either created in and by the act
of consciousness, or has an existence independent
of it. In the former case, the object depends upon
the subject, and the subject alone is the true

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 221

absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends
upon the object, and the object alone is the true
absolute. Or if we attempt a third hypothesis, and
maintain that each exists independently of the
other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair
of relatives ; for co-existence, whether in conscious
ness or not, is itself a relation."78

This whole argument is based upon a wrong
hypothesis regarding the nature of knowledge.
Mansel, like many modern authors, labours under
the false impression that knowledge essentially
supposes a plurality of terms ; and that consequently
no knowledge is possible, unless there exist a subject
knowing and an object known, really distinct from
one another. This is true of sense perception only ;
it cannot be applied to intellectual self-consciousness.
If you apply it to the latter, you never can explain
how a man knows that he exists and thinks and
wills. An intellectual being is spiritual, and of such
a nature that it cannot know anything different
from itself without knowing itself as the knowing
principle. In so far, therefore, as we apprehend
ourselves as thinking principles in all acts of our
intelligence, we are at the same time subject and
object of our knowledge. Now God, the Absolute,
Infinite, unchangeable Being, does not only know
that He knows, but He is essentially a Being knowing
Himself. There is no real difference between His
Essence and the act of His self-consciousness.

In answer, therefore, to Hansel's difficulty, we
deny that his three hypotheses to explain the

78 Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), pp. 48, 49.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

self-corsciousness of the Absolute exhaust the pos
sibilities of the case. He has left out precisely
that alternative against which no solid reason 'can
be brought forward, and which is an evident con
sequence of the infinity of God. God does not
know Himself by creating a mode of existence in
His Essence, or by having such a mode really
distinct from His Essence in Himself. He knows
Himself in virtue of His Essence alone, which is
both infinite Being and infinite Thought, the one
not really distinct from the other.

136. In the simplicity of God, Mansel finds
another source of apparent contradiction in the
Divine attributes. " The almost unanimous voice
of Philosophy," he says, " in pronouncing that the
Absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted
as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any
voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as
indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither
be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite
beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified
with them in their multiplicity."79

This argument proceeds from a wrong con
ception of God's simplicity. God is not one and
simple in this sense, that He is an indeterminate
substratum underlying all existences ; but He is
one and simple inasmuch as His Essence in virtue
of its self-existence contains without division and
composition, equivalently and supereminently, all
conceivable perfections.

137. Not less unsound than the preceding argu-

7!) Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), p. 50.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 223

ments are those by which Mansel labours to show
a contradiction between other Divine attributes.
" How," says he, "can Infinite Power be able to do
all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to
do evil ? " This difficulty falls to the ground when
we consider that omnipotence does not mean infinite
liability to defects, but infinite power of calling into
being any conceivable reality, not in the omnipotent
Being itself, but distinct from and dependent upon
it. He who commits sin allows himself to be over
come by wrong motives of action. The malice of
sin does not consist in the production of a physical
effect, but in the voluntary neglect of a rule of
conduct which reason prescribes as inviolable. The
question, therefore, " How can God be omnipotent
if He cannot sin ? " betrays either a wrong notion
of omnipotence or a wrong notion of sin.

Mansel's next question is : " How can Infinite
Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and
yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner ? " We may
allow this question to stand over till we come to
treat of the Divine will. A right conception of justice
and mercy in God will put an end to the difficulty.

Our author proceeds : " How can Infinite Wisdom
know all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom
be at liberty to do and to forbear ? "

To this we reply : God's free decrees are as
eternal as His knowledge of the future. Whatever
He freely does or forbears to do in time, that He
does or forbears to do, not in consequence of a new
decree, but in harmony with His eternal decrees.

The rest of Hansel's reasonings are virtually

224 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

solved by the preceding answers. The most im
portant among them is the old difficulty against
God's perfection drawn from the existence of evil.
This difficulty deserves a special treatment, which
it will receive in our disquisition on Divine Provi
dence.

138. After having dwelt in his second lecture on
the contradictions contained in the idea of God,
Mansel in the third tries to explain their origin.
As a believer in Christian revelation, he endeavours
to show that they are a necessary consequence of
the limitations of our human understanding, and
ought not, therefore, to be assumed to have objective
validity. If, however, it is possible that the con
tradictions may not really exist, it is worth inquiring
whether we can find any grounds for believing that
they do or do not. From the position thus taken
up he passes afterwards to the conclusion that the
belief in God, as He is revealed to us by Christ and
His Apostles, may, in spite of all contradictions
enumerated before, find a reasonable foundation
in the positive evidences by which it recommends
itself to the needs of our nature. Following this
line of argument, he has drawn down on himself
a storm of agnostic criticism, against which his
idealistic theory of knowledge leaves him no defence.

The argument by which this theory is supported,
and which consequently is the second chief proof
of the impossibility of conceiving the Infinite and
Absolute, rests upon the relativity of human know
ledge. " To have consciousness of the Absolute as
such," says Mansel, " we must know that an object,

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 225

which is given in relation to our consciousness, is
identical with one which exists in its own nature,
out of all relation to consciousness. But to know
this identity we must be able to compare the two
together ; and such a comparison is itself a con
tradiction. We are, in fact, required to compare
that of which we are conscious with that of which
we are not conscious ; the comparison itself being
an act of consciousness, and only possible through
the consciousness of both its objects. It is thus
manifest that, even if we could be conscious of the
absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the
absolute ; and, as we can be conscious of an object
as such only by knowing it to be what it is, this is
equivalent to an admission that we cannot be con
scious of the absolute at all. As an object of
consciousness, everything is necessarily relative ;
and what a thing may be out of consciousness no
mode of consciousness can tell us."80

This argument proves too much. We might
conclude from it that Mansel could not be con
scious of the paper on which he was writing his
lectures, of the audience before whom he delivered
them, and of the existence of atheists, of whose
impiety he complains. All these things were known
to him only as related to his consciousness ; and his
consciousness being in its real existence limited to
his individual soul, he could not possibly know
whether beyond his consciousness there was any
paper to write on, or any persons to talk to, or
any adversaries to fight against. All may have

80 Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), pp. 74, 75.
P

226 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

been a part-creation of consciousness deceiving
itself with idle phantoms. But this conclusion is
revolting to common sense, and leads to universal
scepticism.

139. A third reason why Mansel thinks it im
possible for man to form a positive idea of God is
expressed thus : " It is impossible that man, so long
as he exists in time, should contemplate an object in
whose existence there is no time. For the thought
by which he contemplates it must be one of his
mental states ; it must have a beginning and an
end : it must occupy a certain portion of duration
as a fact of human consciousness. There is, there
fore, no manner of resemblance or community of
nature between the representative thought and that
which it is supposed to represent ; for the one cannot
exist out of time, and the other cannot exist in it."81
If Mansel merely meant to say that a temporal being
could not have a comprehensive knowledge of an
eternal being, this is manifest from the diversity of
nature between the two.82 But he means more than
this ; he means that a temporal being can form no
distinct trustworthy notion whatever of an eternal
being. We can reply that our proofs do not lead
up to a comprehension of the eternity of God, but
they make us sure of the existence of God as an
eternal Being, inasmuch as we have a clear and
distinct, though inadequate, concept of this Being
as an Infinite Substance, existing without beginning

M Limits of Religious Thought (Third Edition), p. 81.
a- St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 12. 4.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 227

and without end, and without any change in the
way of its existence.

140. A similar answer must be given to the last
reason by which Mansel endeavours to prove the
purely negative character of our idea of God. He
says rightly that we can conceive the various mental
attributes of God only as existing in a personal
being. " But," he continues, " personality, as we
conceive it, is essentially a limitation and relation.
Our own personality is presented to us as relative
and limited, and it is from that presentation that all
our representative notions of personality are derived.
Personality is presented to us as a relation between
the conscious self and the various modes of his
consciousness. There is no personality in abstract
thought without a thinker; there is no thinker,
unless he exercises some mode of thought. Person
ality is also a limitation ; for the thought and the
thinker are distinguished from and limit each other;
and the several modes of thought are distinguished
each from each by limitation likewise. If I am
any one of my own thoughts, I live and die with
each successive moment of my consciousness. If I
am not any one of my own thoughts, I am limited by
that very difference, and each thought as different
from another is limited also. This too has been
clearly seen by philosophical theologians ; and
accordingly, they have maintained that in God
there is no distinction between the subject of con
sciousness and its modes, nor between one mode
and another. ' God,' says St. Augustine, ' is not
a Spirit as regards substance, and good as regards

228 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

quality; but both as regards substance. The justice
of God is one with His goodness and with His
blessedness ; and all are one with His spirituality.'
But this assertion, if it be literally true (and we have
no means of judging), annihilates personality itself
in the only form in which we can conceive it. We
cannot transcend our own personality, as we cannot
transcend our own relation to time ; and to speak of
an Absolute and Infinite Person, is simply to use
language which, however true it may be in a super
human sense, denotes an object inconceivable under
the conditions of human thought."83

In this passage Mansel himself carries us so far
on the way as this, that if there be no distinction in
God between the conscious self and the modes of
consciousness, as again between the modes of con
sciousness among themselves, there is no foundation
for conceiving of His Nature as in this particular
respect implicated in relations and limitations.
And although he says here that we have no means
of judging whether this absence of internal dis
tinctions really exists in God, he has previously
remarked with much justice, in words already
quoted, that " the unanimous voice of Philosophy,
in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and
simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason
also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter."
Nor can the qualification in the last clause be
allowed to explain away the force of this admission.
If reason is to have a voice in creating the contra
dictions, she has certainly a claim to be heard when

83 Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 84, 85.

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 229

she represents that the contradictions are not really
of her creating, but arise from a misconception of
the true nature of her utterances.

There remains then but one outstanding point in
Mr. Mansel's passage to be considered. Do we by
identifying in God the conscious self and the modes
of consciousness, "annihilate personality in the
only sense in which we can conceive it " ? This
depends on the sense in which we do conceive it.
Speaking in the name of Catholic Philosophy and
repeating the utterance of all true thought and
self-introspection, we understand by personality
the " subsistence of a rational nature." Let us
explain this technical term. Subsistence is what
characterizes the existence of a natural whole
as distinguished from the existence characteristic
of the component parts of a natural whole. The
arm of a man exists not in itself, but in the man, as
a part in the whole ; so also does the body, and so
again does the soul, though here one has to speak
more carefully, the soul being able to exist apart
and exercise by itself the principal functions of the
whole. On the other hand, the man exists in him
self and in nothing else as in a containing whole
that is, in a containing natural whole, for of course
things can be taken together as component parts of a
system of aggregates like the universe. For anything
to subsist then is to exist in itself and not as a natural
part of something else. Personality we have denned
to be subsistence of a rational nature. That is to
say, when the being which subsists has a rational
nature and therewith consciousness, we call it a

2 30 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

person, and its subsistence personality. Accordingly,
when we say that God is a personal God, we mean
that He exists in Himself and not as a part of some
whole, and that He possesses Mind and Conscious
ness. This is the only concept of Personality we
can consent to deal with, when we claim it for
God. We cannot accept the description given by
Dr. Mansel, that personality is merely a "relation
between the conscious self and the modes of his
consciousness."

Do we, then, virtually deny the personality of
God in the only form in which we can conceive it,
when we deny of Him relation and limitation by
asserting that the perfections which we represent
to ourselves by distinct concepts as His attributes
and modes are objectively in Him as a single and
absolutely simple reality ? Clearly not. It is true,
we do not attribute to Him the perfections which
we find in ourselves as existing in Him in the
same " formal " manner as they are in us, just
because in us they are characterized by attendant
imperfections and limitations. We take the per
fections found in ourselves as a nucleus ; we divest
it of its accompanying imperfections and limitations
by an act of negation ; we then enlarge the measure
of the perfection to infinity by affirming that not
only those limits are excluded from it which are
inseparable from human perfection, but all limits
whatsoever. In this way out of the original nucleus
furnished by direct observation we form to ourselves
by affirmation and negation a composite concept,
and then led by just inference we proceed to take

DIFFICULTIES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. 231

this as a valid and valuable though inadequate
representation of the Divine Nature under some one
or other of its aspects. This doctrine has already
been propounded. But no apology is needed for the
repetition, since the failure to bear it in mind lies
at the root of the imagined contradictions which
form the unsolved problem of Dr. Mansel's philo
sophy.

Let us now apply the doctrine explained to the
point immediately under consideration. Although
personality is not consciousness, yet, as we have
stated, it implies consciousness as an attribute of the
person, and it is the nature of consciousness which
Mansel considers to involve an essential relation
and limitation. That there is any real relation and
consequent mutual limitation between the subject
and object of consciousness — inasmuch as intellectual
consciousness comes under consideration — we have
denied even in regard to our own created conscious
ness, maintaining on the contrary that in conscious
ness the subject and object are essentially one. But
there is in man the distinction, with its admitted con
sequences of relation and mutual limitation, between
the self-conscious subject and the modes of his
consciousness, and again between the latter among
themselves. This distinction appears, therefore, in
the original concept which we form to ourselves of
consciousness. It appears then, however, only as
incidental, not as the central and direct element
in the concept. This central element, therefore, we
can take as a nucleus, since- in itself it is pure
perfection. We then by negation and affirmation

232 OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

represent to ourselves a consciousness which is
realized not by the passage of the subject from the
potential into the actual state, but is ever actual :
a consciousness which embraces in its vision the
entire being of the subject ; a consciousness which
is not realized by even an abiding act distinct from
the conscious subject itself, but is realized inasmuch
as the subject is in virtue of its infinity Infinite
Consciousness as well as Infinite Being.

Thus, then, we arrive at an inadequate indeed,
but nevertheless a distinct and true, idea of God,
an idea not purely negative, but negative-positive .
And thus, for all the apparent contradictions in the
monotheistic idea of God, which Mr. Spencer has
drawn from Mansel's famous work, it remains true
that " we adore that which we know."84

84 St. John iv. 22.

NATURAL THEOLOGY,

BOOK II.
THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

PROLEGOMENA.

141. THE origin of the universe, though neither an
object of immediate intuition nor of pure a priori
demonstration, is nevertheless knowable ; and that,
nt>t on authority only, but also by reason.

From the causality of things surrounding us,
from the thoughts and volitions of our own mind,
from the orderly arrangements visible everywhere
in Nature, from the universal belief of mankind in
some sort of Deity, and finally from the logical
consequences of atheism and agnosticism, we arrive
by lawful reasoning at the conclusion that the
universe is not an effect of the forces of matter,
nor of the evolution of some Unknowable being, but
has started into existence at the will of a self-existing
Mind, through the power of a personal God, whose
Essence is one, simple, infinite, and who is the
cause of all finite things, not by self-evolution, as
pantheists would have it, but by creation out of

234 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

nothing. His decree to create was a free act, and
had no beginning ; but there is nothing to prove
that the effect of that decree must have been without
beginning. On the contrary, creation from eternity
is hardly admissible, even if its absolute impossi
bility is not demonstrable. Moreover, as regards
the existence of the universe known to us, we have
in its changes and generations an evident proof of
its limited duration, and in this its limited duration
an additional argument for its dependence upon the
good pleasure of the one, infinite, personal God.

These are, in short, the conclusions proved and
defended in the previous book. We now pass on to
the further and fuller investigation of the nature of
the attributes of God. The basis on which through
out we shall have to build is the doctrine of the
Divine Infinity, which itself rests on the doctrine of
the Divine Unity and Simplicity. In carrying it out
we shall be guided by the three canons of Divine
attributes laid down already. (§§ 70 — 72 inclus.)

According to these canons those names of created
perfections must be predicated of God, the meaning
of which by abstraction and total denial of limits
can be conceived without their implying any imper
fection. They cannot indeed be predicated of God
and of creatures univocally, but they can analogically,
as we have explained in the place just referred to.
We have also seen that names of created perfections
which necessarily connote imperfection, cannot be
predicated of God save in a metaphorical sense.

142. It may be interesting to note how these
canons were expressed by the ancient writer who

PROLEGOMENA. 235

goes under the name of St. Dionysius the Areopagite.
Among his works there is one, De Divinis Nomi-
nibus, held in high esteem during the middle ages,
and explained by St. Thomas.

In this book the attributes of God are said to be
established in three ways, which are named, the way
of removal, the way of affirmation, the way of eminence.

(1) The way of removal we may call also the way
of negation. — By this way what are termed the
negative Divine attributes are found. We " remove "
from God in thought any name of created perfection,
the meaning of which cannot be conceived in the
abstract without connoting a defect. Thus we say,
by the way of removal, that God is incorporeal, i.e.,
cannot be formally extended according to three
dimensions ; that He is simple, i.e., not composed of
parts ; that He is immutable, i.e., cannot pass from
one state of existence to another. These negative
attributes, whilst explicitly denying certain imper
fections of created beings to exist in God, affirm
thereby implicitly the opposite perfections to be in
Him.

(2) The way of affirmation. — By this is predicated
of God whatever created perfection can be conceived
in the abstract without connotation of imperfection.
Thus we state that God is powerful, wise, truthful,
benevolent, &c. Power, wisdom, veracity, bene
volence, are perfections conceivable without neces
sarily connoting a defect. In affirming them of
God we must however be on our guard not to apply
to Him the limitations encompassing their abstract
meaning, in so far as the latter is verified in

236 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

creatures. The expedient open to us in order to
guard ourselves against this error is called,

(3) The way of eminence. — We have recourse to
this way when we affirm positive attributes of God
in such sort as to deny at the same time that the
perfection affirmed is limited in Him. Thus we say
by way of eminence that God's wisdom, power,
goodness, benevolence, are boundless or infinite.

143. We have also to bear in mind the mutual
relations of the attributes among themselves before
we can thoroughly grasp the explanation to be given
of them. In treating of the Divine simplicity (§§ 61 —
64 inclus.) we have seen that God is not only physi
cally simple but also metaphysically, which means
that no two concepts can be formed of His Essence
without the one overlapping the other. Consequently,
as the physical simplicity of God forbids us to admit
accidental perfections in Him (§ 61), the significa
tions of any two Divine attributes must implicitly
cover one another. From this it does not, however,
follow that the names of different attributes of God
convey the same knowledge to our mind. The term,
" Divine Mercy," differs explicitly in its meaning
from that of " Divine Justice." We say, therefore,
that both attributes (and the same holds good of
any two Divine attributes taken together), are
distinct from one another metaphysically, though
they do not combine in metaphysical composition.
They express the idea of One Incomprehensible
God inadequately under different aspects. For this
reason St. Thomas well says that the names of God
are not "synonymous." " Though the names given

PROLEGOMENA. 237

to God signify the same thing, yet they signify it
under many different mental aspects, and conse
quently are not synonymous," for " those words are
said to be synonymous which signify one and the
same thing from the same.point of view."1

144. We now proceed to treat of the Divine
attributes in particular, developing more fully what
has been established in the first book.

In the second chapter of that book we proved
that there exists a self-existent, intelligent Being,
righty called a personal God ; and in the third
chapter we demonstrated that unity, simplicity, and
infinity are proper to Him. These fundamental
truths are the basis upon which our further specula
tions on the Divine attributes must rest. Having
established that God is infinitely perfect, we see at
once that we are to deny of Him whatever attribute
necessarily involves an imperfection, and to affirm
whatever attribute can be conceived without conno
tation of a defect. Consequently, the Divine attri
butes are partly negative, partly positive. We shall
treat in the three first chapters respectively of God's
immutability, eternity, immensity ; in the next three,
of His infinite knowledge, His infinitely perfect will,
and His infinite power. After this we shall add a
special chapter on the metaphysical essence of God.
Since the chapters on the knowledge and will of
God are of higher importance than the rest, we
shall treat of them at greater length.

1 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 13, 4. " Nomina Deo attributa, licet
significent unam rem, tamen quia significant earn sub rationibus
multis et diversis non sunt synonyma." . . . " Nomina synonyma
dicuntur quse significant unum secundum unam rationum."

CHAPTER I.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD.

Thesis XXII. — The Divine Being is absolutely
immutable.

145. Change is a passing from one state of being
to another. If a thing passes from one species
to another, it is said to be substantially changed.
Thus, according to the scholastic view, oxygen and
hydrogen change substantially when transformed
into water. Food is changed substantially by
assimilation into a living body. If the specific
being of the thing is not affected, the change is
called accidental. Instances of accidental change
are mechanical motion in a body ; in a living being,
growth and sensation ; in a human mind, a new set
of thoughts and volitions.

God is not liable to any of these changes. This
truth some scholastic authors express by saying
that God is physically immutable. They distinguish
between physical and moral mutability, understand
ing by the former a liability to change of physical
being, by the latter a liability to change of will.
Thus men are morally mutable, because they can
form new resolutions, and abandon those previously

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD. 239

adopted. In human beings such a moral change
cannot go on without a physical change accom
panying it ; but it is not immediately evident that
every moral change of God would also be a physical
change. The infinite Being is adequately sufficient
to choose and not to choose from eternity, as we
have explained in the chapter on creation. Why,
then, should He not be able to choose at one time
one thing, at another another, without change in
His Being? Why must He be not only physically,
but also morally unchangeable ? This question we
shall treat of in the chapter on the perfection of
God's will. For the present we are only concerned
about proving that the Being of God cannot be
changed in any way.

146. In proof of this we appeal first to God's
simplicity.

By every change a thing must either lose or
acquire some quality or affection of its being. On
the former supposition, it must consist of at least
two really distinct realities before it changes ; other
wise it would lose nothing. On the latter, it is
composed of at least two distinct realities after the
change. In neither case can it be a necessarily
simple Being. But, as we have shown (Th. VIII.
§§ 61, seq.), God is necessarily simple to the exclu
sion of all real and even of all virtual composition.
Consequently He must be absolutely unchangeable.

The same conclusion may be drawn from the
infinite perfection of God. As has been proved
above (Th. IX. §§ 65, seq.), God is infinitely
perfect. But evidently He could not be so if He

24o THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

were liable to any change ; for by this He must
either become more or less good. If we take the
first alternative, and suppose Him to be bettered
by the change, He could not have been infinite
before it. The other alternative is still more
obviously untenable. If He became less good by
the change, His infinity would evidently cease
to be.

147. It is, indeed, very difficult to see how the
immutability of God thus proved can be consistent
with His supreme freedom of choice, but we shall
treat of this subject in the chapter on the Divine
will. Here we shall merely call attention to the
difficulties which arise from the fact of creation
and the revealed mystery of the Incarnation.

(i) Difficulty. — God of His own free choice created
the world out of nothing. He was not necessitated
to create it, and if He had not done so, He would
not be the Creator. Consequently the attribute
Creator has been added to His Being. But it could
not be added without causing a change. Therefore
God has undergone a change.

Answer. To solve this difficulty, we are to explain
what is meant by the statement, God created the world.
It means that God by an eternal free decree resolved
to produce the world out of nothing, and fixed the
moments of its commencement and the term of its
duration. He then in harmony with that decree
originated it by His infinite power. Both the
decree of creation and the power by which it was
executed are truly in God, but not as entities really
distinct from His Essence. His Essence is infinite,

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD. 241

and in virtue of its infinity is sufficient for forming
and executing any decree without internal change.
From this it follows that the attribute Creator is not
an intrinsic denomination signifying some intrinsic
affection or state accruing .to the Essence of God,
but an extrinsic denomination, signifying the depen
dence of the world on God as regards its origin.

The same must be said of the attributes,
Preserver of all things, Ruler of the universe, and the
like. They are extrinsic denominations signifying
different respects under which creatures depend
upon God's will and power.

The difficulty, then, is solved by denying the
statement that the attribute of Creator has been
added to the Being of God. The truth is, that by
creation God has produced things outside Himself,
and from this production, by which in Himself He
is in nothing changed, God is extrinsically denomi
nated the Creator.

(2) Difficulty. — Any difficulty drawn from the
mystery of the Incarnation, strictly speaking, has
no place in a philosophical treatise. Still it is con
venient to give it a place, as it is one likely to occur
to the minds of readers. The Son of God, who is
really one Being with the Divine Essence, became
Man at a definite moment of time. Since that
moment He has had not only a Divine Nature, but
also a Human one. But it would seem that the
union of a Human Nature with a Divine Person
could not be accomplished without a change in
the latter.

The answer to the difficulty is that the infinite.
Q

242 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

God does not need any self-adaptation for any work
which He pleases to perform. Consequently the
Son of God needed not to adapt Himself for the
assumption of a human nature. Without change of
Himself, He was able to assume humanity at any
moment, on the supposition that a human nature
existed in such a state as to be fit for assumption
by the Divine Person. Consequently the mystery
of the Incarnation neither denotes nor connotes
any change in the Son of God ; but it denotes the
creation of a particular human nature supernaturally
raised to union with the Second Person of the
Blessed Trinity, and it connotes the absence of
human personality in that nature, on account of
its being taken up into the personality of the Son.
It was not, so to speak, the Divinity moving towards
the Humanity, but the Humanity moving towards
the Divinity.

CHAPTER II.

THE ETERNITY OF GOD.

Thesis XXIII. — God is eternal in the strict sense of
the word.

148. The word " eternal " taken in a wider sense
signifies endless existence, though that existence
may have a beginning, and may run through various
successive phases. Thus, the life of men after the
day of the general resurrection will be eternal,
though not without successive mental acts and
bodily movements. It is called eternal simply
because it will never cease.

In its strict sense the word eternity implies an
existence which is essentially without beginning and
without end, and without any successive phases of
being. We beg the reader not to overlook in this
definition the word essentially. If we imagine a spirit
created by God from eternity, and preserved by His
infinite power for ever without any internal change,
the existence of such a spirit wrould be indeed
without beginning and end, and without successive
phases of being, but it would not be eternal in the
strict sense of the word. And why not ? Because
the essence of that spirit would have no existence of

244 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

itself, but would be indebted for its existence and
its boundless duration to the free choice of the
omnipotent God.

From the definition of eternity just given it is
evident that the term, if predicable at all in its strict
sense, is predicable of God alone. No creature can
be essentially without beginning and end and internal
succession. Not essentially without beginning, for
there is no reason why any creature must be created
from eternity. Not essentially without end, for God
may withdraw from the creature His preserving
power. Not essentially without internal succession,
for at least the infinite power of God can cause in it
a new phase of existence.

149. Is then God Himself eternal in the strict
sense of the word ? Yes ; because as the First Cause,
and the only source of all possible being, He must
exist with absolute necessity, and therefore can have
no beginning. Absolute necessity of existence must
be identical with His essence, on account of His
simplicity, which we have proved to be not only
physical but metaphysical (Th. VIII. § 61, seq.); and
therefore it is impossible that He should cease to
be. His existence is unchangeable (Th. XXII.) ;
therefore it cannot contain any different successive
phases or modes of being.

Boethius, who flourished about A.D. 500, in his
work, De Consolatione Philosophic?, thus defines
eternity : J " Eternity is a simultaneously full and
perfect possession of interminable life." What in

1 " ^Eternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta
possessio." (V. Prosa vi.)

THE ETERNITY OF GOD. 245

our definition was implied by the terms " existence
essentially without beginning and without end," is
expressed by Boethius more explicitly in the phrase,
" possession of interminable life." Indeed, as eternity
proper belongs to God alone*, it is identified with the
highest life conceivable, the self-activity of infinite
Intellectual Will. This life is " interminable," or
boundless, because it endures of absolute necessity.
It is " simultaneously possessed " in its fulness and
perfection, because, being infinite, it is neither
capable of development nor liable to defect. As it
is now, so it has been always in the past, and will
be always in the future. Coexisting with all assign
able moments of time, the eternal God is above any
of our measures of the contingent duration of created
being. In Him, therefore, is neither present, nor
past, nor future. As Boethius expresses it, Nunc
fluens facit teinpus, nunc stans facit ceternitatem — " The
passing now makes time, the standing now makes
eternity."2 In other words, the duration proper to
the eternal Being must be conceived as one ever
lasting state, whereas the duration of temporal
being is liable to a succession of states really distinct
from one another.

150. Between temporal and eternal duration
there is a duration intermediate, which, for the
sake of distinction, is called by the scholastics,
(Eviternal duration, or cEvum. It is the duration
of created spirits. Both time and cevum are
contingent durations, dependent upon the free
will of the one eternal Being. But while time is

2 De Trin. c. iv.

246 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

made up of successive states or phases of being,
avum does not imply any succession. A created
spirit may be annihilated, but the specific spiritual
being proper to it cannot be changed ; conse
quently there is no succession in it, as regards
its substantial perfection. Nevertheless, spirits are
not quite above time, or succession of states in their
existence ; for, though the specific perfection of
their substantial being is unalterable, they can still
pass from one thought and volition to another, and
the Creator may cause in them now one, now
another accidental perfection. Their essential being
is above time, but they are liable to accidental modi
fication of temporary duration. The duration, called
time, belongs most properly to matter, which changes
as well in its substantial as its accidental perfection.

St. Thomas expresses the difference between time,
cevum, and eternity briefly in this way : " Time has
an ' earlier ' and a * later ' ; avum has no ' earlier '
and ' later ' in itself, but both can be connected with
it; eternity has neither an ' earlier ' nor a Mater,'
nor can they be connected with it." 3

In other words : Time is made up of a series of
changes in a substantial stratum, or in the accidental
state of a complete substance ; JEvum is not itself a
series of either substantial or accidental changes,
but in the finite incorruptible substance, of which it
is the duration, there may be accidental changes ;

3 " Tempus habet prius et posterius ; aevum autem non habet in
se prius et posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt ; aeternitas autem non
habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur." (St. Thomas,
Sum. Theol. xa. q. 10. art. 5. in corp.)

THE ETERNITY OF GOD. 247

Eternity is the duration of a Being above all change,
whether substantial or accidental. As the duration
called eternity is nothing really distinct from the
Eternal God Himself, we are right in saying that all
and each of the successive events which happen in
this world are coexistent with the whole of eternity
considered in itself. But none of them is coexistent
with the whole of eternity in so far as eternity is con
sidered in its relation of coexistence with preceding or
following eventSj for the simple reason that each
temporary event is a passing reality, whilst eternity
is, so to speak, a standing reality, the everlasting
Being whose Essence is Existence, abiding always
the same with absolute necessity. The works of His
hands are the heavens. They shall perish, but He
shall continue ; and they shall all grow old as a
garment, and as a vesture shall He change them,
and they shall be changed ; but He is the self-same.4

151. Hence we gather the solution of difficulties
against the eternity of God, such as the following :

Two things, the duration of which wholly coin
cides with the whole duration of a third thing, must
coexist with one another. But the Deluge and the
Franco-German War are two things, the duration of
which according to the exposition given, wholly
coincide with the whole duration of God. Conse
quently, whilst the Germans were fighting against
the French, the earth was covered with the waters
of the Deluge.

This difficulty, though commonly urged, need not
detain us long, after the explanations given of the

4 Cf. Heb. i. 10 — 12.

248 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

strict contents of the meaning of time as distinguished
from duration. Both in God and in created things
there is duration, for duration in itself is pure
perfection. But the Divine duration, since it is a
changeless persistency in existence, does not in
itself offer any means of distinguishing before and
after. When, however, substances are created whose
being is liable to successive phases of existence, they,
at each period of their existence, coexist with God,
they last, whilst the entire being of God is persisting.
But this clearly does not cause them all to be con
temporaneous with one another, since although
coexisting with the entire being of God, they are
not coexisting with the entire duration of God.

The same difficulty and the same solution will
present themselves when we correlate the Divine
immensity with the localization of bodies. Since
God is everywhere, and everywhere whole and entire,
wheresoever any extended substance is placed it is
in the same place with the whole of God : but it
would be absurd to conclude therefore that all
bodies are coincident in point of place. But the
Divine immensity is the subject to which we must
now pass.

CHAPTER III.

THE IMMENSITY OF GOD.

Thesis XXIV. — God is immense.

152. The word " immense," explained according
to its etymology, signifies a state of things not
capable of measurement, or of reference to another
thing taken as a rule or standard. Things of this
world are measured chiefly under one of three
aspects, either according to their extension in space,
called simply extension; or according to their exten
sion in time, called duration; or according to their
extension in being, called perfection. Under none of
these aspects is God measurable. In so far as no
created perfection can be applied as a measure to His
infinite perfection, we call Him infinite; in so far as
His duration is beyond the measure of any created
duration, we call Him eternal; and in so far as He
is so present to all things in space, that His presence
cannot be measured either by parts of space or by
the whole of it, we assign to Him the attribute of
immensity.

In virtue then of this perfection God exists
everywhere in space, without consisting of parts
corresponding to parts of space, and without being

250 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

limited to any extension of space. To understand
more fully what this means, the reader must bear
in mind what space properly is, and in what different
ways things can be conceived to exist in space.

As time is not a particular enduring reality
existing in itself, but an object of thought, which is
formed by collecting mentally and reckoning together
the successive states of changeable things ; so
space is not a thing having its own individual being
different from the corporeal beings which are said
to exist in it, but it is an object of thought, formed
by thinking about the extension of bodies under a
peculiar aspect, namely, by thinking of the relation
of distance between their surfaces, which distance
involves three dimensions, and may therefore be
called volume. Representing to ourselves the
volume between the surfaces of one or several
particular bodies, we form the idea of a space, or
place within the world ; and thinking of the volume
between the extreme surfaces of the whole material
world, we conceive the whole of actual space.
Space, therefore, is only actual in so far as extended
bodies exist.

Beyond the corporeal world there is, however,
infinite possible space, inasmuch as by the power
of God the extension of the world can become
larger, and exceed any assignable limit.

The whole of actual space coincides with the
whole of the corporeal world, considered as included
within the extreme surfaces of the extreme bodies.
Each particular body has its own particular space,
which means that it is extended according to three

THE IMMENSITY OF GOD. 251

dimensions between the surfaces surrounding it.
In so far as it is included in its own surfaces it is
sometimes said to have an internal space or place ;
whilst the surfaces of other bodies surrounding it
are called its external space or place.

153. We have next to consider and discriminate
the way in which things can exist in space. A thing
is said by the scholastics to exist circumscriptively
in space, if it be divisible into parts corresponding
to the parts of the surfaces surrounding it. As
only bodies are thus divisible, they alone can exist
in space circumscriptively.1

A thing is said to exist in space definitely, if its
presence be limited to a certain part of space, and
its whole substance be everywhere within the bounds
of that part of space. Thus the human soul is said
to exist definitely in the body, because its existence
is conterminous with the body in such a way, that
its whole substance exists whole in the whole body
and whole in every part of it,2 and on the other
hand is found nowhere outside of the body. A
thing which exists in space circumscriptively is said
to be formally extended. The definite existence of
an indivisible substance in space is called virtual
extension.

By the immensity of God we understand a mode
of existence in corporeal things or space, which is
neither circumscriptive nor definite. It is not
circumscriptive, because in God there are no parts

1 St. Thomas is wont to speak of this circumscriptive existence
in space as esse in loco.

8 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 76. art. 8.

252 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

assignable corresponding to the parts of space.
And it is not definite, because there is no space real
or possible where He does not exist in His entirety,
or in other words, because no limit of possible
space can be given beyond which He would not be
present to created things, if the world were extended
thus far by His power.

154. Is then the way of existence we are speaking
of really proper to God? That He must exist without
having parts corresponding to the parts of space,
is evident from His simplicity. But how shall we
prove that His essence must extend its presence to
every possible space that may be created, and is
not confined to any fixed limits of corporeal magni
tude ?

For our first argument again as ever we may
appeal to the infinity of God. On account of this
attribute we have to predicate of Him whatever
perfection can be conceived without connotation of
defect. But the perfection of being indivisibly and
unlimitedly present to any possible created being,
and of surpassing by an extension which we may
call infinitely virtual, the formal extension of every
conceivable corporeal magnitude is evidently a per
fection without defect. Consequently it is in God,
that is to say, He is immense.

A slightly different way of arriving at the same
conclusion is opened by the consideration that the
creative power of God is infinite. God can create
any number of worlds outside the present, and God
alone can do it. If, therefore, He will create them,
He must create them by the immediate application

THE IMMENSITY OF GOD. 253

of His own power.3 Now it is inconceivable that
any efficient cause should immediately apply its
power there, where it is not by its substance. Con
sequently the Divine substance is such that it would
be present to any possible world supposing that
world to start into existence. This presence would
not be anything new in God : or He would not be
immutable. Therefore we must say that the Divine
substance has an existence eminently equivalent to
any possible extension whatever of corporeal worlds,
i.e., that God is really immense.4

It is gratifying to see this great truth accurately
stated by Newton in Scholion Generate, added to the
third book of his Principia, where he says : " God
is present everywhere, not only by His power, but
also by His substance ; for power cannot subsist
without substance."5

155. To express more fully how God is in all His
creatures, scholastic philosophers are wont to say
that He is in each of them " by essence, presence,
and power." St. Thomas6 illustrates the meaning
of this phrase by some instances taken from human
life. "A king is said to be in his whole kingdom
by his power, though he is not present everywhere.
A thing is said to be by its presence in all things
which are in view of it, as all things that are
exposed in a room are present to a visitor, who
nevertheless is not in substance in every part of

3 Cf. Bk. I. c. iv. Th. XVI. § 90.

4 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 8. art. I.

5 " Deus omniprsesens est non per virtutem solam sed etiam per
substantiam ; narn virtus sine substantia subsistere nequit."

6 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 8. art. 3. in corp.

254 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

the room. Finally, a thing is said to be according
to its substance or essence in that place in which its
substance actually is to be found."

St. Thomas proceeds to apply this doctrine to
three forms of error not at all too antiquated to
deserve mention in our day. The first found an
eloquent advocate in John Stuart Mill,7 the second
was partly at least adopted by some of the deists
of last century ; 8 and the third is, to say the least,
not opposed with enough decision by some Christian
authors who have written on the subject.9

These are St. Thomas's explanations : " There
have been some, to wit, the Manicheans, who
have said that spiritual and incorporeal things
were subject to the Divine power, but visible and
corporeal things to the power of a contrary principle.
Against these then we must say that God is in all
things by His power.

" There were others who believed indeed that all
things were subject to the Divine power; yet did
not extend Divine Providence to the things here
below. Their mind is well expressed in the words
of Scripture : ' He walks about the poles of heaven
and does not consider our things.' 10 Against these
we are to say that God is in all things by His
presence. Again, there were others who granted

7 Essays on Religion, p. 116.

8 Thomas Chubb (1679 — 1747) taught that since creation God
has never acted immediately upon His creatures, and does not
care whether man lives well or badly. Viscount Bolingbroke
(1672 — 1751) held that God did not care for men as individuals.

y Crombie, Natural Theology, i. p. 64, disapproves of Newton's
saying that God is everywhere by His substance.
10 Job xxii. 14.

THE IMMENSITY OF GOD. 255

that in some way all things are under the sway of
Divine Providence, but at the same time made
the assertion that not all things were immediately
created by God. According to them He created
immediately only the first creatures, and these
created the rest. Against them we must maintain
that God is everywhere by His essence.

" Thus then He is in all things by His power,
in that all depend upon Him, and by His presence,
inasmuch as all things are 'naked and open to
His eyes ; ' n He is in all by His essence, because
He is with all as the cause of their existence."

In order to prevent any misunderstanding of the
phrase, " God is in creatures by His essence,"
St. Thomas presently remarks that it does not
mean that His essence is an ingredient of created
essences, but only that His substance is with them
all as the cause of their existence.

And, in the same place, he tells us that the
being of God in creatures by His essence signifies
a closer proximity than His being in them by His
presence. It signifies His being, not at a distance
from His creatures, as one who sees them from
afar, but at their side, sustaining them by His power.
Or, to quote the words of the Saint : " God is in all
things so as to surround them on all sides with His
Being;"12 and, " Nothing is distant from God, as
though He had it not in Himself." 13

11 Cf. Hebrews iv. 13.

12 "Deus est in rebus sicut continens res." (St. Thomas, Sum,
Theol. la. q. 8. art. i. ad 2.)

13 "Nihil est disdans ab eo quasi in se illud Deus non habeat."
(Ibid, ad 3.)

CHAPTER IV.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT.

156. THE Divine attributes of which we have thus
far treated do not explicitly suggest to us anything
about the action of God. We come now to others
which represent Him in His Divine activity.

The first of them is the Wisdom of God, which
we shall consider under five sections.

(1) The perfection of the Divine Intellect con
trasted with the defects of the human.

(2) The knowledge of God completely determined
by His Essence.

(3) The objects of Divine Thought.

(4) The way in which God knows the free act?
of rational creatures.

(5) The knowledge of God distinguished accord
ing to the diversity of its objects.

SECTION i. — The perfection of the Divine Intellect contrasted,
with the defects of the human.

Thesis XXV. — The knowledge of God is not capable
of progressive improvement; but whatever a human
intellect can understand by compounding together different
ideas in affirmative and negative judgments and by the

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 257

processes of inductive or deductive reasoning, is grasped
" eminently " and with absolute perfection by one simple
unchangeable act of the Divine Intellect.

157. This proposition, being intimately connected
with the doctrine of the intellectual nature and
infinite perfection of God as proved in the First
Book, needs rather explanation than demonstration.

We say, then, first that there is no progressive
development about the Divine knowledge, no gradual
growth of information. The various things of this
world which fall under the experience of a child,
are in the beginning represented by his mind under
very general and confused ideas. Only in the course
of time does he become aware of their particular
properties, and is able to form judgments affirmative
or negative concerning them. Years pass by before
he properly begins to reason, whether by the ascent
of induction from particular facts to general prin
ciples, or by the descent of deduction applying
universal truths to individual cases. What the
reader has here to notice is that this method of
procedure involves the multiplication of ideas in
the human mind. Ideas are formed in vast numbers
of the various objects of consideration. Judgments,
another kind of idea, and reasonings, which are
still another kind, have to be formed in vast numbers
so as to arrange and classify these innumerable
ideas according to the exigencies of the objective
order. Yet to the end man remains ignorant of the
greater portion even of those truths which are
accessible to human understanding. The more facts

258 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

he tries to master, the less attention can he devote
to each. If we consider even the whole treasure
of human knowledge, stored up through countless
generations, by multitudinous mental acts of innu
merable men, how imperfect is it all ! How are
the greatest geniuses baffled by unsolved problems !
How many centuries shall mankind still wait for
philosophy and science to be complete ? But in
vain do we wait for such a consummation. The
human mind is unable to acquire a comprehensive
knowledge of even one of the innumerable species
of creatures that surround us. And as regards
spiritual things, man left to his natural faculties
will never proceed beyond an analogous conception
of their nature.1

With the Divine mind there is none of all these
shortcomings. The Divine knowledge is infinitely
perfect in its embrace of every conceivable object
of thought, and it is infinitely perfect from the first,
or rather from eternity. And this infinite perfection
of knowledge is attained not by any succession of
ideas, not by any compounding of predicates with
subjects, nor again by any passage from premisses
to conclusions. It is attained by one all-embracing
act of intuition. And this one act what else
can it be but the Divine Essence itself? If
it were anything really distinct from it, God's
essence would neither be simple, nor infinite, nor
immutable nor eternal, as we have proved it to be.
We must then conclude with St. Thomas, " It must
be affirmed that God's knowledge is His sub-

1 St. Thomas, Sum Theol. IE. q. 88. art. i. 2. 3.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT, 259

stance."2 He, the infinite Being, is unchangeable,
infinite, actual Thought.

SECTION 2. — God's Knowledge completely determined by His
Essence.

Thesis XXVI. — The Divine Mind does not need
any determination from without to enable it to know all
truth. God's mere Essence is determination sufficient
for Him to comprehend whatever there is to know. Hence
His Essence is the "species intelligibilis" by which He
understands all things different from Himself as well
in general as in particular.

158. The mind of man is in communication with
that which it knows ; nay, it possesses it in a certain
way within itself. This truth is implied by the
terminology of common language, as when people
say : " I have grasped it ; I comprehend it," in
order to signify that they have understood some
thing. As often as the object understood is not one
and the same with the mind by which it is under
stood, the union between the two cannot be such
that the actual reality of the thing known shall be
in the knowing mind, but a representation only will
be present there. This representation is a certain
property or quality in the mind, in virtue of which
it is determined to know a certain object.

Intelligible species is the name by which scholastic
philosophers call this mental representation, whereby
the human mind is determined to grasp and under-

2 " Est necesse clicere quod intelligere Dei est ejus substantial'
(St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. 14. 4. c.)

260 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

stand the object. As is explained in the Psychology
of this series, there is a special spiritual power of
the human soul called by scholastics intellectus agens.
By this are formed the intelligible species that afford
a direct mental intuition of material things, after
they have been perceived by sense. Before sense-
perception and the action of the intellectus agens
following it, the human understanding is quasi tabula
rasa, a blank tablet on which nothing has as yet
been written. Stimulated by sensitive representa
tions, the soul may form intelligible species of
countless material objects, and ascend by steps from
the cognition of things sensible to that of things
spiritual ; but considered in its essence alone, the
soul is not determined and adapted to the know
ledge of anything whatsoever. It needs intelligible
species.

159. Now the question arises, Is there in God
anything corresponding to the " intelligible species "
determining the Divine mind to the possession of
an intellectual representation of the object : and if
so, how are we to explain it ? Some among the
scholastic philosophers were inclined to believe that
the term in question is not predicable of God in
its proper sense. St. Thomas, however, and others
are of a contrary opinion ; and we go with them.
It is true that in the concrete an intelligible species
of the human mind is not a pure perfection, but has
a very limited and imperfect being. Yet this does
not prevent us from affirming it of God, if only in
the abstract it can be conceived without connotation
of defect. And it can be so conceived by fixing our

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 261

attention on this feature alone, that an intelligible
species is a perfection by which the mind is adapted
to know something different from its own being.
Doing so, we conceive neither beginning nor multi
plicity, nor change, nor limitation, and thus do not
connote any defect mixed up with its perfection. At
the same time the perfection thus conceived is not
denoted by any other term accurately except " intel
ligible species " or its synonyms. Consequently we
must predicate this term in its proper meaning
of God. Let us now hear what St. Thomas
has to say on this subject.3 " As God can have
no potentiality for further perfection, but is pure
actuality, there cannot be in Him any difference
between intellect and intellectual representation.
Consequently He is neither without an intelligible
species, as our intellect, before it understands
something actually; nor is His intelligible species
different from the substance of the Divine Intellect,
as is the case with our intellect when it has actual
understanding. On the contrary, the intelligible
species (of God) is the Divine Intellect itself."
This comes to the same thing as saying that the
Essence of God is the intelligible species of His
Intellect ; for we have seen in the preceding thesis

3 "Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus
purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem
omnibus modis; ita scilicet ut neque careat specie intelligibili,
sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potential neque species
intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus divini, sicut accidit in
intellect!! nostro, cum est actu intelligens ; sed ipsa species intelli
gibilis est ipse intellectus divinus.'.' (St. Thomas, Sum.Theol. la.q. 14.
art. 2. in corp.)

262 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

that His Essence is His Intellect. Let us set
forth the same truth in other words, so far forth
as it applies to the knowledge God has of the
actual world. Since all things else save God are
so many adumbrations of Himself which He has
called into existence, His Essence bears to each
and all of them the character of a pattern in which
whatever perfection they have has its archetype
and its perfect representation. He needs, therefore,
no other determination by which to know them
adequately. To compare great things with small,
He beholds them all adequately in His Essence
as the architect beholds the building he has set up
in the plan which he has in his own mind and
which he has faithfully copied. The Divine Essence
exceeds indeed all creatures infinitely by its own
Infinite Being; nevertheless, it expresses all and
each of them distinctly, in so far as its Infinite
Being is identical with Infinite Thought, and God's
creative power realizes accurately His conceptions
of creatures chosen for creation.

SECTION 3. — The objects of Divine Thought.

Thesis XXVII. — God has not only a comprehensive
knowledge of Himself and of the essence of each possible
thing and each possible event ; but He sees also from
eternity all His creatures, before they exist, knowing
adequately whatever is knowable about their existence
and activity, so much so that He foreknows distinctly
all future free acts of His rational creatures, even those
which are only conditionally future.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 263

160. The general reason why God must know
all things knowable is again the truth repeatedly
mentioned in the two preceding sections, that His
Intellect is infinitely perfect. This reason alone
suffices to convince us that»He knows with absolute
perfection all those things which are at least imper
fectly knowable to us. But in order to show how it
follows that He knows things of which we know
nothing, some further explanations are wanting ; for
it must be shown that there do exist objective truths
perfectly hidden from created intellect, which are evident
to the uncreated mind. Thus it appears that the
proof of the subjective infinity of the Divine Intel
lect given above, does not supersede a detailed
exposition of the objects of His knowledge. Even
as regards those truths, the Divine knowledge of
which can be inferred from human knowledge, it is
not superfluous to explain carefully their relation
to the mind of God. The effect of this explana
tion will be that we shall be struck more forcibly
by the infinite wisdom of our Creator, and filled
with deeper admiration of His Majesty. At the
same time it will enable us to solve more clearly
the difficulties raised against the knowledge of
God.

161. First, then, we affirm that God knows Him
self by a comprehensive knowledge, that is to say, by
a knowledge which comprises absolutely every point
knowable about Him, whether as He is in Himself
or as He is in relation to other things. This much
will hardly be disputed. The Divine intellect must
evidently know with comprehensive knowledge what-

264 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

ever object of knowledge is intimately present to it.
But the Divine Essence is intimately present to the
Divine intellect so much so that it is even identical
with it.

Now every finite perfection possible and actual
pre-exists eminently in God ; so that when anything
comes to be created, its actually existing essence is
necessarily an imperfect imitation of the infinite
Essence of God. Consequently the Essence of God
is necessarily imitablc by creatures, though its actual
imitations are due to the free act of Divine creation.
This being so, God in comprehending Himself must
know all the different ways in which His Being is
susceptible of imperfect imitation by finite beings.
Such a knowledge involves an actual comprehension
of the essences of all possible creatures, with all the
perfections they may acquire, and all the defects
and privations conceivable in them. Consequently
it implies a knowledge of their faculties, their possible
acts, their relations to one another and to their
Creator, and all manner of combinations, states,
and alterations incident to them. Briefly, God
seeing Himself has an adequate knowledge of all
possible creatures and of all possible events. With
one act of comprehensive intelligence He so repre
sents the whole of them that each is known to Him
fully and distinctly. Consequently, whatever God
now knows as actual for any given period of time,
He would know it as distinctly as He knows it now,
even if He had never created. The difference would
be that then He would judge the same things to be
not actual which now He judges to be actual, and

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 265

thus distinguishes from the indefinite multitude of
purely possible things and events. Indeed that He
cannot fail to make this distinction is readily under
stood, if we consider the dependence of all creatures
and all the incidents of created existence upon the
decrees and power of the Creator. Whatever exists
and whatever happens cannot exist or happen, unless
God has decreed that it should exist or happen, or,
as regards moral evil, that He would not prevent
its existing or happening.

As we shall prove later on, God does not form
new decrees in the course of time, but His decrees
are eternal, and are now what they were from
eternity. Consequently from eternity He foresaw
whatever actually exists or happens in the course
of time. Otherwise how could He have decreed it ?
Therefore all actual creatures past, present, and
future, all their actions and all circumstances of
their existence, were present to the mind of God
from eternity. He foreknew them all without any
exception, even the free actions of His rational
creatures.

162. To prove this still better we will abstract
here from the immutability of the Divine decrees. We
will also distinguish the existence of creatures and
events, according as they are independent of or in
any way dependent upon free choice on the part of
men.

As regards the former, the perfect knowledge of
them is included in the comprehensive cognition
which God has of Himself and all possible things.
Knowing Himself and all possible things, He knows

266 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

which of these according to His will must become
actual, and what facts will be necessarily connected
with their creation. Thus He knows the history
of His creatures, so far as it depends upon His
decrees and His creative power alone.

Of His knowledge of the rest of their history,
there can be no doubt, if only we are able to
demonstrate that He foresees the free volitions of
His rational creatures. Everything except free
volitions runs its course according to certain laws
pre-established by God. The efficacy of created
freedom with regard to these laws does not extend
beyond initiating by free choice either of two alter
natives. The natural consequences of the alternative
thus initiated are to be set down to the freedom of
the creature only inasmuch as they were implicitly
contained in the act of choice. If a man yields to
a propensity for liquor and becomes a drunkard, the
consequences which drunkenness carries with it for
his health, his mental faculties, his fortune, his good
name, and the future of his offspring, &c., are not
controllable by his free-will. He is, however, answer
able for them, not because they are wished by him,
but because he did not prevent the cause by which
they are produced, when he was free and obliged
to prevent it. Let us take another instance. A
sinner who feels moved by the inspiration of Divine
grace to blot out his sins by due penance, is free
to follow the lead of grace or to neglect it. On
the supposition that he follows it, he will receive
a full pardon for his sins, according to a law of the
supernatural order pre-established by God ; if he

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 267

resists grace up to his death, he will die in his sin,
and according to another supernatural law never
reach his last end.

These explanations presupposed, it is evident
that an eternal knowledge of all free volitions of
rational creatures would enable God to foresee
everything from eternity. No one can deny that
God has a knowledge of free volitions, at least at
the time when they are actually elicited. Such a
denial would be an impugning of the Divine intellect,
representing it as falling short of understanding all
objective truth, that is to say, as being limited.
God therefore, whose intellect has no limits, compre
hends all volitions elicited by His creatures at the
moment when they are elicited. But if He knows
them, each in its turn, when they become actual,
He must have known them from all eternity ; other
wise His knowledge would have grown, He would
have learned something which He did not know
before, an hypothesis manifestly incompatible with
His infinite intellect. It follows, then, that He fore
knows from eternity whatever happens in the course
of time, even the free actions of His rational
creatures.

163. But how shall we prove that God must know
from eternity what a free creature would do, if it
were placed in this or that situation, in which it
really never will be placed ? How could He fore
know from eternity that the inhabitants of Tyre and
Sidon would have done penance, if amongst them
Christ had wrought those miracles against which
the citizens of Capharnaum, of Corozain, and Beth-

263 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

saida hardened their hearts ? 4 How could He fore
know the detailed course of action which Napoleon
III. would have taken, if he had conquered the
Germans at Sedan, and made the German monarch
his prisoner ?

Without entering upon the " How " which in this
as in many other cases is an insoluble mystery to us,
we can prove evidently that the knowledge of God
must extend even to those hypothetical cases.

God certainly knows the possible lines of action
open to a free creature, who finds himself with the
full use of his freedom in a certain situation, in
which he is able to attend to and consequently to
choose, among a limited number of possible alterna
tives. Of each of these possible ways of action open
to the person so circumstanced, two propositions
can be formed, contradictorily opposed to each
other. A type of the one is this : Put in the situation
C, Peter will choose the alternative A. A type of the
other is this : Put in the situation C, Peter will not
choose the alternative A. Every one knows from his
own experience how limited is the number of alterna
tives to which he really can attend under given
circumstances, and which really move him, although
they do not force him. We grant much, if we say
that sometimes ten alternatives together may be
open to a man. But whether it be ten or any other
number n, of each there can be formed two propo
sitions of the type given above. If we have, then,
n alternatives, we get n pairs of propositions contra
dictorily opposed to each other. In every pair there
4 Cf. St. Matt. xi. 20 — 23.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 269

must be a true and a false proposition ; for we know
from Logic that two propositions contradictorily
opposed to each other, never can be both true or
both false, but one must be true, the other false.
But God, from whom no .objective truth can be
hidden, must know which is the true one and
which the false one. Knowing this, He knows
thereby the course which any free creature really
would take under any given condition.

The belief in this truth is beautifully expressed in
the Collect which the Catholic Church makes use of
on the Seventh Sunday after Pentecost : " O God,
whose Providence in its arrangements is never
deceived, we humbly ask of Thee to take away
all hurtful things, and to grant whatever will
be useful for us."5 Every Christian knows that
" hurtful " and " useful " in the language of the
Church, are spoken of with reference to our last
end, our future beatitude. Now, whether in view of
this any set of circumstances, in which we may be
put, will prove hurtful or useful, depends, under
Divine grace, upon the use of our own freedom. If,
then, the Church beseeches God to take away all
hurtful things and to grant whatever will be useful
to us, she evidently supposes that He knows under
what conditions we shall make a good or excellent
use of our freedom, and under what others we shall
use it less well, or even abuse the same to our ruin.
We must now answer one or two objections.

5 "Deus, cujus providentia in sui dispositione non fallitur : te
supplices exoramus, ut noxia cuncta submoveas et omnia nobis
profutura concedas."

270 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

164. (i) Mr. Herbert Spencer says in his Principles
of Psychology :° " A thing cannot at the same time be
both subject and object of thought." But evidently
on the supposition that God comprehends Himself,
He is at the same time both subject and object of
thought. Consequently, in attributing to God a
comprehensive self-consciousness, we have put our
selves in opposition to the conclusions of psycho
logical science.

Answer. We have had already occasion to make
some reference to this author. That the subject
and object of thought cannot be identical, is a
proposition which Mr. Spencer does not support
by any argument, nor can any be given unless we
admit the materialistic hypothesis and reduce all
activity to the pulling and pushing of material
particles. On the other hand, Mr. Spencer's
assertion is in glaring contradiction to the evidence
of consciousness, and incompatible with moral
freedom. Who doubts that at the moment when
he has knowledge of anything he knows himself
to be knowing ? Were it otherwise, how could he
know afterwards that he knew the thing before,
though meanwhile he may have forgotten it ?
Again, how can I be morally free and answerable
for my actions, unless at the moment when an
eligible object is presented to my intellect, my
conscience tells me whether I am right or wrong
in choosing it ? Yet if my conscience tells me
this at the moment, it follows that I myself am at
the same time subject and object of my thought.

6 Principles of Psychology, i. p. I4<S.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 271

We must then dismiss as false this piece of
Spencerian psychology even in its application to the
human soul. Much less can it be admitted in regard
to God, who comprises eminently in the simplicity
of His Essence whatever is .conceivable as an intel
lectual perfection, not however possessing it by any
act really distinct from His Essence.

165. (2) We have stated that God sees all possible
things by comprehending His Essence as imitable.
But among other possible things evils are to be
found, and accordingly we are compelled in con
sistency to affirm that God knows evil as well as
good, inasmuch as He comprehends the instability
of His Essence. This, however, seems to involve
us in the Hegelian absurdity of supposing the
Infinite to contain in itself everything, evil not
excepted.

Answer. This objection rests upon the wrong
supposition that evil is a thing existing in itself,
and consequently knowable in itself. The truth is
that evil consists in the absence of some perfection
due to a substance. The want of a physical perfec
tion which the nature of the substance concerned
requires is a physical evil ; and the want of moral
rectitude in the will of a rational creature is a
moral evil. Neither physical nor moral evil can
be in God. Nevertheless God knows all possible
physical and moral evils by knowing, in virtue of
the comprehension of His own Essence, all possible
finite essences. For the perfect knowledge of these
involves a knowledge of all their natural require
ments, and so far as rational creatures are con-

272 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

cerned, their moral obligations. It involves also an
adequate knowledge of all possible actions of free
creatures, and of the relation of those actions to
the requirements of their nature, physical and
moral. Consequently it carries with it a compre
hensive understanding of all the ways in which the
activity of creatures can come into collision either
with the integrity of their own natural being or that
of their fellow-creatures. Thus all possible physical
evils are known. And inasmuch as an adequate
knowledge of all possible rational creatures, of their
faculties and of the relation of those faculties to
their last end, is inconceivable without an insight
into all the possible abuses of their free-will, by
which they can miss the narrow path of duty, God
cannot fail to know all those possible abuses : which
is equivalent to His knowing all possible moral
evils.

166. (3) Against the foreknowledge which God
has of our free actions, there is the obvious difficulty
which has been raised repeatedly in various forms. If
God foreknows from eternity what men deliberately
are doing now and will do in future, their actions
must necessarily be in harmony with the cognition
that God has of them. If men could act otherwise
than as. God foresees, they would be able to make
the infallible knowledge of God fallible, which is
absurd. They act therefore of necessity as God has
foreseen that they will act. But actions which of
necessity agree with the judgment God has formed
of them from eternity, cannot be free actions. Con
sequently, admitting Divine prescience of free human

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 273

actions, we must deny the freedom of the human
will.

Answer. The apparent strength of this difficulty
gives way as soon as a distinction is made between
the necessity of affirming an action as future, and
the necessity of affirming the same action, not only
as future, but also as necessary. He who admits
that God foreknows the future actions of men is
logically compelled to allow that these actions will
certainly take place, but Logic by no means con
strains him to affirm that they will be performed as
necessary and not as free actions. The foreknow
ledge of God is a truth from which we must logically
infer that the event foreseen by Him will happen
precisely as He has foreseen it. But does it follow
that He cannot foresee events, unless they are the
outcome of natural necessity and not of free choice ?
True, if God's foresight did not reach farther than
to the causes of free actions, and consequently could
foresee them only by comprehending the nature of
His free creatures and all the impelling motives
which precede their resolutions, He never could be
absolutely and adequately certain about their par
ticular free acts. Whatever object may be put before
a rational creature that enjoys the full use of its
faculties, it remains at liberty to choose or not to
choose until the choice is made. However, the know
ledge of the Infinite Mind extends beyond causes ;
it has a direct vision also of actions and effects ;
it expresses all objective truth to whatever time it
may belong. Of the two propositions, " The free
creature A under the circumstance B, in which the
s

274 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

action C will be possible to it, will, by the exercise
of its freedom, perform this action," and again,
"The free creature A under the circumstance B, in
which the action C will be possible to it, will, by the
exercise of its freedom, not perform this action," the
one must be necessarily true, the other necessarily
false. That which expresses really what A, under
the circumstance B, will do as regards the action C,
is formally true, because it is really the expression
of an objective future fact. Consequently the Infinite
Intellect of God must represent it as future. More
over, that proposition, inasmuch as ex hypothesi it
is the enunciation of a choice both really future
and really free, expresses a fact which is out of
all necessary connection with any preceding fact.
Therefore God knows it as it is, out of any such
necessary connection. His knowing it as it will
happen before it actually happens does not change
the nature of the fact itself.

God necessarily foresees from eternity what men
will do in the course of time, but His foresight does
not force them to act the one way or the other. If
the drunkard had chosen otherwise, God, without
any change in Himself, would have seen a free act
of abstinence where He now sees a free act of
intemperance. Nevertheless, if the creature chooses
now, for instance, to write rather than to read, God
has foreseen this choice from eternity, because He
represents objective truth as it is or will be under
any given circumstance.

Tourists who are walking through an Alpine
valley may be seen easily by one who is at the top

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 275

of a mountain bordering on it. Whilst they are
walking there, it cannot be true that they are not
doing so, though it depends upon their free choice
to walk or not to walk. Consequently their passing
by cannot be hidden from the spectator within the
range of whose eyesight they are coming. And if
he were able to see with his eyes future events as
clearly as he can see those that happen at a short
distance, he would see the excursionists coming
before they were actually on the way. Yet his
foresight would not be the reason of their coming ;
it would be nothing but an anticipated announce
ment of a future event.

In a similar way God looks, as it were, from the
summit of His Eternity down upon the course of
future times, and sees the free actions of His
rational creatures. Their future resolutions are
expressed by His infinite mind exactly as they will
come about ; consequently, not as natural con
sequences of habitual or actual impulses, but as
self-determinations, as events which will come to
pass at the bidding of rational creatures, making
use of that power of accepting or rejecting any
particular good which He Himself will grant them.
This is well expressed by St. Thomas : " God is
altogether outside the order of time. He is stand
ing, as it were, upon the high citadel of unalterable
eternity. Before Him is spread out the whole
course of time, which He takes in by one simple
intuition. Consequently, by one act of vision, He
sees everything that happens in the course of time ;
and each fact He sees as it is in itself, not as some-

276 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

thing that is to be present to His gaze in the future,
and is for the present involved in the sequence of
causes on which it depends ; at the same time He
does also see that sequence of causes. He sees
every event in a manner altogether proper to an
eternal being. Each fact, to whatever period of
time it belongs, He sees even as the human eye
sees Socrates seated. The sitting itself, not its
cause, is seen by the eye. But from the fact of
a man seeing Socrates seated, it must not be
inferred that the sitting is an effect flowing from
its cause necessarily. On the other hand, the
human eye sees most truly and infallibly Socrates
seated whilst he really is seated, because every
thing, as it is in itself, is a fixed and determined
fact. Thus, then, we must admit that God knows
with absolute certainty and infallibility whatever
happens at any time. Nevertheless temporary
events do not happen of necessity, but are the
effects of causes that might have acted other-

7 " Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, quasi in arce seter-
nitatis constitutus, quae est tota simul, cui subjacet totus temporis
decursus secundum unum et simplicem ejus intuitum. Et ideo uno
intuitu videt omnia, quae aguntur secundum temporis decursum et
unumquodque secundum quod est in seipso existens non quasi sibi
futurum quantum ad ejus intuitum, prout est in solo ordine suarum
causarum, quamvis et ipsum ordinem causarum videat ; sed omnino
seternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt in unoquoque
tempore, sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non
in causa sua. Ex hoc autem quod homo videt Socratem sedere
non tollitur ejus contingentia quae respicit ordinem causae ad
effectum ; tamen verissime et infallibiliter videt oculus hominis
Socratem sedere dum sedet, quia unumquodque prout est in seipso,
jam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur, quod Deus certissime

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 277

We may now state the difficulties in their usual
form with compendious answers, applying the
doctrine just expounded.

(a) An act which God foresees will necessarily
take place. But an act which necessarily takes
place cannot be a free act.

Answer. There is a fallacy in the use of the word
" necessarily." In the minor it denotes the physical
necessity under which a certain class of causes
produce their effects. When there is this necessity,
of course, by force of terms, freedom is excluded.
In the major the necessity denoted is logical
necessity ; the Divine mind being infinitely perfect,
necessarily sees the truth wherever and however
it is, past, present, or future. It is impossible for
the thing to be without God foreseeing it, and by
necessary consequence the Divine foreknowledge
is an infallible evidence of what it will be.

(b) An act the omission of which is impossible
cannot be a free act. But the omission of an act
which God foresees is impossible. Thus such an
act cannot be free.

Answer. Again the same fallacy. The omission
of such an act is logically impossible, but not on
this account physically impossible. The act and
its omission cannot both exist. The one is neces
sarily exclusive of the other. And in that sense, if
the act is really future, its omission is impossible,
but in no other sense is it impossible ; and in no

et infallibiliter cognoscat omnia qure fiunt in tempore, et tamen ea
quoe in tempore eveniunt non sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed con-
tingenter." (In Perihermeneias Aristotelts, Lib. I. Lect. 14.)

278 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

other sense is any necessity on the part of the event
the basis of the infallibility of the Divine fore
knowledge.

(c) That act is necessary and not free which
necessarily follows upon something else that does
not rest with the free choice of the agent. But an
act foreseen by God follows necessarily upon the
Divine foreknowledge, which foreknowledge does
not rest with the free choice of the agent.

Answer. The major is correct, if the necessary
following upon " something else " is because that
something is a necessarily acting cause, but not if
the " something else " is only a necessarily truthful
spectator or seer.

(d) If God were to foresee the free actions of
creatures His foreknowledge would be dependent
on their choice, for it would depend upon their
choice whether it should be framed in this way
rather than in that. But it is absurd to make an
attribute of the Infinite God dependent on the
action of His creatures.

Answer. The alleged dependence can only be
called dependence in a broad and mitigated sense.
True dependence is the relation by which the effect
is bound to its physical cause, not that by which
truthful knowledge is necessitated to conform itself
to its object. The former, so far forth as it is
dependence, is an imperfection. It is a perfection
indeed to possess being, but an imperfection to have
it in dependence on the causality of an external
agent, and the greater the dependence the greater
the imperfection. The latter is pure perfection, and

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 279

the fuller the conformity with the object, the greater
the perfection.

SECTION 4. — The manner in which God knows the free acts of
His rational creatures.

Thesis XXVIII. — i. Whereas God infallibly knows
what any given rational creature would do if left to
exercise its freedom under given circumstances and in
regard of a given object, this infallible knowledge must
not be traced to any Divine decree predetermining the
creature to act in that way.

2. Nor must it be traced to the adequate compre
hension which God has of the nature of the creature,
and of all the influences which under the circumstances
would bear upon its free-will previously to its actual
choice.

3. The true reason why God has a distinct intuition
of conditionally future free actions is because His infinite
intellect must represent those truths which pre-exist in
their causes contingently only, no less than other truths
which follow from their causes by nair.ral neces-
sity.

4. Hence the infallibility of the Divine foreknowledge
of free acts, as not merely conditionally future, but really
future, is to be explained thus : Knowing what use the
creature would make of its freedom under certain cir
cumstances, God has decreed to allow those circumstances
to come about. Thus He knows the free act as absolutely
future, because knowing it as conditionally future, He
further knows that He has decreed to realize the con
dition.

38o THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

167. In the preceding section we have proved
that God knows not only all that is possible, but
also whatever either is actually existing, or will be
actually existing, or would be actually existing under
certain circumstances. We have seen that even
the future free acts of rational creatures, whether
they be absolutely or only conditionally future, are
objects of the Divine Intellect.

Now the question arises : In what relation do
the objects known by God as distinct from Himself
stand to the knowledge He has of His essence and
His free-will ? The answer to this question is easy
enough, so long as we confine our consideration to
things and events purely possible, and to those
actual things and events which depend upon His
will alone, so that the free-will of rational creatures
does not interfere with them. If God did not know
whatever is possible, He could not have a compre
hensive knowledge of His essence ; and again, if He
were unable to discern the natural effects of the
causality of creatures who owe their existence to His
decrees alone, He would have an imperfect know
ledge of what He decreed. So far there is no
special difficulty about the explanation of the Divine
knowledge. The difficulty begins with the free voli
tions of rational creatures. Much labour has been
spent upon this question by Catholic philosophers,
especially since the latter half of the sixteenth
century. In the three first parts of the thesis we
are concerned about the explanation of the -know
ledge which God has of free actions as conditionally
future, and in the fourth about the explanation of

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 281

His knowledge, inasmuch as it represents free
actions as really or absolutely future.

168. We say then in the first place that the know
ledge God has of the conditionally future existence
of free actions cannot be explained by saying that
He knows them by reason of His decree to pre
determine creatures under certain circumstances to
the performance of them. By this assertion, we
express our disagreement from an opinion which
has every claim to our respect on account of the
renown of its author and of the many illustrious
and learned theologians who have adopted it.
Bannez, who was the first who taught explicitly
the opinion we reject, was the founder of a distin
guished school of theology. The predetermina
tion which they allege is called physical premotion.
According to the explanation given of this pre
motion by those who follow Bannez, it influences
the free-will previously to the self-determination of
the latter, and in such a way that by the very nature
of its influence the free-will is infallibly drawn to
the predetermined choice, which, nevertheless, is
genuinely free. This explanation supposes God's
knowledge of the conditionally future free act to
be contained in the comprehensive knowledge which
He has of His decree of physical premotion.

The defence of free-will in this hypothesis
becomes extremely difficult. " Predetermination,"
writes Cardinal Pecci, " includes a determination
which precedes human deliberation. But a deter
mination made by the Divine will must be fulfilled.
Consequently necessity precedes human delibera-

282 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

tion. Such deliberation can no longer be free."8
The solutions that are offered of this difficulty seem
to us by no means clear.9 And we shall argue
later (in Bk. III.), that the reasonings upon
which the assertion of a physical predetermination
of free acts is based are not more convincing.

169. The earliest opponent of Bannez was
Molina. The explanation of the way in which free
acts are knowable to God, is found by Molina in
what he calls the supercomprehension which the Divine
intellect has of the free creature.10 By this super-
comprehension he understands the adequate know
ledge of the nature and faculties of the free created
being, and of all the attracting and repelling
impulses to which it will be subjected previously
to its choice. That there is a knowledge of all
this cannot be denied ; but it does not appear how
we can thereby explain the knowledge God has of
the free choice itself. As it seems repugnant to the
nature of free acts that they should be foreseen in
the comprehension of predetermining decrees, so
neither does it harmonize with their nature that God
should know them from eternity by supercompre-
hending the created beings from whom the free acts
proceed. Nothing that is seen by God as preceding
the free act, can imply an infallible knowledge of the
free act itself. Neither the nature of the creature nor

8 Lehre des hciligcn Thomas nber den Einfluss Gottcs auf die Hand-
lungen der vernilnftigen Gcschopfe, &c. (Translated from the Italian by
G. Triller, D.D.), Part II. § 16, pp. 39, 40.

0 Cf. Zigliara, Surnma Phil. ii. p. 391, at the bottom of the page.

10 Molina in Part I. Divi Thorns, q. 14. a. 13. d. 15. p. 217.

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 283

its faculties, nor any attractive or repellent motives
brought to bear upon its free-will, can prevent this
will from choosing or refusing a given object. Con
sequently an infallible cognition of its choice is in
no way implied in the cognition of anything pre
ceding it. But the knowledge God has of the con
ditionally future choice must be infallible. There
fore it cannot be based upon a supercomprehension
of the creature in the sense of Molina. Molina had
the merit of pointing out that a Divine knowledge
of free acts must be admitted independently of
predetermining decrees. But the positive explana
tion he gives of this knowledge only takes us from
Scylla into Charybdis. On these grounds those who
are called Molinists, as following Molina in the rejec
tion of predetermining decrees, commonly do not
follow him in admitting what he substitutes in their
stead. They might, in fact, more properly be called
Suarezians, for Suarez is the great representative
of the teaching they defend, and which we shall
advocate in the third and fourth part of our thesis.

170. We maintain in the third place that God
sees the conditionally future free actions of creatures,
because they are objective truths and His infinite
intellect sees all objective truth. If a truth is prede
termined in its cause, God sees it by comprehending
that cause. But if it has no predetermining cause,
as a free act really has not, God sees it nevertheless.
But He sees it as something which is, or will be, or
would be, caused in fact, though it is in no necessary
connection, but only in a contingent connection with
its causes. Saying this we do not commit ourselves

284 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

to the statement that God foresees a conditionally
future free action as an event out of all connection
with His decrees. On the contrary, we hold most
firmly with Suarez that a conditionally future use
of freedom supposes a Divine decree to grant the
use of freedom, which decree by the scholastics of
the three last centuries is commonly called "the
decree of immediate Divine concurrence." But this
decree is a decree not to predetermine the creature
to the acceptance or rejection of a certain object,
but simply to render it perfectly able as well to
reject as to accept. Thus the free choice of the
creature, inasmuch as it is the act of choosing
between two alternatives, depends upon God ; but
inasmuch as this act of choosing is a self-deter
mination of the creature to accept rather than to
reject, it depends upon the creature. We shall say
more on this subject in the Third Book.

171. Hence it is readily inferred that God fore
knows those free actions that will in fact be future,
in that He comprehends His actual decrees. These
decrees are formed in the light of the knowledge
which He has of the conditionally future. For
instance, God knows that a man, whom we will call
Peter, under such and such circumstances would
give an alms to a poor man, if He granted him
the actual use of his freedom of will as regards this
object. In the light of this knowledge He decrees
either not to grant Peter the requisite use of his
freedom or to grant it. If the decree is not to grant
it, He will see the omission of the free act of alms
giving as really future and its performan g only as

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 285

conditionally future. But if He decrees to grant it,
He will see the omission as conditionally future
and the performance as really future. In other
words : The free act, which will be really future,
God knows as really future,, because He knows it
as conditionally future, and He further knows that
He has decreed to realize the circumstances under
which it will be really future. This is just what we
have stated in the fourth part of our thesis.

SECTION 5. — The Divisions of the Divine Knoivledge.

172. Though the Divine knowledge is one
undivided act, not really distinct from the Divine
Essence, we may nevertheless divide it according
to the diversity of the objects to which it extends.
Such a division is useful, inasmuch as it is based
upon the different relations of the objects of Divine
knowledge to God Himself, and thus recalls to us
in few words what we have explained fully in the
preceding section.

First, then, if we take the whole body of truths
which God knows concerning Himself and concern
ing finite things, His knowledge may be said to be
partly necessary, partly free. It is necessary, inas
much as on no supposition could it have been in
any other relation to its objects than it is now ; it
is free, inasmuch as things are now known as actual,
which might not have been known as actual under
a different use of the freedom of the Creator and of
His creatures. Therefore God has a necessary know
ledge of Himself, and of all finite things and actions

286 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

in so far as they are purely possible. And by a free
knowledge He knows His own decrees, and what
ever in consequence of the exercise of His own free
dom or that of His rational creatures has been
actual, is actual, will be actual, or would be actual
under certain circumstances, considered precisely in
its past, present, future, absolute, or conditional actu
ality.

At first sight it might seem that such a division
is inconsistent with God's immutability. Yet it is
not so. In saying that the knowledge which God
has of His own decrees and of existences outside
Himself might have stood otherwise towards its
objects than it does stand, we do not say that His
act of knowledge could have changed internally, or
that the range of His knowledge could have extended
further or less far : we state only that He now sees
things as actual which He might have seen as
merely possible. If God had created neither matter
nor spirit, He would nevertheless have distinctly
seen material bodies with all their vicissitudes and
all finite spiritual beings with all their actions and
states ; yet all these things He would have seen as
purely possible, whereas He sees now as actual at
one time or another the things which He has
decreed from eternity to bring into existence, to
gether with their necessary and free actions and the
results of both. Yet in no case is His knowledge
determined from without : He has it in virtue of
His unchangeable essence. Nor would His know
ledge of the exercise of created freedom be less,
strictly speaking, than it now is, even though He

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 287

had created no rational creature. The only differ
ence would be that the actions, which now His
Intellect represents as really future free actions,
would in that case have been represented as con
ditionally future. And the reason of this difference
would be the absence of the free decree to create
rational creatures and to provide the circumstances
under which they use their freedom as they use it
in the present order of things.

173. There is another division of Divine knowledge
which has regard only to things distinct from God.
These are said to be known by God partly through the
scientia visionis (knowledge of vision), partly through
the scientia simplicis intelligentia (knowledge of simple
intelligence). The nature of this distinction is clearly
explained in the following words of St. Thomas :
" A difference must be marked as regards things
which are not now actually existing. Some of
them, although they are not existing now, yet have
existed or will exist, and all these are said to be
known by God through the knowledge of vision. For
since God's understanding which is His being, is
measured by eternity, and eternity is something
which, unchangeable in itself, embraces all time,
it follows that the intuitive vision of God, as it is
at the present moment, takes in all time and all
things that are at any time whatever, and He
sees all this as distinctly as if it were really
present. But there are other things which are in
the power of God or of creatures, but which
never exist, nor will exist, nor have existed, and of
these we do not say that God has a knowledge of

288 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

vision, but only that He knows them through the
knowledge of simple intelligence.''' n

From this passage of the Angelic Doctor it
appears that, according to his terminology, the
knowledge of vision comprises whatever is actual
outside God at whatever time, whereas to the
knowledge of simple intelligence everything is relegated
which, though never actual, is in the power either
of God alone or of creatures under God. Of con
ditionally future free actions, St. Thomas did not
treat ex professo. These actions cannot be said to
be merely possible, and yet they are never actual,
if the circumstances under which they will happen
are never realized. Hence the question arises :
Are they seen by the knowledge of vision or by the
knowledge of simple intelligence ? We might refer
them to the knowledge of simple intelligence, by saying
that to it belongs whatever is seen as possible, and
yet not actual, whether not actual simply (purely
possible), or not actual except under certain con
ditions (conditionally future). We might also refer
conditionally future free actions to the knowledge
of vision by saying that to it belongs whatever is
at any time either really or conditionally actual.

11 " Horumquae actu non sunt est attendenda quaedam diversitas.
Quaedam enim licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt, vel
erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia cum
intelligere Dei, quod est ejus esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine
successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus
Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque
tempore, sicut in subjecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt,
quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nee sunt, nee
erunt, neque fuerunt, et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam
visionis, sed simplicis intelligent i<z." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 14.)

THE DIVINE INTELLECT. 289

Those Catholic philosophers who reject the notion
of physical predetermination, say commonly that con
ditionally future free actions are seen by what they
call scientia media (middle knowledge), as having for
its object something neither purely possible nor
really actual, but between the two. We ourselves
hold strongly to what is meant by the term scientia
media, without insisting upon the necessity of retain
ing this term as such. We conclude then by denning
the scientia media as the knowledge that God has of
the conditionally future existence of the free actions of
His rational creatures, without having decreed physi
cally to predetermine the said creatures to the said
actions.

CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE WILL.

Introductory.

174. IN every being on this earth we find a natural
tendency to follow a certain way of action that
suits its nature, and to avoid other ways out of
harmony with or altogether repugnant to its nature.
Thus every element of matter has a certain chemical
affinity and atomicity, which it satisfies in all com
binations as well as circumstances will allow. Every
plant works upon the nourishment which it takes
up from the soil in such a way as serves its specific
evolution. The instinct of animals leads them with
astonishing accuracy to the food they stand in need
of, to arrangements for their future offspring, and to
avoidance of danger.

In man, the head of the visible creation, there
is not only a longing for things that suit the physical
organism, as in brute animals, but an insatiable
appetite for truth.

That which in one way or another is in harmony
with the nature of a thing is called its good. The
tendency of a thing to obtain what suits its nature
is in scholastic language called its natural appetite
(appetitus naturalis), although this appetite is not

THE DIVINE WILL. 291

always a desire or craving in the strict sense of the
word, but often only a natural tendency in some
sense analogical to a desire or craving. Where
this natural appetite is directed by knowledge, its
scholastic name is elicited appetite (appetitus
elicitus), because it is roused to action (elicited)
by the knowledge of good. Of elicited appetite
there are two varieties which essentially differ
from one another — organic or sensitive appetite
(appetitus organicus vel sensitivus), which is an
inclination to good as apprehended by mere sense-
perception, and spiritual or rational appetite (appe
titus spiritualis vel rationales) , which tends towards
good as presented by intellectual knowledge. This
rational appetite is what is commonly called will.
175. It is evident that in God there can be no
merely natural appetite or appetite without know
ledge, nor any sensitive appetite or appetite following
organic perception ; for He is essentially Intellect,
and therefore cannot be without knowledge ; He is
also essentially simple, and therefore without the
composition of material parts involved in sense-per
ception. He is the most pure Spirit in which being
and knowledge are really one. The question then
arises, Shall we predicate "will" of Him? The
answer to this depends upon whether " will "
denotes a pure perfection or not. If it does, God
must be infinite Will. But there can be no doubt
that "will" in its abstract meaning signifies nothing
but perfection. It is love for good consequent
upon knowledge of it. We cannot conceive that
intellectual being as other than imperfect which

292 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

should know good and yet not approve it as good.
Some love of good is inherent in every intellectual
nature. Intellect is by its very nature directed
towards truth. Truth, therefore, is the good of
intellect, being in harmony with its essence. From
this it follows that there is no act of intellect which
does not carry with it an act of will. And as God
is infinite Intellect, so also He must be infinite
Will.1

The truth that God is endowed with will, not
merely metaphorically, but in the strict sense of the
word, may also be indirectly shown from the fact
of creation. Creation is production out of nothing,
and such production is inconceivable, unless it be
conceived as the effect of infinitely powerful volition.
Thus the Psalmist expresses it, comprising the
whole history of the origin of the universe within
the compass of these few words : Ipse dixit et facia
sunt : ipse mandavit et creata stint — "He spoke, and
they were made ; He commanded, and they were
created."2

It will now be our duty to explain the truths
which by the light of natural reason can be ascer
tained concerning the Divine will.

Our investigation will fall into three branches;
we shall have to consider the necessity and freedom
of the Divine will, its holiness and other moral
attributes, and, lastly, its quality as supreme life
and beatitude.

1 Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, i. c. 72, § "Ex hoc enim quod
Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod est volens," &c.
- Psalm cxlviii. 4.

THE DIVINE WILL. 293

SECTION i. — Necessity and freedom of the Will of God.

Thesis XXIX. — God loves Himself with absolute
necessity, infinitely, and for the sake of His own good
ness. His love towards creatures is an outcome (or out
pouring) of the love which He oears to His own Being.
He loves them with a love not absolutely necessary, but
generous and free ; and His decrees about them are at
once free and irrevocable.

176. Self-respect is not self-conceit, and there is
a well-ordered love of self, quite a distinct thing from
selfishness. The self-conceited man, over-estimating
his own importance, assumes a position of superiority
or authority not due to him. The selfish man cares
for nothing but his own satisfaction and enjoyment.
But the man who is possessed by a noble self-
respect will not stoop to anything incompatible
either with his dignity as a man or with the post
assigned to him by Providence. A well-ordered
love of self leads a man to utilize all his faculties
and all his surroundings for the perfection of that
in himself which is noblest in human nature.

177. Now ascending from the image of God to its
original, we see at once that in Him there can be
no self-conceit nor selfishness. It is impossible that
He should over-esteem His own being or His
authority, for He is infinitely perfect and the only
Lord of all. Neither can there be in Him an
inordinate and exaggerated seeking after His own
advantage. In His essence He finds the source
and fulness of everything grand and excellent,
loveable and enjoyable. He finds it there estab-

294 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

lished on the immoveable rock of His eternity, not
liable to decay from within nor open to aggression
from without. Consequently, care for Himself in
the proper sense of the word, care for His own
aggrandisement or for the increase of His own
happiness, is as inconceivable in God as the loss
of His existence. And as all selfishness is the
outcome of such care, nothing is more remote from
the Creator of all things than selfishness. Yet
well-ordered esteem and love of self belong to Him
in an infinite degree. If He did not value His
nature in proportion to its goodness, if He did not
esteem and love Himself in proportion as He is
worthy of esteem and love, He would be wanting
in knowledge of or due affection for good. His
nature is infinitely good, and therefore infinitely
worthy of esteem and love. Hence God has neces
sarily an infinite esteem and love of Himself for
His own goodness.

178. From this it follows that His love for
creatures is an outcome (or outpouring) of His love
for Himself. It is necessarily so, for no creature is
loveable of itself. All its goodness is based upon
the being that it has, and that being is a free
creation of God. The creature, then, is indebted
to the Creator for whatever it possesses worthy of
esteem and love. Again, the grounds on which
rests the creature's claim for love consist either
in its natural perfection or (in the case of a rational
creature) in its moral goodness. Its natural per
fection is the handiwork of the Creator; and its
moral goodness, though in a certain sense due to

THE DIVINE WILL. 295

the exercise of the creature's own freedom, is
worked out after the ideal set before the creature's
mind by the natural or supernatural law of God,
manifested in the voice of conscience or through
the teaching of revelation. In any case, God sees
no perfection in any creature which is not derived
from Himself, the source of all good. Now a
created rational being, however enlightened about
this dependence of creatures upon their Creator,
may wilfully withdraw its understanding from
paying attention to the fact. Hence men who
have learned much about God sometimes do not
rise to His love, but make a creature the centre
of their affections. No such inordination can pos
sibly exist in God, whose intellect and will are
infinitely perfect. Hence all the love He bears to
creatures must be based upon His love towards
Himself. This truth is compatible with another,
of which we shall say more in the Third Book, that
He loves His rational creatures in a certain sense
for their own sake, inasmuch as He wills their
happiness on condition that they co-operate with
His benevolent intentions.

179. As the Divine mind cannot abstract from
the natural relation in which each finite nature stands
to its infinite prototype, and as the Divine will can
never be displeased with His own production, God
necessarily loves everything He has created, and is
pleased with its natural goodness. How far this
love must lead Him to take care of the well-being
of His creatures, we shall see later on. For the
present we wish to show that the love of God for

296 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

creatures, though necessary in a certain sense on
the supposition of their existence, nevertheless is
to be called a free and not a necessary love. God
being infinite has no need of any creature, nor
would He be less good if He had created none.
He has given existence to finite beings because He
freely willed so to do. He willed to give them a
share in His goodness, though He knew that He
might be infinitely happy by Himself alone. This
has been proved in Book I. Thesis XVIII. § 97.
Hence it follows that the love God bears to creatures
does not suppose any attraction or loveableness
belonging to them independently of the exercise of
Divine freedom. On the contrary, if they possess
anything to attract God to love them, it is due to
His free decree of creation. But for this decree
all creatures would have been eternal nothingness,
unworthy of being loved. In the free volition by
which God chose to produce beings different from
Himself, there is included the free decree of all the
natural and supernatural good that creatures ever
enjoy. Consequently, all and each of them are
indebted to their Creator for everything good they
are and have. We may justly put to every creature
St. Paul's question : " What hast thou that thou
hast not received ? " 3

180. Having thus proved that the love God bears
to His handiwork is an overflow of pure generosity,
and not a constraining natural affection, we are still
to show that His decrees regarding creatures are
at once free and irrevocable. In saying that the
8 i Cor. iv. 7.

THE DIVINE WILL. 297

decrees by which God rules the fate of His
creatures are free, we by no means wish to imply
that they are not referred to any standard whatsoever.
Certainly they are. The standard to which they
are necessarily referred is the# infinite wisdom and
righteousness of the Creator. It is impossible that
He should decree anything about His handiwork
that would appear unwise or unjust in the light of
the eternal truth of His understanding. But of the
many ways by which He may lead the creature
without acting against wisdom or justice or any
other of His Divine perfections, He chooses one
way or another according to His good pleasure
without any necessity from within or without.
Such necessity would betoken either dependence
upon the good of creatures or want of supreme
power over them, defects inconceivable in the
infinite and absolute Lord of all things.

181. The exercise of Divine freedom we are
speaking of, is necessarily an eternal act. God
could not delay any decree without a wise reason.
But no such reason could exist for Him. A
resolution cannot be reasonably put off to a later
date, if he who is to approve or reject it, knows
already beforehand which side he will take. God
knows this of necessity. Consequently He cannot
delay His resolve : such delay in Him would be
setting Himself against His own wisdom. Nor can
He retract the course once settled by His eternal
decrees. They are irrevocable. A decree cannot
be repealed without a motive, nor wisely repealed
without a reasonable motive. But for God there

298 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

can be no reasonable motive ever to recall what He
has once decreed. A reasonable revocation of a
decree is always based upon a better knowledge or
a fuller consideration of the matter and circum
stances. Neither the one nor the other is con
ceivable in God, whose essence is identical with
infinitely perfect intuition of all truth. Hence in
God there is properly speaking but one free decree
abiding for ever. This one decree, however, is
equivalent to an innumerable multitude of decrees,
which according to our way of thinking are con
tained in it. It is formed in the light of infinitely
perfect knowledge of all possible contingencies.
Consequently in it God has also regard to the
free volitions of His rational creatures. It abides
in the Divine will, not only in this sense that it
never is retracted ; but it is an eternally-lasting,
never-changing, actual determination of that will.
In other words, what God has decreed from eternity,
that He approves now and wills now actually, and
that He will approve actually throughout the future.

182. Against this doctrine the following objection
is often made.

If my fate has been settled once for all, why
should I trouble myself about the performance of
religious and moral duties, since no performance of
mine can move God to arrange anything for me
better than that which He has already decreed ?

Those who raise this difficulty forget that the
decrees of God are not formed without regard for
human freedom. God does not settle the fate of a
reasonable creature without paying attention to the

THE DIVINE WILL. 299

way in which that creature will use the freedom of
its will. As His decrees cannot violate justice, He
certainly has not decreed that the faithful obser
vance of the moral law which He has stamped upon
your heart, should lead you to final misery. On the
other hand, if you reason rightly, you must conclude
from the common consent of mankind ; from the
desire of happiness craving for fulfilment in the
breast of every man, and never perfectly satisfied
in this life ; and finally, from the necessity of a
sufficient sanction of the moral law, that there is
another life to follow beyond the grave. As your
soul is spiritual and incorruptible, you have reason
to believe that this future life will last for ever. A
little reflection shows you, moreover, that it would
be absurd for an infinitely just and holy God to have
decreed that it should not make any difference
throughout all eternity, whether a man had finished
his time of probation here on earth in a state of
rebellion against his Creator, or in humble sub
mission to His will. Consequently, even if you
were not favoured with the light of Christian reve
lation, under the guidance of reason alone you
might know enough about the nature of the eternal
decrees of God to become convinced that the only
safe course a man can take is to comply as accu
rately as possible with the law of God, manifested by
the voice of his conscience, and to bear in his heart
and to express by his whole external behaviour those
feelings of reverence, of trust and love, which it
behoves a reasonable creature to entertain with
regard to a Creator of infinite power, wisdom, and

300 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

goodness. As God from eternity would not but
decree to lead every rational creature who freely
and perseveringly obeys the voice of conscience, to
final happiness, so He decrees it now at this very
moment, whilst you are anxious about your final
fate ; for His decrees are now, as they were from
eternity. From this undeniable truth it follows
evidently that it depends upon your free co-operation
with the benevolent intentions of your Creator, whether
eternal happiness or final misery will be your lot. If
against this conclusion the objection suggests itself:
How can I be free, if God foreknows my future
actions, we beg the reader to ponder again what was
said in answer to this objection, § 166. Although
Philosophy, as such, does not rest on the teach
ing of revelation, it is as well here to remember
that Christians have that other source of know
ledge to confirm them in their philosophical belief
that they possess a true liberty, upon the right
exercise of which their future depends. According
to the Christian doctrine, it is an eternal decree
of God that every one shall receive his reward
according to his works, that God will render " to
them indeed who, according to patience in good
works, seek glory and honour and incorruption,
eternal life : " but also that there shall come
"tribulation and anguish upon every man that
worketh evil."4 According to the same doctrine,
it has been decreed by God that every prayer made
with confidence for really " good gifts " shall be
heard, that Heaven shall rejoice over the con-

4 Romans ii. 7, 9.

THE DIVINE WILL. 301

version of a sinner, that the ministers of Christ
shall have power to forgive all sins, however
grievous and numerous : that after death judgment
shall follow, and the wicked shall be condemned to
everlasting punishment and ^the just be rewarded
with never-ceasing glory.5

Whether, then, we consider the eternal decrees
of God from the standpoint of reason or from the
standpoint of Christian faith, they in no way favour
indolence and indifference. To him who does not
allow himself to hold as true every vagary of thought
that can suggest itself, but takes suggestions for
what they really are, the very irrevocability of these
decrees, far from offering an excuse for idleness or
bad morals, will rather be the strongest stimulus to
guard against sin and to practise diligently prayer
and good works. Such a one knows that, according
to the unchangeable will of God, it depends upon
the use of his moral freedom during life, whether
after death that misery is to befall him which is
the unavoidable doom of those who end their days
in obstinate wickedness, or whether he shall have
a share in the happiness held out by unfailing
promises to those who die in loving submission to
the laws of their Creator.

183. Still another difficulty concerning the eternal
decrees of God is to be discussed here. How can
God, being immutable, have any free volition at
all ? If He cannot change, His will remains always
in the same state in which it is by virtue of His

5 Cf. St. Luke xi. 5 — 13, xv. 10; St. John xx. 23; Heb. ix. 27;
St. Matt. xxv. 46.

302 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

essence. How then can He will anything but with
absolute necessity ?

To this difficulty we may answer in the first
place that a puzzling how is never a solid reason for
doubting an evident that. We have proved that
God is both immutable in Himself and free in His
decrees. Nay, a denial of Divine freedom would
lead us logically to a denial of our own moral
liberty, indeed to a denial of virtue and truth itself.

However, we further submit the following con
siderations.

Volition is an immanent action in the strictest
sense of the word. What we express when we say,
" I will this or that," is not a change either in our
selves or outside ourselves, but an actual state of our
mind bearing a definite relation to a certain object,
a relation the nature of which can only be under
stood by him who knows from self-consciousness
what it is to will. Thus the most competent philo
sophers, from St. Thomas down to those of our own
age,6 are of opinion that the action of volition con
sidered in its essence does not imply any change added
to the actuality prerequired in the subject in order
that volition may become possible. This holds good
of all volitions of all rational beings whatsoever. It
is true that in us men there is no volition without
change going before and coming after. We cannot
will anything without actual knowledge of the object
willed. This actual knowledge is not included in

6 Cf. St. Thomas, disp. D Veritatc, q. 8. a. 6. ; Suarez, Metaph.
disp. 48, sect. 2. n. 2. et sect. 4. n. 14. " Dico quarto;" Kleutgen,
Phil, Schol. n. 21 ; Lahousse, Theol. Nat, n, 209, p. 173.

THE DIVINE WILL.

3°3

our essence, but is acquired through a series of
changes. Again, in consequence of our volition of
any object, our mind is necessarily modified by being,
as it were, bent upon that object — to say nothing of
the accompanying changes in the nervous system.
However, these changes do not touch the essence of
volition. They do not prove that volition precisely
as volition adds anything to the internal state in
which a reasonable being exists when it is perfectly
able to decide whether it wills or refuses a certain
object. If I am now perfectly able to accept or to
reject the object A with my free-will, the act of self-
determination proceeds in one direction or the other
without any further physical change. If it did not,
there would be no truth in the saying that I am now
perfectly able to embrace either of the two alterna
tives. Nevertheless, my self-determination, as it
proceeds, does carry a physical change with it ; yet
not because it is self-determination or free volition,
but because it is free volition having a place in a
being essentially changeable, and unable to perse
vere in its self-determination without undergoing
some modification of its being.

Let us now apply these observations to the solu
tion of our difficulty. God is infinite. By virtue
of His essence He possesses whatever actuality is
required for any volition compatible with His per
fection. As we have explained, volition does not
imply change essentially. Consequently, God can
will any object without any real modification of His
being.

Does it follow from this that whatever He wills

304 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

He wills with absolute necessity ? By no means.
It follows only that the internal act of His will,
which is really identical with His essence, can with
out change either involve, or not involve, that rela
tion to an object which we call choosing and willing.
Whether God wills the object with absolute neces
sity or not, depends therefore^ only upon this,
whether He understands it to be on every suppo
sition loveable for its own sake. But apart from His
decree to create, no finite being is loveable in itself.
The conclusion is that without any internal change,
God can will or not will any finite existence : conse
quently all finite beings are indebted for their exist
ence to the free choice of His eternal unchangeable
will. To express this shortly in scholastic ter
minology :

The will of God in its relation to creatures is
absolutely necessary in its entity (i.e., in its internal
actual state), but not in its term (i.e., it does not
necessarily bear to creatures that relation which we
call volition).

SECTION 2. — Holiness and other moral attributes of the
Divine Will.

Thesis XXX. — On account of the infinite rectitude
of His will, God is to be called perfectly and abso
lutely holy, benevolent, and merciful, just, faithful, and
true in His threats and promises.

184. The word "holy," as used of creatures, has
a wider and a more restricted sense. In the wider
signification it means "being removed and distin-

THE DIVINE WILL. 305

guished from other things, or persons, by a sort of
special dedication to the Divinity." In this sense
we speak of churches as holy places ; we call altar-
plate and priestly vestments holy things ; we say
that bishops, priests, and others specially conse
crated to God, are to be revered as holy persons :
and we give the visible Head of the Church the title
of " Holy Father," and "Your Holiness."

The word " holy " predicated thus does not
denote any distinction in the line of morality. Pope
Alexander VI., in that he was the representative of
the Divine Founder of the Church, had so far forth
as much right to the title of Holy Father as
St. Peter himself; although in point of moral excel
lence Peter as far surpassed the common standard
of human virtue as Alexander fell short of it.

In a more restricted sense, holiness is predi
cated of men alone, to signify perfection of moral
character ; in other words, perfect agreement of the
free volitions and actions of a man with the moral
law. The moral law itself is the eternal law of God,
prescribing the line of action to be followed by
rational creatures in the pursuit of their last end.
The moral character of a man is perfect, if he does
his duty with unfailing integrity. His duty as a
reasonable being is to use his freedom reasonably.
One of the first demands of reason in him is that
he should submit freely to the will of his Creator
as soon as he knows it. Doing so, he renders his
actions in complete accordance with the dictates of
infinite wisdom ; for as God's will is really one with
His infinite intellect, it is impossible that God
u

306 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

should impose any duty upon us otherwise than in
absolute harmony with His supreme reason. Hence
we may define a holy man to be a man who uses his
free-will constantly in such a way as to comply with the
rule of action that infinite wisdom has laid down for him
from eternity.

185. This definition, derived as it is from the
common acceptation of the word, enables us to see
that the attribute " holy," taken in its stricter sense,
may be predicated of God. His free-will is not only
united with His infinite wisdom, but in its subjective
aspect is identical with it. It is, therefore, absolutely
impossible that any free volition of God, any decree
of His, any Divine action, or ordination, regarding
creatures, should be different from what it ought to
be according to the judgment of infinite wisdom.
Independently of any other being, in virtue of His
essence, God has an infinitely perfect knowledge of
the way in which it behoves Him to use His free
dom of will. Out of the purest love to His own
infinite goodness (which is the spring and source of
whatever is good), He wills and works according to
that knowledge. Hence He is perfectly and abso
lutely holy, Holiness itself.

186. This holiness is the standard by which we
must judge of the rest of God's moral attributes.
The first of these attributes is the love and bene
volence God bears towards His creatures. He loves
all inasmuch as He wills they should all have some
natural good. But in a stricter sense of the word
God is said to love His rational creatures. Towards
them He has a love of benevolence or friendship. On

THE DIVINE WILL. 307

the other hand, strictly speaking, we cannot say
that He is benevolent to irrational creatures ; the
reason whereof is simply this, that benevolence is
either joy over, or a wish for, another's happiness ;
and only rational beings are. capable of happiness.
Love of friendship towards irrational creatures can
only be based upon a misapprehension of their true
nature. In view of the traces of the Divine good
ness which they exhibit, and the generic similarity
which they bear to the inferior part of our nature,
we may call them our friends, or even, with the
pious exaggeration of St. Francis, our brothers and
sisters ; we may be much opposed to reckless
hurting of their sentient organism. All this accords
perfectly with reason. But as soon as we begin to
represent them to ourselves as self-conscious, as
reflecting upon their state, and consequently, as
capable of happiness and misery in the proper sense
of the words — as persons, and not as things only —
our behaviour becomes unreasonable, and borders
on morbid sentimentality. It would be blasphemy
to suppose such a violation of reason in God. In
conclusion, as regards the benevolence of God
towards His rational creatures, we know from
reason alone that that benevolence is ample enough
perfectly to satisfy the demands of infinite wisdom.
From Revelation we are certain that God on His
part is ready to make each of His rational creatures
in a certain sense infinitely happy in a future life,
and that only abuse of freedom on their own part can
thwart and frustrate the benevolent intention of
their Creator.

308 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

187. Light is thrown upon the benevolence of
God by another of His moral attributes closely
connected with it — Divine mercy. Mercy, as it is a
virtue, and not blind feeling, consists in the efficacious
will to remove the misery of others to the extent approved
of by rightly enlightened reason. In men the practice
of this virtue is frequently attended with a sort of
tender emotion caused in our sensitive organism by
the sight or imagination of misery. And just as
benevolence is not seldom misapplied by us, so we
may also err in the exercise of mercy. In those
who are called to govern others, for instance, mercy
may degenerate into a vice, if they allow themselves
to be drawn away from preventing public danger by
compassion for individual criminals, who experience
pain and hardship if laws against crime are laid
down and enforced.

Not a shadow of these and similar defects, which
disfigure human mercy, can exist in the absolutely
perfect mercy of God. In it there is nothing of
blind emotion. It is purely spiritual, and the rule
of its application is benevolent wisdom. For this
reason the mercy of God must manifest itself here
on earth in nothing so much as providing means by
which men may deliver themselves from moral misery.
In fact, as men alone of all visible creatures are
able to attain happiness, so men alone can fall into
that state which is properly termed misery. It is
shown in Ethics that the final happiness of man
must consist in union with God by perfect know
ledge and love, a union to be expected in a future
life. According to Christian revelation, this happy

THE DIVINE WILL. 309

possession of God will be a supernatural one, an
immediate intuition and fruition of the infinite
beauty and goodness of our Creator, carrying with
it a complete and never failing satisfaction of all
our longings and desires without the least admixture
of satiety or disgust.

From this it must be inferred that man is to be
called substantially happy, in this mortal life, so
long as he is on the right path to his future union
with God, and really miserable, so soon as he
goes astray from it. Here, then, there arises the
question : Which is the true way to that union ?
Reason answers clearly : Compliance with the law
of God in the use of moral freedom. Christianity
stamps this judgment of human reason with the
seal of Divine authority ; and assures us, moreover,
that nothing is able to endanger man's final happi
ness but a deliberate breach of the law of God.

This being so, God cannot show His mercy in
this world more splendidly than by leading men to
the knowledge of Himself and to the observance
of His law, and offering to those who transgress it
a remedy against the evil consequences of their
transgression.

188. Different from but not opposed to the effects
of Divine mercy are the manifestations of another
moral attribute of God — His justice. By this term
we do not signify commutative justice, or that moral
disposition which inclines us to render to others what
they have a right to ask. This virtue cannot belong
to God, who is the First Cause of all rightful claims,
and against whom, strictly speaking, no one can

3io THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

have a right, as He is the only Lord of all. How
ever, besides that kind of justice there is another
kind, called by writers on Ethics distributive justice.
This term denotes a virtue proper to rulers of a com
munity, a virtue which consists in a constant will to
treat every subject according to his dignity and merits.
Such a will is a moral excellence which does not
connote any imperfection, and therefore cannot be
wanting in God, whose absolute dominion extends
over the whole of creation. Being possessed of
infinite knowledge, He thoroughly comprehends the
natural and supernatural dignity of each of His
rational creatures, and estimates exactly its merits
or demerits. Knowing, moreover, how many ways
of treatment there are applicable to a concrete case
without violation of wisdom, He is free to choose
between those ; but He cannot choose any way for
bidden by His wisdom.

These few statements embrace almost every
thing that can be said on the subject of Divine
justice a priori. To determine accurately the way
in which creatures are to be dealt with in harmony
with their natural dignity and merit, is the work
of God alone, whose judgments man has not to
criticize, but in all humility to accept. Created
reason rightly used cannot be opposed to the reason
that is uncreated.

189. From the identity of this uncreated reason
with the will of God we argue that He possesses
two other moral attributes, veracity and fidelity.
God is truthful, that is to say, He never can utter
falsehood, nor approve of any such utterance on the

THE DIVINE WILL. 3II

part of His creatures. The reason is obvious. He
is essentially infinite Intellect and infinitely righteous
Will. Under the former aspect His essence is the
expression of all objective truths in such a perfect
way that He is constantly conscious of each of them ;
under the latter aspect He loves Himself necessarily
as an infinitely complete representation of truth.
His dealing with creatures must be in conformity
with this love which is essential to Him. But an
utterance made with the intention of leading into
error would evidently be opposed to this essential
love of truth. Such an intention would necessarily
be involved in any false utterance coming from
God : for Infinite Wisdom cannot tell an untruth
by mistake. It follows then from God's very nature
that His every utterance must be true.

But can God ever approve of a lie told by one
of His rational creatures ? To solve the question,
we have only to weigh the fact that lying is directly
in conflict with the natural desire for truth proper
to rational beings. Trie good of a creature endowed
with intellect is truth. Its final happiness is in the
possession of God, the Infinite Truth. The pre
paration to be made for this happiness must be
the direction of the creature's free-will towards
God by the way of true knowledge and true love.
For these reasons man feels himself instinctively
repelled by the suggestion of deliberate insincerity.
The child's first lie is told with remorse and con
fusion and sense of moral disorder. How could
it be otherwise ? The intention to tell a falsehood
is a stain on the natural image of Eternal Truth

312

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

stamped upon the human heart. God Himself has
an infinite detestation of uttering what is false, and
necessarily wills that His rational creatures should
in all free acts conform their will to His will, and
consequently to the exigencies of their nature. It is
therefore altogether inconceivable that God should
ever approve of the deliberate spreading of falsehood.
Every deliberate lie must be condemned by Him
as something intrinsically bad : and all the more
condemned, the more it tends to draw men away
from God the Truth. Before all others therefore
those liars must be held in special abhorrence by
God who under the false pretence of Divine authori
zation try to lead others into error as regards
religion and morals. Their endeavours cannot
possibly be favoured by evident marks of Divine
approval, as are true prophecies and true miracles.
No false religion can be supported by such marks.

God's veracity is the light which guides the
Christian safely along the narrow paths of faith.
Another moral attribute of God, His fidelity,
guarantees the attainment of the goal of happiness
to which living faith leads.

11 God is faithful," writes St. Paul.7 To prove
this, we need but to consider the veracity along
with the physical and moral immutability of God.
Being truthful, He does not reveal that He will
punish or bless, without at the time of the reve
lation intending to award punishment or blessing,
either absolutely or under certain conditions. This
intention, in virtue of His physical and moral
7 i Cor. i. 9, and x. 13.

THE DIVINE WILL. 313

immutability, remains unchangeable. Consequently,
when the time arrives to which the threat or
promise is attached, and the condition fulfilled
under which it was uttered, He is as determined
to keep His word as He was when He first uttered
it. As we shall see in the next chapter, He is also
omnipotent. Therefore nothing can prevent Him
from doing what He wills. Consequently, He is
faithful. He will never be mocked by the sinner
who despises His warnings, nor will He ever dis
appoint the just man who relies upon His promises.
Note. — Difficulties against the moral attributes
of God will be solved in the chapter on Providence.

SECTION 3. — The Will of God as supreme Life and
Beatitude.

Thesis XXXI. — God lives an infinitely perfect
intellectual life, and enjoys an infinite beatitude; con
sequently sadness, anger, and repentance are not to be
predicated of Him except in a metaphorical sense.

190. There are three principal kinds of life in
this world : vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual.
Vegetative life is carried on by the processes of
nutrition, growth, and reproduction.

Sensitive life manifests itself in organic percep
tion, imagination, organic instinct and craving, and
in locomotion.

Intellectual life consists in acts of understanding
and will.

As is proved in Psychology, plants have only
vegetative life, brutes vegetative and sensitive but

3i4 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

not intellectual life, whilst man unites in himself
all three lives. God cannot have vegetative and
sensitive life, for these involve a material organism,
and God is a pure Spirit. But He must have
intellectual life, which does not involve any essential
dependence on matter, and is a pure perfection.
His life is therefore essentially intellectual ; and as
His intellect and volition are infinitely perfect, He
must be said to live an infinitely perfect life.

191. Even without the light of Revelation we
can understand that the life of God must be
infinitely blissful, a state of supreme beatitude.
Beatitude is defined in scholastic language as the
bonum perfectum intellectiialis naturce, i.e., the fulness
of everything really desirable to a rational being.
Such a being has a natural longing for truth. Con
sequently, beatitude must attend the full possession
of truth. This full possession is to be found in
God, and in God alone. From this it follows that
beatitude is greater in proportion as the union writh
God through knowledge and love increases. But
God comprehends Himself with absolutely perfect
knowledge, and has an infinite love for His own
infinite goodness. He is therefore infinitely happy
in virtue of His infinitely perfect life.

As He is unchangeable, so His beatitude can
undergo no change. Neither the material universe,
with its countless beauties and wonders showing forth
everywhere traces of God's power, wisdom, and
bounty, nor the world of created spirits, reflecting in
legions of incorruptible beings the image of the Divine
Majesty, nor the blessed in Heaven, praising their

THE DIVINE WILL. 315

Creator day and night, nor the just on earth serving
Him under trials and temptations, can augment His
beatitude in the least. Nor does the rebellion of
Lucifer and his wicked band, the indifference and
ingratitude of mortals, the never-ceasing obstinacy
of the damned in Hell, mar in any way the happiness
of Him whose essence is the centre and the only
source of all happiness. He is the Lord who
embraces His servants with a care and love in
finitely more pure and generous than that of the
tenderest mother, but without anxiety and sorrow.
His Justice sentences the impenitent to everlasting
misery, but without anger and excitement, and without
wishing them evil as evil, out of love to the order
demanded by His infinite Wisdom. " He was," to
use the words of Cardinal Newman, " from eternity
ever in action, though ever at rest ; ever surely in
rest and peace, profound and ineffable : yet with
a living present mind, self-possessed, and all-con
scious, comprehending Himself and sustaining the
comprehension. He rested ever, but He rested in
Himself; His own resource, His own end, His
own contemplation, His own blessedness."8

192. It is then evident that no affection of will
implying want of perfect peace and serenity of mind
is compatible with the infinitely blissful state proper
to the Divine Existence. Sadness, therefore, espe
cially that sort of sadness called envy, which finds
a reason for grief in the prosperity of others, and
which by the heathens of old was attributed to their
false gods, is altogether alien to the Divine Nature.

8 Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations, p. 289. (Seventh Edit.)

3i6 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

It follows from this also that anger and repentance,
which have their root in some sadness, cannot be
predicated of God properly.

Notwithstanding all this, there is a deep truth
in the Scriptural expressions by which on certain
occasions sadness, anger, and repentance are attri
buted to God. But they must be explained as
metaphors, as Catholic Doctors have always explained
them.9

God is said to be angry, because He decrees to
inflict penalties on sinners ; and thus deals with
them as a king on earth might deal with a subject
who had provoked his anger. But while the earthly
potentate may be really angry, and act out of
passion, God is neither liable to the passion of
anger, nor can He inflict punishment for the sole
object of causing pain. He does not punish save
for justice' sake, and that in absolute calmness.
Infinite, therefore, is the difference between what
is metaphorically called the anger of God, and what
is really the anger of man. The one resembles the
other, not in its essence, but in its effects.

The same holds good of repentance, attributed
to God metaphorically, and existing in man really.
Repentance taken in its proper meaning is essen
tially sorrow and dissatisfaction arising from the con
sciousness of having done something evil, or omitted
something good which should have been done. Such
sorrow cannot be genuine, unless it includes the
wish and resolution to undo the past mistake as
much as possible. This purpose of following another

9 Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gcntes, i. 89, and 91. § " Sciendum tamen."

THE DIVINE WILL. 317

line of action for the time to come is marked by
special firmness and determination in the case of
true repentance. For this reason the term "repent
ance " is a very apt metaphorical expression, to
signify that God in virtue of His eternal decrees
will henceforth either withdraw certain blessings
and inflict certain penalties on account of the sins
of men, or will cease to punish and pour out
favours in consideration for sinners being sincerely
converted to Him. In the former sense repentance
is attributed to God in the Book of Genesis:10 "It
repented Him that He had made man." This
phrase means that God foreseeing the spread of
vice among the contemporaries of Noe, had decreed
from eternity to destroy them off the face of the
earth. The same term is used also to denote God's
eternal decree to stay the infliction of penalties,
on condition of true conversion. Thus God orders
the Prophet Jeremias to speak to the cities of Juda,
all the words which He had commanded him : " If
so be they will hearken and be converted every one
from his evil way, that I may repent Me of the evil
that I think to do unto them for the wickedness
of their doings."11

There are in Scripture other terms applied to
God which signify disgust and sadness at the doings
of others. This language metaphorically denotes
the extreme hatred that the Divine will bears to
sin, especially to those sins which are committed
after the reception of special favours, or which imply
want of faith and confidence in the word of God.

10 Genesis vi. 6. n Jeremias xxvi. 3.

3i 8 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

Thus we read in reference to the ingratitude of the
chosen people : " In those days the Lord began to
be weary of Israel."12 The want of faith in the
unbelieving King Achaz, the representative of the
house of David, calls down the reproach : " O house
of David, is it a small thing for you to be grievous
to men, that you are grievous to my God also ? "13

So long as men remain sensitive-rational beings
— they will continue thus to express spiritual truths
in metaphorical language. And the more they con
template the infinite perfection of the Creator of
matter and spirit, and the more their heart is set
on fire with love for " the First Author of beauty,"14
the more impressively will they speak of Him in
language rich with imagery. Those who at once
suspect anthropomorphism when they hear the lan
guage of metaphor used of the First Cause, are as
unreasonable as he would be who should accuse
men of anthropomorphizing nature when they seek
a shelter against the rage of a snowstorm, protect
the sensitiveness of a delicate instrument, disport
themselves in the smiling meadows, or watch the
sun sinking to his couch.

12 4 Kings x. 32. J3 Isaias vii. 13.

14 Cf. Wisdom xiii. 3.

CHAPTER VI.

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD.

Thesis XXXII. — God is able by the infinite efficacy
of His will to effect whatever is not intrinsically im
possible ; wherefore He is all-powerful or omnipotent.

193. Power is ability to effect. In created agents
there is no ability to effect anything beyond changes
in things that are already existing in virtue of God's
creative act, as we have proved in Book I. Even
this power of producing changes in already existing
things is in many ways imperfect, as creatures
possess it. In inanimate matter, plants and dumb
animals, the power is exercised without the agent
being able to control it. The magnet has no choice,
but must communicate its mysterious power to the
iron that comes near it ; the oak-tree of necessity
pushes its roots beneath the earth to obtain nourish
ment ; nor can the dog help running to the food
that tempts his appetite, or turning against another
animal which has provoked his anger. It is evident
that such blind power is essentially defective, and
therefore altogether inconceivable in God.

Let us now turn to the consideration of the
power of man. In him, as in the lower animals,

320 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

there are material forces, vital power, sensitive
perception, animal instinct, and the faculty of loco
motion. But in him there is, besides all this,
intellect and free-will ; and in virtue of the intel
lectual life sustained by these two faculties, he has
the power of producing an effect freely chosen. He
alone therefore among all beings of the visible world
has a power which can properly be predicated of
God. No production of any effect can be a mani
festation of pure perfection, unless it be controlled
by free-will. Yet not all production thus controlled,
when considered in the concrete, is pure perfection.
It is enough to glance at the exercise of man's
power in order to see the truth of this statement.
Man has the power of choice and of carrying out
what he has chosen, only on certain conditions
independent of his free-will. There is, moreover,
in him a real distinction between the faculty of
choosing and the faculty of carrying out the effect
chosen. The former resides in his will, the latter
in the faculties subject to the rule of his will. If he
chooses something for which these faculties are
unfit, his faculty of choice is not borne out by the
faculty of execution, as in the case of a paralytic
resolving to walk. In this case choice is not only
distinct from execution, but is altogether divorced
from it. Choice thus void of efficiency is not power.
That power alone is absolute perfection which
essentially involves at once the faculty of choosing
and the faculty of carrying out the choice : and this
is the exclusive privilege of the power of God. God
is essentially Free-will in His relation to everything

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD. 321

distinct from His own unchangeable essence. What
ever He chooses to effect, that He carries out by
the efficacy of His will. " Power," says St. Thomas,
" is not attributed to God as something really
different from His knowledge and will, but as
something expressed by a diffeVent idea ; as power
means the principle which carries out the command
of the will and the advice of the intellect. These
three (viz., intellect, will, power), coincide with one
another in God."1

194. The power of God, being absolutely perfect
and really one with His intellect and will, and con
sequently with the simple, infinite, Divine essence,
must be infinite ; that is to say, it must suffice of
itself to produce whatever is not intrinsically im
possible. Hence it follows that God can, by His
will alone, produce things out of nothing. This
truth we have proved in Book I., by showing that
no other hypothesis than that of creation can
account for the origin of matter and mind, in
accordance with the nature of God and of material
and spiritual things. The explanation just now
given of God's power, and of its identity with His
will, is calculated not only to bear out the fact of
creation, but also to show how the possibility of
creation is necessarily attached to the essence
of God.

1 " Potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens ab scientia
et voluntate secundum rem sed solum secundum rationem, in
quantum scilicet potentia importat rationem principii exequentis
id quod voluntas imperat et ad quod scientia dirigit ; quse tria,
Deo secundum idem conveniunt." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 25.
art. i. ad 4.)

322 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

It further follows that the range of Divine power
infinitely surpasses its actual productions. These
are regulated by irrevocable eternal decrees. Once
such decrees are made by Him, God can apply His
power only in agreement with their import.

Therefore we have to distinguish between the
absolute and the regulated power of God (potentia Dei
absoluta et ordinata). By His absolute power He
can do everything which is not intrinsically re
pugnant. By His power, however, as ruled by His
decrees, or by His regulated power, He cannot
carry out anything but that which He has decreed.
Thus, for instance, God has the absolute power
to preserve man altogether from death : but He
cannot do so in the present order, because He
has decreed otherwise. To express this techni
cally, scholastics say : God can preserve man from
death, potentia absoluta ; He cannot do so potentia
ordinata.

195. Against the omnipotence of God thus ex
plained the following difficulties are often raised.

(i) God cannot commit a sin. But the com
mission of a sin is something intrinsically possible.
Therefore God cannot do everything intrinsically
possible.

Answer. In answering this difficulty we have first
to remark that the essence of sin does not consist
in the production of an effect, but in the opposition
of free-will to the eternal law of God. If a sin
carries an effect with it, as in the case of blasphemy,
theft, murder, and other crimes, such an effect is
sinful only inasmuch as it is brought about by the

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD. 323

abuse of moral freedom to the neglect of the Divine
law. Sin therefore is intrinsically possible only in
a being whose will can neglect the law of God, and
whose faculties can be used in opposition to that
law. »

But the will of God cannot be opposed to the
law of God, because that law considered under its
subjective aspect is really identical with the act of
the Divine will. Nor can any Divine faculty be
used in opposition to the Divine law, because none
is really distinct from its source, the unchangeable
Divine essence. Although, therefore, sin in a
created being is intrinsically possible, yet the pro
position, " God can sin," is intrinsically contra
dictory. Nor can it be said that this intrinsic
repugnance between the nature of God and« the
nature of sin implies any defect of power in God.
It would do so indeed, if sin considered precisely as
sin consisted in the production of something really
distinct from the free self-determination of the will to
neglect a line of thinking, judging, desiring, acting,
sufficiently manifested by the voice of conscience as
prescribed by the Creator. The perfection under
lying the action of self-determination is the faculty
of free-will ; and this faculty, of course, is in God
formally and eminently. The action of self-determi
nation itself, as we have repeatedly remarked, is
not a production of any reality distinct from the
free choice of the will, but it is the will itself,
inasmuch as it approves, or rejects, or neglects an
object presented by the understanding as eligible.
When a being endowed with free-will and capable

324 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

of sinning, enjoys the use of its freedom, it does not
want more power to commit sin than to abstain
from sin, but its power in that state suffices for
either of the two alternatives. On the other hand,
the ability to commit sin involves liability to be
overcome by false, unreasonable motives, and this
liability is rather weakness and imperfection than
power and perfection. Consequently, if God could
commit sin, he would not possess more active
physical power, but would be exposed to moral
weakness.

(2) God can produce no other God. But if His
power were infinite, He should be able to do so ;
because infinite power must suffice for the produc
tion of an infinite Being.

Answer. As we have seen in Book I., it is re
pugnant to the nature of a self-existing being that
it should exist in several separate individuals.

Hence another God is something intrinsically
impossible. Infinite power, precisely because it is
infinite, cannot be fully manifested, whether in a
particular effect or in a series of effects ; it is essen
tially inexhaustible power.

For this reason it also excludes the possibility
not only of another God, but even of an absolutely
best world or best creaturet as we have explained in
Book I. chap. iv.

CHAPTER VII.

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD.

Thesis XXXIII. — The metaphysical essence of God,
or that Divine attribute by which the human intellect
must principally distinguish Him from all created beings,
is the attribute of self -existence. In other words, God is
best defined by saying that He is the self-existing Being,
or "He who is." Consequently, the transcendental
attributes, "Truth," "Goodness," "Beauty," belong most
properly to God, who is to be called the first and supreme
Truth, the first and supreme Goodness, the first and
supreme Beauty.

196. The essence of a created thing is that in
virtue of which it is what it is (id quo res est id quod
est), or that which constitutes its inmost being, and
without which it could not possibly be what it is
said to be. Using the term in a wider sense, we
apply it not only to natural substances, but also
to artificial things, to accidental determinations of
substances, and even to defects. Thus we speak of
the essence of a machine, of the essence of colour,
of the essence of a disease, of sin, &c. But primarily
the word " essence " is used of natural substances.

Under this aspect of the meaning of " essence"

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

a distinction is to be drawn between the essence of
a thing as existing and as conceived by a human
intellect.

There are in the order of existence as many
essences as there are different substances ; for each
particular substance has its peculiar being, and is
in virtue thereof one particular substance and no
other. As St. Thomas expresses it : Esse proprium
cujuslibet rei est tantum unum — "The proper being
of each thing is only one."1

If a particular individual thing could be con
ceived by us adequately and according to its proper
being, our knowledge of its essence would be
complete ; in other words, we should have grasped
what some among modern scholastics call the
physical essence of the thing.2

But no substance is fully known by us according
to the inmost constitution of its being. Conse
quently of none do we know exactly its physical
essence. Such distinction as we are able to draw
between one individual thing and another, is based
upon a difference of accidental determinations, or
individual marks (note individnantes) . Thus we tell
one man from another by his figure, gait, size,
countenance, voice, &c.

The essence of created things as conceived by us
does not contain all, but only some of the realities
of which its physical essence is made up, to wit,

1 Contra Gcntes, i. c. 42.

Cf. Grand-Claude, Breviarium Philosophic, ii. n. 355. What
here is called physical essence corresponds in natural substances to
the esse of St. Thomas as distinguished from essentia.

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 327

such as are found in other things of a similar,
though not really the same, physical essence.

Conceiving for instance the essence of an indi
vidual man as a sensitive rational being, I conceive
it in no way adequately as jt is existing, but only
inadequately according to those notes which I
conceive as obtaining in all individual men. These
individuals differ from one another precisely in virtue
of their different physical essences, whilst at the same
time they resemble one another on account of
the similarity of those essences. The notes which
form the basis of such a resemblance constitute
the metaphysical essence of each member of the
group.

The metaphysical essence is consequently an
inadequate mental expression of the physical essence
of a thing. That expression may be of various
shades of perfection. It may express only the remote
genus to which a thing belongs, or its proximate
genus only, or its proximate genus together with the
specific difference, by which the lowest species of
which it is a member, differs from other species.
Thus I express the metaphysical essence of my
friend very inadequately by saying that he is a
substance, more to the point by giving him the name
of living being, still better by affirming that he is an
animal, and best of all by declaring that he is a
rational animal.

What we have said about physical and meta
physical essence, is based upon the doctrine laid
down by logicians that the universal as such has
no existence, but exists only inasmuch as it is

328 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

realized in particular things resembling one another.
Hence it is readily understood that the metaphysical
essence of a created thing is a true but imperfect
mental delineation of the physical essence ; and that
consequently the distinction between metaphysical
and physical essence, in so far as both are verified in
one individual thing, is not a distinction existing as
such objectively, but in thought only. Yet as it is
based upon the objective similarity of physical
essences, it is not a mere fiction, but founded on a
real fact.

The limitations of the human intellect prevent
our having any more accurate conception of the
essence of a created being than is obtained by
putting together those notes which constitute its
lowest species. We say accordingly that we know
the essence of a thing, when we are able to express
the realities intelligible in each member of its lowest
species. For the same reason the definition of a
thing is supposed sufficiently to express its essence,
when it gives a good account of its specific nature,
as is done by indicating the proximate genus and
the specific difference of that. nature. Here then
the old principle of St. Thomas is verified, that
our way of speaking imitates the inadequacy of our
conceptions. Although the metaphysical essence of
a thing expresses its real physical essence but very
imperfectly, yet it is simply called "essence."
"Essence or nature," says St. Thomas, "comprises
only those notes of a thing which fall under the
definition of a species, as for instance humanity
comprises only those notes which are contained

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 329

in the definition of man ; for by these man is
man."3

" Essence is properly that which is signified by
a definition. But a definition comprises only the
constituents of a species, not those of an indi
vidual."4

"The essence of each thing is that which is
signified by its definition." 5

197. These remarks about "essence" may suffice
to explain the sense in which Catholic philosophers
speak of the Divine Essence. Sometimes they use
the term to express what would correspond to the
physical essence of creatures. We meet for instance
with passages like the following : " Although the
existence of God and some of His attributes are
knowable, yet His Essence cannot be known by
us, so long as we are in this life." In such phrases
" Essence " means the Being of God as it is in itself.
Thus considered, it is hidden from our direct and
immediate intuition. Our natural knowledge about
it is altogether inferential, analogical, and inade
quate. And, indeed, so it must be. Experience
testifies that we are unable to grasp adequately the
physical essence of even the meanest of creatures.
How then shall we fathom that of the Creator ?

3 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 3. art. 3. in corp. "Essentia
vel natura comprehendit ilia tantum quae cadunt in definitione
specie! ; sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in
definitione hominis; his enim homo est homo."

4 " Essentia proprie est id quod significatur per definitionem.
Definitio autem complectitur speciei principia, non autem principia
individualia." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. 29. 2. ad 3.)

5 " Essentia enim uniuscuj usque rei est illud quod significat
definitio ejus." (Compendium Theol. c. x.)

33o THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES,

The question then arises : Is there among the
attributes of God any one attribute that may
rightly be called His metaphysical Essence ? This
attribute, if such there be, must distinguish God
from all species of finite beings after the manner
in which the metaphysical essence of creatures
of a certain species distinguishes them from those
of another species of the same proximate genus.
And as the metaphysical essence of a creature is
for our intellect the root of its specific properties,
so the metaphysical essence of God should furnish
a foundation for our mind to construct thereupon
in systematic order the rest of the Divine attri
butes.

To this question different answers have been
given by different schoolmen. Scotus thought that
the attribute of infinity was aptly called the Essence
of God ; Billuart held that the Divine intelligence,
inasmuch as it is self-existing, deserved that name.

Neither of these two opinions satisfies the expla
nation of metaphysical essence given above. To
human reason, unaided by revelation, infinity is not
the root of all the attributes of God.; for we cannot
understand why God must be infinite, before we
have understood that He is self-existent and one.6
Nor again is the attribute of intelligence, con
sidered as self-existent, the starting-point from
which our intellect proceeds in order to establish
the rest of the Divine attributes. Moreover, this
attribute of intelligence contains more than is
necessary to distinguish God from all creatures.

6 Cf. Bk. I. p. ioo.

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 331

For this purpose it is not requisite to affirm that
He is a self-existent Intelligence ; it is enough to
say that He is self-existent ; for a self-existent being
must be infinitely intelligent, as our previous argu
ments have shown.

It is then in the attribute *of self-existence alone
that we find these properties which make a Divine
attribute correspond to what we call in creatures
metaphysical essence. In this attribute there is ex
pressed as well that which is (analogically) common
to God and to creatures, as also that by which He
is distinguished from them all. God exists really
and creatures exist really. God has His proper being,
or, rather is it, and so has every creature its proper
being. Inasmuch therefore as " being," conceived
in the highest possible abstraction, means nothing
more than opposition to nothingness, we say truly :
God is and the creature is. Yet the Divine being
and the created being differ infinitely from one
another in that the former is independent, the latter
dependent; the former uncaused, the latter caused;
the former has all things of itself, the latter has
absolutely nothing of itself, but is itself an effect
produced out of nothing according to a preconceived
idea derived from the Divine essence. This infinite
difference is indicated by saying, that God not only
is, but is of Himself, in virtue of His own essence ;
in a word, He is self-existent. From this concept
of self-existence we have unfolded the unity and
infinity of God and established rules for determi
ning whether any given created perfection is to be
affirmed or denied of the Creator and in what

332 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

sense.7 Following these rules we found the chief
negative and positive attributes of God, as ex
pounded in the six previous chapters of this Book.

Self-existence is consequently, for a logically
reasoning human intellect, not merely a distinctive
excellence of the Divinity, it is the one fundamental
excellence from which all others are to be explained.
Therefore it deserves the name of Divine Essence.

198. The only objection worthy of consideration
against this view is this, that self-existence does
not sufficiently mark off the one true God from the
fictitious deity of pantheists and the uncreated
atoms of materialists. It would seem that mono-
theists, pantheists, and materialists agree with one
another perfectly in that they suppose a self-existent
source of all being. Monotheists believe in a self-
existent personal and infinite God, who created all
things other than Himself out of nothing by His
omnipotent will. Pantheists, at least our modern
Spinozists and Hegelians, assume a self-existent
substance or idea developing into various spiritual
and material things as so many modes or determi
nations of its proper being. Materialists imagine
self-existent atoms driven by inexplicable laws to
evolve out of their innermost potentiality life and
sense and reason.

If then self-existence is predicated both of
fictitious first causes and of the one true First
Cause, how can we say that it expresses the essence
of God ?

To understand fully the answer to this question,

7 See the rules laid down in Bk. I. pp. 101, seq.

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 333

the reader must bear in mind what has been proved
in Book I. chap. iv. against the pantheistic and
materialistic hypothesis. It has been shown there8
that both the self-existent and self-evolving deity
of pantheists, and the self-existent atoms assumed
by materialists, are intrinsically absurd. Now defi
nitions are not made to distinguish the thing
defined from intrinsic absurdities, but to point out
its difference from realities. The definition of God
must therefore contain that by which God is clearly
and primarily distinguished from all real things that
are not God. And from all these He is clearly and
primarily distinguished by the definition : God is the
self-existent being. If, therefore, according to the
common way of speaking, the essence of a thing is
the import of its definition, self-existence must be
the essence of God.

The truth underlying the difficulty which we
have solved amounts to this, that the phrase, God is
the self-existing being, is not a definition, which in an
age like our own should be put forward without
proper explanation. Yet this does not prevent it
from being a good definition in itself. All definitions
need explaining according to the circumstances of
those to whom they are propounded.

199. Comparing the definition given with the name
under which God revealed Himself to Moses : " /
am who am. . . . Thus shalt thou say to the children
of Israel : He who is hath sent me to you ; " 9 we
see that the phrase, He who is, is identical in meaning
with the self-existent being. The term, " self-existent

8 Bk. I. c. iv. § 78, seq. and §§ 93, seq. 9 Exodus iii. 14.

334 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

being," denotes that actual essence which alone is in
capable of being rightly conceived otherwise than as
existing in itself. Every other actual essence can be
conceived as not existing in itself, as a mere term
of the Divine intellect, a purely possible imitation
of the Divine essence. But this is exactly what is
meant by the Scriptural phrase, " He who is." God
is accurately defined to be the self-existent being, ipsum
esse in se subsistens,10 and He is equally well defined,
He who is, Qui est.

For the appropriateness of this name revealed
by God Himself, St. Thomas11 gives three reasons.

(1) This name suggests to us that God is not
a being made according to a preconceived eternal
idea, but a necessarily existing essence.12

(2) This name, as it is of the widest universality,
does not, like other names, such as Mighty, Wise,
Just, connote a certain class or classes of beings.
Consequently, when used with emphasis as the
proper name of the Divine Being, it suggests to us
that that Being is not limited in His perfection to
the reality conceivable in one or more genera of
finite things, but unites in Himself eminently what
ever outside Himself can be conceived as being, in
opposition to privation or defect.13

10 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. IE. q. 4. art. ii. in corp.

11 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 13. art. xi. in corp.

12 " Primum quidem propter sui significationem. Non enim sig-
nificat formam aliquam sed ipsum esse," &c.

ia " Secundo propter ejus universalitatem. . . . Quolibet enim
alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei ; sed hoc
nomen Qui est nullum modum esscndi determinat, sed se habet
indeterminate ad omnes, et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantial
infinitum."

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 335

(3) The name He who is, as it contains the
substantive verb to be in the present tense, connotes
the essence of God to be unalterable eternity, an
unchangeable standing "now" in the midst of tran
sitory created existences.14

200. The metaphysical ess'ence of God naturally
suggests His three transcendental attributes : Truth,
Goodness, Beauty. We call them transcendental,
because they transcend all the genera and classi
fication of substances inasmuch as they are not
properties of a certain class or classes of substances,
but are, to a certain extent, verified in every creature.
They express the perfection of all being whatsoever,
as bearing certain relations to intellect and will.15

Every being, in so far as it is conceivable as a
positive reality, is true; in so far as its perfection
is matter of approval or desire to a rational will,
it is good; and in so far as its perfection involves an
excellence which the intellect cannot contemplate
without the will, if duly disposed, being moved to
a certain complacency and delight, it is beautiful.16

As then God unites in His self-existent essence
all conceivable perfections, He must stand in such a
relation to every intellect and will as to deserve in a

14 "Tertio vero ex ejus consignificatione. . . . Significat enim esse
in praesenti ; et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cujus esse non
novit praeteritum vel futurum."

15 This is the original meaning of the word "transcendental,"
as it was employed for centuries by scholastic philosophers. Since
Kant it has been employed with another meaning in quite a
different connection. According to Kant, the transcendental is
what surpasses our experience.

16 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 5. art. 4. ad i.

336

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

most proper sense the denominations of Truth,
Goodness, Beauty. A short explanation and proof
of this will aptly conclude this chapter.

201. (i) Truth. We must distinguish objective
truth, intellectual truth, moral truth. A thing is
objectively or essentially true, in so far as it deserves
the name of thing, and is not a mere chimera.
Every conceivable possible or actual substance is
consequently objectively true. Besides this properly
transcendental meaning of truth, there are two
other senses in which truth is found only in
rational beings. A rational being apprehending
and judging a thing in harmony with its possible
or actual existence, and not confounding the one
with the other, has formal or intellectual truth ; its
intellect is formally or intellectually true. Intellectual
or formal truth is the conformity of the knowing
intellect with the object known (adaequatio intellectus
cum re).

A rational being when it addresses itself to
other minds by speech or equivalent modes of ex
pression, is said to be truthful or not according as it
manifests or not what it takes to be objective truth.
This sort of truth or truthfulness is generally called
moral truth. The speaker is under a moral obli
gation to be truthful in this manner.

In each of these three meanings truth is proper
to God without limit. He is infinitely perfect objective
Truth; for He is not only a really conceivable Being,
but He is the only Being the acknowledgment of
whom explains all realities, as He is the principle
of all possible being and the First Cause of all

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 337

actual being outside Himself. Being possessed of
an infinite intellect, which is really identical with
His essence, He is the first intellectual Truth, not
liable either to the shadows of ignorance or to the
depravations of error. Moreover it has been proved
in our exposition of His moral attributes that His
veracity and faithfulness are absolutely perfect.
Each revelation He makes is therefore morally true ;
and as the manifestation of infinitely perfect wisdom,
altogether infallible.

202. (2) Goodness is distinguished as absolute
and relative. Absolute goodness is the perfection
of a being, in so far as it cannot be considered
in itself without eliciting the approval of a rational
and righteous will. Relative goodness is the per
fection of a being, considered in its aptitude to
satisfy the natural tendencies of other beings.

From these definitions it appears easily that God
is supreme goodness both absolute and relative. He
is supreme absolute goodness by virtue of His infinitely
perfect essence, which contains without any defect
everything worthy of approval and love. He is
supreme relative goodness, for, as we shall see in
Book III., no creature can reach the goal of its
existence unless it be preserved and directed by
Him, who alone is the First Cause of its goodness;
and, as we see in Ethics, no rational being can find
the happiness for which it has been made, save
through union with Him by perfect knowledge and
love. Nay, just as being, when taken as a necessary
attribute, cannot be predicated except of God, so
goodness is predicable with absolute necessity of God
w

338 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

alone. In this sense our Saviour said, " None is
good but God alone." 17

St. Thomas gives a fuller explanation of this
truth in the following words : " God alone is good
by His essence. For the goodness of everything is
based upon its perfection. Now there is a three
fold perfection of a thing to be distinguished. The
first is that which constitutes its existence. To this
a second perfection is added, in that the thing
existing receives some accidental qualities necessary
for its perfect operation. Its third perfection con
sists in attaining something outside itself as the end
of its existence. . . . But of these three perfections
none belongs to any creature in virtue of its essence.
God alone possesses them in this way. Indeed of
Him alone can it be said that His essence is His
existence ; He alone cannot receive accidental quali
ties, but possesses as identical with His essence
what is predicated of others accidentally — for
instance, power, wisdom, &c. He also has no end
to reach, but is Himself the end of all things. It
is consequently evident that God alone is essentially
perfect in every respect, which is tantamount to
saying that He alone is good in virtue of His
essence." 18

17 St. Luke xviii. 19.

18 " Solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque
enim dicitur bonum secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio
autem alicujus rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in
suo esse constituitur ; secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia
superadduntur ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria ; tertia
vero perfectio alicujus est per hoc quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut
tinem. . . . Haic autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 339

In the following article the Angelic Doctor ex
plains thus the relation of God's goodness to that
of creatures : " Everything is said to be good in
virtue of the Divine goodness, inasmuch as this is
the prototype, the first efficient cause and last end
of whatever is good. Nevertheless everything is
good in itself, in so far as it is a sort of copy of
the Divine Being, from the resemblance to which
it is formally denominated good. Thus under one
aspect there is one goodness of all, under another
aspect there are, if we may say so, many good
nesses."19

Note. — Goodness in a more limited sense signifies
reasonable benevolence. That this must be pre
dicated of God in regard to His rational creatures
we have proved when treating of the moral attri
butes.'20

2°3- (3) Beauty is the inseparable companion of
perfect goodness. By the beautiful we mean that
which, when intellectually perceived, excites by its

secundum suam essentiam, sed soli Deo, cujus solius essentia est
suum esse, et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia ; sed quae de aliis
dicuntur accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse poten-
tem, sapientem, et alia hujusmodi ; ipse etiam ad nihil aliud
ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum.
Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfec-
tionem secundum suam essentiam ; et ideo ipse solus est bonus per
suam essentiam." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. i. q. 6. a. 3.

19 " Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo
principio exemplari, effective et final! totius bonitatis. Nihilominus
tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis
sibi inhxrente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas, denominans ipsum.
Et sic est bonitas una omnium, et etiam multae bonitates." (Ibid.
a. 4. c. fin.)

20 Cf. Bk. II. c. v. sect. 2, § 186.

34o THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

mere contemplation feelings of satisfaction and
delight in the well-disposed will. This idea is
happily expressed in the old saying, Fulcrum est
splendor vert — " Beauty is the lustre of truth."

The description given applies equally to a beau
tiful edifice, a beautiful statue, a beautiful sermon,
a beautiful saying, beautiful music, and to a beau
tiful idea, a beautiful way of acting, a beautiful
character, a beautiful soul.21 As our intellect in
this life can have no direct intuition but of sensible
things, it is impossible for mortal men to con
template beauty intuitively unless it appears under
sensible forms. Yet its essence is in no way
sensible, but purely intellectual. The most essential
note of beauty in corporeal things is proportion of
parts to a whole and to one another. Now pro
portion as such is evidently an object not of sense-
perception, but of intellectual apprehension, whether
it exists in the region of colour or of sound or of
ideas, in the harmony of the animal body, limb with
limb, or in the fitness of moral action to the rational
nature of the doer. It follows from this that a
brute beast, although it may have an attraction for
bright colour, has no true taste for beauty ; and that
the ability of a man to judge of its presence or
absence increases with the power of his intellect
to strike a comparison between phenomenal appear
ance and ideal type. Pulchra dicuntur quce visa
placent,22 says St. Thomas. "Things beautiful are

21 Cf. Goethe's Aus den Bekcnntnissen einer schonen Seek.

22 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. za. q. 5. art. 4. ad i. From the
context it appears clearly that it is not the intention of the Angelic

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 341

those of which the mental intuition causes delight."
The more comprehensive the mental intuition of
the beautiful, the greater is the spiritual delight
produced by it. Things of which we can have no
direct intuition are to be judged beautiful if it can
be shown that on the supposition of immediate con
templation spiritual satisfaction would naturally
arise. This being so, God must be infinitely
beautiful. In the section on Divine Life 23 we
draw the conclusion that the comprehensive know
ledge which God has of this His perfection neces
sarily involves in Him a state of infinite happiness.
How much more must this infinite perfection of
the Creator suffice to make finite minds happy
if they are allowed to behold it. As God is
the final end of man, even the knowledge of Him
as He is reflected in the mirror of creatures
would, as is proved in Ethics, become so perfect in
our final state as to cause in us a perfect natural
happiness, supposing us not to have been raised to
a supernatural state, nor ever to have forfeited the
attainment of our last end by sin not pardoned.
Indeed, the millions of infants who die without
baptism every year will rejoice throughout eternity
over the Divine beauty as it is reflected in creation.
Yet their knowledge of God and the happiness
resulting from it cannot be compared with what
Christian faith leads us to live and to long for. By

Doctor to confine the province of the beautiful to things visible by
the eyes of the body. He says expressly, " Fulcrum et bonum in
subjecto quidem sunt idem . . . sed ratione differunt."
-3 Bk. II. c. v. sect. 3, § 191.

342 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

this faith we are certain that all those who believe
in the Word made Flesh with that living faith which
works through charity are children of God by
adoption. As such they are destined to see God
face to face, and to find a torrent of delight in the
vision of His eternal and unchangeable beauty. The
hope of coming to the enjoyment of this beauty of
beauties has guided and strengthened the Apostles
and martyrs of all ages in the midst of persecutions
and torments. They reckoned with St. Paul " that
the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be com
pared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed
in us," 24 when we shall see " the Blessed and only
Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who
only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light in
accessible " 25 to the intuition of mortals. The same
hope forms even at the end of our materialistic
nineteenth century an inexhaustible source of con
solation for millions of Christians, who experience
in the practice of Christianity the fulfilment of the
Divine promise : " He shall know of the doctrine
whether it be of God." 26 It is they who truly can
rejoice in the thought of their Creator even here on
earth, whilst His essence is not seen by them. If
all around seems dark, in Him they find light. If
everything else be lost, in Him they recover it
abundantly. " Wearied with the never-ceasing din
of the world, wearied with the monotonous bustle of
commerce and of trade, wearied with the hollow
pretensions, the duplicity, the jealousies of political

24 Romans viii. 18. 25 j xim. vi. 15, 16.

vc St. John vii. 17.

THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD. 343

parties, wearied yet more with the trivialities of
social intercourse, and with the solemn littlenesses
of individual self-assertion as it jostles its way among
the crowd to gain its own wretched hillock — what a
joy and consolation to pass by contemplation (if
only for an hour) into the bosotn of our ever-tranquil
God." 27 It was during an hour of this sublimest
of all contemplations that St. Augustine exclaimed :
" Too late I loved Thee, O Thou, Beauty of ancient
days, yet ever new ! too late I loved Thee." 28

27 Harper, Sermon on Spiritual Life, p. i.

28 " Sero te amavi, pulchritude tarn antiqua et tarn nova, sero te
amavi." (St. Aug. Conf. x. 27.)

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

BOOK III.
THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

PROLEGOMENA.

CONNECTION OF THIS BOOK WITH THE TWO
PRECEDING.

204. IN Book I. we showed that the visible universe
and the minds of men are indebted for their origin
to one personal infinitely perfect God, who created
matter and mind by the potency of a sheer exercise
of volition. Thus the Christian idea of God is
justified before the tribunal of reason under a two
fold aspect ; for it became evident that logical
reasoning from the deliverance of our senses and
consciousness leads to the acknowledgment of what
Christian monotheists believe both about the funda
mental attributes of God and about His fundamental
relation to this world as Creator of all things.

A fuller explanation and defence of the truths
implicitly contained in the most fundamental attri-

PROLEGOMENA. 345

butes of God (His self-existence, unity, simplicity;
infinity), formed the subject-matter of Book II.
During the course of it we saw first that the infinite
Divine Being is placed above all internal changes
by His immutability, above all limits of duration by
His eternity, beyond all boundaries of space by His
immensity. From these three negative attributes
we passed on to the consideration of the intellect
and the will of God, those two positive attributes
which constitute the Divine life. It appeared clearly
that the Creator with an all-comprehensive intel
lectual grasp comprehends both the infinite depths of
His Divinity, and the innumerable multitude of finite
beings, possibilities that shall never turn to actual
ities, and also the whole of past, present, and future
existences, including even the future free volitions
of rational creatures. Next it was proved that God,
knowing that He is infinitely perfect, must love
Himself with absolute necessity, whilst He is free
to grant or not to grant existence to things distinct
from His essence. It was then shown that the
exercise of Divine freedom must be one eternal
irrevocable choice, and reasons were given for the
compatibility of such a choice with the unchange
able state of the Divine Nature. Having after that
expounded the holiness of God and the chief moral
attributes comprised in it (benevolence, mercy, justice,
veracity, and fidelity), we concluded the treatise on
the intellectual life of God by demonstrating that
He not only lives in the most proper sense of the
word, but lives also an infinitely happy life.

From the consideration of the internal perfection

346 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

of the Divine will we next proceeded to weigh its
relation to possible finite beings, and arrived at the
conclusion that under this aspect Divine volition
implies infinite power, or omnipotence. The par
ticular attributes of God thus established were in
the last chapter of Book II. compared with one
another; and it was found that the most funda
mental of them all for the purposes of human
thought, is the attribute of self-existence ; that this
attribute therefore deserves the appellation of
" Divine Essence ; " and that the name most appro
priate to the Creator in opposition to His creatures
is that revealed by Himself, " Jahveh," or " He who
is." The fulness of being implicitly signified by this
name led to the final conclusion, that God stands
in such a relation to every competent and well-
disposed intellect and will as to be, in the most
proper sense of the term, supreme truth, supreme
goodness, supreme beauty.

The reader sees from this short recapitulation
that the whole of Book II. aims at bringing out
logically and distinctly the import of the first funda
mental truth established in Book I. viz., that
"there exists a personal God, one, simple, infinitely
perfect Being." It remains now to draw the logical
consequences from the second fundamental dogma
proved in Book I. viz., that " God is the Creator
of the universe."

205. The first question suggested by the great
fact of creation is this : How far do existing creatures
continue to be dependent on God both as regards
the continuance of their being and the exercise of

PROLEGOMENA. 347

their activity ? It will appear from the answers
to be given to this question that under a certain
aspect God continually preserves all finite beings
and operates immediately in all their operations.
These answers call forth at once another query :
What is the final goal prefixed by the Creator to
the existence and actions of creatures ? Is the
activity He exerts in their regard such as to deserve
the name of Divine providence and government ?
How shall we reconcile the affirmation of Divine
providence and government with the evils of this
world, and with what Christians believe about the
eternal punishment of the wicked in the life to
come ? Moreover, it is an historical fact that mono
theistic nations of ancient and modern times have
believed and are believing still, not only in a Divine
government through the means of natural laws, but
also in a supernatural interference by special Divine
revelations confirmed by prophecies and miracles.
What is the judgment of right reason on such a
belief?

CHAPTER I.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE.
SECTION I. — The Divine conservation of creatures.

Thesis XXXIV. — Even after it has been created,
created being cannot continue to exist without continuous
action on the part of God to preserve it in existence.
This Divine action is called " conservation"

206. We may begin by considering how far our
created being can be affected in regard to its con
tinuance in existence by other created beings. To
preserve a thing is to be in some way or other the
cause of its not ceasing to be what it is. In this sense
we speak of preserving health, life, good name, inno
cence, virtue, peace, and so on. Now, as we have
proved in Book I., the being of matter as matter,
and the individual being of each created spirit,
human souls included, must be attributed to imme
diate Divine creation out of nothing. From this
it follows that there is something in every creature
which lies altogether beyond the domain of created
causality, whether to destroy or to continue its
existence. For the substance in question is either
a purely corporeal thing of a lower or higher order
(a piece of inanimate matter, a plant, a dumb
animal), or it is a man, or it is a spirit. In the first

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 349

case the basis of its individual being is matter, as
matter; in the second case matter joined to spirit:
in the third case spirit alone. Now the production
of matter and spirit is production out of nothing,
and production out of nothing, as has been pre
viously shown, requires infinite and therefore Divine
power. Such an effect manifestly cannot owe its
continuance in existence to the action of any
creature. The power of every creature and of all
creatures together is finite, and finite power is
unable to destroy what has its existence in virtue
of infinite power. Therefore no creature and no
multitudes of creatures can destroy even the smallest
piece of matter, or the most degraded of human
souls. If they cannot destroy the being of these
things, evidently the preservation of such things
cannot be ascribed to them.

Hence the preserving influence of creature upon
creature is limited to the substantial species of
material things, and to the accidental states of
substances both material and spiritual. For instance,
a sportsman may for a time preserve his dog as a dog
by taking care of its health, he may also destroy
it by a pistol-shot ; but the matter of which the
dog is made up cannot be destroyed either by him
or by any other creature ; it is, so far as created
power of destruction goes, absolutely indestructible.
An artisan may preserve by practice his acquired
skill in his art ; yet it does not belong to him to
preserve the internal foundation of that skill, his
own spiritual soul, and the elementary matter of
which his organism is formed.

350 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

In their own sphere creatures may preserve a
thing either directly or indirectly. Direct preserva
tion is an influence without the continuation of
which the thing upon which it is exercised can no
longer last. Thus through the action of a source
of light upon the organ of vision of sensitive beings,
colours are directly preserved as actually visible ;
for they exist under this aspect only so long as that
action lasts. For a blind man the phenomenon of
colour exists only potentially, nor can the quality
denoted by the term " colour " pass from potential
to actual visibility in a room perfectly dark.

A thing is preserved indirectly, in that the causes
are warded off which would effect its destruction.
An example of indirect preservation would be the
rescue of a man from drowning.

207. No created being then can preserve in exist
ence either directly or indirectly the underlying
entity of any other created being. And now the
question arises : Does God preserve all things ?
And in what sense ? The answer given in our
thesis is : God preserves all things directly.

That He does not preserve all individual things
indirectly is evident both from experience and reason.
In mankind and in the other living beings of this
world, a continual corruption and generation of
specific existence is witnessed. And reason tells us
that human souls and pure spirits are incorruptible
substances, consequently not liable to the influence
of dissolving causes, and therefore, in so far as their
specific being is concerned, not capable of indirect
preservation.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 351

But we say that He preserves all things directly,
and that without direct Divine preservation no
created being can continue in existence. As St.
Thomas says : " The existence of all creatures
depends upon God in such a way that they could
not last even for a moment, but would return into
nothing, if the influence of Divine power did not
keep them in being."1

And why so ? For the following reasons : Since
every created being consists ultimately either of
matter or of spirit or is a combination of the two,
and neither matter nor spirit can have their
origin except in an immediate Divine act, viz., that
of creation, it follows that the very basis of the
being of each created substance depends for its
origin exclusively on the power of God. Such a
dependence is manifestly an essential one. It is
like the dependence of the daylight on the sun, not
like that of the offspring on its parent. But an
essential dependence must last so long as the depen
dent object retains its own proper essence. Thus we
arrive at the conclusion that every created essence
depends upon the power of God so long as its
existence lasts ; in other words, that each creature,
so long as it exists, is directly preserved by God.

The same inference may be drawn from this
consideration : Every creature depends upon the
free volition of God for the existence of its inmost

1 " Dependet enim esse cujuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nee
ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi
operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse." (St. Thomas,
Sum. Theol. la. q. 104. art. i.

352 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

being, in that God is free to grant or not to grant
existence to finite things. But God can withdraw
what depends upon His free-will, a withdrawal not
to be conceived as the making of any reality, but
only as a subtraction of preservation.

Hence God preserves all creatures continually
and directly by not ceasing to act Upon them as the
cause of their being.

The last italicized phrase is meant to prevent a
wrong conception of Divine preservation. It would
be false and childish to conceive it with Bayle as a
reiterated creation, postulated by the continual sink
ing back of creatures into nothingness, from which
abyss they must be saved by the continual causation
of their being through Divine power. If this opinion
were true, there would be properly no preservation
at all, but only renewal by Divine creation of inter
rupted existences. The relation in which Divine
preservation stands to creation may be shortly put
in this way : Creation is the omnipotent free volition
of God conceived as causing the starting into exist
ence of finite beings ; preservation is the same
omnipotent free volition of God conceived as causing
the continuance of the existences already produced.
It is therefore right to say : By preservation the
creature receives nothing which it has not already
got by creation. It would, however, be wrong and
false to assert : Creatures are indebted to God
immediately indeed for the first beginning of their
existence ; yet its continuation depends only medi
ately upon the Creator. This statement is to be
rejected, for created beings are all under some

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 353

aspect continually and immediately dependent upon
God alone. For the rest it is true that under other
aspects, explained above, creatures preserve crea
tures, but only on the supposition that the basis of
their own being, the very ^root of their " esse,"
and likewise the basis of the things which they are
said to preserve, be kept in existence immediately
by Divine power alone.2

208. These explanations will throw light upon the
following difficulties :

(i) Angels and human souls are incorruptible
beings, and consequently cannot lose their exist
ence as individuals of a certain species. But such
incorruptible beings do not need preservation.
Consequently angels and human souls need no
preservation, and the doctrine that God directly
preserves all creatures is false.

Answer. In this argument incorruptibility of
individual existence is taken for absolute necessity.
It is true that human souls and angels cannot be
dissolved into component parts, and thus give rise
to individual existences of other species. But
nevertheless their existence is an effect of free
Divine volition, and therefore is contingent, and,
absolutely speaking, might cease to be. Faith
supported by reason makes us infallibly sure that
God will never annihilate either angels or men,
and we have also good reason for thinking with
St. Thomas that He will not annihilate the elemen
tary matter which forms the basis of all corporeal

* St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. za. q. 104. art. 2. " Utrum Deus imme
diate omnem creaturam conservet."
X

354 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

beings.3 Yet we have proved above that He could
do so by withdrawal of His preservation, if He
willed. To express this in the technical terms
already explained in the chapter on Divine Power :
God can annihilate them potentia absohtta, not, how
ever, potentia ordinata. Hence without His preserva
tion they would be nothing.

(2) The Creator should be able to produce effects
superior in stability to those of creatures. But if
no effect of God's power can last without being
preserved by God, His productions are inferior to
those of His creatures : for many productions of
creatures, monuments of art for instance, last for
centuries without any continuous action of the
causes that produced them.

Answer. The apparent strength of this difficulty
rests upon its attributing to the causality of creatures
what really is due to the power of the Creator. All
effects of creatures are modifications or transforma
tions of subjects that owe their existence to Divine
creation. After the active influence of a created
cause has ceased, its effect continues only on the
condition that the subject in which it exists has a
natural aptitude for its retention. A chemical com
pound artificially produced is more or less stable in
proportion as it satisfies the affinities of the elements.
A machine, the maker of which has violated the

3 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. IE. q. 104. art. 4. The holy Doctor
teaches in this article that God could annihilate creatures by over
ruling their natural aptitude to persevere in existence. But this
would be a sort of miracle, not adapted to the spread of the
knowledge and love of God, and therefore not to be expected.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 355

laws imposed upon him by the attractive and resist
ing forces of its materials, is sure soon to get out of
working order. The impress of a seal, which lasts
in wax, is lost upon water. In a word, the durability
of effects produced by creatures is altogether depen
dent upon the nature of the created subject in which
they are produced. This subject itself has no other
subject for its support, and therefore would be
nothing, if the free Divine volition that produced
it out of nothing, withdrew its omnipotent influence.
Consequently the assumption that on the hypothesis
of Divine preservation created causes would produce
effects superior in stability to those produced by the
Creator, is false for two reasons : first, because all
stability of effects of creatures is due, not to the
efficiency of the creature, but to the subjects pro
duced by the Creator ; and secondly, there is no
parity between these subjects and the effects of
created causes, as the former are productions out
of nothing, the latter changes of pre-existing created
things.

SECTION 2. — Simultaneous concurrence of God in the
actions of creatures.

Thesis XXXV. — God concurs simultaneously in the
actions of finite beings.

209. Hitherto we have treated of the continual
direct action of God whereby He sustains creatures in
their existence. Now we are to consider His opera
tion regarding their activity. This subject is known
in the schools of Catholic Philosophy under the

356 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

name of concursus divinus, or Divine concurrence.
Instead of " concursus " the Angelic Doctor uses
constantly other terms. He denotes the Divine
co-operation with the actions of finite beings by
the general term " operation " (operatio) ; and he
specifies it by saying that God moves creatures
to action (Dens movet res ad operandum), by which
he means that this motion to action is exercised
inasmuch as God directs, as it were, the active
principles and forces of created natures, to their
operation (quasi applicando formas et virtutes rerum ad
operationem) , and that, inasmuch as the created
activity being thus influenced by Divine motion,
all things act in virtue of the Divine power, so much
so that He is the cause of all the actions of every
agent (secundum hoc omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei;
et ita ipse est causa omnium agentium).*

It is difficult to say which of the two modes of
expression is better. Whether we use the modern
term " concursus " or whether we follow the termi
nology of St. Thomas, and say that God's influence
upon the activity of creatures is a sort of motion
or application exercised upon their faculties, that
He operates in their operation, and that creatures
act in virtue of Divine power : all these technical
terms may be easily misunderstood unless accu
rately explained. Misunderstanding of terms is here
the more to be guarded against, because there is
something in the dependence of finite activities
upon the action of God, which has become a

4 Cf. St. Thomas, Sum Theol. ia. q. 105. art. 3. 4. 5 ; la. 202.
q. 10. art. i. and 4.; De Potentia, iii. a. 7; Contra Gent. iii. 67—70.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 357

subject of controversy among Catholic philosophers,
although they agree with one another up to a certain
point. That all actions of creatures, simultaneously
with their dependence upon created causes, have
also a certain dependence upon the action of the
Creator, nobody denies. The difference of opinion
is about the nature of the dependence.

To the best of our ability we shall first put
before the reader the doctrine held by ourselves on
this subject, and afterwards the controversy about
the necessity of what is called physical promotion
or predetermination.

210. Let us begin by distinguishing various Divine
operations or concurrences regarding the activity
of creatures.

(a) Natural and supernatural concurrence.
By the concurrence which is merely natural God
helps creatures to act and work in harmony with
their natural faculties ; whilst by supernatural con
currence He elevates them to a way of acting to
which their nature with its faculties is inadequately
proportioned, although it may be raised to the same
by a special Divine operation. Thus God concurs
naturally with material things, in that they act in
agreement with the chemical, mechanical, and bio
logical laws which rule the energies of their nature.
He concurs also naturally with the spiritual faculties
of man, intellect and will, as often as their opera
tion is proportioned to the psychological laws
inherent in the human soul. But He concurs
supernaturally with the forces of His creatures,
when He makes use of them as ministerial or

358 THE ACTION OF COD UPON THIS WORLD.

instrumental causes for the extraordinary Divine
operation known by the name of miracle, which we
shall consider in chapter iii. We may remark also
by the way — though this is a truth which lies beyond
the cognizance of reason and is only guaranteed
by revelation — that God exercises a supernatural
concurrence in those actions which, according to
Christian revelation, are performed under the in
fluence of His actual grace, which consists in super
natural illumination of the intellect, and comfort,
encouragement, and strength of the will. Thus a
good preparation for and devout reception of the
sacraments of the Church, an effectual prayer, in fine
every action by which a reasonable creature positively
prepares itself for final union with God (and a
fortiori, every good work meriting reward in Heaven)
requires a supernatural concurrence of the Divinity.

(b) Mediate and immediate concurrence.

By mediate concurrence God prepares the crea
ture for a certain action : by immediate concurrence
He causes it to act really either with necessity or
with freedom according to its nature. In mediate
concurrence several stages are discernible, which
we may best illustrate with reference to a particular
free action, say an alms bestowed by a charitable
person on a man in need who has offended him.
To this action God has concurred mediately (a) by
creating that man, (13) by preserving him, (7) by
helping him to acquire the habit of kindness and
generosity, (8) by directing through supernatural
or natural causes his attention to the reasons for
which he should practise charity precisely just now.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 359

The last sort of mediate concurrence is called
moral concurrence, and thus we arrive at a third
distinction :

(c) Moral and physical concurrence.

Moral concurrence is oniy possible with regard
to free acts. It consists in the suggestion of motives
to good actions, and in making such actions appear
desirable. Thus by moral concurrence God draws
the will, but He does not force it. We may dis
tinguish a natural moral concurrence, exercised
through the medium of rational creatures, and a
supernatural exercised immediately by God Himself.

By natural moral concurrence God causes those
influences of created beings, for instance of parents,
teachers, good friends, upon our intellect and will,
which incline us naturally to choose what is right
and to reject what is wrong. But incomparably
more excellent is the supernatural moral concur
rence, known to Christians under the name of
Divine illuminations and inspirations, by which the
Holy Ghost moves our souls to saving actions, in
such a way that it depends upon the free-will of
man whether he chooses to follow his Heavenly
Guide or "to kick against the goad."

In contrast with this moral concurrence, God's
immediate influence upon the creature in the
moment of its action, and precisely upon its faculties
considered as acting, is called physical concurrence.

To signify that all capabilities of creatures for
action must be reduced to Divine creation and
preservation, and that the exercise of these capa
bilities can never take place but with dependence

360 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

upon Divine volition, scholastics say that God
concurs with His creatures in action as the first
cause, whilst the creatures are second causes.

211. To prove the existence of a supernatural
concurrence of God belongs to apologetic and
dogmatic Theology. We shall show its possibility
and harmony with reason in chap. iii. when treating
of miracles. As regards natural concurrence, it is
enough to prove that every action of every creature
depends immediately upon God. From this it will
follow that all the influences by which one creature
impels another to action must be considered as
a mediate Divine concurrence ; which concurrence
will be moral, if the influence exerted proceeds
immediately from a rational creature and consists in
the suggestion of motives to a good action.

But what of suggestions to evil ? Why cannot
the harangue of a disloyal demagogue exciting
people to rebellion against their lawful sovereign
be held as a suggestion made to them under mediate
moral concurrence on the part of God ?

In order to give to questions like this a satis
factory answer, we have to weigh carefully the
relation of God to moral evil. We shall do this in
chapter ii., and from the explanations given there
it will become evident that God neither intends sin,
nor approves of sin, nor helps to sin, nor in sus
taining the natural activity of creatures, does any
thing which He should omit in order to prevent sin.

These explanations presupposed, we may answer
in short to the question proposed, no man is rightly
held responsible for suggestions to evil which in

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 361

some way arise out of his action as out of their
mediate cause unless he either intends to bring
about the suggestion by his way of acting, or shows
his approval of the suggestion, or does not hinder
it, although he not only could but also should do so.
Now, no one of these conditions is realized in God
when He concurs with rational creatures in their
suggestions to evil. Therefore He cannot be said
mediately to suggest it.

212. As appears from what we have said, our
task of proving the existence of Divine concurrence
philosophically, reduces itself to the demonstration
of an immediate or physical influence of the Creator
upon the action of His creature. When we speak
of an immediate influence we do not mean to say
that the action of the creature depends under all
aspects immediately upon God. This assertion would
be a virtual denial of created activity, and par
ticularly of that activity known under the name of
free volition.

In order that the reader may understand under
what aspect we argue the action of a creature to
depend mediately upon God, and under what aspect
we say it depends immediately upon God and the
acting creature together, we must recall some truths
regarding action already touched upon in Book II.,
when we were occupied in showing the harmony of
Divine freedom with Divine immutability, and again
when we treated of the life of God.

What we do assert is that, although under one
aspect the action of a creature is truly its own action
depending on its own activity, under another aspect

362 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

it is at the same time dependent upon God, and
this not only mediately but immediately. In other
words, the creature in action depends upon a causal
exercise of the omnipotent Divine Will, not only
for the existence and preservation of its nature and
faculties, but also for the actual exercise of those
faculties ; so much so that it can use none of them
unless the Creator in the very moment when the
faculty is used, supports it with the efficacy of His
Divine power.. To this power the creature owes
not only its faculties as applicable for action, but
also as applied to act.

If the former of these two different ways of
dependence existed without the latter, Divine con
currence would only be mediate. It then could be
likened to what a watchmaker does for his watches.
His concurrence with the continual motion of the
watch is manifestly only mediate. Whether he
wakes or sleeps, whether he thinks of the watch
or not, the watch goes for as long as the laws of
mechanics and dynamics will allow. But neither can
the watch go, nor the watchmaker work in its con
struction, nor any creature do anything whatsoever,
unless in the very moment in which the action
takes place God wills that the faculty from which
it flows be really exercised.

213. This it is what we mean by immediate
Divine concurrence. But no sooner is the position
stated than we feel obliged to guard it against
misunderstanding. We said just now that God
by the power of His will, is a true cause of every
action at the very moment when it proceeds from

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 363

the faculty of His creature. Above we said, and
every Christian believes, that God cannot approve
of sin. How are these two statements compatible ?
The answer involves a fuller explanation of our
position.

In every action that proceeds from a morally
free faculty two characteristics are to be distin
guished. The first is the use of liberty or the act
of choosing. This act considered precisely as such
is not due to the exercise of created freedom, but
it is that very exercise itself, and follows necessarily
from the free nature of the creature, so long as God
wills that that nature shall have its proper play and
field of action. The free creature is not free to
exercise its freedom or not to exercise it, it is only
free to exercise it with regard to any particular
object proposed as eligible, either accepting or not
caring to accept that object. It is then clear that
the free act of the creature, in that it is an exercise
of freedom, can depend immediately both upon God
and the creature, and can nevertheless depend
immediately upon the creature alone, in that it is
rather acceptance than neglect of a particular
object. God willing the exercise of freedom at the
moment when it is exercised, implicitly wills that
there be a choice made by the creature. This
choice is not a change, but an immanent act of the
will, consisting in what wre may call the fixing or
clamping of one or other of two alternatives, namely,
the refusal or the acceptance of this object, this
thought, this desire, this deed, this word, here and
now eligible to me. By the fact that God grants

36* niE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

trie actual use of freedom, He grants the action of
c:hoice without determining its issue. So St. Thomas
teaches expressly when he says : "The act, as deter
mined to be this or that, is from no other agent than
from the will itself."5

These explanations will enable the reader to,
understand how far the free volition of a rational
creature is due immediately both to God and to
the creature, how far it is immediately due to the
creature alone, how far that which is the creature's
own doing is approved of by God, and how far it is
disapproved of by His will without being prevented
by His power.

Inasmuch as free volition is the use of a faculty
natural to rational creatures, or, as scholastics are
wont to say, an actus physicus, it is the immediate
effect both of God willing the use of the free-will,
and of the creature having this use actually under
God, as a natural result of its faculty of freedom.
Inasmuch, however, as the use of freedom with
regard to a certain object, say an alluring imagina
tion, is acceptance and not refusal or vice versa, it
is a self-determination immediately due to the
creature alone. If the acceptance or refusal the
free creature makes is in harmony with the moral
law laid down by the Creator, it is approved of by
Him. If it is against that law, He disapproves of
it, and cannot be said to will it, unless by this
phrase be signified that He wills not to impede it.
In other words, at the moment of the free choice

6 "Quod determinate exeat in hunc actum vel in ilium, non est
ab alio agente sed ab ipsa voluntate." (Sent. II. d. 39. q. i. a. i.)

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 365

He wills positively that His creature shall have the
actual use of freedom ; and willing this, He leaves
it to the creature to determine whether this use
shall be such or such with regard to the object in
question, whether eventually it shall be virtuous or
sinful. The creature determines this, not by pro
ducing a reality independently of God — this would
be absurd — but simply by immanent volition or
nolition, neither of which means production, in the
sense of the effecting of a new physical actuality.
Both volition and nolition are only productions in
the sense of causing a definite relation of will to a
certain object apt to be chosen, and at a moment in
which the will has sufficient actuality for choosing.
The will itself alone causes immediately this its
relation to the object ; in other words, it alone is
the proximate cause of its free self-determination,
but only in virtue of an actuality, upon the bringing
about of which God as Prime Cause has immediate
influence. (Cf. pp. 266 and 302.)

Thus it remains true that there is no actual
being in the creature independent of God, at the
same time the free action of the creature, considered
precisely as self-determination to one alternative out of
two or more, depends immediately upon the creature
alone as a consequence of moral freedom.

Having cleared away the danger of misunder
standing as regards the immediate concurrence of
God to all operations of creatures, we may now
proceed to prove that there is such concurrence.

214. In the preceding section on Divine preserva
tion it was shown that no created being can last

366 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

even for a moment without being kept in existence
by the continuation of the same omnipotent Divine
volition that caused it to be. As Father Faber has
beautifully said : " The home of the creature is the
hand of the Creator." From it there is no escape,
so long as the creature exists. The pen may drop
from the hand of the writer, it does not lose thereby
its existence, though it be no longer applied to the
work of writing ; but the creature is so absolutely
under the sway of Divine omnipotence, as to have
no being at all apart therefrom. Now the omni
potence which preserves the creature is not a blind
force. No, God knows from eternity the nature of
every creature that He preserves, from the tiniest
piece of matter up to the loftiest spirit. Decreeing
its existence and its preservation, He foresees what
will naturally follow, if He chooses to preserve the
creature in a state harmonizing with its nature. He
sees that such a state is impossible without actual
operation on the part of the creature. Moreover,
He comprehends perfectly the relation between
nature and action, and thus He foresees that under
certain conditions of existence a certain natural
action of the creature will either be inseparably
connected with its existence or not. In the former
case6 He knows that decreeing its existence implies

6 We put this case only hypothetically. We do not state that
there is really any individual action of a finite being, not only
continually and connaturally, but inseparably connected with its
existence, though perhaps the self-consciousness of an angel may
be such an action. See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 56. art. i. in
corp. etc. ad 3.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 367

decreeing its action ; in the latter case He sees
that it depends upon Him to prevent, if He will, the
natural outpouring of the activity of the creature,
at the same time that He preserves the creature
in being. In either case HQ cannot decree the
existence of a creature for a certain moment,
together with the existence of the natural condi
tions prerequired for action, and the existence of
its unchecked natural activity, without decreeing
thereby the actual use of the faculties of the
creature, or in other words the action itself considered
precisely as actual exercise of created activity.

Let us now call to mind what we have proved
in Book II., that the decrees of God stand un
changeable, and that His Will is by itself infinite
power. In virtue then of the same omnipotent
volition by which God from eternity has decreed
ihe existence of the unchecked activity of the
creature, He causes that activity at the moment
when the creature operates, not as a Divine
operation, but as an operation natural to a finite
faculty. Therefore we say that He causes it
simultaneously with the creature as the primary
cause, whilst the creature is the secondary cause
of the same. Seeing and willing beforehand any
given natural operation of any creature, He forms
what we call technically the decree of simultaneous
concurrence with the action. When the creature
comes to exercise this activity, God sees what this
exercise means, and wills at the same time that it
shall take place. This is His simultaneous con
currence with the creature to its action, in so far

368 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

precisely as that action is an outcome of the natural
being which the creature possesses at the time.

Evidently, therefore, there is no action of any
creature independent of the Divine Will, or that
would take place at all, if that Supreme Will did not
intend the action efficaciously and simultaneously,
inasmuch as it is an exercise of a natural faculty.

The efficacious intention of the Divine Will
which influences the created agent is not directed
merely to the existence of the agent with its faculties
and habits, but to its existence precisely as acting in
harmony with its natural exigency of action. In other
words, the action of the creature is not only
mediately dependent upon Divine volition, but imme
diately, because not only in its source, but in its
own reality, it is foreseen and decreed by God from
eternity; and as it has been decreed, so it is
willed and produced in time by God as the first
cause and by the creature as the second cause.
Thus one of the schoolmen, Durandus, who will
only admit a mediate concurrence of God to the
actions of creatures, does not express the full truth.
On the other hand, the Divine concurrence is
mediate in this sense, that between God (who
efficaciously wills the action of the creature, not as
His action, but as the action of a finite being) and
the actual action of a created faculty, there exists
really the creature with its faculty as proximate
cause of the same action which is attributed to
God as its First Cause. He is its First Cause, in
that the creature owes the actual exercise of its
faculty to the fact that God, at the very moment

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 369

when the faculty acts, intends (what indeed He
has intended from eternity) that it shall not only
have a potential or habitual fitness for actual
application, but shall really proceed to that actual
application. St. Thomas expresses this truth in
the words : Omnia aguni in virtute ipsius Dei, et ita
ipse est causa omnium actionum agentium — " Every
being that acts is in the exercise of its action
dependent upon an influence proceeding from God
Himself, and thus He is the cause of all actions of
active beings."

215. Against the doctrine of immediate Divine
concurrence thus explained and proved, two diffi
culties occur.

(i) If the action of the creature is also God's
action, it would seem that nothing remains for
the creature to do. For God does what He does
sufficiently well, and consequently we may reason
thus : If God concurs in the operation of the
creature, this operation is sufficiently explained by
His causality alone. But what is sufficiently ex
plained by one causality, is not to be attributed to
another. Therefore what is called the action of
the creature is properly not attributable to it, but
to God, which is equivalent to saying that the
creature does not act at all.

Answer. God could, of course, produce without
the intervention of any created agent the same
physical effects which He enables them to produce
by His concurrence with their activity. He could

7 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 105. art. 5. in corp. ; De Potentia,
q. 3. art. 7.

Y

370 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

for instance thus make a steam-engine, but in that
case the steam-engine would not have been the
work of man, whereas this latter is what, on the
supposition of creation, God wills, and what is in
itself a worthy object of Divine volition. If,
however, He chooses to have created agents, He
must " concur " with them in their activity in such
a way as not to suppress the application of it, but
rather to grant this application by the nature of
His concurrence.

(2) The statement that there exists no action of
any creature, unless supported by an efficacious
Divine volition which has for its term that very
action, implies that even sinful actions are effica
ciously willed by God, which is absurd, as being
in evident contradiction with the Divine holiness.

Answer. All that the said statement implies is
that God wills to grant the actual use of freedom
with regard to the objects by which creatures are
tempted to sin ; not that He efficaciously draws
them into sin or helps to sin as sin.

SECTION 3. — Controverted question about physical premotion
and predetermination.

Thesis XXXVI. —The theory of physical predeter
mination in the sense in which it is understood in the
Catholic schools is not supported by any cogent reasons,
and it makes the explanation and defence of moral
freedom unnecessarily difficult.

216. Whilst all Catholic philosophers and theo
logians assert unanimously that every action of

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 371

creatures depends simultaneously upon God, they
differ in their explanation of the nature of that
simultaneous dependence. The doctrine enunciated
in the thesis is that of Molina. The opposite doctrine
is generally called Thomism, on the plea that it is
that of St. Thomas, although we are by no means
prepared to admit that the Saint is rightly interpreted
by those who impute to him this sense. It is neces
sary to give an outline of this famous controversy,
because it appertains to a question concerning which
some conclusions must be reached in any treatise
on Natural Theology which aims at being complete.
We must be understood, however, in advocating
our own conclusions, to speak with all becoming
deference of the views of our opponents, many of
whom bear names worthy of the highest honour
among Catholic philosophers.

What, then, is meant by physical predeter
mination ? It does not signify Divine " premotion "
in general — that is to say, any sort of Divine moral
or physical help towards action which precedes the
action, but it denotes quite a particular sort of Divine
premotion. As we shall explain below, Divine pre
motion in general cannot be denied by any Catholic.
Not only does God premove His creatures morally,
He premoves them also physically. At least He
exercises such an influence upon them as may
rightly go by this name. But physical predeter
mination, as upheld by its advocates, is a transitory
impulse to action produced immediately by God
in the faculty of a creature as often as the latter
is to act, an impulse so perfectly adapted to the

372 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

nature of the agent that a certain particular action
will infallibly result. And so far is this said to be
the case that God, as the adherents of this doctrine
explain, knows the future action of a creature by
knowing the premotion that He has decreed for it.
Nevertheless, while maintaining thus much, they are
far from denying the moral freedom of rational
beings.

According to them the physical predetermi
nation, which draws the free-will of a man to a
particular choice, causes this choice infallibly, but
not necessarily. Our self-determination, they say, is
both the certain result of Divine predetermina
tion and the outcome of the use of moral freedom
granted by that very predetermination. God pre
determining the creature does not lead it to a
necessary, but to a free self-determination, and at
the same time He leads it infallibly to that choice
to which His predetermination, taken together with
the disposition of the creature that receives it,
naturally tends. Nevertheless God does not pre
determine any one to a sin. True, His predeter
mination causes the free choice which is sinful, but
He does not cause it as sinful. Its sinfulness is
caused by the bad disposition of the created will
in which the Divine predetermination is received.8

If we object to this that it is exceedingly difficult
to understand how a creature thus predetermined
can possibly have the actual use of its freedom, our
opponents do not deny that there is some mystery

8 See Goudin in Philosopkia, Pars IV. q. 4 (Edit. Parisiensis,
l85I). PP- 224—283, especially pp. 228—239 and pp. 264—267.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 373

in this. But they refer us to the incomprehensibility
of Divine causation at once most sweet and most
efficacious. Its sweetness manifests itself in this,
that the predetermining Divine premotion causes
the creature to act, not anyhow, but only in such a
manner as is in keeping with its nature. Therefore
in an irrational creature God causes a necessary
action, but in the rational will of angels and men
He causes free actions, as often as the use of
freedom is due to their nature.

217. But why insist upon this predetermination ?
Why refuse the doctrine stated in the thesis ?
Chiefly, they reply, for these reasons :

(1) Without physical predetermination the supreme
dominion of God over His creatures and the infal
libility of His Providence cannot be sufficiently
explained. The Molinists, who teach only a simul
taneous concurrence, and do not admit that God
premoves free creatures otherwise than morally, by
showing them certain actions in a pleasing or dis
pleasing light, make the Creator a simple co-operator
with His creatures — nay, in a certain sense they
subordinate His action to the action of the creature;
for, if God does not predetermine the action of the
free creature, then the free creature must predeter
mine the Divine concurrence, as the latter in itself
does not tend to this or to that free volition. How,
then, can it remain true that God is the first free
cause ? 9

(2) As Catholic Philosophy has for its guiding

9 Gouclin, Ibid. pp. 263, 264, § n, " Probatur ultimo praemotio ex
inccnvenientibus."

374 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

star Catholic Theology, a philosophical opinion
which agrees less well with the teachings of the
Fathers of the Church and with common Catholic
doctrine should not be favoured, although the
Church has not condemned it. But the teaching
of the Molinists on Divine concurrence does not
well agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine, who
teaches expressly : Deus de voluntatibus hominum,
quod vult cum vult facit 10 — " God makes of the wills
of men what He wills, when He wills it." And
does not the Church represent to us the special
benefit of efficacious grace as a physical predeter
mination when she directs her priests to pray : Ut
Detis nostras etiam rebelles compellat propitius ad se
voluntates ; ut convertat nos, &c. — "That God may
compel our wills, even when they are rebellious, to
Himself; that He may convert us," &c.n

218. We hope the summary given here of the
view of our opponents is a fair one. Let us, then,
now give our answer, which will be done best by
following the tenor of our thesis.

First of all, we admit that God in more than
one sense premoves all His creatures to action,
inasmuch as premotion designates a direction to a
certain kind of activity, and the actuation of created
faculties in harmony with the eternal decrees of
Providence. Is not the very fact of creation and

10 De Correptione et Gratia, c. xiv. Cf. Prov. xxi.: Sicut divisions
aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini est, quocumque voluerit, inclinabit

" As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the King is in the
hand of the Lord ; whithersoever He will He shall turn it "

11 Cf. Goudin, Ibid, pp 245, 246.

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 375

preservation a sort of Divine premotion ? No
creature can perform any other species of action
than that for which it has faculties from the
Creator ; and on the supposition of its preservation,
it needs must act in harmony with the natural
tendency of its faculties so far as natural actions
are concerned. If we turn to those which are
supernatural, the creature can perform none of them
save in agreement with the supernatural powers
added to its nature by the Creator. All this is true
premotion, and no Molinist denies aught of it.

Nay, as appears from our exposition in sect. 2,
Molinists do not shrink from saying with St. Thomas
— Deus est causa nobis non solum voluntatis sed etiam
volendi — " God causes in us not only our faculty of
will, but even our actual volition." 'And again :
Deus est causa omnis actionis — " God is the cause of
every action." 12

But all these phrases are easily explained with
out physical predetermination. God's concurrence
at the moment of our free volition consists in our
opinion precisely in this, that His power grants us
not only the faculty of choosing, but the actual
exercise of free choice. By His causality our will
is impelled to the desire of good in general, when
ever our intellect represents any particular good
either real or apparent ; but He causes this desire
in such a way that we ourselves alone determine
whether we will accept or reject this or that par
ticular thing which seems good to us.

The issue of our choice is from eternity known

12 Contra Gent. 1. 3. c. 89.

376 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

to Him, simply because it is one of the objective
future truths, all of which must be present to the
intuition of His eternal infinitely perfect intellect.
This knowledge, inasmuch as it represents the action
of the creature conditioned by the decree of simul
taneous concurrence under any given circumstances,
we have called in Book II. scicntia media.™ The
simultaneous concurrence of God with acts of
free-will coincides with the causation of the actual
longing for good in general, which longing is in
cluded in every volition of a particular good, as the
genus in the individual, or as " animal " is included
in " Peter."

It is not therefore true that in the Molinist
system God does not cause the creature's action,
especially not the actual volition of free creatures.
All that can be said is that, according to Molinists,
God does not cause free action under such an aspect
as to make it imperative on the creature by its very
nature.

219. We return to the objections of the ad
herents of physical predetermination.

Their first objection was that with the negation
of a predetermining premotion the guidance of
created activity, essentially belonging to the supreme
Lord of all things, is denied to Him. From the
explanations already given it appears that this objec
tion lacks weight. It was started in the Thomist
schools on the occasion of Molina's celebrated

13 We here beg the reader to remember that in the positive expla
nation of the scientia media we do not stand by Molina, but against
him with Suarez. (Cf. pp. 282, seq.)

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 377

but perhaps not very dignified comparison of the
simultaneous concurrence of God with creatures,
to two men towing a boat or carrying a burden.
Molina's aim was to show that creatures, espe
cially rational creatures, exercising their natural
activity, are in their own order really principal
causes of those effects to which their faculties are
proportioned.

Let us show this in a concrete instance. God
concurs with the action of the writer, He concurs
also with the action of the pen. Is not the writer
then a principal cause in the order of secondary
causes, and the pen an instrument ? True, com
pared with God the First Cause, the writer himself
may be likened to an instrument, in so far as in the
exercise of his activity he depends altogether upon
the supporting power of His Creator. Yet He
certainly cannot be said to receive from God an
impulse for action perfectly like that given by a
writer to his pen. To say that would be to deny
human freedom. It is idle, therefore, to appeal
with Goudin14 and others to this illustration of
Molina, as a proof that Molinists conceive the
Divine concurrence as a sort of help collateral
and co-ordinate with the operation of the creature.
Nor can it be shown that our doctrine is opposed to
St. Thomas on the ground that he rejected the same
illustration which Molina used. His rejection was
based upon the well-grounded anticipation that it
might easily be misunderstood. Molina made use
of it because he thought that his meaning would ^

14 Philosophia, Pars. IV. p. 232.

378 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

sufficiently gathered from the context. But if you
will have it to mean that God causes one part of
the action and the creature another part, just as
two men towing a boat cause each a part only of
the total motion, the illustration does not hold.
And thus St. Thomas took it. If, however, you
apply it to free creatures, to indicate that the action
of a creature really depends upon two causes,
neither of which is physically predetermined, the
illustration cannot be considered as a mark of a
false conception of Divine concurrence.

That in this sense it was not rejected by the
Angelic Doctor, is to us quite evident.

220. And now as to the objection that in our
system the creature must predetermine the con
currence of God, because that concurrence is in
itself indifferent. This difficulty would have force,
if we affirmed the simultaneous concurrence of
God without asserting at the same time the scientia
media. By this knowledge God foresees from eter
nity which choice any rational creature under given
definite circumstances would make on the hypothesis
that He on His part decreed simultaneously to
concur with it in the actual exercise of its freedom.

In the light then of this knowledge God freely
decrees from eternity to grant the use of freedom
requisite for the creature to act and make its
choice. He comprehends also from eternity the
alternatives that are open to the choice of the
created free being. Moreover, by virtue of the
scientia media, He foresees the choice, in so far as it
depends proximately upon the creature alone, or in

DIVINE PRESERVATION AND CONCURRENCE. 375

other words, is an actual preference of one alter
native to the other, based upon the actuality
necessary for choosing, which actuality is granted
by the free decree of the Creator.

Nor can it be said that Molinism mars Christian
humility and leads men to *neglect to pray for
efficacious graces for the performance of saving
and meritorious actions. Molinists teach that
every salutary and, a fortiori, every meritorious
action we perform is due to a premoving, though
not predetermining grace of the Almighty, which
by the scientia media He foresaw that we would use.
He could have granted another grace perfectly
sufficient for the performance of the good work,
but one which He knew we would freely despise.
Why did He give us the one rather than the other ?
Because He loved us with a special love.

A Molinist then has the strongest motives to ask
for those graces of which God foresees he will make
a good use. Such a prayer would be equivalent to
that of Holy Church : Converte nos Deus salutaris
noster — " Convert us, God our Saviour." Nostras
etiam rebclles compelle ad te voluntates — " Compel to
Thee our rebellious wills."

It would seem, therefore, that there is nothing in
the supreme dominion of God and the Catholic
doctrine of efficacious grace to make us shrink from
Molinism.

Let us see now whether the harmony between
human freedom and Divine concurrence be indeed
as apparent on the theory of physical predetermi
nation as upon that of scientia media and simul-

380 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

taneous concurrence. Let us take a concrete
instance, and imagine a human being making the
first free choice in his life, and that a choice
deliberately sinful. How this could come about in
the system we defend is clear enough. In the
moment of choice the free creature owes to God
the actual use of freedom. But the determination
to the one alternative rather than to the other,
included in that use of freedom, is, according to
Molinists, not predetermined but only foreseen in
the case of a sinful choice. In the case of a good
choice, it may have been absolutely intended, but was
not physically predetermined. How does the same
choice come about in the system of the Thomists ?
Whether it be a good or a bad one, it is physically
predetermined. And yet they say, and must say,
that God does not predetermine a man to sin
as sin. Whence then, we ask, does the first sin
a man commits take its rise ? We ask about the
first, in order to preclude at once the evasion,
that a man by his sin might have deserved to
receive a predetermination to a choice that would
infallibly be sinful, although it would always be
sinful through the man's own fault. Such a solution
of the difficulty we are proposing is in itself very
obscure, and certainly not applicable to the first
sin. If it be true that the sinful choice must in
fallibly follow from the combination of the physical
predetermination with the disposition of the will
that receives it, at the moment when it receives it,
the reality of the use of freedom under such a pre
determination is indeed an insoluble mystery.

CHAPTER II.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND ITS RELATION TO
EXISTING EVIL.

SECTION I. — The existence of Divine Providence.

Thesis XXXVII. — All things created are under the
sway of Divine Providence, and none of them can frus-
trate the final end absolutely intended by the Creator, or
move towards it in a way and under circumstances not
foreseen by His intellect, or not freely either approved
or at least tolerated by His most holy will. The final
end of creatures consists in the first place in a certain
degree of manifestation of the Divine perfections in the
created likenesses of God, and in the second place in the
perfect union of rational creatures with their Creator by
knowledge and love. This is technically expressed by
saying that the end of creation is God's external glory
both objective and formal and the happiness of rational
creatures.

221. Providence as well as prudence (which is its
doublet), considered in its etymological meaning,
is equivalent to foresight. This etymological signifi
cation of the word coincides pretty well with the
real import of what we call prudence in a man and
providence in God. We say that a man is prudent

382 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

when the whole tenor of his life justifies the suppo
sition that in his undertakings he has a definite object
in view, and uses constantly the means fit for the
attainment of his purpose. In a similar sense we
attribute providence to God ; for this predicate is
given to Him in order to imply that He has settled
from eternity the final goal toward which the whole
of His creation and each particular creature is to
be directed, that He has ordained the means by
which the end shall be reached, and that He rules
in the course of ages all events so perfectly as that
nothing shall occur to bar His final and absolute
intention.

It was this idea of Providence that suggested
to the deep Christian philosopher, Boethius, the
following definition of it, which was adopted by
St. Thomas : " Providence is the all-regulating and
stable plan of God, the supreme Ruler of the
universe."1

To be more explicit, we may give the definition
another form and say : " Providence is God the
supreme Lord of the universe Himself, inasmuch
as He directs all things to an end fixed by Him, in
harmony with His eternal plan.

The verification of this definition supposes the
existence of two Divine operations with regard to
creatures :

(i) The assignment of an end to all things and
of ways by which they shall reach it.

1 "Providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe
constituta, quae cuncta disponit." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 22.
art. i.)

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 383

(2) Actual direction of all things to that end.

222. Can it be proved that Providence thus ex
plained really exists ? Or shall we say with the
artisan-philosopher Chubb and other more recent
deists, that the existence of a Creator cannot be
denied, but that His influence upon this world does
not extend beyond laying the foundation of it, which
being laid all things go on as best they can without
their author watching their course or interfering in
any way ? Against this deistic position we enunciate
our thesis in its several parts.

First we say that God has prefixed a final end
to everything created, and that He allows nothing
to frustrate that end or move towards it otherwise
than as He foresees and either approves or at least
tolerates.

We call attention to the phrase, approves or at
least tolerates. Why do we not say simply : What
ever happens is God's will ? Because this expression
might be taken to mean that even the sins com
mitted by rational creatures are willed by God, at
least as means to an end. This of course would be
inconsistent with God's holiness. Although He
can tolerate sin, and can turn the misery following
it into an occasion of good, He never can approve
of or wish for sin in order to reach His end. We
express this in scholastic terms shortly by saying
that God wills sin, not positively but permissively.
The term permissively does not imply that God gives
permission to sin, but means only that for good
reasons He does not hinder those sins which rational
creatures commit through the abuse of their free-

384 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

will. Having thus made clear the meaning of our
statement, we may proceed to prove its truth.

It has been demonstrated in Books I. and II. that
the one self-existing personal God has created all
things, and that He is infinitely wise and powerful.
Moreover, we have shown in chapter i. of this Book
that the being of each creature depends continually
upon Him for its existence, and that no action of
a creature can come about except under His con
currence. Now it is evident that an infinitely wise
and good Being cannot act without intending a
good end, nor in His actions lose sight of that end.
It is also evident that all effects of Divine action
are decreed from eternity. It follows that the
origin, the duration, the various phases of existence
and action of each particular creature were from
eternity willed by God, either positively or per-
missively, with a view to a certain end. Moreover,
it follows that the influence which He continually
exercises upon the activity of creatures is in
harmony with His eternal plan, and involves the
continual intention of the end.

As we have seen in Book II., God is really
identical with an intellect of Infinite Wisdom and
a will of Infinite Goodness. By His Infinite Wisdom
He understands from eternity the end to be reached
by creation, and the various ways in which by His
omnipotence He might reach it. His will of infinite
goodness embraces the end He has in view and
fixes by irrevocable decree the ways in which it
shall be reached. Abiding in Himself by His
absolutely perfect essence, He watches and directs

PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 385

in the course of time the exercise of every faculty
of His creatures. He watches and directs it without
any toil or labour, paying equal attention to the
whole and to the minutest details. As by one
eternal glance of His infinite understanding He
comprehends the dimensions of space, and calculates
the distances and orbits of the heavenly bodies,
and by one omnipotent volition keeps the whole
machinery of the universe in motion, with a con
tinual regard to the final goal it is to reach ; so by
the ' same eternal all-penetrating intuition does He
read the most secret thoughts of every mind,
observe the most minute oscillations of every
organic cell, and count the most insignificant vibra
tions of every atom of matter, ruling by His omni
potent will all things so that there is no thought of
any mind, no oscillation of any cell, no vibration
of any atom, which is not in some way or other duly
subordinated to the end He intends.

223. And this end — wherein does it consist ?
Evidently it must be an external manifestation of
His internal perfection ; not a manifestation in the
pantheistic sense, as though God evolved Himself,
as it were, into the visible and invisible universe,
but a manifestation by the production of finite
created likenesses of the infinite Divine essence.
That the end of the world created can be nothing
else is evident from a truth demonstrated in Book II.
We showed there that God loves Himself with
absolute necessity, and cannot love anything else
but with reference to His own infinite goodness.
Now the external manifestation of the Divine per-
Z

386 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

fection through created likenesses is called in
scholastic language, God's external glory, just as His
internal perfection as known to Himself alone is
called His internal glory. Moreover, scholastics dis
tinguish between external objective and external formal
glory. By the external objective glory of God they
mean created things in so far as they are adapted by
their very existence and activity to bear witness to
the Divine perfection, on the supposition that some
where in creation there are intelligent beings, who
can intellectually perceive them and form a judg
ment on their nature. The external formal glory
of God is the acknowledgment of His perfection
produced in the minds of intellectual creatures by
the contemplation of His works.

Supposing these definitions, it is so evident that
the Creator of the world intends His external
objective and formal glory, that without such an
intention we cannot even conceive creation to be
possible. For it is repugnant to reason that a finite
being should exist, the nature of which is not a
copy, however imperfect, of the essence of the
One infinite Being ; consequently God, producing
creatures, intends the production of likenesses of
His own essence, as so many mirrors in which His
infinite goodness is reflected under some aspect or
other. If He did not intend this, He would be
acting without any knowledge or intention at all—
a supposition absolutely alien to His wisdom. But
if He intends it, His intention is directed to what
we have defined as His external objective glory.
Moreover, as He cannot love anything but with

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 387

reference to His own goodness, so He must will
that the activities of created intellects and wills
shall be related to that goodness according to their
natures. But they cannot be related to it rightly
save by the acknowledgment that God is what He
is, the supreme Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. To
this acknowledgment all rational creatures must
finally arrive. If they are not impeded in the right
use of their reason, they will arrive at it in the
course of this life, unless through their own fault
they prefer darkness to light. If it be impossible
for them to know God before they leave this life,
as in the case of the innumerable multitudes of
children who die before the use of reason, at their
entrance into the next life the Creator will manifest
Himself to their immortal souls, draw them to His
love, and thereby make them happy. Not indeed
with the supernatural beatitude of which we learn
from revelation, but with an enduring natural
happiness.

Those who wilfully shut their mind against the
knowledge of their Creator, at all events will be
undeceived in the moment when they depart from
this life. As so many other delusions vanish when
death puts an end to our earthly existence, so before
all others that delusion of delusions will disappear,
which makes man believe that there is no personal
God who rules the world.

The Monotheist and the Agnostic will then agree
perfectly in the recognition of that God, whose
eternal power and divinity St. Paul2 declares to

2 Rom. i. 20.

388 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

be clearly visible in His works. They will both
recognize their God, but with very different feelings.
The one will then be forced to acknowledge Him
as infinitely good, albeit he still refuses to love
Him ; the other, if indeed he perseveres till the end
of his days in acknowledging his Creator both in
theory and practice according to the lights received,
will know and love Him, and thus reach what is
called in our thesis, the secondary end of creation,
the beatitude for which rational creatures are des
tined. This secondary end God does not intend
absolutely, but conditionally. He says as it were
to every rational creature with reference to eternal
salvation or final misery : " I have set before you
life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose there
fore life." 3 If man, by either expressly denying
or practically ignoring his dependence upon God,
obstinately refuses to choose life, it is not so much
his Creator that condemns him, as his own malice,
which changes him from a vessel of Divine mercy
into a victim of Divine justice. God has implanted
in the heart of man a nature longing for perfect
happiness. In vain does man strive to quench his
thirst for happiness with the perishable goods of this
world. He possesses them only for a short while,
and whilst he is enjoying them, the better part of
his being does not cease to crave instinctively for
the fulness of truth and goodness and beauty, which
is to be found nowhere but in God alone. Now if
the nature of man is thus naturally driven towards
God as the source of its beatitude, it follows evi-

3 Deut. xxx 19.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 389

dently that it is the intention of our Maker to cause
our happiness by perfect knowledge and love of
Himself, at least on the condition that we co-operate
with His benevolent designs.

No human being, however wretched he may be,
is excluded by God from final happiness, unless
through his own fault he makes himself unworthy
of it, by persevering in a state of rebellion up to
his last breath. St. Paul's words are in harmony
with our rational inference when he says that " God
will have all men to be saved."4 How could it be
otherwise ?

224. Here, no doubt, many a reader is tempted to
say : " All well and good ; but I am at a loss to see
how you can affirm that even the uncivilized savage
is under the influence of the Divine light, which
you say, guides every human being to his last end
who does not deliberately turn away from it ? To
this grave difficulty which in theology meets with a
deal of attention, we may be content to give a com
pendious answer in a philosophical treatise. It is
clearly God's arrangement that men should depend
largely upon one another for their instruction and
progress in knowledge of all kinds, religious know
ledge included. The necessary consequence of this
is that through the neglect and malice of some who
should be the natural teachers and leaders of their
fellow-men, the latter should suffer. But God can
rectify the evil.

225. But what about the secondary end of the
irrational creation ? Shall we say that the elements,

4 i Tim. ii. 4.

3Qo THE ACTION OF GOD UPOX THIS WORLD.

plants, and dumb animals are destined also to
glorify God formally by knowledge and love, and
thus to become happy through Him ? Evidently
this would be absurd. Even the highest among
irrational creatures, the dumb animals, are unable
to form a rational judgment on anything, to have
a rational desire of anything, to reflect upon happi
ness, to wish for happiness, or to grieve for its
absence. Their knowledge is but a reaction of their
sensitive organism upon impressions produced in
•them by material things. Their cravings are blind
emotions, resulting from the combination of the
innate instinct proper to their species, with impres
sions made upon them. It%is impossible that such
beings should know and love God, or be happy
in Him. Shall we then say that their end is not
to glorify God formally, but only objectively, to be
realizations of Divine thoughts, to be, as it were,
books written by infinite wisdom ? This is true as
far as it goes, and there are those who think that
it was in no sense necessary for God to go further
and place a crown on His creation by the creation
of rational creatures. But at all events, the objective
praise which they render Him would have far less
meaning, if there were no beings who could read
the Divine ideas expressed in their existence. Those
beings are the rational souls of men ; and in a far
higher degree, the pure spirits called angels. It is
to them and through them that the heavens tell the
glory of God, and the firmament announces the
works of His hands. Yet we cannot say that
the material world below men is properly meant for

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 391

the use of angels. These do not need to be roused
by sensible impressions to the evolution of their
intellects. Being altogether independent of matter,
they are endowed with innate ideas, and therefore
able to know and love God, without going first
through a process of intellectual development aided
by material impressions. Only those rational beings
who are compounds of matter and spirit, stand in
need of such helps. Man, therefore, must be the
favoured creature, for whose utility the Divine
Majesty has created the visible universe that sur
rounds us. And indeed everywhere we find irra
tional creatures supplying the wants of human
nature. They serve mankind partly by providing
nourishment, clothing, shelter, and other bodily
conveniences ; partly by stirring up their intellects
and wills to the pursuit of arts and sciences, and
by leading them through the knowledge of creatures
to that of the Creator ; and last but not least, by
affording opportunities for the practice of moral
virtues, patience especially, and resignation to the
inscrutable ways of their Creator.

226. From the doctrine of Providence thus proved
and explained, two important corollaries are to be
drawn. The first is this : God does not intend the
final well-being of any individual living creature of
this world except man. And man himself is to be
perfectly happy, not here on earth, but hereafter.

It is therefore quite intelligible, that God should
allow millions of irrational creatures to be sacrificed
for the sake of man, to serve his eternal welfare
remotely or proximately. No less reconcilable is it

392 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

with Divine Providence, that under certain con
ditions mortal men should be wasted by contagious
diseases, emaciated by famine, or fall in the flower
of their age on the battlefield. In a word : God
cares more for one immortal soul that does not resist
Him, than for the whole of the material universe.

God must rule His creatures with a wise regard
for their natural dignity, according as that is greater
or less. Now the human soul stands by its nature
in an infinitely nearer relation to God than the most
perfect of dumb animals. It is an image of the
Creator, whilst every other living creature of this
world exhibits only some trace of His Majesty. It
owes its origin immediately to His creative power;
whilst a dumb animal is a living erection made by
secondary causes on the groundwork laid by God
in the creation of matter and life. The rational soul
alone is able and destined to know and love God, and
thus to be personally happy, whilst everything else is
made to reveal the Creator to His rational creatures,
and to promote their eternal welfare during a short
period of time, till that day shall come of which
St. Peter says, that on it " the heavens shall pass
away with great violence, and the elements shall
be melted with heat, and the earth and the works
in it shall be burnt up."5

The other corollary we are to derive from the
great truth of Divine Providence may be thus for
mulated : Every man, however low his social posi
tion, ought to be treated with reverence by his
fellow-man, as a personal being destined for an

8 2 St. Peter iii. 10.

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 393

eternal exaltation and happiness infinitely greater
than all the aims of temporal ambition. On the
other hand, dumb animals must be left in their
own sphere, and be treated as things, not cared for
as persons, not accepted as subjects of right against
whom injustice can be committed, but as living
instruments which man may utilize in every reasonable
way.

SECTION 2. — The relation of Providence to existing evil.

Thesis XXXV III. —Neither from the evils which
exist in this world, nor from those which, according to
Divine revelation, await the wicked in the life to come,
can any lawful inference derogatory to Divine Providence
be drawn.

227. One of the most harassing questions which
have ever wearied the brains of philosophers, and
stimulated the zeal of Christian apologists, is as to
the possibility of such an enormous amount of evil
in a world created by an infinitely good God, and
continually under the sway of His Providence.

Absolutely speaking, this difficulty against the
moral attributes of the Creator is sufficiently solved
by an appeal to the arguments by which we have
proved to demonstration the existence of one
personal, infinitely perfect, and infinitely wise God.
These arguments are built on evident premisses,
according to the rules of sound Logic. The oppo
nent of the doctrine proved has first to show a want
of internal soundness in our arguments before he
can hope to destroy them' by difficulties. No

394 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

puzzling doubt, however great, can overthrow evi
dent conclusions. A man charged with a crime,
who has manifestly proved his alibi, cannot possibly
be the perpetrator, although from accidental circum
stances grave suspicions may have arisen against
him. In a similar way, when once it has been
evidently proved that God exists, and is infinitely
good ; the evils of this world cannot be attributed
to the absence of a wise and benevolent Providence,
even if the existence of those evils remain to a large
extent a riddle to us. A man who waited to render
homage to his Creator till he had solved all the
problems, to the solution of which his curiosity
might urge him, would act far more absurdly than
a child who refused to honour and obey his parents
till they had justified to his mind all the details of
their housekeeping. The distance between a child's
mental capacity and that of his parents is, after all,
finite : but God's mind is infinitely above ours.

228. Yet this answer, though substantially ade
quate, it is clearly desirable to supplement by a
detailed account of the relation in which evil stands
to the infinitely good will of God. Such an account
we must now endeavour to render, and before all
things it is necessary to fix accurately the sense of
the term evil. Some modern philosophers take evil
to be any absence of good in a thing. They distin
guish, consequently, three sorts of evils, meta
physical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical evil is
understood by them to be the absence of a certain
perfection in a being, the nature of which is incom
patible with such a perfection. Thus, for instance,

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 395

the absence of feeling in a stone, the absence of
reason in a dumb animal, and the absence of
learning in an infant, are in this view metaphysical
evils. By physical evil they mean a defect which
mars the natural integrity of a being, or interferes
with a proper development of its activity. Thus,
under the category of physical evil come, bodily
diseases of whatever kind, mental imbecility, liability
to great fits of passion preceding the use of free-will,
want, destruction of property by drought or inunda
tions, violent death, &c. Under the term of moral
evil they comprise the deviation of the free-will from
the moral law, and the actions proceeding from a
will thus gone astray, as lying, theft, murder. In
order that such volitions and actions may be
considered as moral evils in the strict sense of
the word, their source must be a will deliberately
malicious. Otherwise, we have only what moralists
call material sin, not formal.

In this explanation of evils nothing seems to be
objectionable but that the term evil is taken in a
wider sense than its usual application allows. Men
commonly do not call every imperfection an evil,
especially where the imperfection is the mere
absence of a perfection not due to a thing. Every
thing is good, inasmuch as its state of existence
harmonizes perfectly with its nature. A nature of
a lower order is in itself less good than a nature
of a higher order. Yet the essence of that lower
nature does not involve what is properly called evil.
The word evil signifies not the mere absence of a
perfection, but its absence in a being to which under

396 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

a certain aspect it is due. Therefore, only physical
and moral evils are evils in the strict sense of the
word.

229. What are called metaphysical evils cannot
possibly militate against the infinite goodness of
the Creator. To abolish them would mean to
annihilate all creatures. A created being, either
infinitely perfect, or at least so perfect that none
more perfect could be created, is a contradiction
in terms. The hypothesis of an infinitely perfect
creature would involve the existence of two infinite
beings, disproved in the First Book. The hypothesis
of a creature so perfect that none more perfect
could be, would amount to an implicit denial of
the infinite power of the Creator. We have already
shown in Book I. that an absolutely perfect world
is impossible. The world of an infinitely good
God can only be relatively perfect, that is to say,
perfectly adapted to its end as intended by the
Creator. In Section i of this Book, we have seen
that God intends by creation the manifestation of
His goodness, or His external glory, and the beati
tude of rational creatures. Neither the one nor
the other can be intended in an infinite degree.
In other words, God can neither intend that any
particular creature, or any multitude of creatures,
should adequately represent His unbounded perfec
tion ; nor can He intend that any purely finite
creature should enjoy a happiness of infinite inten
sity. He must, therefore, intend both the primary
and the secondary end of creation to be realized
within certain limits. Now, every finite degree of

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 397

external glory of God falls infinitely short of an
adequate expression of the infinite Divine goodness.
Comparing, therefore, finite degrees of external
manifestation with the adequate expression of the
Divinity, we may say that tlje difference between,
i, 100, and 1,000,000 degrees vanishes. Which of
these degrees shall God intend in creation? Surely,
whichever He pleases. The selection depends en
tirely on His free-will. He does not need any
creature. He may, therefore, choose among the
indefinite multitude of possible beings without violat
ing any of His perfections ; yet so that He shall
always attain His own glory, both objective and
formal; subordinate the course of things perfectly
to the end He has in view, and conduct to final
happiness those rational creatures who obey the
voice of their conscience. With these restrictions,
we affirm that no amount of imperfection in created
natures can be adduced as an exception against the
statement of the monotheist : "An infinitely good
and wise God rules this world."

230. Supposing, then, that God creates a world
filled with creatures of a nature under many aspects
very imperfect — an hypothesis doubtless verified in
this world of ours, the possibility of moral evil, and
the natural necessity of physical evil, is sufficiently
explained. Man has a free-will. By his very nature
he is such that he can commit sin. Again, both
man and the rest of the living creatures of this
world, in consequence of their imperfect nature,
must be liable to many physical sufferings, unless
God is continually to work miracles for their

398 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

deliverance. Does, then, the infinite goodness of
God require that by supernatural interference He
should prevent all physical and moral evils ? The
answer is evidently to be given in the negative.

231. First, as regards physical evils, God cannot,
indeed, intend them for their own sake. He cannot
delight in the misery and sufferings of His creatures.
But there is no reason whatever to prove that He
may not allow these evils, with the intention to
compensate them by some good occasioned thereby.
Nay, He may even intend them as means to an end.
It is not necessary that He should lay open to our
view the particular final cause of every disease
and every misfortune ; it is enough for us to know
that He is infinitely good, infinitely wise and just.
Knowing thus much, we are certain of two truths
which must satisfy every reasonable thinker. The
first is, that an infinitely good, and wise, and just
God must draw some good out of every evil He
allows, and cannot allow any without a reason
worthy of His infinite wisdom. The second may
be formulated thus. A human mind, though able
to get a true knowledge of God amply sufficient
to guide the man on his way to his last end, is
manifestly unfit to comprehend the eternal counsels
of the Almighty. Add to this, that in many cases
experience and history show to the faithful Christian
distinctly, how in the hand of Providence physical
evils become instruments of great boons in the
moral order. Poverty and sickness teach man most
forcibly his nothingness, and open his mind to the
consolations of religion. The blood of the martyrs

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 399

became the fertile seed of Christianity, whilst the
ignominious death of Christ our Saviour enhanced
the glory of His Resurrection, brought out the
Divine origin of His Church, and opened to fallen
mankind the road that leads to the Heavenly City,
where "God shall wipe away all tears from their
eyes ; and death shall be no more, nor mourning,
nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."6

None can understand this fully, unless he believes
that God became Man, that as Man He died upon
the Cross, and afterwards ascended glorious into
Heaven. The belief in these truths makes it easily
conceivable that through many tribulations we must
enter into the Kingdom of God. An acquaintance
with the life and doctrines of Christ and His
Apostles goes far to reconcile the believer in
Christianity with the hard lot of the poor, and the
promiscuous distribution of temporal goods, and of
merely natural mental gifts among just and unjust.
A Christian knows that there is another life, in
which both the unbridled sensuality and supercilious
cruelty of Dives and the patient resignation and
heroic suffering of Lazarus will be duly rewarded.
And reflecting how vastly the natural endowments
of Lucifer surpass the most splendid human genius,
he no longer wonders at beholding at times among
men the spectacle of great abilities thrown away in
a bad cause.

232. But this reflection involves another difficulty
far greater than that drawn from mere physical evils.
God foresaw from eternity the fall of Lucifer and
6 Apoc. xxi. 4.

400 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

the evil angels. He foresaw all the sins of man.
Why did He not hinder them ?

Let us first see in what relation God stands to
moral evil. Moral evil in the strict sense of the
word consists in a free turning away of the created
will from the law laid down by God. God neces
sarily loves His own goodness and everything else in
relation to it. He can, therefore, never approve of
a created free being deliberately ignoring its true
position to Him. But sin manifestly involves a
deliberate refusal of the creature to stand to God
in that attitude of subject to ruler, which is the
proper posture of a creature before its Creator. No
sin, therefore, can be pleasing to God. He manifests
His disapproval of it to every man who commits sin,
and that in the very moment when he is about to
commit it. For sin in the strict sense of the word is
not committed without disobedience to the voice of
conscience, which re-echoes the will of the Supreme
Lawgiver. But it is one thing to disapprove of sin,
and quite another thing not to impede it. God does
not impede sin ; although, absolutely speaking, this
was possible for Him. Yet we must not forget that
He is infinitely free as well as infinitely powerful. He
can, therefore, tolerate sin, if this toleration is not
opposed to His Divine perfections. But it is not
opposed to any one of them ; as will easily appear
on comparing it with those perfections which at first
sight it would seem to violate, namely, His wisdom,
His holiness, His justice, and His mercy.

233. First, then, it may be argued as an objection,
that God does not attain the end He intends by

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 401

tolerating sin ; for the sinner does not glorify God
as he ought to do, and forfeits his own happiness,
if he dies in the state of grievous sin. We reply
that the end which God intends is His own glory,
and that on such terms as tq, leave it to the choice
of the free creature to become throughout eternity
a living monument of His beatifying love or of His
rigorous justice. As regards the happiness of the
free creature, He intends that happiness only on
condition that the creature prepares for the same
before the time of probation expires with the close
of this earthly life.

234. But is the toleration of sin compatible with
the sanctity of God ? No sin can be committed,
unless God concurs to the sinful action. But in
doing so He seems to approve of sin ; for there is
nothing which could necessitate Him to lend the
sinner His aid. In answer to this difficulty, let us
repeat briefly the solution already given in the
chapter on Divine concurrence, (pp. 364 seq. and
370.) We there showed that God does not concur
in the sin itself, nor does He encourage the sinner
to abuse his free-will. The concurrence of God,
which the sinner abuses, consists in this, that God
grants him the use of the moral freedom that
belongs to his nature. To do so He has reasons
worthy of His infinite wisdom, although incompre
hensible to human minds.

235. But scarcely is this answer given, when
another difficulty arises : God puts one man in
circumstances in which it is very easy to avoid sin,
and He places another in positions which make sin,

AA

402 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

apparently, unavoidable. Is such an unequal treat
ment of two creatures of the same human nature
not against Divine justice ? Is it not acceptance of
persons ? Compare the case of a well trained child
of good Christian parents with that of a youth who
grows up in the surroundings of vice and impiety.

We answer in the first place that God's justice
does not oblige Him to treat creatures of the same
nature exactly in the same way. The justice of
God is not commutative, but distributive. It is not
manifested by paying to creatures what they have
any right to ask of Him, but in granting them what
He cannot refuse to their nature and their merits
without denying His own goodness, wisdom, and
benevolence. If then He grants thus much to all
men, the objection against His justice ceases,
although He may make the grant to one in a
sufficient, to another in an abundant degree.
Certainly nobody can prove that poor, ignorant,
and badly educated people fall into or are punished
by God for really grievous sins, the avoidance of
which was not made morally possible for them,
either naturally or supernaturally by special internal
graces. Their acts often do not involve that malice
which prompts better-endowed minds to similar
excesses. Ignorance frequently excuses them from
grievous guilt, when they do things objectively very
serious. From reason and revelation we must con
clude that no man is ever necessitated to violate the
law of God culpably, and that every sin- imputable
to man is caused only by abuse of freedom against
the voice of conscience. Add to this, that through-

DIVIDE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 403

out the Old and New Testament God calls Himself
with a sort of preference the protector of the poor ;
and indicates that their human frailties will be
judged with great mercy. For what else is the
meaning of these passages* of Scripture : " He
that despiseth the poor reproacheth his Maker;"7
" He that hath mercy on the poor lendeth to
the Lord;"8 "He" (the Messiah) "shall judge the
poor of the people and He shall save the children
of the poor; " " He shall spare the poor and needy
and He shall save the souls of the poor ; " 9 " He "
(the Messiah) " shall judge the poor with justice ; "10
" To him that is little, mercy shall be granted ;
but the mighty shall be mightily tormented," &C.;11
"The prayer out of the mouth of the poor shall
reach the ears of God;"12 "The Lord will not
accept any person against a poor man;"13 and
the poverty of the Word Incarnate, His perpetual
companion during life, what else does it signify
than that the poor are dear to God ? If they are
dear to Him, it is impossible that any one of them
should perish finally unless by his own grievous
fault. What we have said of poor and uninstructed
men may be applied to all those who without their
own fault are in great danger of sin. Experience
proves that they are often protected in quite an
astonishing way, if they use those precautions which
Providence has placed within their reach.

236. But how is it consonant with the mercy of

7 Prov. xvii. 5. 8 Prov. xix. 17. 9 Psalm Ixxi. 4, 13.

10 Isaias xi. 4. « Wisdom vi. 7. 12 Ecclus. xxi. 6.

13 Ecclus. xxxv. 16.

4o4 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

God, to grant the sinner moral freedom, when He
foresees that the wretched man will abuse it and ruin
himself? A father surely should not hand his son
a loaded pistol, at a time when the latter shows
himself overcome by disgust of life and ready to
get rid of it at the first convenient opportunity.
Really, however, there is an infinite disparity
between the two cases. The father is bound by
human and Divine law to follow another line of
action. He is the head of a family and not the
ruler of the universe. It is not with him to draw
out the fundamental laws of his domestic govern
ment. Through the voice of his conscience he is
informed of the will of his Maker. And his con
science tells him that he does grievous wrong by
thus occasioning the death of his son without any
sufficient reason. No motive can be made out for
putting the temptation in his way but wanton
cruelty and desire of the suicide of his charge.
God, on the contrary, in granting moral freedom
does not intend that the sinner shall abuse it. By
warning him through the voice of conscience He
manifests clearly that He wishes him to turn away
from the temptation. His foreseeing that the free
creature will go wrong could only obscure His
mercy, if it were not easily understood that He
has quite sufficient reason for allowing the use of
freedom, although this use becomes mischievous
through the fault of the creature.

We may insist upon the natural harmony between
a free creature and the use of freedom ; we may
call attention to the truth that God can and will

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 405

elicit good from evil, that He is free to grant or
not to grant those special privileges of grace by
which He preserves saints at times, that sufficient
grace to avoid formal sin is offered to every one.
Considerations like these suffice to show that the
argument raised against the mercy of God from the
existence of moral evil is unsound, although they
do not unveil the mystery of Divine wisdom that
shrouds from our view the reasons for which, in
particular cases, moral evils are not prevented. We
are only allowed to see some of the Divine artifices
by which our incomprehensible Creator raises upon
the spiritual ruin caused by sin, the most splendid
edifices of virtue and true greatness, or causes the
malice of the wicked to be one of the many rungs
in the ladder by which His faithful servants ascend
to the height of Divine charity and intimate union
with God. Thus the fallen Peter becomes the
immoveable Rock of the Church, the strength of his
brethren, the model of pastors, the undaunted hero
whom nothing can separate from his crucified
Master. On the other hand, the rage of unbelievers
causes St. Stephen to practise heroic charity, makes
St. Lawrence exult upon the gridiron, and peoples
Heaven with an innumerable multitude of martyrs.

237. " Yet," continues our objector, " according
to Christian belief, eternal punishment is the lot of
him who dies in grievous sin. Why should this be ?
Why should those who refuse grace up to death
lose for ever all chance of salvation ? "

Before answering, let us formulate one principle.
It is this : What Infinite Wisdom deems just must

4o6 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

a priori be approved by a finite understanding. But
we have proved the First Cause of all things to be
infinitely perfect and wise, and may we not reason
ably expect that among the arrangements of Infinite
Wisdom there will be many beyond the grasp of our
limited faculties ? However, let us see what human
reason makes of the arguments of our opponent.

First, then, it is alleged that according to justice
there must be proportion between the magnitude
of a crime and the punishment inflicted for it, and
that this does not seem to be the case if a grievous
sin committed in the twinkling of an eye is to be
expiated by never-ending torments.

This reasoning rests manifestly on the wrong
supposition that the magnitude of crime is to be
measured by the time required for its perpetration.
If this were the case, the boy who plays truant
for half a day would be a far greater criminal than
the ruffian who in half an hour commits a dozen
murders. Common sense does not take this view
of the matter. Whilst committing the boy to the
cane, it delivers the murderer to the gallows. Every
one agrees that by the crimes committed within the
space of thirty minutes, the murderer has forfeited
twelve times over all the benefits which he might
have enjoyed in human society on earth for forty
or fifty years. It is evident then that time cannot
be the standard by which punishment is to be deter
mined. Not the duration of a bad deed, but its
internal wickedness, must be the measure of the
expiation due to it. But its wickedness increases
in proportion as the obligation is sacred which is

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL 407

deliberately violated. Now it is evident that no
obligation of man towards man can stand com
parison for a moment with the obligation of man
to obey God. The right of God to the obedience
of His reasonable creature is absolute and infinite.
No right can be more strict ; and every other right
is based upon it. A wilful violation, therefore, of
this right implies a malice which opposes itself to
the foundation of all orders. It is, in comparison
with social disorders, considered as violations of
merely human rights, an infinite moral disorder.
Hence it is justly punished with an infinite penalty.
But a finite creature cannot suffer a penalty infinite
in intensity. The duration, therefore, of the penalty
must be infinite. This must be insisted upon all
the more emphatically, because the soul of a man
who dies in mortal sin leaves this world in a state
of opposition to its Creator. The distortion of the
human understanding and will, caused by a deliberate
refusal to acknowledge God as Supreme Master,
cannot be repaired when the time of preparation
for man's last end has passed. Death puts a term
to that time. Consequently, the free-will of man
remains for ever in the same relation to God in
which it is in the moment of the separation of soul
and body. The will of one, therefore, who dies
impenitent, after having committed grievous sin,
remains for ever averted from God, refusing to
embrace lovingly the only Being in which the
created spirit can find his beatitude. Happiness
is incompatible with such a state. On the contrary,
it must be a state of the deepest dissatisfaction and

4o8 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

misery ; for it is impossible that a rational and
spiritual nature should ever find rest and peace
unless it be united with God, the source of all
goodness, and beauty, and truth. The misery of
the dying, impenitent sinner lasts then as long as
the perversity of his will. His will is incorrigible ;
hence his misery must be irremediable.

Accordingly, there is perfect harmony between
Divine justice and the most essential feature of
eternal punishment as proposed by Catholic doc
trine. Catholic theologians agree that Hell would
cease to be Hell, if the damned could only enjoy
the Beatific Vision of God. Whatever may be the
nature of the fire of Hell and its effects upon the
damned, it is certain that the pain which it causes
is nothing in comparison with the distress and
despair produced by the consciousness of having
for ever forfeited access to the only true source of
peace and happiness. It is, however, a connatural
consequence of this greatest of all penalties, that
the damned should suffer positively through the
intervention of creatures. He who has refused to
make use of creatures as instruments in the service
of his Creator, is justly punished by experiencing
pain through their influence. Hence our reason
sees how congruous it is that, according to the law
of God, rebellion against Him should be punished
in the next world through the instrumentality of
a real, material being, bearing some similarity to
earthly fire. The " fire " of the sun has remotely
a share in all the benefits God grants us through
His creatures for our salvation. A contempt of

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 409

those benefits is appropriately avenged by a sub
stance similar to that by the aid of which the benefits
were conferred, that is, by fire.

In what way this will be done is irrelevant to
our discussion here. Readers may consult St.
Thomas.14

238. Let us now turn to the objection against
Divine mercy based upon the same doctrine of eternal
punishment. "Whatever may be the demands of
justice ! " exclaims the unbeliever, " infinite mercy
requires the final extinction of all punishment, all
the more so because eternal punishment is useless,
and consequently its infliction real cruelty ! "

Let us judge of the relation between mercy and
punishment, not according to blind sentiment, but
in the light of reason. First as regards the infinity
of Divine mercy. To place limitations to the
Divine mercy as it is in itself, one must show that
that mercy somehow falls short of the standard
required by Infinite Wisdom. But how shall the
infidel show this ? Not certainly by pointing out
that the effects of God's mercy are limited. In fact
it seems intrinsically repugnant that creatures should
act according to their nature, and yet evil be removed
from them without any limit. To answer, however,
more positively we may solve the difficulty thus. As
Divine Mercy is infinitely perfect because it is in
perfect harmony with Infinite Wisdom, so Divine
Justice is infinitely perfect for the same reason. Con
sequently, a priori, there is no ground why, in the

14 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 33.; Suppl. q. 70. a. 3. § " Et ideo dicen-
dum; " and Ibid. q. 97. art. 5.

4io THE ACTION 01' GOD Ul'ON THIS IVOh'LD.

relation of God towards His reasonable creatures,
either one or other of these two attributes should be
manifested exclusively. It would appear more proper
that both should shine forth in their effects. Of
course, God owes it to His own goodness that the
joint glorification of these two attributes should be
in harmony with the final happiness of all reasonable
creatures, on the supposition that none of them
refuse to fulfil the conditions laid down for the
attainment of that happiness. But if some submit
to their Creator, and others rebel against Him, it
behoves the dignity of God to make a final irre
vocable distinction between loyal subjects and
obstinate rebels. This distinction may be made
in such a way that the everlasting punishment of
the wicked shall itself be a manifestation both of
justice and of mercy, — of justice in point of duration,
and of mercy in point of intensity. According to
St. Thomas, this is what is actually done. He
says : " In the damnation of the reprobate, mercy
manifests itself, not by putting a stop to the penalty
inflicted, but by alleviating it somewhat, so as to
exact less than what is really due." 15

239. From this discussion on Providence, in
respect of the permission of evil and the infliction of
eternal punishment, it is, we hope, evident that the
Christian philosopher, after having proved on philo
sophical grounds the existence and attributes of
God, may face boldly any difficulty by which adver-

15 " In damnatione reproborum apparet misericordia non quidem
totaliter relaxans sed aliqualiter allevians dum punit citra con-
dignum." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 21. art. 4. ad i.)

DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND EXISTING EVIL. 411

saries try to undermine his conclusions. To do more
than dispel the fallacies with which unbelief opposes
the evidences of reason and the testimonies of
Christianity in favour of an infinitely wise and good
Providence, is a task neither necessary nor possible.
It is not necessary; because after the truth of
Divine Providence has been established, man knows
enough for taking a proper view of life. Under
such a Providence as Natural Theology discloses to
our reason, and Christian revelation proposes to
our faith, life is certainly worth living, in obedi
ence to the voice of conscience and in opposition
to the impulse of blind passion. All the duties
imposed upon us by the voice of conscience can be
fulfilled without investigation of the secret counsels
and hidden ways of the Supreme Being. No need
to lose time in such investigations. When once
we clearly understand that we are essentially
servants of an infinitely good Master, it behoves
us to pay Him adoration, confidence, and love,
and to be anxious rather about a complete know
ledge of the duty of the creature to its Creator
than about the ways by which the Creator guides
His creature.

CHAPTER III.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE.

SECTION i. — Miracles conceivable and possible.

Thesis XXXIX. — Miracles, as believed in by
Christian monotheists, involve nothing self -contradictory
or absolutely impossible, nor are they in any way opposed
to the existence of physical law. Consequently, they are
intrinsically and extrinsically possible, and by no means
effects unworthy of a wise Governor of the Universe.

240. In the present section we are only con
cerned with the possibility of miracles ; in the next
we shall discuss whether they come within the range
of human knowledge. Our thesis says, first that
miracles are not self-contradictory, or that the
proper notion of a miracle does not involve any
union of mutually inconsistent ideas.

To prove this it will be necessary to inquire
what is meant by " a miracle." In a wider sense,
we call " a miracle " anything astonishing. Thus,
we may speak of " miracles of beauty," " of learn
ing," " of virtue." And we may call any effect of
an unknown cause " a miracle." But the Christian,
theological sense of the word miracle is far more
restricted, and very definite. In this sense no event

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 413

is called a miracle, unless it be due to quite a special
interference of God. Yet not even every such event
is a miracle. Something must be added, as will
appear from the two following definitions of miracle,
the first of which is given by St. Thomas, the second
adopted by modern theologians.

241. According to St. Thomas, " miracles are
effects wrought by the power of God alone in things
which have a natural tendency to a contrary effect,
or to a contrary way of producing it."1

In explanation of this definition we have to make
the following remarks :

(a) St. Thomas requires for the existence of a
miracle that the effect in question should be attri
butable exclusively to Divine power. It appears from
the context of his doctrine that he means to say :
The principal cause of a miracle is God alone ; a
creature can only be instrumental in its operation,
either by disposing the matter in which, by virtue of
the Divine volition alone, the miracle is produced,
or by obtaining miracles from God through prayers
or good works, or by commanding in the name of
God that a miracle shall take place. Such a
command supposes a special Divine inspiration,
through which the person who works the miracle
is made sure that his command will be efficacious.2

To some readers the objection may occur : You
say, God alone is the principal cause of a miracle.

1 " Ilia quae sola virtute divina fiunt in illis rebus, in quibus est
naturalis ordo ad contrarium effectum vel ad contrarium modum
faciendi, dicuntur proprie miracula " (De Potentia, q. 6. DeMiraculis,
art. 2. in corp.).

2 Cf. St. Thomas, ibid. a. 4.

THE ACTION OF COD UPON THIS WORLD.

But God is the principal cause of every positive
effect. Therefore, according to your explanation,
every positive effect is a miracle ? The answer to
this objection is that God is the principal cause
of a miracle, not merely in the sense of prime cause,
but inasmuch as principal cause denotes a cause en
dowed with natural faculties proportioned to a certain
effect, and is thus opposed to instrumental cause,
which by itself alone has no perfect natural aptitude
for the effect in which it is said to be instrumental,
but is raised to that aptitude by a special impulse
and direction proceeding from the principal cause.
Thus, in the action of painting, God is the prime
cause ; the artist is the principal cause ; and his brush
and pallet are the instrumental causes of the picture.
The action of painting is, therefore, a human action
depending upon ordinary Divine concurrence ; but
it is not a Divine action. Though God be the prime
came, human faculties are proportioned to such an
action, and therefore the painter is the principal
cause of it. But a miracle is an effect which, con
sidered in the concrete with all its circumstances, is
manifestly proportioned to the Divine power alone.
Elias prayed, and the wet wood caught fire miracu
lously, not because the natural conditions pre-
required for this effect were present, but because
God willed it so on account of the prayer of the
Prophet. The man born blind, who washed himself
in the pool of Siloe by the command of our Lord,
was cured, not because the washing was propor
tioned to the cure, but because the Incarnate Son
of God willed it so on condition of this act of

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 415

obedience. The man born blind was to a certain
extent the principal cause of his going to the pool
and washing himself there ; but the Son of God was
not only the prime, but also the sole principal and
proper cause of the miracle.3 ^ (b) By the additional
words, " in things which have a natural tendency to
a contrary effect, or to a contrary way of producing
it," St. Thomas implies that the effect of a miracle
is either something which in the ordinary course of
nature never happens, or something which in the
ordinary course of nature does not happen in this
way. Of the first kind is the raising of a dead man
to life again, of the second kind the cure of a very
serious disease by a simple command.

242. After having given his definition, the
Angelic Doctor, by way of further explanation,
indicates two series of facts, which at first sight
would seem to be miracles, but are not miracles
in the sense in which Catholic theologians use the
term.

The first series is formed by the hidden effects
of nature — (ea qua natura facit nobis tamen vel alicui
occulta). There are natural effects, the natural cause
of which is unknown. That cause may be either
some hidden force or forces of nature acting by
themselves, or it may be forces of nature applied by
the natural faculties of man in an artificial way, or
it may be forces of nature utilized by pure spirits,
supposing they act only with their natural faculties.
All these effects are wonderful and marvellous, but
not miracles.

3 Cf. 3 King- xviii. 30—39 ; St. John ix.

4i6 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

The second series is made up of actions which
are Divine, but occur regularly in the ordinary
natural or supernatural course of things — (ea qua
Deus facit nee aliter nata sunt fieri nisi a Deo). Such
actions are : (i) The creation of each individual
human soul, which takes place through purely
Divine power as often as the substratum of a
human body has been duly prepared by natural
causes. As we have shown in Book I., no human
soul can come into existence otherwise than through
immediate Divine creation. But this creation follows
a certain rule, laid down by God from eternity to be
followed regularly; and moreover it follows a rule
which must be observed, if God wills mankind to
continue to exist in agreement with the exigencies
of their nature. The creation of a human soul, then,
though a purely Divine action, is neither a miracle
nor a supernatural action in the strict sense of the
word. It is not a miracle, because it is in harmony
with the ordinary course of things : it is not a
supernatural action, because it is necessary for
the completion of human nature. Also the first
creation of pure spirits and of matter, though
most marvellous, does not come under the cate
gory of miracles, because by that creation the very
foundation of created nature was laid. Christians
believe also in other actions, transcending not only
the faculties of creatures, but even the exigen
cies grounded on their nature and their faculties ;
and therefore strictly supernatural actions, yet not
miracles. Such actions are the infusion or increase
of sanctifying grace through the sacraments of the

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 417

Church, and through acts of perfect contrition.
Such are also all illuminations and inspirations of
the Holy Ghost, by which men are prepared and
helped to the performance of saving and meritorious
works. These actions are not miracles, because
they follow the ordinary course of constant super
natural influence of God upon rational creatures, in
accordance with the general direction of His Provi
dence in the present order of things towards a
supernatural beatitude.

The conversion of St. Paul no doubt was pre
ceded and accompanied by miracles in the strict
sense of the word. The conversion itself may be
rightly called a miracle of grace ; but it was not
a miracle 'in the ordinary sense, because it was not
a supernatural and extraordinary change produced
by God in Saul as in a living, corporeal being;
but the change was made in his spiritual faculties.
Miracles, as understood by St. Thomas and Catholic
theologians, are extraordinary Divine operations in
nature, that is to say, in the sphere of sensible
corporeal things.

243. To express this clearly, modern theologians
define a miracle to be a sensible, unusual, Divine,
and supernatural work.* (a) A miracle is defined " a
sensible work," because the definition does not
extend beyond those extraordinary supernatural

4 " Opus sensibile, divinitus factum, insolitum, supernaturale."
(Cf. T. Pesch, Instit. Phil. Nat. p. 711.) Whilst agreeing in the
substance, different modern representatives of Catholic Theology
and Philosophy vary in the form of the definition. To our mind
the form adopted I.e. recommends itself for great precision.

BB

4i 8 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

facts which imply changes perceptible through the
senses.

(6) A miracle is defined " an unusual work,"
because it is opposed to the ordinary course of
nature, or to the ordinary way in which corporeal
things under similar circumstances act and react on
one another. The mere frequency of a miracle in
comparatively few spots of the globe does not take
away its character of being "an unusual work."
To use the words of St. Thomas : " If daily some
blind man were made to see, this would nevertheless
be a miracle, because opposed to the ordinary course
of nature."5

(c) A miracle is called " a Divine work," because
it is due to a special positive agency of God. The
co-operation of even the holiest and most wonderful
of the saints in the miracles which they are said to
work, does not extend beyond acting as impetrators,
or as instrumental and ministerial causes, as ex
plained above.

(d) A miracle is called not only a Divine, but
also a supernatural work, because it is not one of
those Divine works which complete the natural
existence of corporeal things, man included. To
these works belong the first creation of the world
and the continual creation of individual souls.

Note. — In the language of Scripture miracles are
often called signs, prodigies, virtues. The word sign
refers to the intention God has in working miracles.
He wills thereby to speak to man in a sensible way.
The name prodigy points to the wonder excited in

0 Sent. ii. dist. 18. q. i. art. 3. ad 2.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE 419

human minds by the sight of miracles ; whilst the
word virtues implies that they are manifestations of
power, supreme and Divine.

244. Against the definition of miracles just ex
plained, a difficulty may be faised from a division
of miracles very common in Catholic schools, and
mentioned repeatedly by St. Thomas. Miracles are
divided into miracles above nature, beside nature, and
against nature — (miracula supra naturam, prater
naturam, contra naturam). Above nature are those
miracles which are worked in material subjects, in
which in the ordinary course of nature similar effects
never occur. Thus, it never happens naturally,
that a dead and decomposing body rises to* life
again. Therefore, the resurrection of Lazarus was
a miracle above nature.6

Beside nature are those miracles that occur in
material subjects, in which through the forces of
nature, either left to themselves or artificially
applied, similar effects do occur. Here an effect
is known to be miraculous by its occurring at a
prophesied time, or simply upon the word of a
thaumaturgus, and that in cases in which similar
effects could not have been obtained through natural
forces otherwise than gradually and with no certainty
about the success. Thus, the fact that in Egypt,
upon the word of Moses, all the first-born of men
and beasts died in one night, whilst the Israelites
were spared, was a miracle beside nature. Such a
miracle also was the sudden withering of the hand
of Jeroboam, when he stretched it out against the

6 Cf. St.John xi. 43, 44.

420 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

Prophet of God ; and the blindness of the sorcerer
Elymas, caused upon the prediction of St. Paul.7

Against nature are the miracles which happen in
material subjects that naturally tend to a contrary
effect, and are not prevented from producing their
effect by any natural cause. Thus, the preservation
of the three companions of Daniel was a miracle
against nature ; also the going back of the shadow
upon the sun-dial of Achaz.8

This is the division of miracles which is sub
stantially to be found in St. Thomas.9 The term
" nature," which is taken as the standard of this
division, means the whole of corporeal substances
and their forces acting under ordinary Divine
concurrence, either by themselves alone, or under
some artificial direction of rational creatures. We
must note that the miracles which are said to be
against nature, are in no way against the essence or
against the final end of natural substances, but only
against the course of action these substances would
take, if God had not from eternity decreed for
special reasons to interfere with it.

But how to combine the division with the defi
nition ? The definition says, that every miracle is
supernatural, or above nature. In the division, on the
contrary, only one class of miracles is marked as
being above nature. The solution is to be found in
the fact that in the definition the miraculous effect

7 Cf. Exodus xi. xii. ; 3 Kings xiii. ; Acts xiii. 8 — 12.

8 Cf. Daniel iii. 21 — 24; 4 Kings xx.

9 St. Thomas, Sent. ii. dist. 18. q. i. art. 3. solutio; De Potentia,
q. 6. art. 2. ad 3m.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 421

is considered as it exists in the concrete, with all its
circumstances, knowable to a diligent observer.
When thus viewed, every real miracle must be
pronounced to be supernatural, or a Divine effect.
But a miraculous effect, though manifestly Divine
when viewed adequately, may be taken into con
sideration inadequately and the question asked :
How does this effect stand to the efficiency of
mere natural forces, abstraction being made from
all particular circumstances ? This consideration
leads to the result that some miracles are above-
nature, others beside nature, others against nature.
Therefore, the definition is not opposed to the
division ; because in the definition the miraculous
effect is viewed as happening under all the peculiar
circumstances under which it does happen : whilst
the division of miracles is made by comparing the
effect with the forces of nature, abstracting from
concrete circumstances. And thus far of the defini
tion and division of miracles.

245. That miracles are conceivable and not
intrinsically absurd, is easily shown. They are by
hypothesis extraordinary effects of Divine power in
corporeal things, beyond the powers of creatures.
There is certainly nothing in this concept approach
ing to self-contradiction. The power of creatures is
finite. It is, therefore, conceivable that God should
work in created things in a way impossible to
creatures ; and that not in the ordinary way, which
the continuation of created existences and activities
implies, but in a manner quite extraordinary. Again,
as we have seen, God is infinitely powerful and free.

422 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

If He is infinitely powerful, He certainly can produce
effects in corporeal things, which no created activity
left to itself could produce under the circumstances.
And if He is infinitely free, He cannot be said to
have been necessitated from eternity so to order the
course of created activities as to leave no room for
His own immediate interference further than was
altogether necessary for the continuance of the world.
Miracles are consequently conceivable as works of
God's absolute power.

246. It remains to be considered whether they
can be combined with the eternal decrees of God.
God, it may be urged, cannot contradict Himself.
Now, universal experience leads to the conclusion
that the material substances of the universe follow
natural laws, or certain uniform ways of action, so
that under the same circumstances the same effects
occur. These natural laws must have been decreed
by God from eternity. If so, what room remains
for extraordinary interference ? Some such train of
reasoning seems to have been in Dr. Carpenter's
mind, when he penned the following lines : " In
regard to the Physical Universe then, it might be
better to substitute for the phrase, * Government by
Laws,' ' Government according to Laws ' : meaning
thereby the direct exertion of the Divine Will or
operation of the First Cause, in the forces of Nature,
according to certain constant uniformities which are
simply unchangeable, because — having been origi
nally the expression of Infinite Wisdom — any change
would be for the worse."10

10 Mental Physiology, p. 706.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 423

There is much truth in these words, but not
the whole truth. God's decrees are indeed irre
vocable, and the course of nature is at least gener
ally uniform. Were it otherwise, mankind would
be held in a state of perpetual suspense by the
unavoidable and insoluble question : What will
happen next ? There would be no stimulus to labour
where no fruit could be counted on ; and human
life, if possible at all, wo.uld be in a condition of
abject misery.

But the one concession, that God governs the
world according to natural laws, does not involve
the other, that in every particular case the general
law is applied. There are exceptions made in human
legislation, where it is foreseen that a general enact
ment would bear too hard upon a particular case.
So the Creator may foresee from eternity that in
this case and that an exception to the general course
of nature will serve His purpose better than the
maintenance of the uniformity ; and He may decree
that exception accordingly from all eternity. Let
us suppose, at least for argument's sake, that it is
God's eternal design to raise some of His rational
creatures to a union with Himself in knowledge and
love, far more intimate than any that their nature
could lay claim to. This being so, God could no
doubt decree to communicate His benevolent designs
to particular chosen legates, and to commission them
with the promulgation of those designs to mankind.
In order now to give these His legates an incon
testable authority, He could decree to make known
to them what they could not possibly know by

424 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

natural means, namely, the future free actions of
men with all their particular circumstances. Such
a decree itself would be a decree to interfere with
the psychological law of the natural dependence of
the human mind upon ideas gathered from experi
ence or elaborated by reason. It would be a
suspension of a psychological law for a higher end
and in a particular case only. There is nothing
repugnant in all this. If, then, God can thus inter
fere with a psychological law on behalf of a Prophet
whom He sends, why should He be unable to give
His Prophet still more authority, by decreeing that
in particular cases a prayer, a command, a touch,
or even a mere volition of that Prophet should be
followed by an extraordinary effect in a corporeal
thing ? There is again nothing unworthy of God in
this supposition. No decrees are repealed, but from
eternity the rule and the exception from the rule are
settled with one act of Divine volition in the light of
infinite knowledge and with an intention not to help
nature to that for which as a work of God it is competent
by its natural forces, but to raise it to a higher level out
of pure generous love.

247. Once we understand that God is infinite
intellect and will, and acts by mere volition according to
eternal decrees, we can have no difficulty in solving
modern arguments against the possibility of miracles.
Almost all are variations of those of Spinoza.11 This
author starts from the supposition that God must
from eternity will everything He knows, a supposi
tion disproved by us in Book II., where we treated

11 Tract. Theol. Polit. c. 6.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 425

of the free-will of God. (Cf. pp. 295, seq.) We showed
there that God wills nothing with absolute neces
sity but His own existence. Arguing in particular
against those miracles which the scholastics called
against nature, Spinoza says 12 that such miracles
would involve either the absence of general laws of
nature, or the supposition that God could act against
the laws of His own nature. This difficulty is done
away with by what we have shown in Book I., that
the self-evolving God of Spinozism exists only in
the imagination of pantheists. The phrase, '/ against
nature," means, as we have seen, no more than this,
that the natural tendency to action proper to a
corporeal being in a particular case remains poten
tial, instead of becoming actual, as it would have
become had not God decreed to make this case an
exception to the general rule.

" But," continues Spinoza, " if miracles are,
strictly speaking, all above nature, then you must
admit a break in the necessary and immutable
course of nature ; which is absurd. It would follow
also that the principles of reason are violable ;
for after all they are but laws of nature. In that
case we are unable to trust them, unable to prove
the existence of God ; and thus miracles, far from
being a help to the knowledge of God, prove a
total impediment to that knowledge."

This argument confounds in the first place the

course of nature as decreed by the Divine mind

from eternity with the course of nature as it

commonly occurs in human experience. Under

12 Loc. cit.

426 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

the former respect it is absolutely immutable, not
under the latter ; and this suffices for the possibility
of miracles, as has been shown in the proof of our
thesis. If in a particular case the common rule is
not followed, if, for instance, water changes miracu
lously into wine, it does not follow that equally
well in another particular case two and two might
become five, and thus a principle of reason be
violated. If Spinoza had studied St. Thomas, he
would have found the solution of his difficulty.13
St. Thomas says, that if we speak of an action
against principles of nature (or more accurately,
against the natural tendency of physical forces),
we imply thereby that such an action surpasses
created agencies, from which it does not follow
that the Almighty Creator cannot effect it, sup
posing it to be in keeping with His justice and
wisdom. But the principles of reason are not
tendencies of physical forces, but enunciations of

13 De Potentia, q. 6. art. i. obj. n. As this passage is one of the
many in which Aquinas anticipated modern difficulties, we will
give it in full. The obj. n runs thus: " Sicuti ratio humana a
Deo est, ita et natura. Sed contra principia rationis Deus facere
non potest, sicut quod genus de specie non praedicetur, vel quod
latus quadrati sit commensurabile diametro. Ergo nee contra
principia naturae Deus facere potest." His answer is: "Ad un-
decimum dicendum, quod logicus et mathematicus considerant
tantum res secundum principia formalia ; unde nihil est impossibile
in logicis et mathematicis, nisi quod est contra rei formalem
rationem. Et hujusmodi impossibile in se contradictionem claudit,
et sic est per se impossibile. Talia autem impossibilia Deus facere
non potest. Naturalis (i.e. the physicist and biologist) autem
applicat ad determinatam materiam ; unde reputat impossibile
etiam id quod est huic impossibile. Nihil autem prohibet Deum
posse facere quae sunt inferioribus agentibus impossibilia."

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. .527

inviolable truths, which cannot be set aside by any
rational being without the ruin of all certainty,
much less be over-ruled by God, Who is the First
Truth and the Source of all truth.

Spinoza's difficulty regarding the perturbation
of order by miracles has been repeated by Voltaire,
Strauss, and others, and seems to be a chief
stumbling-block for many, because they forget the
distinction between order as conceived by God and
order as manifested in the uniformity of nature.
Order under the first aspect reigns everywhere ;
order under the second aspect is the normal thing,
but there are exceptions for wise reasons. Such
exceptions are no more perturbations of the laws
of nature than in human society privileges modify
ing the tenor of a general, civil, or criminal law,
granted by the lawgiver at the same time he
establishes the law, and granted with wise limita
tions, can be called abrogations of the law itself.

SECTION 2. — Miracles can be known as such.

Thesis XL. — By careful inquiry the extraordinary
Divine operations called miracles can be sufficiently dis
tinguished from the wonders of nature and art} and from
the operations of created spirits.

248. Affirming in our thesis that miracles are
knowable, we do not maintain that every particular
miracle is sufficiently open to all inquirers. All we
hold is, that those in whose favour God works
miracles, and to whom He wishes thereby to
manifest Himself in an extraordinary way, cannot

42S THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

fail to discover Him as the Author of those effects.
Our argument is simply this. God never works
miracles but for an end worthy of Himself. He
works them in order to draw men nearer to Him
self by extraordinary manifestations of His Divine
attributes, of His power, wisdom, benevolence,
mercy, justice. His miracles are intended to be
a solid comfort to men of good-will, and an earnest
and terrifying warning to those who revolt against
the voice of their conscience. They are, as it were,
a Divine speech, expressed, not by Divine words,
but by Divine deeds. Now, is it possible that God
should thus address men without offering them
sufficient means to ascertain that He has spoken ?
To suppose this would involve the denial either of
God's power or of God's wisdom. The supposition
in fact amounts to this, either that God cannot
make Himself known as the Author of these special
works, or that He does not care to do so. Take
the first alternative, and you deny God's power;
take the second, and you deny His wisdom. In
both cases you think of the Creator in a way
altogether incompatible with His perfection. Men
are able to stamp their works with such indisputable
signs of their individuality as that nobody, on
sufficient inquiry, can see any reason for suspend
ing his judgment as to their origin. And should the
Creator be powerless to manifest Himself by equally
clear evidences ? Men of common sense do not
annoy their fellow-men with ambiguous communi
cations, the proper meaning and origin of which
nobody can discover ; and shall the infinitely wise

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 429

God speak the language of signs and wonders in
such a way that no amount of reasonable inquiry
can throw light upon the real speaker ? ' Such
suppositions cannot be entertained for a moment.
But to acknowledge them «as absurd is equivalent
to the statement that miracles are really knowable
if duly inquired into.

249. This last-mentioned condition must be
added. Otherwise we may take for miraculous what
are really no more than hidden effects of nature,
artificial tricks of men, or operations of created
spirits, surpassing men in their acuteness of intellect
and in their power of applying the forces of nature
to ends of their own. The first and second of these
cases is possible, and has happened often enough.
The third case is of course put down as impossible
by materialists, extreme evolutionists, and agnostics.
If there are any other thinkers, not in this class,
who still do not believe in rational beings higher
than man, and yet infinitely distant from the
Creator, then, we must say, their stand-point is
not conformable to reason and history, and is
besides opposed to a fundamental truth of Christi
anity. Reason a priori finds it far more probable
that between the one infinite spirit and human souls
not purely spiritual, there should exist created pure
spirits, than that they should not exist. History
testifies that the belief in such spirits among civi
lized nations is as old as mankind. The history of
magnetism and spiritualism countenances this sup
position, that some purely spiritual creatures do
at times make their influence sensibly felt in this

430 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

world. Such is the judgment of many Catholic
theologians, who have studied the history of spiri
tualism with great attention.14

250. It appears then that created rational beings
higher than man, or at least other than human, in
fluence this visible world. Shall we then call their
influence miraculous ? According to the definition of
a miracle we cannot do so, unless they act not by
mere natural power but as instruments of God.
Now St. Thomas, speaking from the stand-point of
Christian Revelation, and consequently taking for
granted that there are good spirits (holy angels) and
evil spirits (demons or devils), lays it down, as an
evident corollary of revealed doctrine that God,
whilst using good angels as moral instruments
for miraculous effects, never grants to evil spirits
greater power than they have by nature, but

14 Not long ago the Spectator wrote as follows : " He [the writer]
would assert that no one who has studied what are now called
euphemistically the phenomena of hypnotism, and the various states
of distinct personal consciousness which the French physicians elicit
in their hypnotic patients, should doubt that the old doctrine of
one spirit over-riding another in the same organism is as good an
explanation of the facts as any other which can be suggested ;
indeed, a great deal better, in his opinion — he speaks only of himself
— than Mr. Myers' theory of different strata of consciousness. . . .
Though the writer speaks only for himself in saying what he does,
the present generation has, in his opinion, ample and absolute
evidence, if it will only bear patiently with fools and knaves and
impostors of all kinds in seeking it, that alien intelligences not acting
through any human body — and sometimes intelligences of a very
mean order — do produce definite physical effects on this world,
and do sometimes induce aberrations of mind in men and women
which rise to a point of virtual insanity." (Spectator, Feb. 9, 1889,
" Professor Huxley and Agnosticism," p. 195.)

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 431

on the contrary, often restrains their natural
energy.15

Whatever such spirits do, is done, as the Angelic
Doctor says, " by skilfully utilizing through motion
the potential energies latent in nature " — adhibendo
corporalia semina per motum localem.1Q This they do
with an incredible velocity, and an insight into
possible combination of natural forces of which man
can form no idea.

251. Thus for a due inquiry into miracles, we
need a double series of criteria ; the first to guard
us against taking for miracles mere natural effects,
caused by physical forces left to themselves or
artificially applied by men ; whilst the second helps
us to distinguish miracles from the effects of evil
spirits. As the good angels never go about to
deceive men by their artifices, we do not want a
series of criteria to mark off their natural opera
tions from true miracles.

Before the application of these criteria, the
historical truth of the fact itself must first be tested.
Inquiry must be made as to " Who reports the
fact ? " " Could such a witness know the truth,

15 Cf. Sum. Theol. i. q. no. art. 3. et art. 4. and De Potentia, q. 6.
art. 3. art. 4. art. 5. In the last place he says distinctly : " Sicut
Angeli boni per gratiam aliquid possunt ultra naturalem virtutem,
ita Angeli mali minus possunt ex divina providentia eos repri-
mente, quam possint secundum naturalem virtutem. . . . Cum
operatic miraculosa sit quoddam divinum testimonium indicativum
divinae virtutis et veritatis ; si daemonibus quorum est tota voluntas
ad malum, aliqua potestas daretur faciendi miracula, Deus falsitatis
eorum testis existeret ; quod divinam bonitatem non decet."

16 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. no. art. 4. ad 3.

432 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

or is it likely that he was deceived ? " " Is the
veracity of the witness above suspicion ? " If the
answer to these three questions is favourable, we
are morally certain of the existence of the fact, as
reported by one or more immediate or mediate
witnesses, according to the ordinary rules of testi
mony.17 When this certainty has been reached, the
criteria of the miraculous character of the fact
come into application.

252. (i) Criteria by which we may judge whether
a well attested fact apparently miraculous, is or is
not to be assigned to hidden physical causes, either
left to themselves or applied by men.

(a) An effect, which of its very nature is out of
proportion to the efficacy of physical forces how
ever combined by human ingenuity, must be due
to a cause transcending physical nature and the will
of man. Such an effect would be the raising to life
again of a human body dead and buried and in a
state of decomposition.

(6) If an effect be within the competence of
physical and human causes under certain condi
tions, but not under the conditions present in this
particular well attested instance, such an effect
must be attributed to an agency above that of
nature and man. The sudden cure of leprosy or
blindness by a mere form of words would be such
an effect.

(c) As often as a well attested effect is produced
after physical means have been applied, which
according to the judgment of experts are not quite

17 See the First Principles of this series, c. vii.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 433

out of proportion to the production of the effect, yet
not likely to produce it, we are not sufficiently
warranted to put the effect down to a superhuman
cause. Of this sort are cures of certain nervous
diseases by such influences upon the imagination as
naturally cause considerable shocks to the system,
and might thus have remedied the disorder.

253. (2) Criteria by which miracles are distin
guished from wonders worked by evil spirits.

Note. — For the application of these criteria it is
supposed that those of the first series have been
applied, and that there is no longer any doubt about
the superhuman character of the effect.

(a) A well attested effect of such a nature that it
could not have been produced by any physical forces
however well arranged must be Divine. By certain
material unseen influences, guided by created spirits,
diseases may be cured; and even hidden things may
be revealed. But it seems inconceivable that any
such influence should bring back the soul of a dead
man to a body already in a state of decay.

(b) However marvellous and well attested an
effect may be, yet if by its very nature it tends to
discredit beliefs, which can be proved to rest upon
a Divine foundation, and to have been confirmed by
real prophecies and true miracles, it is certainly not
Divine, but attributable only to fallen spirits opposed
to God. Such were the effects produced through
the instrumentality of Simon Magus,18 of Elymas,19
of Apollonius of Tyana,20 and of various so-called

38 Acts viii. g. 19 Acts xiii. 8.

'20 Lactantius, Instit. Div. v. c. 3.
CC

434 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

idols.21 We have been warned beforehand that
' 'many false prophets shall arise and shall seduce
many,"*2 and that a time shall come "when that
wicked one shall be revealed . . . whose coming is
according to the working of Satan in all power arid
signs and lying wonders."23

(c) Superhuman effects which contain anything
manifestly unworthy of the Creator, cannot in
reason be put down to Divine influence. Therefore
St. Thomas, attributing certain magic arts of the
middle ages to superhuman influences, brings this
argument among others to show that evil spirits
are concerned in them. " To favour things which
are contrary to virtue is not the work of a good
spirit, but these arts favour such things ; for they
result in adultery, theft, murder, and other evil
deeds. . . . Therefore," &c.24

(d) If neither the nature of a superhuman effect,
nor the human person who is instrumental in pro
ducing it, nor the object for the attainment of which
it is produced, nor the circumstances under which
it occurs, show anything to excite reasonable sus
picion of demoniac influence, the effect must be
considered as a Divine work. A fortiori must it be

81 See St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, Bk. XXII. cc 9, 10. Cf. also
Euseb. Eccks. Hist. iv. c. 3, a passage quoted from the Christian
apologist, Quadratus. Cf. the excellent work, System der gottlichen
Thaten des Christenthums, by Professor Dr. F. X. Dieringer.

22 St. Matt. xxiv. n. 23 2 Thess. ii. 8, 9.

24 " Praestare enim patrocinium aliquibus quae sunt contraria
virtuti non est alicujus intellectus bene dispositi. Hoc autem fit ex
hujusmodi artibus; fiunt enim plerumque adulteria, furta, homicidia,
et alia hujusmodi maleficia procurantur. . . . Non est ergo," etc.
(St. Thomas, Contra Gent. iii. c. 106.)

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 435

considered such, if with increasing inquiry, made
with a humble and sincere desire to know the truth,
evidences from all sides concur to prove that God
alone can be the author of the wonder in question.25

Objections against the knowableness of miracles,
as distinguished from the possibility of them, may
be reduced to the two following, the first of which
is Hume's celebrated argument as restated by Mill,
the second has frequently been brought forward by
various unbelievers.

254. (i) Mill, repeating Hume's argument,26
reasons thus : " The evidence of miracles consists
of testimony. The ground of our reliance on tes
timony is our experience, that certain conditions
being supposed, testimony is generally veracious.
But the same experience tells us that even under the
best conditions testimony is frequently either inten
tionally or unintentionally false. When therefore
the fact to which testimony is produced is one,
the happening of which would be more at variance
with experience than the falsehood of testimony,
we ought not to believe it. And this rule all prudent
persons observe in the conduct of life. Those who
do not are sure to suffer for their credulity.

" Now a miracle (the argument goes on) is in the
highest possible degree contradictory to experience ;

25 <i Non pertinet ad providentiam Dei, non permittere falsa
signa quae ad probationem et profectum electorum prosunt ; sed
pertinet ad providentiam Dei, dare auxilium ac modum quo possint
dijudicari et cognosci, quia non est divince bonitatis et sapientiae
ut permittat hominem tentari ultra id quod potest." (Cf. Suarez, De
Mysteriis vite Christi, d. 31, sect. 2.)

26 Essays on Religion, pp. 219, seq.

436 THE ACTION OF GOD UPON THIS WORLD.

for if it were not contradictory to experience, it
would not be a miracle. The very reason for its
being regarded as a miracle is, that it is a breach
of the law of nature, that is, of an otherwise in
variable and inviolable uniformity in the succession
of natural events. There is therefore the very
strongest reason for disbelieving it that experience
can give for disbelieving anything. But the men
dacity or error of witnesses, even though numerous
and of fair character, is quite within the bounds of
common experience. That supposition, therefore,
ought to be preferred."

Answer. This sort of reasoning manifestly begs
the question. It is said that it is an invariable
experience that miracles never occur; therefore
they never occur. But that is just the question,
whether the experience against miracles is really
invariable ? According to most trustworthy sources
of historical knowledge there never has been such
an invariable experience. Nor is this unbroken
uniformity demonstrable a priori by any argument
available to show that God cannot work miracles.
We have proved that He can. Therefore the asser
tion of invariable uniformity is not borne out either
by testimony or theory.

Nor can the interruption of the uniformity of the
course of nature in comparatively few cases, and
those settled from eternity by infinite Wisdom,
reasonably be called a breach of law. As well call
every limitation included in the tenor of a law a
breach of the same.

Then it is said that witnesses are never free

POSSIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE. 437

from the suspicion of mendacity. Foolish and un
reasonable suspicion, granted. But can we reasonably
suspect all witnesses, however numerous and however
fair their character may be, even when they attest
their experiences on oath, as is done in the processes
of beatifications and canonizations in the Catholic
Church ?

255. The second objection may be thus stated
in its general form : " Even the best attested facts
alleged as miraculous may be due to some hidden
physical causes of which we do not know ; for who
can know all the forces of nature ? "

Answer. Of course we cannot be certain that
the event is miraculous, before reasonable inquiry
has been made, what has been done in the case,
and what has not been done. But such an inquiry
may surely show that no physical forces, competent
to that effect, have been applied, though they may
exist in nature. For instance, a man who suffers
from a disease, say a malignant tumour, pronounced
fatal by several good physicians, is cured on a
sudden and perfectly by addressing a short prayer
to God through the intercession of a Saint. It is
absolutely certain that his cure is a Divine effect.
If he will not be satisfied about this, he might as
well doubt whether his thirst to-day is quenched
by the liquid that he drinks to-day.

Thus not only the natural Providence of God,
in which every monotheist believes, but also His
supernatural Providence, the great consolation and
strength of the Christian during life and at the hour
of death, stands perfectly in conformity with reason.

APPENDIX I.

ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION.

WHEN treating of physical predetermination,1 we
remarked that we wTere by no means prepared to
admit that St. Thomas is rightly interpreted by
those who find it laid down in his works, and we
now submit our reasons for taking him to sanction
the Molinists rather than the so-called Thomist
teaching. Our object in doing so is to satisfy those
of our readers who are specially interested in the
views of the great Doctor. In order to prove our
point we have only to refer to his doctrine on the
way in which God moves the human will, on the
nature of moral freedom, on the origin of free voli
tions and on the Divine foresight of these volitions.
A. And first, as regards the Divine motion by
which human wills are influenced, the Angelic
Doctor discusses this subject under the heading,
" Utrum voluntas moveatur a Deo solo sicut ab
exteriori principio."5

1 Natural Theology, p. 371.

2 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. 2ae. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3tn. " Deus movet
voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum
voluntatis, quod est bonum ; et sine hac universal! motione homo
non potest aliquid velle ; sed homo per rationem determinat se ad
volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum.
Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid
determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per
gratiam."

44o APPENDIX I.

There he teaches that the human will is moved
from without, and that the external principle by
which it is moved, is no other than God, and this
for two reasons : first, because He is the Creator of
the rational soul ; and secondly, because He is the
universal good.

Against this doctrine he puts the following
objection : " God does not cause anything but what
is good, according to Gen. i. 31, ' God saw all the
things that He had made, and they were very good.'
Therefore, if the human will were moved only by
God, it never would be moved to anything bad ; and
yet, as St. Augustine says, ' it is the will that sins
and it is the will that acts rightly.' '

In answer to this difficulty St. Thomas says :
" God moves the will of man as universal mover to
the universal object of the will, which is good taken
in general ; and without this universal motion man
cannot will anything ; but man determines himself
under application of his reason to the volition of
this or that thing, which is really or apparently
good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some
to a determinate particular volition of something
good. This is the case with those whom He moves
by His grace." Comparing these clear words of
Aquinas with the expositions of those who defend
physical predetermination, we are struck by a con
siderable difference.

On the one hand St. Thomas teaches that God
commonly does not cause the acts of the human will
except in so far as they involve a craving for some
thing good. The determination, which particular

ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION. 441

good shall be chosen to satisfy that craving, is,
according to him, not due to God but to man, who
by a free consent to a particular practical judgment
of his reason, moves his will, now to this, now to
that object.

Those on the contrary who maintain physical
predetermination, tell us that the motions of the
human will towards precisely those particular goods
which we choose, are predetermined by God, and
therefore come about infallibly. Again, St. Thomas
teaches indeed that God sometimes premoves men to
some particular good, but the holy Doctor does not
specify how this is done. He leaves it therefore
open to us to explain that motion, as we have
explained it, in solving the Thomistic difficulty
drawn from the nature of efficacious grace. (Cf.

P- 379-)

B. If we now turn to the idea of freedom as
explained by St. Thomas, we find him again opposed
to the predeterminists.

Contra Gentes, iii. c. 112. — -St. Thomas is ex
plaining the different relations of rational and
irrational creatures to Divine Providence. God,
he says, governs rational creatures for their own
sake, the irrational for the sake of the rational.
His first reason for this doctrine is the existence
of freedom of will in the rational, and the absence
of it in the irrational world. In what then consists
that freedom ? These are his own words : " Free
is that being which can rule its own action ; for
free is he who is the cause of himself; whereas
that which by a sort of necessity is driven to action,

APPENDIX I.

is in a state incompatible with freedom."3 As regards
this passage, we know very well that the adherents
of physical predetermination say explicitly that the
predetermined creature really rules its own action
under God, and that the predetermining motion of
God by no means necessitates the creature to a
certain action, but only draws it to the same
infallibly. Let all this pass, however difficult it
may be to understand. But we beg leave to ask
one question : In what sense does St. Thomas say
that the free being is the cause of himself? We
all know that he does not mean to imply that man,
on account of his freedom of will, must have in
himself the principle of his existence. Nor can his
saying be explained in this sense, that the free
rational creature causes its own action independently
of God ; for he teaches expressly that God operates
in all operations of His creatures. Is it then his
meaning that the free creature causes its action
in dependence upon God ? No, because thus under
stood, he would say nothing of the free creature
that would be at all peculiar to a free creature as
such. All creatures depend upon the Creator in
their actions. There remains, then, only this in
terpretation, that the free creature, whilst dependent
upon God for action, depends proximately upon
itself alone as regards its determination to this or
that action. This interpretation thoroughly agrees
with another saying of the Angelic Doctor : " It is

3 " Quod dominium sui actus habet, liberum est in agendo ; liber
enim est qui sui causa est ; quod autem quadam necessitate ab alic
agitur ad operandum, servituti subjectum est."

ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION. 443

peculiar to the rational nature that it tends to an
end in such a way as to move and lead itself there
unto, whilst an irrational creature must tend to it
as moved and led by another."4 Who this other
is, St. Thomas says clearly immediately before, in
the words : " The whole of irrational nature stands
to God in the relation of an instrument to its
principal cause."5 The inference to be drawn from
this is, manifestly, that rational creatures, acting as
rational creatures, that is to say, using their freedom of
will, are not set in action by God as instruments
by their principal causes. On the contrary, he
represents them as principal causes of their own
self-determination, on the supposition that they
actually enjoy the use of freedom.

C. If we now ask the Angelic Doctor to explain
himself more fully, and name the agency that carries
the free-will to one alternative rather than another,
he answers quite frankly that it is none other than
the free-will itself. The passage to which we refer is
Sent. ii. d. 39, q. i. art. i. in corp. St. Thomas teaches
there that the human will, through man's own fault,
may fall into sin. He adds that in the will we must
distinguish between the faculty and the act. " The
will as a faculty," he says, " is not from ourselves,
but from God, and therefore cannot be sin in us,
but the act of that faculty may be sin, because it is

4 " Proprium est naturae rationalis, ut tendat in finem, quasi
se agens vel ducens ad fmem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab
alio acta vel ducta." (Sum. Theol. la. aae. q. i. a. 2. in corp.)

5 " Tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instru-
mentum ad agens principale." (Ibid.)

444 APPENDIX I.

from us."6 He wishes, however, to make us under
stand that the act of which he here speaks is not the
actual use of freedom as such (this no doubt is also
from God), but the actual use of freedom inasmuch
as it means the actual preference of one alternative
before another, when the creature is actually free to choose
either. To leave not a shadow of doubt regarding
this his real meaning, he adds expressly, "That the
will embraces this or that determinate particular
action, is not owing to any agency other than the
will itself."7

It would seem that this passage of St. Thomas is
not only implicitly but explicitly opposed to physical
predetermination. For the predeterminists maintain
that each particular determination of the free-will
is predetermined by God, and that the knowledge
God has of the infallible future existence of the
free acts of men is involved in the knowledge of the
decree by which He has settled the exercise of
His predetermining influence upon human wills.

D. In the latter part of this statement we find
another contradiction between so-called Thomism
and St. Thomas. Aquinas teaches that the reason
why God knows future free actions is this, that they
in themselves are present to Divine intuition, not only
in their causes. " Further, events considered in their
individual future existence, can only be known by
God, to whom they are present even then, when in

6 " Voluntas potentiae, cum a nobis non sit, sed a Deo, in nobis
non potest esse peccatum, sed actus ejus qui a nobis est."

7 " Quod determinate exeat in hunc actum vel in ilium, non est
ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate."

ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION. 445

the course of things they are still future, inasmuch
as His eternal intuition extends itself by one act
over the whole course of time."8 Of course this
must in the first place be true of those future events
which do not follow necessarily from their causes ;
consequently, of free actions. These actions are
in the most proper sense of the word contingent
effects, and therefore it is certain that, according
to St. Thomas, future free actions of creatures are
known by God directly, not in the decrees by
which they are caused.

Nay, he goes so far as to exclude the possibility
of the latter knowledge, when he says : " A con
tingent event may be considered inasmuch as it has
pre-existence in its cause ; and thus it is considered
as something both future and not determined as yet
to one definite issue (because a cause which acts
not necessarily may turn to this or to that of two
alternatives opposite to each other) ; and under this
aspect a contingent event cannot be known for
certain by any knowledge whatsoever." £

Then the Angelic Doctor goes on to say that
God knows nevertheless future contingent events,
because not only their causes, but their future par-

8 " In se ipsis quidem futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo,
cui etiam sunt praesentia, dura in cursu rerum sunt futura, in
quantum ejus aeternus intuitus simul fertur supra totum temporis
cursum." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 86. art. 4. in corp.)

9 " Potest considerari contingens ut est in sua causa; et sic
consideratur ut futurum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum
ad unum (quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita) ; et sic con
tingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni." (St. Thomas,
Sum. Theol. la. q. 14 art. 13. in corp.)

446 APPENDIX I.

ticular existences are open to His eternal intuition.
The reader will remember that this doctrine coincides
with the teaching of the Suarezian Molinists given
by us in Book II., who advocate the scientia media,
which is nothing else than an immediate intuition
of the conditionally future existence of free actions.
St. Thomas certainly does not seem to hold that the
future free actions of rational creatures are known
by God in His predetermining decrees, as in the
real and infallibly operating causes of those actions.

E. Among all the passages which Thomists love
to quote from St. Thomas in favour of predeter
mining premotion, there is none which really proves
physical predetermination to be his doctrine, although
there are many which prove premotion in general,
and even in particular, inasmuch as it can be con
ceived without physical predetermining influence.
We are the last persons to deny that this sort of
premotion, which we have explained and approved
(p. 374, § 218), was before the mind of St. Thomas,
when he compared the operation of God in created
agencies to the motion by which an artist applies
his instrument to cut something.10 The truths really
contained in this simile may be stated thus :

i. As the natural aptitude of an instrument for
cutting is without effect unless it is applied by the
artist to some material, so the natural faculties
existing in creatures to produce changes in other
creatures are of no avail, unless God by His Provi
dence brings them mediately or immediately into

10 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. la. q. 105. art. 5. in corp. et ad 3;
De Potentia, q. 3. art. 7. in corp. § " Sciendum namque," et ad 7.

ST. THOMAS AND PREMOTION . 447

relation with matter to act upon. What is, for
instance, the best orator without an audience, the
best master without pupils ?

2. As the artist can freely drop the instrument,
and thus put a stop to its cutting, so God by His
absolute power could, save for His free decree to
act otherwise, efface any creature from the order of
existing things, and thus abolish its activity. He
can also make creatures cease to act without sub
tracting their preservation, simply by not willing
that they shall be in a state fit for certain actions.
Thus, for instance, He destroyed the. influence of
Elymas by striking him on a sudden with blindness.11

3. As the action of the instrument is directed
by the artist's intellect and will to the end that he
intends, so every action of creatures is turned by
Divine Providence into a means to the last end of
all creation, the external manifestation of God's
perfections.

We should have good hope of harmony between
Molinists and Thomists, if Molinists would bring
their true doctrine regarding premotion more ex
plicitly to the front, and if Thomists would dis
tinguish carefully between premotion to free action
in general, and premotion to this or that particular
free election ; and again between the Divine know
ledge of a particular future free action, as possible
to the will under a certain condition, and the Divine
knowledge of the same action, as infallibly to. come
about under that condition. It is true, in order
that a free volition under a given condition may be

11 Acts xiii. ii.

448 APPENDIX I.

really and adequately possible to us, God must have
decreed from eternity to concur with us by granting
us the actual use of freedom. But the decree to
grant this actual use is not a decree to influence the
free-will in such a way that by the physical nature of
the said influence our free choice in one direction
is predetermined. On the contrary, according to
reason and to St. Thomas's teaching, it is a decree,
physically thus to influence the free-will (naturally
or supernaturally) that in virtue of its actual physical
state it must exercise its freedom, that is to say, must
accept, or omit to accept, any object proposed by
the understanding as eligible.

SPINOZA'S ETHICS.

449

APPENDIX II.

EXAMINATION OF PROPOSITIONS I. — VI. IN SPINOZA'S
ETHICS.

THE pantheistic system of Spinoza, embodied in
his Ethics, is worked out with so much simulation
of mathematical exactness, that to some authors,
particularly to the German philosopher, Frederick
H. Jacobi, it appeared to be theoretically irrefutable.
We have already argued the absurdity of the two
fundamental dogmas of Spinoza's monism.1 More
over, we have set forth the ambiguity of two of his
most important definitions, and pointed out the
paralogism introduced by their use in the very first
step of his reasoning.2 This, however, we could
not do without referring to the connection between
the first six propositions of the Ethics. In order
now to enable our reader to see this connection,
and to judge for himself as to the safety of the
road cut by Spinoza to his famous Proposition VI.,
" One substance cannot be produced by another
substance," we will examine thoroughly into the
first six propositions of his Ethics.

Let us begin by singling out of the eight defini
tions and seven axioms with which the Ethics open,
those which form the groundwork of the proposi
tions we are concerned about. They are Definitions

1 Natural Theology, Th. X. pp. 112, seq.
2 Loc. cit. Bk. I. c. v. sect. 6, pp. 200, seq.

DD

450 APPENDIX II.

III., IV., V., and Axioms I., IV., V. Our comment
on these fundamental principles will show that all
of them are more or less ambiguous, and may
therefore be applied in a true or in a false sense.

As regards Definitions III. and V. in particular,
we shall sum up here what we have said on them at
greater length in Bk. I. c. v. sect. 6.

Definition III. " By substance I mean that
which is in itself and is conceived by itself."
(Per substantiam intclligo id quod in se est, et per se
concipitur .)

Comment. This definition may signify either
(i) A substance is a natural whole, a complete indi
vidual being, in opposition to parts, properties, or
modifications of such a being ; or (2) a substance is
a self-existing being.

In the first sense the definition is true, in the
second arbitrary and false. (§ 79.)

Definition IV. " By attribute I understand that
which the understanding apprehends in substance
as constituting its essence." (Per attribidum intelligo
id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejus
essentiam constituent.)

Comment. The definition does not cover all
attributes, but only the attributes of God, the one
self-existing Being. Of course the Divine attributes
are identical with the simple Divine essence. Each
of them may therefore be said to constitute that
essence, although self-existence is said to do so with
most propriety.3 Of the attributes of creatures we
cannot say this. Some of them complete one another
8 Cf. Bk. II. c. vii.

SPINOZA'S ETHICS. 451

to constitute an essence (e.g., animality and ration
ality in man) ; others are conceived as flowing from
the essence of a being (e.g., understanding and free
will) ; others again are accidental modifications added
to substance (e.g., learning in man).

We have then to choose between two alterna
tives. Either we must pronounce Spinoza's defini
tion of " substance " to be taken in the second,
false sense explained above, or we must reject his
definition of attribute as altogether inadequate.

Definition V. " By mode I mean the affections of
a substance, or that which is in something else, by
which also it is apprehended." (Per modum intelligo
substantice affectiones, sive id quod in olio est, per quod
etiam concipitur.)

Comment. This definition allows of three inter
pretations : (i) A mode is that which gives to any
thing its specific character (e.g., the principle of life
to a dog). (2) A mode is a property accompanying a
being, so to speak, by its acts (e.g., understanding,
moral freedom). (3) A mode is an accidental modi
fication (e.g., skill).

Only in its second or third interpretation does
Spinoza's definition of "mode" harmonize sufficiently
with common parlance ; perfectly in the third alone.

And now as to the three axioms :

Axiom I. is thus worded: "All that is, is either
in itself or in something else." (Omnia, qua sunt, vel
in se, vel in alio sunt.)

Comment. According to the different meanings
that may be attached to the phrase, " in itself," this
axiom signifies either, (i) everything is either a

452 APPENDIX II.

subject or a determination of a subject, which
determination may be substantial or accidental
(a substantial or accidental form) ; or (2) every
thing is either self-existent or inherent in self-exist
ence.

In the first sense the axiom is true, in the
second intrinsically contradictory, because in self-
existence there can be no inherent determinations
really distinct from it. (Th. VIII. and Th. XXII.)

Axiom IV. " Knowledge of an effect depends
on knowledge of a cause, and involves the same."
(Effectus cognitio a cognitione causes dependet, et eandem
involvit.)

Comment. This means either (i) an effect as an
effect cannot be known without the conception of a
cause ; or (2) a thing which is an effect cannot be
known, unless it be conceived together with its
cause.

In the first sense the axiom expresses a self-
evident truism ; in the second it is manifestly false.
A child knows his home, his parents and relations,
his toys, &c., before he in any way reflects upon the
causes of these things. And accurate self-intro
spection will convince any one that his first concep
tion of things is an apprehension of their existence
and of some of their attributes (extension, colour,
&c.), involving no notion of cause.

Axiom V. "Things that have nothing in common
one with another cannot be understood through one
another, or the conception of one does not involve
the conception of the other." (Qua nihil commune
cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi

SPINOZA'S ETHICS. 453

non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conccpium non
involvit.)

Comment. This axiom may be explained in two
ways : (i) Things really diverse cannot be explained
by means of one another, unless under some aspect
they are conceivable by a common idea. (2) Things
really diverse can under no aspect be conceived by a
common idea, because they have really nothing in
common.

The first sense is true, the second false, involv
ing, as it does, the absurd position of nominalism,
that there are no universal ideas based upon the
objective similarity of diverse essences.

Now let us see how Spinoza proves his first six
propositions by the help of the ambiguous principles
just explained. We give a translation both of his
propositions and of his demonstrations, omitting
nothing ; and add our respective comments to each.

Proposition I. " Substance is prior in nature to
its affections." (Substantia prior est natura suis
affectibus.)

Demonstration. " This is comprised in Definitions
III. and IV."

Comment. We have already fully commented on
this first step of Spinoza's reasonings. (Bk. I. c. v.
sect. 6.) Therefore it will suffice to remark here
shortly that Proposition I. is true, if you take
Definition III. in the first, and Definition V. in
the second or third sense explained above. In other
words, if you suppose that substance signifies any
natural whole, and mode either a natural property or
an accidental modification of such a whole, Propo-

454

APPENDIX II.

sition I. cannot be denied. If you, howexer, take
Definition III. in the second and false sense to
mean a self-existing being, and Definition V. in
any of the three meanings compatible with its
ambiguity, Spinoza's Proposition I. means that "a
self-existent being is prior in nature either to its
specific determination or to its natural properties,
or to its accidental modifications," an assertion
which involves the absurdity that self-existence is a
changeable subject. (Cf. Th. XXII.) In Spinoza's
system there is no room for Proposition I. but in its
second false sense, as will appear from the following :

Proposition II. " Two substances having dif
ferent attributes have nothing in common with one
another." (Duce siibstanticz diver set attributa habentes,
nihil inter se commune habent.)

Demonstration. "This too appears from Defini
tion III.; for each must be comprised in itself and
conceived by itself; or, the conception of the one
does not involve the conception of the other."

Comment. If to signify any being complete in itself
as a natural whole Definition III. is taken in its first
(true) meaning, Proposition II. is false, because
diverse natural wholes, of however different attri
butes, may nevertheless, under one or other aspect,
resemble one another, and on account of this simi
larity have the same attribute in common, inasmuch
as its import is realized in each of them. Thus,
for instance, a man and his dog have the same
attribute, " animality," in common. Of either of
them I say, with perfect truth, " This substance is
an animal." And I say also rightly, " The substance

SPINOZA'S ETHICS.

455

which is really identical with the animal dog is other
than that which is really identical with the animal
man." If, however, Spinoza's Definition III. is
taken in its second (false) meaning, so as to make
substance identical with self -existence, there is no
raison d'etre for Proposition II. ; because self-exist
ence can gnly be one substance. (Th. VII.)

Proposition III. " Of things that have nothing
in common, one cannot be the cause of another."
(Qua res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una
alterius causa esse non potest.)

Demonstration. " If the things have nothing in
common, neither can they (by Axiom V.) be under
stood one from the other, and so (by Axiom IV.)
they cannot be causes of one another : q.e.d."

Comment. If the phrase, " to have something in
common," is applied in a sense quite usual, so as to
mean, "to have the same predicate," Proposition
III. is based on a false supposition, because there
are no things which would not have at least the
predicate "being" in common.

If, however, the phrase, "to have nothing in
common," shall mean "to exist as diverse realities,"
Proposition III. is false, and the proof given by
Spinoza does not really support it, unless each of
the two ambiguous Axioms V. and IV. be taken in
its second false meaning, pointed out above. Indeed,
Spinoza's conclusion would only follow if it be
supposed that Axiom V., "Things that have nothing
in common one with another cannot be understood
through one another," is true if you take it to mean,
" Diverse things under no aspect can be conceived

456 APPENDIX II.

by a common idea; " and that the truth enunciated
by Axiom IV., " Knowledge of an effect depends on
knowledge of a cause, and involves the same," is no
other but this manifest falsehood, " The idea of an
effect, however the latter may be viewed, involves
necessarily the idea of its cause."

Proposition IV. " Two or more different things
are distinguished from each other either by diversity
of the attributes of substances, or by diversity in
the affections of these same substances." (Ducz aut
plnres res distinctce vel inter se distingmmtur ex diver-
sitate attributorum substantiarum, vel ex diversitate
carundem affectionum.)

Demonstration. " All that is, is either in itself or
in something else (by Axiom I.), that is to say,
there is nothing out of or beyond the understanding
except substances and their affections (by Defini
tions III. and V.). There is consequently nothing
out of the understanding by which individual things
can be distinguished from each other except sub
stances, or — and this comes to the same thing —
their attributes and affections (by Definition IV.)"

Comment. Different things are in the first place
distinguished from one another by their different
substantial being, and secondarily by their attributes
and affections. In commenting upon Definition IV.
we have given reasons to show that there is a
difference between the substantial being of created
things, or what we may call their physical essence,
and the attributes of that essence. Moreover, while
the essential attribute remains the same, the affec
tions of an individual thing may vary indefinitely.

SPINOZA'S ETHICS. 457

The same man of whom I have to predicate con
stantly moral responsibility may attach his heart
now to money, now to pleasure, now to virtue, &c.

It appears then that Proposition IV. is alto
gether false, and based upon a false application of
the inadequate Definition IV. In order to be in
harmony with truth, Proposition IV. must be thus
worded : " Two or more different things are dis
tinguished from each other by their different undi
vided substantial being; from this primary difference
there follows a difference in their attributes, and in
their affections, or accidental modifications, if they
are capable of any such." The restriction, " if
they," &c., is added with reference to the Divine
substance, which is immutable.

Proposition V. "In the order of existence there
cannot be two or more substances' of the same
nature or attribute." (In rerum natura non possunt
dari duce aut plures substanticz ejusdem natures sive
attributi.)

Demonstration. " Did several distinct substances
exist, they would be distinguished from each other
either by diversity of attributes or by diversity of
affections [modes] (as appears by the proposition
immediately preceding) ; if by diversity of attri
butes only, it were then conceded that there is but
one substance of the same attribute ; if by diversity
of affections, then inasmuch as substance is prior
in nature to its affections (by Proposition I.), if
we set aside its affections, and consider the sub
stance in itself, which is to consider it truly (by
Definitions III. and V.), the substance in that case

APPENDIX II.

could not be conceived as distinct from anything
else; so that, as stated in the preceding proposition,
there cannot be several substances, but one sub
stance only."

Comment. First of all, Spinoza appeals in vain
to his Proposition IV. as a firm basis of that under
consideration ; for we have shown above that
Proposition IV. is false, and based upon false
reasoning.

In development of his proof of the present
proposition, Spinoza adds another piece of false
information by telling us that, setting aside affec
tions of substances, and considering them " in
themselves, or truly," there is no longer any distinc
tion of substances. This false statement he bases
upon Definition III. and Definition V. Yet it does
not follow from these definitions, unless we take
Definition III. in its second, false sense, so as to
define substance to be self -existence.

We see then that Proposition V., which has
been sometimes termed the Argumentum Achilleum
of Spinoza, deserves that name in that it is really
vulnerable, like Achilles, if only you strike at the
vulnerable spot.

The truth underlying Proposition V. amounts to
this, that two different substances cannot have the
same physical attribute in common. But nobody
wishes to signify this, when he says that two sub
stantial beings, say Peter and Paul, have the attri
bute " rationality " in common. The meaning is
that, as regards the import of this attribute, they
resemble each other perfectly, and that there is

SPINOZA'S ETHICS.

459

consequently in their different physical substantiality
a real foundation for a logical identity of attribute.

Proposition VI. " One substance cannot be pro
duced by another substance." (Una substantia non
potest prodnci ab alia substantia.)

Demonstration. " In the preceding proposition
we have seen that there cannot in the order of
existence be two substances of the same attribute,
or that have anything in common (by Proposition
II.) ; and so (by Proposition III.) one cannot be
the cause of, or be produced by another : q.e.d."

To the demonstration Spinoza adds by way of
corollary, " Substance cannot be produced by any
thing else." And in order to make this corollary,
which on the hypothesis that Proposition VI. was
really proved, is evident enough, still more plau
sible, he supports it by the reductio ad absurdmn in
this manner : " If substance could be produced by
something else, the knowledge of substance would
have to depend on a knowledge of its cause (by
Axiom IV.), in which case it would not be sub
stance (by Definition III.)."

Comment. As appears clearly from the demon
stration of Proposition VI., it rests entirely on
Proposition V., Proposition II., and Proposition
III., all of them ambiguous, and only applicable
to support Proposition VI., if they are taken in a
sense manifestly false, and sophistically supposed by
Spinoza as really proved.

For the demonstration of this Proposition VI.
to hold, we must assume that (a) there cannot be
several substances of the same logical attribute,

460 APPENDIX II,

grounded on their physical similarity (false sense of
Proposition V.) ; (b) two substances having physically
different attributes, have nothing logically in common,
based upon real physical similarity (false sense of Pro
position II.) ; (c) things that have nothing physically
in common (or that are, considered in their physical
existence, not one thing, but many things), cannot be
cause and effect (false sense of Proposition III.).

Only, I say, by assuming all these false interpre
tations of ambiguously worded propositions, can
any connection be made out between the premisses
and the conclusion of the demonstration by which
Spinoza proves Proposition VI. Consequently this
proposition, which is the whole foundation of his
pantheistic monism, must be pronounced to be a
miserable sophism.

The same verdict must be given on the accessory
proof contained in the corollary. A simple appeal
to Axiom IV. and Definition III., so Spinoza
thinks, is enough to show that " substance cannot
be produced by anything else." Indeed, if you
interpret Axiom IV. to mean that an effect under no
aspect is conceivable without the conception im
plying the conception of its cause ; and if you take
Definition III. to imply that " substance " is
synonymous with " self-existence," the conclusion
in due course runs that no effect can be a substance,
and that consequently there is only One substance
effecting changes in itself. But such a process of
reasoning, taken for what it is really worth, evinces
no more than that from two absurd premisses there
follows as usual an equally absurd conclusion.

IMMEDIATE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD. 461

APPENDIX III.

IMMEDIATE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD IN THE
PATRISTIC WRITINGS.

SEVERAL distinguished scholars of our own century
have been of opinion that in the writings of the
early defenders of the Christian faith, particularly
in those of St. Justin, Clement of Alexandria,
Tertullian, and St. Augustine, passages were found
which showed that their authors, in opposition to
scholasticism, believed in an immediate natural
knowledge of God. Thorough information on this
subject is given by Kleutgen, Philosophic Scholastique
(translated from the German), nn. 427 — 489. He
shows that the meaning of the sayings alleged in
no way disagrees with the common teaching of the
schoolmen.

The passages to which our opponents appeal,
may aptly be divided into two classes, inasmuch
as in some of them the knowledge of God is spoken
of as belonging to human nature, whilst in others man
is said to know truth in God, the First, Unchangeable
Truth.

Careful examination shows, however, that the
first class of passages do not imply any belief in
an innate idea of God, or any direct intuition of
Him in His relation to finite beings. They are
only designed to express strongly that human

462 APPENDIX III.

reason, connaturally developed and applied, cannot
fail to arrive at the knowledge of the Creator.

As regards the other statements, which affirm
that we know truth in God, their real import is
that the natural light of our reason, by which we
perceive truth, is in its existence and activity a sort
of faint copy of God, the self-existing Infinite Truth,
and caused by Him. We say in common parlance
that we see things of this world in the light of the
sun. By this phrase we imply indeed a dependence
of our actual vision of things round about us upon
the influence of the sun. Yet we do not imply
a gazing at the sun as the reason why we are able to
see things. In a similar way, St. Augustine says in
answer to the question, Where we see the truth of
our affirmations ? that we see it neither in ourselves
nor in other men, but in God, the Unchangeable
Truth.1 By this assertion he impresses upon us
the dependence of our ability for discerning truth
upon Divine creation and concurrence ; but he can
in no way be said to advocate an immediate con
sciousness of God, as is well shown by Kleutgen,
loc. cit. n. 472, seq.

1 Confess. Lib. XII. c. 25.

THE IDEA OF INDETERMINATE BEING. 463

APPENDIX IV.

ST. THOMAS AND THE IDEA OF INDETERMINATE
BEING.

A DISTINGUISHED student of Rosmini's philosophy
called some years ago our attention to these words
of St. Thomas : " Anima semper intelligit se et
Deum indeterminate."1 He found in them a sup
port of Rosmini's hypothesis that we are born
with a dim perception of God as being. (Cf. p. 14.)
Assuredly an interpretation like this would upset
the whole of St. Thomas's psychology as contained
in his commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima, and
in Sum. Theol. i. qq. 75 — 89.

P>ut what does St. Thomas mean by those
words? Considering. the whole context in which
they occur, and comparing it with the doctrine of
Aquinas on the Intellectus agens, especially with the
remarkable assertion, "Intellects agens est agens
tantum et nulla modo patiens,"2 and with the more
explicit teaching laid down in ii. Sent. dist. 17.
q. 2. a. i. § " Et ideo remotis omnibus prcedictis
erroribus," we have arrived at the following inter
pretation, which the reader may kindly consider
and examine : In virtue of its spiritual nature and
of the spontaneous activity of the intellectus agens

1 In i. Sent. dist. 3. q. 4. a. 5.
2 Sum. Theol. la. aa. q. 50. a. 5. ad 2.

464 APPENDIX IV.

flowing from it, the soul possesses habitually all
needful capacity for being awakened to self-con
sciousness and for ascending by degrees to the
knowledge of its Creator. So far forth we may say,
then, that the soul always knows its own existence
and God indeterminately ; that is to say, such is the
natural sympathy between the organic faculty called
imagination, and the spiritual faculty called intellectus
agens, that immediately upon due determination of
the imaginative faculty, the soul will arrive in the
first place at the intellectual perception of material
things ; concomitantly, in the second place, at self-
consciousness, inasmuch as it knows its own know
ing; and finally, in virtue of its natural tendency
to investigate the causes of things perceived, by
degrees it will arrive at the knowledge of the First
Cause, or God.3

8 Cf. St. Thomas, Qq. Disp. De Veritate, q. x. a. 8. et Sum. Thtol.
q. 88. a. i. et a. 3.

THE UNITY AND INFINITY OF GOD 465

APPENDIX V.

THE LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UNITY
AND INFINITY OF GOD.

MANY authors of Latin text-books of Philosophy
agree with us in proving the Unity of God from
His Self-existence. Yet for the most part they
treat of the Infinity of God before having proved
His Unity, and then in proving the Unity they avail
themselves not only of our argument drawn from
Self-existence, but appeal also to the premised
doctrine on the Infinity. We prefer the order
followed by St. Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles,
and by Suarez in his Disputationes Metaphysics. In
both of these works the Unity is treated of before
the Infinity.1

To our mind this order alone is in strict harmony
with Logic on the supposition that we reason upon
merely natural grounds. Of course, even before
proving that there can be but One undivided self-
existent essence, we are able to show that all con
tingent reality must be based upon the order of being
denoted by the term self-existence, abstracting alto
gether from the question, whether in that order
there is only one being possible or several separately
existing beings. Yet this alone does not suffice for

1 Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gent. i. c. 42. et c. 43,,; Suarez, Metaph.
clisp. 29. sect. 2. et disp. 30. sect. 2.

EE

4r,6 APPENDIX V.

the proof that there is an Infinite Being. The
existence of such a being implies the existence of
One undivided essence of so high a perfection that
there is no perfection, either real or conceivable,
but has in that One essence, in that One undivided
being, some kind of equivalent. How can we make
sure that such an essence exists, unless we prove
first that Self-existence is by its very nature not
only One metaphysical, but also One physical essence ?
As long as you leave it in the dark, whether or not
there is an intrinsic contradiction in the supposition
of many self-existences, you cannot possibly be
certain that there is a being comprising in its own
essence the source of all reality conceivable. Indeed,
on the hypothesis of the internal possibility of several
self-existent beings, none of them would be the
source of all reality, because none would possess
the actual perfection of the rest, formally or emi
nently ; consequently none of them would be really
infinite. We must therefore first lay open the
intrinsic absurdity contained in the assertion of
several self-existent beings, before we can prove
the Infinity of God by evident natural reasons.

ON THE OPTIMISM OF ST. THOMAS. 467

APPENDIX VI.

ON THE OPTIMISM OF ST. THOMAS.

IN Bk. I. Th. XV. we laid down the tenet that
Creation is not only good, but even very good, nay,
in a certain sense, best, inasmuch as in all its
departments there is a perfect adaptation of means
to such ends as are absolutely intended by the
Creator.

Let us in this place test briefly the reasons
which have led three distinguished monotheistic
philosophers, Leibnitz, Malebranche, and Rosmini,
to maintain that our world is not only the best of
worlds, in the sense just explained, but the very
best world possible.

(A) Leibnitz argues thus : " If among all possible
worlds there were not one which is best, God would
not have created any of them. . . . There is an
infinity of possible worlds, and of these God must
have chosen the best, because He does nothing but
in agreement with His supreme Reason."1

Answer. We agree with the assumption that
there is an infinity of possible worlds, that is to
say, an indefinite number of possible systems of

1 " S'il n'y avait pas le meilleur (optimum) parmi tous les
mondes possibles, Dieu n'en avait produit aucun . . . il y a une
infinite de mondes possibles, dont il faut que Dieu ait choisi le
meilleur, puisqu'il ne fait rien sans agir suivant la supreme Raison."
( Jpp. Edit. Erdmann, p. 506.)

468 APPENDIX VI.

finite things, or, as we are accustomed to say, of
possible universes. But from this it in no way
follows that God must have chosen the very best
of them for creation. In fact, as no universe is
rightly called possible, unless it can be produced
by Omnipotence under the guidance of Infinite
Wisdom, it follows from the assumption of an
infinity of possible worlds that there are in the
Divine Mind worlds without number, each of them
good enough for creation. Consequently there is
neither any possible world which, when created,
would not be relatively the best, nor is there any
which ought to be called the very best of all. If
there were any w^orld really possible which would
not be relatively best, infinite Wisdom would fall
short of its absolute aims. On the other hand, if
there were any world absolutely best, Infinite Power,
i.e., power not exhaustible, would be exhausted by
its creation.

(B) Malebranche's reason for exaggerated opti
mism is equally weak. He thought that any world
not the very best possible was incompatible with
the end of creation, inasmuch as this end is the
external glory of God, or, what comes to the same
thing, the manifestation of His goodness, and the
making that goodness to be acknowledged by
rational creatures in the highest degree possible.
Besides, it seemed to him that infinitely perfect
Wisdom necessarily produces a work so perfect as
that none can be more perfect.2

3 Cf. Recherche de la Verite, Lib. IV. c. i. ; Traltc de la Nature et de
la Grace, 2, 51.

ON THE OPTIMISM OF ST. THOMAS. 469

Answer. Although God owes it to His own per
fection to aim at the manifestation of His goodness
in His works, and thus seek what is commonly
called His external glory, yet we should be wrong
in asserting that He must seek that glory in the
highest degree possible. To say so is to put
bounds to God's supreme freedom, and to ignore
His omnipotence, which cannot be limited to any
degree of created perfection. Malebranche seems
to have overlooked the fact that an adequate mani
festation of God's power and wisdom is intrinsically
impossible ; whilst for an inadequate showing forth
of both of them there suffices the creation and
perfect adaptation to ends of any system into which
rational creatures enter.

(C) Rosmini considered this world to be the
only one in harmony with the goodness of God,
inasmuch as in it the greatest good was produced
by the smallest means.3

Answer. This assertion seems to extol the wisdom
of God, while really it depreciates it. Must not
Infinite Wisdom be capable of arranging systems
of creatures for the manifestation of God's good
ness in endless many ways ? Of course we do not
mean to say that there is an actually infinite number
of possible worlds, but we contend that the multitude
of possible worlds transcends any given number. Out
of such an endless multitude, which cannot be

3 "Alia dimanda: perche (Iddio) voile creare questo mondo,
anziche un altro, dee respondersi : perche questo mondo era degno
della somma bonta come quello che col minimo mezzo produceva U
mazzimo bene, e percio fu il solo possibile," (Teodicea, n. 651.)

47°

APPENDIX VI.

gathered together in the form of a number, God
chooses freely a particular universe. Yet this
choice is not exercised by successive comparison
of the terms at choice. Such a comparison, as
Rosmini says rightly, would be impossible. Rather,
the Divine choice is made upon a comprehensive
view of the Divine Essence, involving a clear insight
into all possibilities of finite essences and their
combinations, inasmuch as the Divine Essence is
the prototype of an endless multitude of contingent
beings.4

The moderate optimism advocated by us against
Leibnitz, Malebranche, and Rosmini, is in perfect
harmony with the doctrine of St. Thomas, as the
reader may see for himself by reading Sum. Theol.
q. 25. a. 5. and a. 6. Very clear is also the following

4 " Medium illud quo Deus cognoscit, scilicet essentia sua, est
infinitorum similitudo quae ipsum imitari possunt." (St. Thomas,
Qq. Disp. De Veritate, q. 2. a. 9.) Cf. the deep explanation given by
St. Thomas throughout the whole of Sum. Theol. la. q. 14. a. 12.:
" Utrum Deus possit cognoscere infinita." Upon many disputes
about this subject great light is thrown by the following saying of
St. Augustine : Quamvis infinitorum numerus mtllus sit numerus, non est
tamen incomprehensibilis ei cnjus scientice non est numerus — "Although
an infinite multitude cannot be gathered in any number, yet it is
not beyond the comprehension of Him whose knowledge is not
limited to things that can be summed up in numbers." (De Civitate
Dei, Lib. XII. c. 18.) Mark, however, the difference between
"infinite "or "indefinite multitude," and " actually infinite multi
tude of actually existing things." The former is incomprehensible
to us, but really comprehended by God ; the latter is intrinsically
contradictory, as may be seen, pp. 55 and 98, seq., where we deny
the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of things and events,
either having existed successively, or now existing simultaneously.
But whilst such a multitude is impossible, multitudes ever increasing
and never complete are not only possible but actual in the minds of
rational creatures, as St. Thomas, loc cit. rightly remarks.

ON THE OPTIMISM OF ST. THOMAS. 471

statement of his : " God necessarily wills His own
goodness, and therefore naturally intends its mani
festation by the production of creatures. Yet the
things actually created do not stand in such a
correspondence to His goodness, as though without
them the Divine goodness could not be manifested.
For as it is manifested by the things that are and
by the present order of the world, so it might be
manifested by other creatures and by another
arrangement of creatures. From this it follows
that, without contradicting His goodness, justice,
and wisdom, God could create other things than
those created."5 No less pronounced is this remark
of the Angel of the School : " Over and above the
things created, God can create things of quite
different qualities, new species, new genera of
creatures, in fine, other worlds ; and no Creation
can exhaust the power of the Creator."6

5 " Finis naturalis divinse voluntatis est ejus bonitas, quam non
velle non potest. Sed fini huic non commensurantur creaturae ita,
quod sine his divina bonitas manifestari non possit ; quod Deus
intendit ex creaturis. Sicut enim manifestatur divina bonitas per
has res qua? nunc sunt et per hunc rerum ordinem ; ita potest
manifestari per alias creaturas et alio modo ordinatas. Et ideo
divina voluntas, absque prasjudicio bonitatis, justitiae et sapientias,
potest se extendere in alia quam quae fecit." (Qq. Disp. De Potentia,
q. i. a. 5.)

6 " Super omnia quae Deus fecit, adhuc possit alia dissimilia
facere, et novas species et nova genera et alios mundos ; nee unquam
id quod factum est, facientis virtutem adaequare potest." (Qq. Disp.
De Veritate, q. xx. a. 4. § "In utraque.")

INDEX.

ACTION of God upon this world
344seqq. ; of creatures influenced
by God 355 seqq.

AGNOSTICISM opposed to the voice
of mankind 66 seqq. ; religious
consequences 76 seqq. ; moral
consequences 8 I seqq.

ANGER, how far predicable of
God 316.

ANIMAL progenitors not the cause
of the human soul 44, 131, 198
seqq. ; dumb animals intended
for man's use 390 seqq.

ANSELM'S (ST.) famous proof 24
seqq.; objected against by Gaunilo
26; answer of the Saint 27 ; criti
cism of the argument 27 seqq.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM, how to be
avoided IOI seqq. ; misrepre
sented by Spencer 106 seqq.

APPETITE, natural and elicited 290
seq.; sensitive and rational 291 ;
rational in God 291 seqq.

ARISTOTLE on the cognition of
immaterial things 17 ; on design
in nature 47 ; on eternal motion
209 seqq.

ATHEISM, theoretical and practical
76 ; dogmatic and sceptical ib.

ATTRIBUTES of God 85 seqq. ; fully
discussed 233 seqq.

AUGUSTINE (ST.) on the Beauty
of God 343 ; on the power of
His will 374 ; on man's know
ledge depending upon God 462 ;
on God's knowledge of an infinite
multitude 470.
HE*

BACON on God revealed in the
world 47.

BANNEZ'S view of premotion 281,
371 seqq.

BAYLE's false hypotheses on the
origin of religion 68 seqq.; on
conservation 352.

BEATITUDE of God 314 seqq.;
human intended by God 386
seqq.

BEAUTY described 339 seqq.; its
essence not sensible 340 ; God
supreme Beauty 341 seqq.

BEGINNING of the world possible
138 seqq.; of its chief processes
145 seqq.

BENEVOLENCE of God 306 seqq.

BEST, absolutely best cseature im
possible 124 seq. 467 seq.; this
world relatively best 125.

BII.LUART on the essence of God

330.

BOETHIUS on Eternity 244 ; on

Providence 382.
BONALD on the origin of belief in

God ii.
BONAVENTURE (ST.) on succession

in spirits 144.
BUFFON on wisdom manifested in

organisms 190.
BRUTES not the progenitors of man,

as man 44, 131, 198.

CAIRD on formative power 168.

CANONS for the proper use of
Divine names 101 seqq. ; ex
pressed in another form 234 seqq.

474

INDEX.

CARPENTER on design in plants 49 ;
on rudimentary organs 191 ; on
the nature of man's soul 200; on
natural laws 422.

CAUSALITY advocated for all con
tingent existence 33 seqq.; prin
ciple of violated by Materialists
39 seqq.; and by Pantheists 115
seqq.

CHANCE, strictly speaking, im
possible 54, 381 seqq.

CHANGE not denoted by Creation
I2O; nor by volition either 302 ;
absolutely impossible in God 238
seqq.

CICERO on design in nature 47 ; on
universality of religion 74.

CIRCUMSCRIPTIVE existence 251 ;
impossible in God 251 seqq.

CLARKE (R. F.) on immateriality
of thought 37 ; on objectivity of
universals 87.

CLASSIFICATION of creatures with
God impossible 96 seqq., 101
seqq.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA on
universality of religion 64.

CONCURRENCE OF GOD in the
actions of creatures 355 seqq.;
paraphrased by St. Thomas 356;
natural and supernatural 357
seq. ; mediate and immediate
358 seq.; moral and physical
359 ; not favouring moral evil
360 seqq.; immediate concur
rence fully explained 361 ; proved
365 seqq. ; objected against 369
seqq.; whether it involves physi
cal premotion 370 seqq. 439
seqq. See PREDETERMINATION.

CONIMRRICENSES on succession in
spirits 144.

CONSERVATION exercised by crea
tures 348 seqq. ; direct and indi
rect 350; of all creatures by God
350 seqq. ; misunderstood by
Bayle352; objected against 353.

CONTINGENCY of the world 117
seqq.

COUSIN (VICTOR) on Creation
136, 214.

CREATION defined and explained
109 seqq.; real 119 seqq.; ac
counted for 122 seqq. ; objections
against its conceivableness 216
seqq. ; removal of a difficulty from
the Infinity of God 137 ; possible
to God alone 127 seqq.; free 135,
295 seqq., 301 seqq, ; eternal
creation not necessary 138 seqq.;
objections against this statement
209 seqq. ; whether eternal crea
tion possible 141 seqq.

DARWIN (Charles) agnostic 182 ;
his objections to the arguments
for God's existence 182 seqq.

DARWINIANISM, how far com
patible with belief in creation
1 32 seqq.

DECREES OF GOD, free 296 ;
eternal and irrevocable 297
seqq. ; objected against 298 seqq.

DEFINITIVE existence in space 25 1 ;
not predicable of God 252.

DEPENDENCE OF CREATURES
UPON GOD for their origin 118
seqq.; for their preservation 348
seqq. ; for their action 355 seqq. ;
for their guidance 381 seqq.

DES CARTES'S ontological prooj
25 ; criticized 28 seq.

DESIGN-ARGUMENT 46 seqq.; ob
jected against 154 seq. 165 seqq.
182 seqq.

DIERINGER on miracles 434.

DISGUST, in what meaning attri
buted to God 317.

DISTINCTION in God without com
position 98.

DIVISION of Divine knowledge
285 seqq.

DURANDUS on Divine concurrence
368.

EFFECTS reduced to a First Cause
34 seqq.

EMOTIONS metaphorically attri
buted to God 315 seqq.

END, primary, of the whole of
creation 385 seqq.j secondary of

INDEX

475

rational creatures 386 seqq. ; of
irrational creatures 389 seqq.

" ESSE IN LOCO,'' what it means in
the language of St. Thomas 251.

ESSENCE ol creatures 325 ; physical
326; metaphysical 327; physical
of God 329; metaphysical of God
330 seqq. ; creatures composed of
essence and existence 95 ; God
not ib.

ETERNAL creation not demonstra
ble 138 seqq.; whether possible
141 seqq.; motion and evolution
impossible 146 seqq.; man des
tined for eternal happiness 387
seqq. ; eternal punishment com
patible with God's attributes 405
seqq.

ETERNITY explained 243 ; precli-
cable of God 244 ; Boethius'
definition 244 seq.; distinguished
from time and cevum 246 seq.;
objection 247 seqq.

EVIL existing no proof against
God's goodness 393 seqq.; three
kinds of evil 394 ; metaphysical
in any possible world 396 ; phy
sical intended as means 398 ;
moral hated by God 400 ; tole
rated without prejudice of any
Divine attribute 401 seqq.

EVOLUTION cannot account for the
origin of man as man 35 seqq.;
how far admissible 1 32 seqq. ; had
a beginning 146 seqq.

EXAMINATION of the basis of
Spinozism 449 seqq.

EXISTENCE considered in its actu
ality not multiplied 91 ; of God
not immediately known 12 seqq.;
not proved a priori 24 seqq.;
proved a posteriori 32 seqq. See
GOD.

FEAR not the cause of the univer
sality of religion 69 seqq.

FICHTE'S (J. G.) fundamental
dogmas about God 113 seqq.;
his idealistic basis 206.

FIDELITY a moral attribute of God
312 seqq.

FLINT on design in nature 198 seq.

FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD 265
seqq. ; objections aga4nst His
foreknowledge of our free actions
272 seqq. ; explanation of this
foreknowledge 279 seqq.

FRAUD not the cause of univer
sality of religion 69 seqq.

FREE-WILL in man 42 seqq. ; its
influence upon natural laws 266 ;
its agreement with Divine fort-
sight 272 seqq. ; with Divine
concurrence 375 seqq. ; 440 seqq. ;
free-will of God 135 seqq. ; 296
seqq.; objected against 301 seqq.

GAUNILO objecting to the argu
ment of St. Anselm 26 seq.

GERARD (J.) on Clodd's Story of
Creation 50.

GIOBERTI on immediate conscious
ness of God 13 seq.

GLORY OF GOD the end of the
world 386 seqq.

GOD'S existence differently upheld
by different philosophers 8 seqq.;
not immediately knowable 12
seqq. ; not demonstrable from the
idea of God 24 seqq. ; how to be
proved 30 seqq. ; argument from
First Cause 32 seqq. ; from design
46 seqq. ; moral 62 seqq. ; ob
jected against by Traditionalists
149 seqq. ; by Kant 152 seqq. ;
by Spencer 155 seqq. ; by Mill
159 seqq. ; by Lange 174 seqq. ;
by Mallock 177 seqq. ; by Dar
win 182 seqq. ; by Spinoza 200
seqq., 459 seq. ; by Fichte 205
seq. ; by Hegel 207 seq. ; by
Mansel (utilized by Spencer) 214
seqq. ; God's Unity 85 seqq. ;
Infinity 98 seqq ; relation to the
world for its origin 109 seqq. ;
immutability 238 seqq. ; eternity
243 seqq. ; immensity 249 seqq. ;
intellect and knowledge 256 seqq.
(See FOREKNOWLEDGE) ; will
and decrees 290 seqq. ; omnipo
tence 319 seqq. ; metaphysical
essence 325 seqq. (See ESSENCE,
TRANSCENDENTAL, TRUTH,

476

INDEX.

GOODNESS, BEAUTY) ; action

upon ihis world 344 seq.
GOODNESS explained 337 ; God

supreme Goodness 337 seq.
GOUDIN on Divine Concurrence

372 seqq.
GRAND-CLAUDE on physical and

metaphysical essence 326.

HAMILTON on belief in God 12.
HARPER on contemplation of God

342 seq.

HARTMANN'S Unconscious 208.
HEGEL'S fundamental dogmas

about God 113; basis of his

system 207 seq.
HELLWALD on universality of

religion 66.
"HE WHO is," the most proper

name of God 333 seq.
HOLINESS explained 304 seqq. ; of

God 306 seqq.
HUME'S difficulty against miracles

repeated by Mill 435 seqq.
HUXLEY on chance-theories 54 ;

on teleology in relation to the

mechanical views of nature 56

seq. ; on the bearing of science

upon theological difficulties 67 ;

on the possibility of creation 123.

IDEA, sense idea 37 ; intellectual
idea ib. ; the latter not accounted
for by organic impressions 38
seqq.

IGNORANCE of physical causes not
the foundation of persistent belief
in God 68 seqq. ; whether opposed
to the recognition of miracles
432 seqq., 437.

IMMENSITY of God 249 seqq.

IMMUTABILITY of God 238 seqq. ;
objected against 240 seqq. ; 301
seqq. ; of Divine decrees 296
seqq. ; objected against 298 seqq.

INFINITY, in what sense predi
cated of number and space 98
seqq. ; of God 100 seqq.

INFLUENCE of God upon the
origin of matter and mind 117
seqq. ; upon the preservation of

creatures 348 seqq. ; upon their
action 355 seqq. ; supernatural
influence through miracles 421
seqq. See CREATION, CONSER
VATION, CONCURRENCE, PRE
DETERMINATION, PROVIDENCE,
MIRACLES.

INSTRUMENT, whether possible in
creation 129 seq. ; in what sense
all actions of creatures are actions
of instruments 377, 446 seq.

INTELLECT, a spiritual faculty 38
seqq. ; Divine 256 seqq.

JACOBI (F. II.) on knowledge of
God II ; on Spinozism 449.

JANET on final causes 62.

JUSTICE of God 309 seq. ; com
patible with existing evil 402
seq. ; with eternal punishment
406 seqq.

KANT on belief in God 10 seq. ;
on the principle of causality 32 ;
on the impressiveness of the
design-argument 50 seqq. ; on the
strength of the proofs for God's
existence 152 seqq. ; on the be
ginning of the world 212.

KLEUTGEN on the ontological
argument 29 ; on immanent ac
tivity 302 ; on Patristic theology
in its relation to ontologism 461.

KNOWLEDGE falsely explained on
materialistic grounds 38 seqq. ;
also on idealistic 205 seqq. ; 224
seqq. ; Divine knowledge 256
seqq. See FOREKNOWLEDGE.

LAIIOUSSE on self-determination

302.
LANGE'S objection against design

in nature 174 seqq.
LEIBNITZ'S ontological proof 25 ;

criticized 28 seq. ; on design in

nature 47 seq. ; his optimism

467 seq.

LEPIDI on Ontologism 24.
LIKERATORE on Ontologism 24.
LIFE in living creatures 313 seq. ;

Divine 314 seqq.

INDEX.

477

LUBBOCK on irreligious tribes,
refuted 64 seqq.

MAHER on the nature of the soul
and free-will 37 ; on brutes 198.

MALEBRANCHK, ontologist 13 ;
optimist 468 seq.

MALLOCK on design in nature's
working, &c., 177 seqq.

M ANSEL on belief in God 12 ; on
contradictions in the idea of God
214 seqq.

MATTER cannot evolve a human
soul 38 seqq. ; depends for its
origin upon God 118; has been
created immediately 131 seqq. ;
not necessarily from eternity
138 seqq. ; did not move from
eternity 145 seqq., 209 seqq.

MERCY of God 308 seq. ; com
patible with eternal punishment
409 seqq.

METAPHORICAL language of God
suggestive of real truth 105 seqq. ;
unreasonably suspected of an
thropomorphism 318.

METAPHYSICAL simplicity of God
94 seqq. ; essence of God 325
seqq. ; evil 394, 396.

MAX MULLER on Deus, Theos,
Deva I.

MILL (J. H.) on creation by intel
ligence 48, 122 seq.; his in
ference from Conservation of
Energy 55 ; on unity in nature
89 ; against the proof of a First
Cause 159 seqq. ; against the
design-argument 165 seqq.

MIND, immaterial 38 seqq.; created
out of nothing 131.

MIRACLES according to the defi
nition of St. Thomas 412 seqq. ;
modern definition 41 7 seqq. ; divi
sion 419 ; objection against this
division 420 seq. ; possibility of
miracles 421 seqq. ; objections
against their possibility 424 seqq. ;
miracles knowable 427 seqq. ;
Criteria 432 seqq. ; objection of
Hume 435 seqq. ; another objec
tion 437.

MlVART on design in nature 49 ;
on nature's end 58 ; on breaks
of continuity in nature 59 ; on
Spencer's psychology 158 ; on
rudimentary organs 190 ; on the
difference between man and
brute 199.

MOLINA on supercom prehension
of free acts 282 ; his merit and
mistake 283 seq. ; his illustration
of Divine concurrence 376 seqq.

MOLINIST teaching on Divine
foresight 279 seqq. ; modified by
Suarez 283 seqq.; on Divine con
currence 355 seqq. ; on Divine
promotion 374 seqq. ; in agree
ment with St. Thomas 439 seqq.

MONISM, materialistic refuted 38
seqq. ; pantheistic 112 seqq. 200
seqq. 205 seqq. 449 seqq.

MORAL proof of God's existence
62 seqq. ; objected against by
Darwin 195 seq. ; attributes of
God 304 seqq.

MORALITY injured by agnosticism
81 seqq. ; by Pantheism 1 16 seq.

NEGATIVE- POSITIVE character of

our idea of God 19 ; 230 seqq.
NEWMAN (Cardinal) on implicit

and explicit reason 72 seq. ; on

the Divine life 315.
NEWTON on design in nature 48 ;

on the presence of God 253.

OMNIPOTENCE of God 319 seqq.;

objected against by Mill 170

seqq. ; other objections 322 seqq.
ONTOLOGICAL arguments discussed

24 seqq.

ONTOLOGISM refuted 12 seqq.
OPTIMISM, how far true 124 seq. ;

exaggerated 467 seqq. ; opinion

of St. Thomas 470 seq.
ORDER of the world originated by

intelligence 46 seq.
ORIGIN of the world 1 18 seqq. See

CREATION.

PAGET
191.

rudimentary organs

478

INDEX.

PALKY commented upon by Darwin
182 seqq.

PANTHEISM, modern in general
1 12 seqq. ; of Spinoza 200 seqq.
449 seqq. ; of Fichle 205 seqq. ;
of Hegel 207 seq.

PECCI (Card.) on predetermination
281 seq.

PERSONALITY of God proved 35
seqq. ; predicable without anthro
pomorphism 227 seqq.

PESCH (Ch.) on the notion of God
among heathens 90.

PESCH (T.) on succession in spirits
144 ; on the definition of miracles
417.

PESCHEL (Oskar) on universality
of religion 65.

PHYSICAL proof of God's existence
46 seqq. (see DESIGN); premotion
(see PREDETERMINATION and
PREMOTION.)

PLATO on design in nature 47.

PLUTARCH on universality of
religion 63.

POSSIBLE things why known by
God 264.

POWER of God 319 seqq.

PREDETERMINATION, physical pr.
how understood by Bannez and
his followers 281 ; how opposed
by Molina 282 ; by Suarezian
Molinists 283 seq.; reasons for
it 373 seq. ; these reasons not
cogent 374 seqq. ; reasons against
it 379 seq. ; doctrine of St.
Thomas 439 seqq.

PREMOTION, how far admissible
374 seqq. 446 seqq.

PROVIDENCE explained 381 seqq.;
proved 383 seqq. ; its relation to
evil 393 seqq.

RELATIVITY of knowledge inter
preted by Mansel 224 seqq.

REPENTANCE, in what sense pre
dicable of God 316 seq.

RiCKABY (John) on scepticism 33 ;
on idealism 206 ; on belief in
human testimony 432.

RosKOFF (Gustav) on universality

of religion 65.
ROSMINI on God apprehended as

being 14 ; on the perfection of

this world 469 seqq.
RUDIMENTARY organs, whether

opposed to design 187 seqq.
RULE (Martin) on the argument

of St. Anselm 29.

SANCTIFYING GRACE, why not a
miraculous effect 416 seq.

SCHEI.LING'S dogmas on the Ab
solute 113 seqq.

SCHOPENHAUER'S world-will 208.

SCIENTIA MEDIA explained 279
seqq. ; named and defined 289.

SCIENTIA SIMPLICIS INTELLI
GENTLY 288.

SCIENTIA VISIONIS 288.

SCOTUS on the essence of God
330.

SELF-CONCEIT impossible in God

293-

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS an imma
terial act 41 ; in God infinitely
perfect 263 seq. ; objection of
Spencer 270 seq.

SELF-DETERMINATION in general
302 seq. ; of God 303 seq. ;
of man, God concurring 364
seqq.

SELF-ESTEEM in God 294.

SELF-EXISTENCE proved 32 seqq.;
only one 85 seqq. ; objected
against by Spencer 155 seqq. ;
by Mill 159 seqq.

SELFISHNESS in God impossible

293-
SELF-LOVE infinite and necessary

in God 294.
SIEMENS (Sir William) on design

in nature 50.
SIMPLICITY distinguished from

unity 92 ; physical of God 93 ;

metaphysical 94 seqq.
SPACE, whether infinite 99 ; its

nature explained 250.
SPECIES (intelligible) of the Divine

Intellect 260 seqq.

INDEX.

479

SPENCER on the nature of intel
lectual ideas 39 ; on the impos
sibility to classify the Infinite
96 seqq. ; on anthropomorphism
1 06 seqq. ; on the impossibility to
conceive self-existence 155 seqq.;
on Hansel's reasonings 216; on
the impossibility of self-con
sciousness 270.

SPINOZA'S fundamental errors 113
seqq. ; his proof of one substance
200 seqq. ; his objections against
miracles 425 seqq. ; examination
of his first six propositions 449
seqq.

SPIRITS (Angels) whether they can
work miracles 429 seqq.

SPIRITUALITY of the human soul
35 seqq.

STOCKL on Ontologism 24 ; on
Anaxagoras 47 ; on Bacon 47.

STRAUSS against miracles 427.

SUAREZ on Divine foreknowledge
283 seqq. ; on immanent action
302 ; on miracles 435.

SUBSTANCE according to Spinoza
200 seqq. ; one self-existing 85
seqq. ; many contingent substances
possible 264; also actual 112
seqq.

SUFFERINGS, how explained by
Darwin 192 seq. ; objected
against Darwin 193 seq. ; their
relation to Providence 398 seq.

THEOLOGY etymologically ex
plained I ; natural defined 2 ;
dogmatic explained 2 seq. ; re
lation of the one to the other 3
seq. ; importance of natural 5
seq.

THOMAS AQUINAS (St.) on know
ledge of immaterial things 17 ;
on the eternity of universal ideas
23 ; on the argument of St.
Anselm 29 ; on the proof from
design 47 ; on the objectivity of
a universal nature 86 ; on com
munity of Divine and human
nature 87 ; on the oneness of
self-existence 91 ; on infinite

number 99 ; on infinite dimen
sions ib. ; on the import of
Divine names 104, 106, 237 ;
on the meaning of Creation 1 10,
ill ; why Creation possible to
God alone 128 ; what it is that
makes creatures loveable 137 ;
against Traditionalism 149 seq. ;
on intuition of God 226 ; on the
difference between time, cevum,
eternity 246 ; on the way in which
the soul is in the body 251 ; on
God's immensity 253, 255 ; on
the identity of Divine Thought
and Substance 259, 261 ; on
Divine foreknowledge 276 ; on
the connection between Divine
Intellect and Will 292 ; on im
manent action 302 ; on passions
as predicated of God 316; on
Divine power 321; on ' ' Essence "
329; on the name " He who is"
334 seq. ; on goodness 338 seq. ;
on beauty 340 ; on Divine con
servation 351, 353 seq. ; on
Divine concurrence 356, 439
seq. ; on free-will 441 seq. ; on
self-consciousness of Angels 366 ;
on Divine Providence 382 ; on
Hell-fire 409 ; on God's mercy as
shown in Hell 410 ; on miracles
413, 418, 420, 426, 4^1 ; on
magic arts 434 ; on indeter
minate knowledge of self and
God 463 seq. ; on optimism
470 seq.

THOMSON (Sir William) on Design
50.

TRADITIONALISTS on the know
ledge of God 1 1 ; against the
demonstrability 149 seqq.

TRANSCENDENTAL attributes of
God 335 seqq.

TRINITY compared as Dogma with
God's unity 86 seqq. ; with His
simplicity 98.

TRUTH, meaning and divisions
336 ; God supreme Truth 336
seq.

TYLOR on universality of religion
65-

INDEX.

UBAGHS, ontologist 14, iS seq.
~~NITY of God 85 seqq. ; how c
nected with Infinity 100, 465

UNIVERSALS misconceived by on-
tolop;ists 23 ; by Hegel 207.

UNIVERSE (The) depends upon
God for its origin 1 18 seqq. ; for
its preservation 348 seqq. ; for
the constancy of its energy 355
seqq. ; for its end 383 seqq.

VERACITY of God 310 seqq.
VOLTAIRE against miracles 427.

WALLACE (A. R.) on the nature
of the human soul 44 seq. ; on

the existence of a world of spirit
49-

WILL free in man 42 seqq. ; Divine
existing 290 seq. ; necessity and
freedom of the Divine 290 seqq.;
objected against 301 seqq. ;
decrees of the Divine irrevocable
297 seq. ; objected against 298
seqq. ; holiness of the Divine
304 seq. ; object of the Divine
in Creation 385 seqq.

WORLD not absolutely best 124,
467 seqq.; relatively best 125.

ZIGLIARA (Card.) on Ontologism
24 ; on the beginning of this
world 148 ; on freedom under
physical premotion 282.

ENGLISH MANUALS

OF

CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY.

(STONYHURST SERIES.)
EDITED BY

RICHARD F. CLARKE, S.J.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF

HIS HOLINESS THE POPE TO THE BISHOP OF SALFORD
ON THE STONYHURST PHILOSOPHY.

"You will easily understand, Venerable Brother, the pleasure
We felt in what you lately reported to Us about the College of
Stonyhurst in your diocese, namely, that by the efforts of the
superiors of this College, an excellent course of the exact sciences
has been successfully set on foot, by establishing professorships,
and by publishing in the vernacular for their students text-books
of Philosophy, following the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas.
On this work We earnestly congratulate the superiors and teachers
of the College, and by letter We wish affectionately to express Our
good-will towards them."

1. Logic. By RICHARD F. CLARKE, SJ., formerly

Fellow and Tutor of St. John's College, Oxford ; Classical
Examiner in the Royal University of Ireland. Price 55.

2. First Principles of Knowledge. By JOHN

RlCKABY, S.J., Professor of Logic and General Metaphy
sics at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst. 2nd Ed. Price 55.

3. Moral Philosophy. (Ethics and Natural Law.)

By JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J., M.A. Lond. ; Professor of
Ethics at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst. 2nd Ed. Price 53.

4. Natural Theology. By BERNARD BOEDDER, SJ.,

Professor of Natural Theology at St. Mary's Hall,
Stonyhurst. Price 6s. 6d.

5. Psychology. By MICHAEL MAHER, S.J., M.A. Lond.;

Professor of Mental Philosophy at Stonyhurst College.
Price 6s. 6d.

6. General Metaphysics. By JOHN RICKABY, SJ.

Price 55 __

In the Press.
A Manual of Political Economy. By C. S. DEVAS,

Esq., M.A., Examiner in Political Economy in the Royal
University of Ireland. Price 6s. 6d.

Some Opinions of the Press on the first three Vols.

LOGIC.

" We must congratulate the editor of the series of Catholic
Manuals of Philosophy on affording such a valuable contribution
to English Catholic literature. The easy style throughout, the
clearness of exposition, and the well-chosen examples, make the
book at once attractive to the general reader, and of inestimable
use to the special student. But the highest excellence of the work,
and the one which characterises the series conceived and edited by
the author, is sympathy with the intellectual atmosphere in which
we live, with its difficulties, with its strength, and with its weak
ness." — The Tablet, April 13, 1889.

"An excellent text-book of Aristotelian logic, interesting, vivid,
sometimes almost racy in its illustrations, while from first to last
it never, so far as we have noticed, diverges from Aristotelian
orthodoxy . ' ' — Guardian.

" Though Father Clarke mainly concerns himself with Formal
Logic, he occasionally, for the sake of edification, makes excur
sions into wider fields. Adopting the standpoint of ' moderate
realism,' he directs his chief attack against the limitation of the
Principle of Contradiction, the nominalist statement of the Principle
of Identity, and the theory of conception set forth by Mill. The
arguments usually employed in these time-honoured controversies
are marshalled with much vigour. . . . The uncontroversial portions
of the book are extremely clear, and the descriptions of the various
forms of syllogism as little dry as their subject-matter permits." —
Saturday Review, April 20, 1889.

" Father Clarke has most successfully accomplished his high
purpose, and makes the study of a comparatively dry subject
most interesting and attractive. The book cannot fail to be of
supreme advantage to all engaged in the teaching or acquiring of
sound philosophical principles." — Freeman's Journal, March 15, 1889.

" To converts from Protestantism educated in the English
Universities, and bewildered by the discrepancies created by the
perversions to which they were in early life accustomed, the exist
ence of such a text-book will be particularly useful. The task has
been executed with remarkable ability. It is not possible to make
the study of logic as easy as reading a novel, but the author has
the power of rendering the work of the serious learner comparatively
easy, and no conscientious reader of fair intelligence need shrink
from the mastery of this difficult branch with such aid as this book
affords." — Cork Examiner, March 8, 1889.

" In its general outline it follows the order of the Formal Logic
which is still required in the Oxford schools, and is familiar to
most people who are in any way interested in philosophy. The
author has had a wider aim in view than merely providing a manual
for Catholics ; he would appeal also to perplexed Protestants, and
to women who have shared the advantages of higher education." —
Church Quarterly, April, 1889.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE.

"The volume before us is a solid fundamental exposition of what
is known by modern logicians as ' Applied Logic,' or a treatise on
the ' Philosophy of Certitude.' It defends the objective reality of
human thought against the false systems of idealism."- — Ave Maria
Magazine, April, 1889.

"It is a hopeful sign of the times that a Catholic professor
should freely enter the lists of debate in opposition to acknowledged
masters of recent philosophy. The Jesuit Father is no respecter
of persons." — Journal of Education, April i, 1889.

" These Manuals are worthy of the widest circulation. They will
clear away many popular delusions, much confusion of thought and
language. They will help to strengthen many minds to strive fear
lessly and perseveringly in the search of truth." — Bombay Catholic
Examiner, April 19, 1889.

" It is a valuable treatise in every sense of the word. We have
read it with the greatest pleasure. The style carries on the reader,
and the several points are introduced with a truth and accuracy in
pleasing contrast to the lumbering sophistries of many who call
themselves philosophers and are not." — Catholic Times, April 5, 1889.

"The burden of Mr. Rickaby's utterance is that Idealism is
wrong and Realism is right; that Idealism is a mere blind, con
cealing a general scepticism as to the possibility of truth at all,
whereas Realism alone will explain the facts of knowledge, and
strengthen a man's conviction of the validity of his rational pro
cesses. — Church Quarterly.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

" Father Rickaby's Moral Philosophy, or Ethics and Natural Law
(Longmans) is the first of a series of ' Manuals of Catholic Philo
sophy.' The author is a member of the Society of Jesus, and his
work embodies the substance of a course of lectures delivered for
eight years in succession to the scholastics of that Society, at
St. Mary's, Stonyhurst. The arrangement is methodical, and the
style clear and condensed. Many of the sections are supplied with
lists of passages for reading, selected from such authors as Plato,
Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Paley, and Mr. Ruskin. The work
is a new and important departure, and deserves to be read by others
than those for whom it is primarily intended." — Scottish Review.

" The style of the book is bright and easy, and the English (as
we need not say) extremely good. . . . The manual will be welcome
on all sides as a sound, original, and fairly complete English treatise
on the groundwork of morality." — Dublin Review.

" The work, to the ordinary reader, is interesting enough to
absorb the attention ; to the student of Ethics it has a double value
—simplicity of style, as well as full knowledge of the subject and
its various branches. WTe are glad that the price of the book puts
it within reach of the great mass of the people." — Catholic Times,
October, 1888.

" As regards the style of the book, it is, as a rule, clear, terse,
and simple ; and there are many passages marked alike by sound
sense and by elevation of tone." — Journal of Education.

" Father Rickaby, with his Aristotelian and scholastic training,
is always definite and clear, distrustful of sentiment, with an answer
ready for every assailant." — Mind, No. 54.

"Father Rickaby's style of exposition will be found singularly
clear and fresh, and his power of elucidating the bearing of an
abstruse thought by some historical illustrations singularly happy.
It should be specified also as one of the features in the book, that
it keeps close on the track of Aristotle, and is careful to expound his
pregnant but perplexing epigrams." — The Month.

" The authority of the moral law is asserted admirably as a
binding Imperative, and not as a mere utterance of the autonomous
reason. And there are many true and valuable statements in most
parts of the book." — Church Quarterly, April, 1889.

"It is one of a series of ' Manuals of Catholic Philosophy ' in
course of issue, and embodies the substance of lectures delivered by
the author during eight successive years to the students of the
Jesuit Society at Stonyhurst. The book is marked with several of
the merits usually found in the educational writings of the Jesuits :
orderly method, lucid arrangement, clear, definite, and incisive
wording, competent familiarity with the literature of the subject,
both ancient and modern." — Church Times, May 3, 1889.

" These three volumes form a part of a series of works intended
to present in an easily accessible form the philosophy which
the Roman Church delights to honour. They are written by
three different members of the Society of Jesus, and though
remarkably similar in tone present some few differences of detail.
The third — that on Ethics — is rendered additionally interesting by
a list of authorities appended to each section. The style of the
three is popular and easily intelligible ; the principles are fully
illustrated by concrete examples." — Church Quarterly.

"In the two volumes named below (First Principles of Knowledge
and Logic), we have set forth in clear and vigorous English the
doctrine of knowledge and the principles of reasoning taught by
the learned and subtle Aquinas in the thirteenth century, but
adapted to the needs of students and controversialists of the
nineteenth century by teachers who, like St. Thomas himself, are
able to discuss doubts without doubting, to hold converse with
sceptics of every school, and still to hold to the faith. . . . To
those who would like to know exactly the form that philosophy
takes when she enters the service of ' The Church ' the volumes
may be commended." — Inquirer, Sept. 21, 1889.

.Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago.

USE

- J

BL 181 .86 1891 SMC
Boedder, Bernard,
Natural theology